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1 Introduction   
1.1 Introduction and motivation 
 
Public sector reform, which at the present moment dominates the less developed countries 
(LDCs), was introduced due to the low level of service provision and the excessive demand 
made on government budget. However, initially it did not bring about substantial improvement, 
mainly because the measurements taken lacked elements of privatisation (Nellis, 2003). 
Therefore, privatisation has been the major policy item in structural adjustment. Nevertheless, 
there is still debate about whether privatisation actually provides better socio-economic benefits 
(Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995). The World Bank and the IMF have encouraged many LDCs to 
pursue privatisation policies (Craig, 2000; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995; Cook, 1986), presuming 
that ownership changes will induce superior1 management controls (chapter 3), and hence 
greater productive and allocative efficiency (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988a). On the other hand, the 
UNDP (1998) and Kikeri et al. (1994) argue that the success of privatisation is likely to be 
influenced by a number of factors. These factors include competitiveness of the market, the 
macroeconomic conditions and policy frameworks; in other words the prevalent market and 
country conditions.  
 
So far, a great deal of accounting research linked to privatisation (both financial and managerial) 
has been conducted within developed countries (Ogden, 1993; Wright et al., 1993; Jones, 1992, 
1985; Espeland & Hirsch, 1990). Accounting researchers tend to look in particular at the effects 
of ownership change and the role of management accounting. So the debate about privatisation 
now also addresses issues such as post-privatisation enterprise performance (e.g. Uddin & 
Hopper, 2003; Weiss, 1995; Karatas, 1995) and its impact on societies (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 
1995; Fontaine & Geronimi, 1995), internal managerial problems and conflicts in privatised 
companies (Potts, 1995), and the creation of conglomerates through privatisation (e.g., Plumbe, 
1995). However, most development researchers have as yet not addressed the ‘internal realities’2 
of post-privatisation regimes and remain ambiguous about the results of privatisation. Cook & 
Kirkpatrick (1995, 1988), for example, are cynical about post-privatisation results, whereas the 
World Bank (1992) is positive about them in terms of increased investments, improvement in 
productivity, output growth and diversification. However, as stated by Uddin & Hopper (2003), 
evidence indicates that structural adjustment programmes, globalisation as well as the 
internationalisation of accounting practices may not necessarily improve the accountability and 
                                                           
1 Different authors have used various terms to represent superior MCS practices or techniques. These terms 
include: idealised, advanced, improved, effective, modern, new or Western MCS practices. They convey similar 
meaning and will be used interchangeably in the study. 
2 According to Wickramasinghe (1996), ‘internal realities’ refer to the practices of and the changes that Management 
Control Systems undergo within the boundaries of an organisation as a result of privatisation. In addition, internal 
realities apply to the performance of organisations after privatisation.  
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transparency of companies in LDCs3. Similarly, opinions are divided on whether privatisation 
actually improves the performance of enterprises within LDCs, facilitates development goals, 
distributes wealth fairly, and induces more effective controls, accountability and transparency. 
Therefore, considering the above-mentioned ambiguities regarding the outcomes of 
privatisation, prudence is in order when making quick generalisation about this issue.  
 
Considering the prevailing ambiguities and the fact that the success of privatisation is largely 
influenced by wider environmental factors, it is the task of the accounting researcher to shed 
light on reality by bringing forth practical evidence. Basically, it is unwise to assume that 
policies, which increase the role of the private sector, will automatically result in ‘efficient 
forms’4 of accounting (Uddin & Hopper, 2003). Uddin & Hopper emphasise that accounting is 
socially and politically determined, and cannot be left to markets, which is an important pre-
condition for market functioning. Accounting reform is therefore a crucial but so far neglected 
component of an effective development policy. As accounting researchers have become more 
concerned with internal organisational matters as well as their connections with socio-economic 
contexts (Hopwood & Miller, 1994; Hopper et al., 1987; Neimark & Tinker, 1986; Burchell et 
al., 1980), they are now capable of providing more realistic pictures of post-privatisation issues 
in the sphere of management control systems (MCS) in LDCs.  
 
The review of articles by Hopper et al. (2004b) shows that there is a growing research interest in 
MCS in LDCs. They explain that this interest could be attributed to various factors, including 
the growing exposure of LDCs to global capital markets and international competition as well as 
their adoption of structural adjustment programmes involving privatisation and new public 
sector management. Further, Hopper et al. argue that journals that are devoted to accounting and 
development (e.g. Research in Third World Accounting) have a propensity to contain normative 
articles rather than contextual studies of accounting and its relation to socio-political, cultural 
and economic aspects. They therefore conclude that accounting research conducted in 
developing countries has unjustly neglected the broader socio-economic factors, assuming that 
the transfer of Western accounting technologies is just as unproblematic and beneficial to the 
country adopting them as it has been to Western countries. Similarly, Perera (1989: cited in 
Hopper et al., 2004b) argues that in its current form MSC is inapplicable to LDCs largely 
because of the differences in their business environments, ownership structures, users of 
accounting information, and attitudes towards disclosure. There are some studies on Third 
World Accounting available by Brandt (1980) and Ramanathan (1985); but they have not 
provided any adequate theoretical frameworks or appealing empirical evidence. It can therefore 
                                                           
3 Uddin & Hopper (2003) base this conclusion on evidence from empirical studies conducted in the field of financial 
accounting, which covers similar privatisation and structural adjustment topics (e.g., Abu-Nassar & Rutherford, 1996; 
Perera, 1975) that made them arrive at this conclusion. 
4 According to Uddin & Hopper (2003) ‘efficient forms’ refer to the best practices of accounting advocated by accounting 
researchers and consultants, which are generally dealt with in the accounting books (e.g., ABC costing, throughput 
costing, continuous improvement, just in time, budgeting, effective forms of internal control systems, etc.). 
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be concluded that Third World accounting remains largely a much-neglected area of research 
(Wickramasinghe, 1996).  
 
For that reason, this study is aimed at obtaining knowledge about Third World accounting in an 
attempt to shed light on some of the prevailing ambiguities. Generally, the research addresses 
the relations among privatisation, MCS changes, and firm performance, within the wider socio-
economic and political context of the recently privatised manufacturing firms of Eritrea. 
Specifically, the issues covered include a description of MCS practices, an assessment of the 
post-privatisation changes in MCS practices, firm activities and performance. In addition, we 
present the influence of contextual factors on MCS practice changes and firm performance. Data 
of the pre- and post-privatisation periods are compared to enable us understand the changes 
taking place in the privatised firms.  
 
1.2  Background of Eritrean Manufacturing Firms 
 
What is the background of privatised firms in Eritrea? To obtain a better picture of this, we will 
begin with the historical background of the country’s industrialisation process. The history of 
Eritrea indicates that it has been a trading nation since the Italian colonial era. By the end of 
1945 there were more than 300 small, medium and large factories. By the 1970s, the number of 
factories was reduced to about 160 (Hailemariam, 2001). The Derg Regime of Ethiopia 
nationalised almost all enterprises and brought them under government control. It imposed strict 
price controls and introduced import restrictions. The Government of Eritrea (GOE) inherited 
these public enterprises at the time of liberation in 1991. The enterprises were operated with 
obsolete technologies and some were unable to produce high-quality goods or services. Due to 
the inadequate technological input, a lack of supplies and raw materials, and a poor and 
politicised management, the manufacturing and services industries performed at a mere 20-50 
percent of their capacity (GOE, 1998). Therefore, in order to kick-start and to spur the wheel of 
the economy, the GOE needed to create a policy to boost the long-term economic development 
of the country. 
 
Prior to the country’s independence, for almost thirty years there had been little or no 
developments in new production technologies and the business management and administration 
of public enterprises. As a result, the existing technological base of the economy’s productive 
sectors was antiquated, and the managerial technology in both the private and public sectors was 
woefully inadequate to permit an efficient utilisation of resources, or to achieve international 
competitiveness. To meet the country’s developmental challenges, the government has, since 
mid 1991, formulated and implemented policies and strategies that promote an outward-
oriented, private sector-led market economy. Consequently, the government has liberalised the 
major sectors of the economy, restructured government institutions, and streamlined the civil 
service. 




To pave the way to privatisation, the GOE has undertaken a number of measures. These 
measures have provided the managements of the public enterprises with some degree of 
autonomy, so that they can now make independent decisions about hiring, selling, and 
competing in the market. In early 1992 the GOE dissolved the Ethiopian Domestic Distribution 
Corporation (EDDC) and the so-called “cooperative” retail shops in order to introduce free 
market orientation. Privatisation was initiated in 1995. The government tried to coordinate the 
process of privatisation with its development agenda. The transfer of ownership took place by 
selecting those potential buyers who presented the most promising business plan to enhance the 
economic development of the country. However, the road towards privatisation has not been a 
smooth one, and implementation of the proposed business and investment plans was in fact 
challenged.  
 
According to the report on pilot investment climate assessment conducted by the World Bank 
(2002a), the Eritrean manufacturing sector is characterised as capital intensive with significantly 
lower capital productivity than many other Sub-Saharan African countries. Moreover, the report 
states that the sector suffers from scarcity of labour (especially skilled), which causes a rise in 
wages and production costs (see also World Bank, 2002b). This is why, among other reasons, 
firms have become less productive in Eritrea. Other problems include high bank interest rates on 
loans, difficult requirements for counteracting collateral and macroeconomic instability, which 
is reflected in higher inflation rates, and a lack of foreign exchange.  
  
1.3 The role of MCS in economic development 
 
MCS is an area that is central to the development of management practices that meet the needs 
of contemporary business organisations (Otley, 1994). MCS plays a vital role in development 
and has many benefits. There are many ways to define development. According to Todaro 
(1994), development is conceived as a multidimensional process involving major changes in 
social structures, popular attitudes and national institutions, as well as the acceleration of 
economic growth, the reduction in inequality, and the eradication of poverty. Studies indicate 
that MCS has come to play a vital role in organisations and societies (Burchell et al., 1980). 
Societies need development, such as economic growth and social progress (Meier, 1984). MCS 
enables organisations to be more efficient and effective (Falmholtz, 1983; Otley & Berry, 1980), 
to improve productivity (Enthoven, 1968), and to bring about socio-economic development 
(Bardhan, 1989; Nabli & Nugent, 1989: cited in Wickramasinghe, 1996). MCS plays an 
essential role in development (e.g., Ndzinge & Briston, 1999; Ghartey, 1985; Mirghani, 1982; 
Winjum, 1972; Enthoven, 1968; Seidler, 1967; Seiler, 1966) by assisting organisations in 
observing nation-wide accountabilities (Hodges & Wright, 1995). 
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If effectively used, MCS can stimulate the motivation of managers and employees to make an 
optimal use of the resources available (Anthony et al., 1984; Horngren, 1972). In LDCs, where 
the public sector is relatively large, MCS can be used to improve the problem of capacity 
utilisation (Adam et al., 1992). Eventually, the achievements in meeting budgeted targets, 
reducing public financing and improving economies of scales and profitability may stimulate 
development, provided that the socio-economic and political factors are unproblematic 
(Rothstein, 1976). In addition, MCS may enhance the motivation and productivity or ability of 
workers, capitalists and merchants (Nabli & Nugent, 1989). It can facilitate a more accountable 
management by providing benchmarks for monitoring the behaviour of industrial enterprises. 
Seiler (1966) has also indicated that MCS, combined with managerial ability and strong 
entrepreneurship, can help achieve development in Third World Countries. However, if the 
accounting profession is weak, as is the case in LDCs, development is hindered (Seiler, 1966). 
 
MCS studies can help organisations avoid price distortions by introducing modern costing 
systems (Ahmed, 1992) that improve pricing and stimulate the motivation to improve 
performance (Cooper, 1987). Moreover, accounting studies can identify problematic socio-
economic and political contexts and introduce alternative MCS by replacing the current 
practices that do not sufficiently improve organisational performance. According to Nabli & 
Nugent (1989), MCS can also be used in counteracting “institutional backwardness”5, which is a 
common phenomenon in many developing countries. This institutional backwardness has 
emerged as a result of the non-capitalist, traditional beliefs of the people in these countries 
(Hofstede, 1980) and dominates the organisational processes of enterprises, resulting in 
organisational inefficiency. In this context, the role of management accountants has become 
unparalleled. 
  
Within an enterprise, management accountants gather information by collecting, recording and 
analysing “a particular variety of facts about the world” (Irvine et al., 1979). They transform 
these facts into accounting information. The information produced tends to be regarded as 
factual, objective, independent of “social values or ideology” (Chua, 1986; Loft, 1986) and 
unconstrained by organisations and societies (Burchell et al., 1980). This notion has been 
embraced by management accounting researchers who draw from neo-classical economic 
theory. In particular, these researchers incorporate marginal economic analysis into management 
accounting decision models, assuming, for instance, that profit marks economic efficiency and 
                                                           
5 According to North (1991) institutions are defined as humanly devised constraints that structure political, 
economic and social interaction. They consist of both informal constraints (sanctions, taboos, customs, traditions, 
and codes of conduct), and formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights). Hofstede (1980) explains that 
societal norms have led to the development and maintenance of institutions (the family, education systems, 
politics, and legislation) and the way they are structured and function. Once these institutions have been 
established they reinforce the societal norms. In a relatively closed society, an institution is hardly subject to 
change, and the value system will influence new institutions in such a way that they become adapted to the 
existing societal norms. Hofstede concludes that these norms only rarely change by a direct adoption of outside 
values. Therefore, the institutions in LDCs are to a certain degree less perfect or suitable for the functioning of 
the market economy, which gives rise to institutional backwardness. 
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that an increase in the marginal productivity determines profitability (Ahmed, 1992; Tinker, 
1980). Such conceptions have led researchers to adopt various neo-classical economic theories, 
such as the Agency Theory (e.g. Baiman, 1990, 1982; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), the 
Transaction Cost Theory (e.g. Spicer & Ballew, 1983), and the Information Economics theory 
(Demski & Feltham, 1978).  
 
Researchers have been concerned with the role of accounting in economic development and 
related policies (e.g. Enthoven, 1973); see the case of the localised uniformity of accounting 
(Perera, 1989); and the effect of the international transfer of accounting skills (Needles, 1976; 
Seidler, 1967). They presume that organisations and societies are stable, passive, and 
unproblematic entities. From an ontological perspective they assume an objective world in 
which the managers are economically rational (Hopper et al., 1995; Chua, 1986; Tinker et al., 
1982) and where accounting is a technical activity providing them with information on the basis 
of which they can make economic decisions (Hopper et. al., 1995; Horngren, 1972) and 
formulate development plans. Moreover, development economists argue that accounting is a 
static concept, which is not subject to change as development proceeds (Scott, 1970). The 
principal methodology of their studies is positivistic and based on statistical analysis. Their 
work is rooted in a functionalist paradigm (cf. Hopper & Powell, 1985). Hence, Perera, 
Enthoven, Seidler and Needles have not theoretically or empirically explored the assumption 
that accounting may be a reflection of societies and their social systems.  
 
Hopper et al. (2004b) point out that, based on the above arguments, some papers reviewed 
earlier advocate a view that ‘Western MCS techniques’ are applicable in LDCs. The authors 
argue that the MCS practices in LDCs are neutral and unproblematic, and that ‘Western drugs’ 
can be applied to them. They assume that Anglo-Saxon accounting knowledge is fit to solve any 
accounting-related problem in LDCs. They also claim that LDCs form a homogeneous group, of 
which all members face the same accounting problems, which can be solved through 
international consensus. However, Hopper et al. argue that these assumptions are to some extent 
unrealistic and ambitious. For example, geography is one of the factors that determine the 
differences and distinctive characteristics of people’s behaviour, reflecting different social, 
political, and cultural peculiarities. A considerable number of research studies have also 
illustrated that even in the West the Anglo-Saxon accounting techniques should be questioned 
(see Hopper et al, 1987; Chua, 1986) since there are clear country-specific differences. Although 
the use of accounting theory and practice is actually being called into question in imperialist 
countries (Scapens, 1984), policy-makers and practitioners in LDCs have “imported” models 
without critically assessing them to verify whether they can be applied to the local conditions. 
So, researchers and practitioners are unaware of the problematic nature of the relationship 
between MCS and its socio-economic and political contexts. 
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As a consequence, many accounting studies in developing countries have failed to regard 
accounting as part of a wider socio-economic and political context. Wickramasinghe (1996) also 
observes that, despite the call for studies in accounting and development (e.g. Enthoven, 1973; 
Scott, 1970), accounting literature deals little with the “real” role of ‘accounting controls’6 in 
countries that are going through a process of development. So far, accounting research has not 
adequately exploited MCS practices in the contexts of LDCs. This is mainly due to the lack of 
awareness on the part of development researchers with respect to accounting and its relationship 
with the wider context. Unlike the expected contribution of accounting to development, some 
evidence suggests that the transfer of accounting has played an opposite role in LDCs by 
actually undermining development rather than stimulating it (cf. Chaderton & Taylor, 1993; 
Graves & Berry, 1989).  
 
The literature states that MCS practices have been imported from the West (Briston, 1978) 
through colonialism, powerful foreign investors and multinational businesses, foreign aid, and 
professional accountancy institutions (Hove, 1986). Some studies doubt the assumption that the 
transfer of accounting knowledge has not been functional, considering the differences in the 
contextual factors applying to LDCs (e.g. Hove, 1986). However, a serious misconception in 
both accounting and development studies is the notion that accounting is a neutral profession 
(Hines, 1988; Hopwood & Miller, 1994), which is not subject to constraints emanating from 
contextual factors (cf. Burchell et al., 1980). Therefore, it is essential to theorise accounting 
from a developmental perspective (Wickramasinghe, 1996) and to assess the MCS changes after 
the process of privatisation in LDCs.  
 
The emergence of naturalistic studies based on the organisational context has been a fruitful 
development that could resolve the problems with the contingency studies, and offer researchers 
a suitable framework for investigating accounting practices in LDCs. These studies have made it 
possible to study organisations meaningfully, considering them as active and proactive 
organisms. This shows that accounting researchers have shifted from rational to more social 
views; however, most of the organisations they have studied are Western. Although some of 
them have dealt with cases in LDCs (e.g. El-Ebaishi et al., 2003; Tinker, 1980), the researchers 
work with theories formulated in developed countries, such as the UK and the USA. Due to the 
above-mentioned economic, societal and political differences, such theories are not valid in the 
context of LDCs (Hulme & Tuner, 1991; Hewagama & Warnapala, 1989; Cardoso & Falletto, 
1979). In most of the cases, accounting researchers in the West are not at all familiar with the 
societal aspects in Third World countries, such as politics and culture. They are not acquainted 
with poverty or underprivileged groups, and have either consciously or unconsciously failed to 
address the development issues in Third World countries, where 75% of the world’s population 
                                                           
6 Wickramasinghe’s (1996) study states that controls constitute both planning and control within the totality of 
organisational processes. He argues that management accounting, in a broader sense, is about controls and these 
controls are normally known as accounting controls (pp. 13-14). 
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lives (Brandt, 1980). Therefore, conducting an MCS study in order to gain insight into the 
perspective of LDCs is imperative. 
 
1.4 Objectives of the study and research questions  
 
Studies have shown that the success of MCS is related to external factors, such as socio-
economic, historical, political and cultural ones (Hopwood, 1987; Neimark & Tinker, 1986; 
Burchell et al., 1980; Miller & O’Leary, 1990; Scapens & Roberts, 1993; Hoque & Hopper, 
1994, 1997; Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992; Broadbent, 1999). However, only few papers have 
examined MCS practices in their wider context (Wickramasinghe, 1996). These papers 
emphasise the effect of local social, cultural, and political factors upon accounting in LDCs and 
are based on the view that MCS in LDCs may operate differently from that in the West (e.g. 
Asechemie & Ikeri, 1999: cited in Hopper et al. (2004b). This thesis starts from a similar line of 
reasoning, which is that MCS practices in LDCs should be considered in relation to their wider 
context and be adapted to their new environment in order to be functional. The overall aim 
should be to contribute to filling this gap in accounting research by presenting empirical 
evidence that can be used in enhancing the knowledge of accounting in Third World Countries. 
The current literature on privatisation simply assumes that improved MCS practices and firm 
performance are the result of privatisation, but it fails to show how this process actually takes 
place during the transition period. This study intends to shed light on this process and the 
relations among privatisation, MCS change, and firm performance, while taking into account the 
influence of contextual factors. This is an area on which accounting researchers should focus in 
order to clear the existing ambiguities in neo-classical theories, former accounting research, and 
development studies. These ambiguities refer to issues such as: the role of MCS in development 
processes, expected changes in MCS after ownership changes [from the perspective of theory 
and practice], the role of government in the operation of private enterprises, post-privatisation 
firm performance, and the like.  
 
As we will point out in the following two chapters, evidence suggests that the success of 
privatisation is affected by MCS practices as well as by internal and external contextual factors. 
Therefore, the empirical evidence resulting from our case firms would enable us to understand 
what changes have taken place in MCS practices and whether or not case firms are able to 
improve their performance. In assessing the change processes during the transition period, we 
have compared MCS practices and the performance of the case firms by taking data of the pre- 
and post-privatisation periods. In our analysis, we have studied the individual MCS techniques 
to capture the broader picture of the evolving changes. In addition, we have employed various 
measurement tools to help us evaluate the changes in firm performance. These are described in 
chapter four. Further, an assessment of the impact of contextual [internal and external] factors 
has been conducted for each case-firm in our study. As regards internal factors we have mostly 
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drawn from contingency theory. External contextual factors have been taken from institutional 
theory.  
 
In order to gain more insight into the impact of environmental factors on MSC practices, firm 
activities and performance, our research includes the wider socio-economic and political context 
of Eritrea. This thesis views MCS in its broader form, and for this reason we have adopted a 
broader definition, which allows us to incorporate issues such as the motivation of management 
and employees, wider participation and empowerment of low-level employees as well as 
innovations in MCS practices, which have been left out in traditional MCS definitions. In this 
study we will focus on the relations among these issues and investigate the actual situation as it 
is in Eritrea. We observe that privatisation outcomes [mainly MCS changes and firm 
performance] that are documented by studies conducted in the West do not provide an adequate 
picture of the situation in LDCs. Therefore, by including LDCs-related issues this thesis aspires 
to contribute to the development of accounting theories to explain changes in ownership, the 
resulting MCS practices and firm performance, the impact of contextual factors, managerial 
behaviour and influence, and employees’ reactions to the changes in MCS practices (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). Thus, our findings should enable us to understand whether or not privatised 
firms have managed to utilise the improved MCS practices to achieve a better performance.  
 
In addition to the aim of contributing to the literature, this study also intends to be of purpose to 
Eritrean firms and firms in other LDCs. As presented above, Eritrea is in the process of 
privatising its public enterprises pursuant to its free market-oriented economic policy, as a result 
of which private ownership is regarded as the main factor that can bring economic development 
and growth. However, the role of MCS in economic development has not been recognised and 
no reform measures have been devised by policy makers with respect to MCS practices. 
Additionally, no research has so far been conducted that allows us to evaluate post-privatisation 
firm performance. This study tries to bring to light whether the firms studied make a proper use 
of MCS and whether they are faced with serious challenges. Therefore, suggestions and 
recommendations of the study may contribute to helping Eritrean firms identify their 
weaknesses in adopting MCS. Generally, privatised firms understand the role that MCS can play 
in strengthening their competitive position and enhancing their performance. Similarly, the 
bodies concerned [such as firm owners and government authorities] are expected to be aware of 
their responsibilities and to take the appropriate action. Privatised firms are expected to 
continuously enhance their utilisation of MCS practices in order to implement their business 
plans properly and improve their performance. At the same time however, government 
authorities should support the use of MCS to stimulate a healthy business climate in the country.  
 
This study attempts to provide knowledge about the changes in MCS practices and firm 
performance as a result of the privatisation processes in LDCs. The available literature dealing 
with this issue is scarce. Therefore, with the outcome of this study we hope to make a relevant 
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contribution to the body of knowledge. We believe that the issues raised and the information 
gathered by this study will benefit policy makers [such as the GOE, including the World Bank 
and IMF] in their future reforms. The reforms to be aimed at might be the creation of an 
environment suitable for privatisation. In addition, the policy makers mentioned should 
stimulate the relevant institutions that provide support to the private sector. Also, challenges of 
the case firms would be brought to the attention of government bodies so that they can take 
effective measures to solve them. In this way, the development policies as well as the ownership 
changes could be executed successfully. Further, other LDCs, which are also going through the 
process of privatisation, could use this study as a guideline. Finally, the framework of the study 
can be adapted to serve as a basis for similar studies to be conducted in other LDCs. 
 
Our study addresses the area that has been neglected by the current accounting research. It 
focuses on the unresolved issues concerning privatisation and its impact, MCS changes, firm 
performance, and the influence of contextual factors. To help find answers to the issues raised 
and to structure our approach, we pose the following general research question and its sub 
questions: 
 
General Research Question: How do internal and external factors affect the relations among 
privatisation, MCS change and firm performance?  
 
Research Sub questions: the above-stated general research question can be presented in its 
detailed form as follows: 
1. Which MCS practices were used prior to privatisation and what changes have taken 
place after the change in ownership?  
2. How do the internal and external contextual factors influence [changes in] post-
privatisation MCS practices and firm activities and performance?  
3. What is the level of post-privatisation firm performance when compared to that during 
the public ownership era?  
 
These research questions were further refined after conducting a pilot study, in which we 
focussed on the Eritrean business environment. We conducted this pilot study so we could make 
a preliminary analysis in order to modify, if necessary, our research design on the basis of our 
findings. Moreover, it gave us the opportunity to select relevant issues related to the area itself 
[such as, gaining insight into MCS practices and their changes, identification of the contextual 
factors, selection of case firms, etc] rather than having to depend entirely on the literature 






Chapter 1: Introduction 
  
 11 
1.5 Organisation of the book 
 
The book contains eight chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduction. In this chapter we 
motivate our arguments for choosing our research topic. The issues dealt with include the need 
for MCS research in LDCs aimed at the current practices and the changes taking place in 
privatised enterprises. Key topics are privatisation, MCS practices, firm performance and the 
influence of contextual [internal and external] factors. Chapter 1 also presents a brief summary 
of the nature and findings of former studies, an outline of their shortcomings and our vision 
regarding the need for research in Third World Countries. Finally, in this chapter the research 
objectives and the research questions are presented. 
 
Chapters 2 and 3 cover the literature review. Issues dealt with in Chapter 2 include the 
theoretical background, the arguments for the decision of privatisation, the objectives of 
privatisation and its necessity for LDCs, the lessons to be learnt from previous privatisation 
studies and the limitations of privatisation theories. In these chapters we also deal with the 
influence of external contextual factors on MCS practices and the role of governments in the 
attainment of development objectives.  
 
Chapter 3 presents the theoretical discussions about MCS practices and their subsequent post 
privatisation changes. It also addresses the influence of internal change factors and presents 
empirical findings on firm performance by prior studies conducted mostly in LDCs. Finally, the 
conceptual framework is presented, which has served as the basis for our data collection and 
case analysis. 
 
Chapter 4 deals with the research methodology. In this study we have applied the case study 
method, which allows a qualitative research approach. Chapter 4 gives a description of the data 
collection and analysis methods used. The greater part of the data is collected by means of in-
depth interviews and various secondary sources. The data analysis method used is mainly 
qualitative. Chapter 4 also explains the relations among the components of the conceptual 
model. Further, an outline is given of the measurement methods to assess firm performance. 
 
Chapters 5-7 focus on the empirical results of case studies conducted in three Eritrean 
manufacturing firms: Asmara Sweater & Garment Factory (IMAM), Asmara Wine & Liquor 
Factory (AWL), and Red Sea Bottlers Share Company (RIBS). This detailed investigation 
shows how MCS practices are actually evolving, what changes are taking place, and the 
influence of contextual factors on the process of change, firm operations and performance. It 
also explains the challenges that case firms are facing.  
 
Chapter 8 concludes the study by presenting conclusions and implications of the study. It 
discusses cross-case analysis and combines the findings of the former three chapters. This 
chapter highlights the matters that could help us understand the communalities and peculiarities 
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presented in the cases. The findings are discussed in connection with theoretical expectations 
and findings of former studies. Moreover, implications of the study are assessed and reflections 
are made on the adaptation of our conceptual framework. Finally, we present limitations of the 
study and indicate areas for further research.  
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2 Privatisation - its theoretical arguments, objectives, 
outcomes and limitations in relation to the influence of 
contextual factors 
2.1  Introduction 
 
In chapter one, we have introduced privatisation. This chapter will deal with this concept in 
more detail. As already pointed out, advocates share the view that privatisation will stimulate 
the improvement of MCS and firm performance. In theory, privatisation is considered to lead to 
an efficient form of market capitalism, abolishing all failures associated with the public mode of 
production. However, issues such as the way in which MCS changes actually take place and 
whether privatisation results meet the expectations, have until now not been fully addressed in 
the context of LDCs. On the basis of the evidence presented in this chapter we argue, in fact, 
that the privatisation process may not necessarily produce the results as claimed by development 
economists and aid agencies. By means of case studies conducted in Eritrea, we have tried to 
map out the current ambiguities existing in accounting and development research. This chapter 
will discuss the objectives and the outcome of the process of privatisation, and the way in which 
external factors can actually shape MCS in LDCs. 
 
This chapter focuses on the theoretical arguments for privatisation and its objectives (sections 
2.2 and 2.3). In addition, the reasons of LDC governments to introduce privatisation 
programmes will be explained. Next, on the basis of evidence gathered from other studies, the 
results of several privatisation processes are presented (section 2.4). This evidence shows that 
the outcomes of these processes do not live up to the general expectations. In order to analyse 
the results of privatisation as described in the case studies, we will give some examples of 
criticism with respect to the theoretical justification of privatisation (subsection 2.4.2). Section 
2.5 then describes the general issues that affect the success of privatised firms as well as the 
relevant contextual factors that cause MSC change in LDCs. These factors will be further 
discussed in Chapter 3, which will elaborate on MCS changes within firms. Our emphasis 
particularly lies on MCS changes and firm performance. In addition, we will consider the role of 
the government. The discussions in Chapters 2 and 3 will eventually lead to the development of 
our conceptual framework, which can be applied to the Eritrean context. The final section 
(section 2.6) of this chapter contains a summary of the issues discussed and the preliminary 
conclusions. 
 
2.2 Privatisation and its theoretical justification  
2.2.1 Definition:  
In particular, politicians tend to equate privatisation with commercialisation and deregulation 
(Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1988, Cook Paul, 1986; Kay & Thompson, 1986). However, in economic 
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terms privatisation remains the transfer of ownership of goods and services from the public to 
the private sector (Adam et al., 1992; Roth, 1987). In our study, we have used the definition of 
Adam et al. This definition formulates privatisation as the change from public ownership and/or 
control of enterprises to private ownership and/or control. This definition is also used by the 
GOE, and it is the most common one. In this definition commercialisation and liberalisation are 
excluded, and the following issues are included: 1) the complete or partial sale of assets by the 
state, 2) the transfer of assets to the private sector through leasing arrangements, and 3) the 
introduction of management contracting arrangements. 
2.2.2 Theories of Privatisation  
The advocates believe that privatisation offers the best opportunities for improving MCS and 
firm performance. The view that privatisation is crucial to achieving performance gains has 
strengthened the notion that “ownership matters” (Commander & Killick, 1988). This line of 
reasoning is also followed by property rights theorists. Relevant theories on the privatisation 
concept are: productive efficiency theories, property right theory, agency theory as well as the 
theory of allocative efficiency. Generally, these theories start from two types of efficiency. As 
they are well described in the literature, we do not intend to present an exhaustive account of 
them in this study. In the following paragraphs we will give an outline of the most relevant ones. 
 
Productive efficiency focuses on a decrease in the production costs, which can be achieved by a 
proper management and the right incentives. In this respect, neo-classical economists argue that 
private ownership stimulates the implementation of efficiency-enhancing policies. Property 
rights are instrumental in achieving both allocative and productive efficiency with respect to the 
use of firm resources (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988a). It is argued that abolishing the public sector 
property rights has a positive impact on the productive performance and innovation of firms 
(Erbetta & Fraquelli, 2002). Agency theory states that agents act merely out of self-interest, and 
therefore incentives have to be offered that motivate them to adjust their aims to those of the 
enterprise. Agency theorists believe that privatisation stimulates the design of new MCS, 
including accounting systems (Macias, 2002). Further, privately owned firms are presumed to be 
governed by business goals and the capital market acts as a deterrent to managerial non-profit 
behaviour (Ott & Hartley, 1991). 
 
According to Adam et al. (1992) competition generated by private ownership is essential in 
achieving allocative efficiency, as during this process crucial information is revealed, which is 
required for an efficient use of a firm’s input. If the level of competition is low, it will be more 
difficult to detect signals on the basis of which a proper input-output balance can be determined. 
In addition, due to managerial inefficiency or lower levels of demand, profits may decrease. 
Neo-classical economists claim that the allocative efficiency of public enterprises is poor 
because the politicians as well as the managers and workers are motivated by goals that do not 
correspond with the interests of the company. They also argue that an adequate allocation of 
resources will be stimulated by measures such as market pricing, the removal of import 
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restrictions or quotas, the promotion of the private sector, the curtailment of government 
activities by closing state enterprises, and contracting out government functions to the private 
sector (Toye, 1994). The view is that private rather than public ownership will produce more 
efficient enterprises, beneficial to consumers, the industry, and the nation as a whole (see 
Donald & Hutton, 1998; Flemming & Mayer, 1997; Shaoul, 1997; Ogden, 1997; Adam et al., 
1992; Goodman & Loveman, 1991). 
 
Advocates consider privatisation to be intertwined with public financing and allocative 
efficiency. In their view privatisation reduces net budgetary transfers, eliminates possible 
external debt liabilities and decreases the adverse effects of deficit financing. Critics however, 
argue that the actual reality differs significantly from what is being claimed in most theories on 
privatisation. They argue that a broader range of issues (as described in sub-section 2.4.2) have 
to be incorporated to achieve the desired results. Generally, it is believed that improved MCS 
will result in both accounting practices that are more transparent and an increase in economic 
performance (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988b), investments, Gross Domestic Product (GDP), 
productivity and employment. The assumption is that these improved management control 
systems and accounting techniques are suitable to be introduced in any privately-owned firm. 
There is however, little empirical evidence to support this notion, especially with respect to 
LDCs (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995). Some studies even doubt the relevance of improved MCS 
in the case of LDCs. So on the basis of these findings researchers have identified some gaps in 
the theories on privatisation, in particular with respect to the desired outcome of the privatisation 
process. Although this process is believed to result in the improvement of MCS practices and 
firm performance, no explanation has as yet been given of how this actually takes place. We 
believe that this is an important issue to consider. Prior to dealing with the theory and actual 
practice of privatisation and the problems associated with it, we will in the following section go 
into the motives behind privatisation, especially from the perspective of LDCs. 
 
2.3 Privatisation: the objectives and its necessity for Developing Countries 
 
The privatisation concept forms the core of the market-based alternative to public management, 
and plays a crucial role in most of the structural adjustment programmes implemented in LDCs. 
That is why many consider the introduction of private ownership as the cornerstone of a 
successful transformation of the LDCs’ economies (Rider, 1994). A common view is that the 
privatisation process in developing countries is being stimulated by both internal politics and 
external pressures (Adam et al., 1992; Ramanadhan, 1989, Hemming & Mansoor, 1988, Cook, 
1986). Studies show that the external pressures mainly come from the developed countries, the 
IMF and the World Bank. They stimulate LDCs to introduce policy reforms. In addition, 
developed countries offer them development packages with a clear focus on market-oriented 
approaches and less government involvement. In some cases, the awareness of the need for 
change has emerged within the LDC governments themselves (Cook, 1986; cited in Uddin, 
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1997). The World Bank is unequivocal in its support for privatisation: “Privatisation, when 
correctly conceived and implemented, fosters efficiency, encourages investment [and thus new 
growth and employment], and frees public resources for investment in infrastructure and social 
programs” (Kikeri et al., 1992). All privatisation methods aim at generating revenue and 
stimulating corporate control as well as competitiveness. Most research, therefore, focuses on 
the improvement of the efficiency of enterprises (Vickers and Yarrow, 1991). State-owned 
enterprises can generally be characterised by inefficiency, mainly caused by overstaffing, a 
dependence on subsidies and the absence of competition (Lieberman, 1993). Studies indicate 
that cost savings are the most important source of performance improvement (Fahy & Smithee, 
1999). 
 
Research has also shown that in terms of profitability and added value the performance of public 
enterprises is poor compared to that of firms in the private sector (Ayub & Hegstad, 1986; 
Killick, 1983; Kim, 1981). Public enterprises do not seem to be capable of generating 
sustainable returns from investments, which generally leads to budgetary difficulties (IMF, 
1986; Short, 1984; World Bank, 1983, 1981). Evidence indicates that the poor performance of 
public enterprises is due to political interference in their decision-making processes, and their 
own incapability to set specific goals and develop incentive schemes (Milward et al., 1982). In 
this context MCS become irrelevant, as the political influence on the enterprise’s decisions 
undermines its commercial inventiveness and accountability (Jones & Sefiane, 1992).       
In general, privatisation is considered as an obvious solution to the problems of the 
public sector (Shirley & Walsh, 2001). Market mechanisms are believed to improve efficiency 
and resolve public finance difficulties (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1988). The advocates of the 
privatisation principle argue that the transfer of property rights to private hands and the resulting 
competition will stimulate the improvement of MCS and the development of business goals 
(Rees, 1985: cited in Wickramasinghe et al., 2004). So when it comes to solving control 
problems, ownership does matter, as is the general belief. Moreover, it is claimed that 
management control systems help businesses to set and achieve their objectives, such as for 
example profit maximisation (Jensen & Meckling, 1976).  In a privatised economy these “micro 
level profits” will then result in “macro level (capitalist) development” (Tinker et al, 1982). 
Through this “profits” mechanism the production means will be employed more “efficiently and 
effectively” (Rees, 1985). So, ownership change increases “profits”, thereby facilitating a 
country’s “economic development”. 
 
In actual fact however, the motives for privatisation vary among countries. In the case of LDCs, 
for example, privatisation is influenced by the macroeconomic burden of the public sector. The 
legacy of state ownerships consists of fiscal imbalances, unused social services funds, and 
extensive private sector borrowings, which by the 1970s accounted for one-third of the LDCs’ 
international loans (ibid). Evidence shows that financial flows to public enterprises burden 
government budgets and the financial systems in sub-Saharan Africa considerably (World Bank, 
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1994). For this and other reasons, the World Bank started to encourage the introduction of 
privatisation programmes as a means to decrease the weight of the Public Sector on the fiscal 
budget, and as from the mid 1980s it used them as a condition for the provision of loans. From 
this period on, privatisation measures in LDCs have considerably increased (Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 1988). 
 
The main motive of the governments of LDCs for starting the process of privatisation is to gain 
economic benefits. The objective is to generate additional state revenue, promote economic 
efficiency while at the same time maintaining the level of employment and reducing the 
involvement of the government in the management of enterprises. Other objectives are the 
transfer of ownership to the private sector, introducing competition through economic 
liberalisation, exposing public enterprises to market discipline, developing capital markets and 
attracting national and foreign investors (Megginson et al., 1994). By achieving these goals 
government money, otherwise spent on subsidies, will be saved and political and social stability 
will be achieved through a more balanced allocation of resources. Moreover, there will be more 
economic growth and new opportunities will be created with respect to employment. The 
general expectation is a higher output, increasing investment levels, a supply of quality goods 
and services at low prices, a growing use of modern technology and know-how, higher profits 
and dividends, more employment and higher salaries, a reduction in leverage, effective 
corporate governance, financial benefits and a decrease in taxation levels (Makalou, 1999). In 
addition, LDCs aim at obtaining a maximum output from scarce resources and reducing poverty. 
In brief, their main focus is on economic development (Parker & Kirkpatrick, 2005). However, 
Kikeri (1998) points at the circumstance where as a result of the privatisation process prices 
increase and employment as well as tax payments decrease. In that case poverty will only be 
aggravated. In addition, governments also need to pay attention to trade union reactions to job 
losses (Young, 1995). 
 
Only a relatively small number of LDCs have privatised their economies, and not until the late 
1980s (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1988). Many governments of LDCs have restricted themselves to 
reforms within the public sector to improve the efficiency of state-owned enterprises (Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 1995). However, the results of these reforms have been disappointing. Sub-Saharan 
African countries mainly focus on improving the accountability practices in the public sector to 
gain growth in GDP. Also, donors believe that the improvement of accountability and 
transparency will reduce the level of corruption and mismanagement (Okeahialam & Kedslie, 
1999). Because the public sector reforms did not work and the sub-Saharan states were in fact 
dependent upon aid agencies, they were finally encouraged to start privatising. Makalou (1999) 
indicates that the number of privatisation transaction has increased from less than 200 in 1990 to 
over 2,800 by the end of 1997. 
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De Castro and Uhlenbruck (1997) point out that the privatisation policies and firm strategies in 
LDCs are significantly determined by the specific characteristics of these countries. In the West 
there are mature capital markets, venture capitalists, banks and other kinds of loan creditors, a 
well-functioning legal system that protects private property rights, and conventional standards of 
business conduct that facilitate the exchange of products. LDCs are lacking these institutions. 
The shortage of administrative and institutional capacity has hindered the development of 
competition policies and the establishment of regulatory agencies to prevent market abuse 
(Parker & Kirkpatrick, 2005). The market conditions in LDCs are not good enough to ensure 
proper functioning of the private sector. Moreover, in some LDCs there is no mechanism to 
protect private property rights, which discourage organizations to make investments due to the 
threat of expropriation. In addition, because of the absence of well-developed markets, only 
certain groups (those with high incomes or families who can count on government backing) are 
in the position to make investments (Saha & Parker, 2002). Moreover, local entrepreneurs who 
have purchased public enterprises may not possess the necessary working capital and 
management know-how required to make their businesses a success. 
 
Although the public sector in Africa has actually succeeded in providing resources and welfare 
functions, the economies of a large number of countries are in a deplorable state, which is 
reflected by huge debts and a large dependency on government subsidies. Companies are 
characterised by excessive manpower, bureaucratic control, undercapitalisation, and a shortage 
of qualified managerial and technical personnel. Their monopoly position has increased 
inefficiency and undermined firm performance. That is why the divestiture programmes in 
Africa were especially aimed at those enterprises that made losses and were financially 
unhealthy, heavily indebted, operating with inadequate records or accounts, or substantially 
overmanned. 
 Several studies indicate that privatised enterprises in LDCs are performing well and 
contribute to the overall economic prosperity (Galal et al., 1994; Megginson et al., 1994: cited 
in Cook & Uchida, 2004). Primarily, a healthy private sector is a crucial condition for 
establishing a sound economy. In a free market where there is a relatively open access to inputs, 
where enterprises can autonomously make decisions with respect to investments and operational 
strategies, and where there are fair incentives that apply to all participants, private enterprises 
can generate productivity growth (Khatkhate, 1992) and large economic returns. 
 
According to the literature LDCs mainly view the concept of privatisation as the transfer of 
products or services from public to private ownership and control. In the case of Africa, it was 
not until the early 1980s when privatisation was first considered as a serious economic 
alternative, and initially the focus was mainly on public sector reform and economic 
liberalisation (Young, 1995). A World Bank study (Berg & Shirley, 1987: cited in Young, 1995, 
p. 163) shows that although by the mid 1980s there were 26 LDCs (14 of which were African 
states) that put privatisation on their public agendas, only 17 have actually carried out equity 
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transfers. In addition, African states accounted for 35 percent of the 1,343 world-wide 
privatisations (planned, in the process or completed) recorded by the World Bank in 1988. This 
means that only 10 per cent of Africa’s public enterprises have been privatised (Young, 1995). 
That is why in our view it is vital to conduct privatisation studies in the context of LDCs. This 
research should focus on both the achievements (with respect to MCS changes and firm 
performance) and the problems. Moreover, it should consider the implications for privatisation 
theory in general and the economic policies of LDCs in particular. 
 
2.4 Outcomes of Privatisation 
 
There are serious doubts whether privatisation has actually produced the results as claimed by 
its advocates and theorists. Despite some positive achievements, researchers have identified a 
number of theoretical problems that are supported by empirical evidence. The following sub-
sections will deal with the empirical evidences and also the theoretical problems of privatisation. 
2.4.1 Empirical evidence gathered from privatisation studies 
Since the 1980s, privatisation has been the most significant approach in global market reform. In 
general, privatisation is associated with economic liberalisation, free trade, competition and 
limited government intervention. In spite of the fact that it was introduced decades ago, there is 
not much documentation available about privatised firms, which is considered as a major 
concern (Adam et al., 1992; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1988). Only after a considerable time after 
their global introduction have researchers started to investigate the results and effects of 
privatisation programmes. Several studies on post-privatisation effects have been published 
(Cook, 1986; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995; Megginson & Netter, 2001; Parker & Kirkpatrick, 
2005), but their findings are somewhat ambiguous and contradictory. Comparative studies were, 
for example, conducted by Weiss (1995) to evaluate the performance of state-owned and 
privately-owned corporations, and by Karatas (1995) to compare the performance of enterprises 
during the pre-privatisation and the post-privatisation periods. These studies have not provided 
significant and conclusive data. In addition, the empirical evidence presented in the 
development literature does not offer significant clues to the nature of the internal changes 
taking place within firms during the privatisation process (Wickramasinghe, 1996). Before 
going into the details of the findings resulting from research conducted mainly in LDCs, we will 
give a general outline of privatisation studies carried out in both the West and in developing 
countries. 
 
Studies conducted in the West: The empirical evidence collected so far on the effects of 
privatisation in developed countries is inconclusive. Wright et al. (1993) show that in several 
cases privatisation has had a positive impact on firm performance through so-called 
management buy-out practices. On the other hand, other studies indicate that privatisation 
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policies have resulted in the transfer of a large amount of public wealth into private hands. For 
example, a study by Shaoul (1997) on the privatisation of the provision of water shows that 
contrary to the government’s expectations, no efficiency gains were achieved, a percentage of 
workers actually lost their jobs, consumer prices rose, and the infrastructure deteriorated. In a 
study conducted in 1999, Arnold & Cooper (1999) report that the UK government only received 
£ 13,1 million for the sale of a port, which was resold 18 months later for £ 103,7 million. Those 
who mainly benefited from this undertaking were the managing directors and the banks that 
financed the buy-out. 
 
Studies conducted in LDCs: The results of the empirical research into the effects of privatisation 
in LDCs are also inconclusive (Cook and Kirkpatrick, 1995). Some studies show that the 
profitability of public enterprises is lower than that of their private sector counterparts in the 
same industry (Ayub & Hegstod, 1986; Killick, 1983; Kim, 1981; Funkhouser & MacAvoy, 
1979). Other studies, however, indicate that the efficiency levels of public sector enterprises are 
in fact higher than those of private sector corporations (Ramaswamy, 1988; Wortzel & Wortzel, 
1989). Potts (1995) conducted research into denationalisation and production efficiency in 
Tanzania. In two states the management of organisations had improved after privatisation, 
whereas in others it had declined. According to Potts there is a relationship between 
management decline and production performance. Further, Potts concludes that apart from some 
macro-economic benefits, a clear disadvantage of the privatisation process is the transfer of 
ownership to foreign-based companies. When using size, market structure, industry trends and 
ownership as variables to investigate possible changes in performance, Weiss (1995) found no 
significant evidence for the assumption that public enterprises perform less good than private 
companies. Moreover, he has found no proof that privatisation measures increase economic 
efficiency. What Weiss’ study does show us is that in particular branches, foreign-owned firms 
outperform national firms. Karatas (1995) compared pre- and post-privatisation firm 
performance in Turkey by using financial measures as point of departure. No significant 
differences were found. 
 
Although the theory suggests that privatisation leads to the improvement of MCS practices, 
researchers generally show little interest in finding empirical evidence that supports this 
assumption. The available evidence does not convincingly show clear improvements in the 
performance of enterprises as a result of privatisation. In Sri Lanka (Wickramasinghe, 1996) 
privatisation did not lead to higher levels of profitability or productivity, and after privatisation 
in Mexico, consumers did not benefit at all (Martin, 1995). In addition, a study by Uddin and 
Hopper (2003), conducted in 13 privatised firms, shows that returns did not increase; in fact, 
states revenues as well as employment decreased. In addition, transparency in external reports 
was not achieved, and some shareholders, creditors and tax collecting institutions were affected 
by wrongful transactions. 
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Asechemie (1997) argues that concepts such as owner profit or wages are irrelevant in Nigerian 
society, particularly in the informal sector. Wickramasinghe and Hopper (2005) claim that 
Western MCS techniques are not suitable for Sri Lanka’s local culture. This problem is also 
pointed out by Perera (1989); he indicates that accounting practices in their current form are not 
suited for LDCs because of the differences in business environments, ownership structures, use 
of accounting information and attitudes towards disclosure practices, which stem from the 
colonial era. Therefore, some degree of reserve with respect to the assumptions of the advocates 
of privatisation is justified (Burchell et al., 1980). It can be concluded that the adoption of 
Western MCS techniques by LDCs leads to problems because of the different socio-economic, 
cultural and political circumstances (Hopper et al., 2004b; Wickramasinghe, 1996). Issues such 
as culture (Velayutham & Perera, 1996) and ethnic conflicts, as in Ghana (Tsamenyi, 1997), 
play an important role in the development of MCS. However, in some countries, for example 
Syria (Abdeen, 1980) and China (Chan & Lee, 1997: cited in Hopper et al., 2004b), Western 
MCS techniques can sometimes be applied successfully. 
 
Hopper et al. (2004a) have found evidence that in some cases the introduction of computerised 
systems by privatised firms has improved the link between production and market information. 
However, the transparency in the internal and external information flows, which is an essential 
element of market control, is still insufficient due to the weak regulations and their inadequate 
enforcement. In addition, case studies conducted in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (ibid) show that 
MCS practices are being hampered by the inexperience of firm owners and top management. In 
general, it can be claimed that external factors, such as aid agencies and the state (Hoque & 
Hopper, 1994), play an important role in shaping the nature of MCS practices. Also other 
external factors, such as political climate, industrial relations, competition and government 
regulations, influence the development of MCS, as is illustrated by a study on the privatised jute 
mills in Bangladesh (Hoque & Hopper, 1997). 
 
In Bangladesh annual reports were not produced, and the families who owned the firms were in 
charge of the company finances. Budgeting policies were conducted top down, and the labour 
force was subjected to inferior conditions, having little union protection. 
In Sri Lanka, after the privatisation process had been completed, the textile mill managers 
continued to keep the budgets low to maintain the ethnic divisions and to protect the local 
workers. There was evidence of financial malpractice. The partial privatisation did not reduce 
the interference of the government; it was only less direct through the intermediation activities 
of regulatory agencies (Hopper et al., 2004a). 
Also Perera (1975) argues that Sri Lankan firms are more interested in preparing tax return than 
in drawing up accounting reports. Overall, the lack of transparency and accountability is mainly 
caused by factors such as weak capital markets, accounting regulations that are not carried out 
properly, a culture of tax avoidance, and inappropriate education in the field of accounting. 
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The study of Al-Rohaily (1992) on the MCS in 25 large Saudi enterprises shows that MCS 
techniques are often inadequately applied for planning and control purposes, and in some cases 
they are not used at all. This was due to a lack of internal control, inefficient costing systems, 
and a shortage in accounting staff. Also Mustafa (1985) affirms that with respect to external as 
well as internal requirements the transfer of accounting information of Saudi firms is deficient. 
This is mainly because their management control systems are not well-structured; there are no 
proper forms, procedures and records, and internal control instruments are seriously inadequate 
or do sometimes not even exist. 
Al-Namri (1993) examined the similarities and differences between the MCS practices of Saudi-
owned and -managed enterprises and those of Western joint ventures operating in the country. 
Al-Namri concludes the MCS techniques as applied by joint venture firms are generally more 
elaborate and sophisticated than those used by Saudi-owned enterprises. 
 
Over time, the accounting literature has been influenced by the developments linked to 
ownership as well as control changes, such as privatisation, management buy-outs (MBOs) and 
take-overs. According to Jones (1985) the use of management control systems was helpful in the 
decision-making process during the transition period prior to mergers, but after the change of 
ownership their role decreased considerably. The modification of old systems has also led to the 
development of new MCS, resulting from a change in management style aimed at the delegation 
of authority and clearer regulations. Wright et al. (1993) provide examples that illustrate 
positive effects of privatisation. In their study they show that buy-outs lead to performance 
improvements both in the short and in the medium term. In their view ownership change and 
improvements in management and MCS practices have resulted in a well-structured transfer of 
financial information, the introduction of employment contracts, possibilities for negotiation, 
and the abolishment of subsidiaries’ investment constraints. 
 
Critical studies: Jomo (1995) has studied the post-privatisation effects in Malaysia. Advocates 
in Malaysia share the view that privatisation has had a positive effect on government finances, 
economic growth, efficiency and the distribution of wealth. Jomo argues that these claims are 
vague and even incorrect. His study indicates that there is no clear evidence that supports the 
notion that privatisation has significantly contributed to the recent economic growth. He argues 
that the privatisation trajectory in Malaysia consists of “Bumiputera (indigenous) wealth 
acquisition”7 programmes, the objectives of which are in contrast with the privatisation 
principle. Uddin and Hopper (2003) have analysed a report by the World Bank on the post-
privatisation performance of several companies in Bangladesh. They question both the 
conclusions of the World Bank’s assessment and its claim that privatisation has a positive effect 
on the MCS practices of enterprises and their performance and development. 
                                                           
7 “Bumiputera wealth acquisition” means that the privatisation process in Malaysia has merely aimed at enhancing 
the wealth of the Malays and native people of Malaysia, and that private ownership by foreign entrepreneurs was 
not allowed (see Uddin, 1997; Jomo, 1995). 




Studies on family-owned businesses: Family ownership is a common phenomenon in post-
colonial countries. In family-owned enterprises, the family are both the owners and managers, 
and control practices are highly centralised and to some extent arbitrary. This means that 
personal relationships are more important than formalised rules and regulations, and no use is 
being made of formal control instruments (Black et al., 2000). In addition, the cultural values in 
Eastern countries are different from those in the West. In Eastern societies the focus is clearly on 
the collective rather than on the individual perspective. In the decision-making process family 
and friends are central and formal rules and regulations play a minor role. Family ties and 
informal relations also influence decision-making in general. Similar findings have been 
reported by Uddin (1997), Wickramasinghe (1996) and Hoque & Hopper (1994). 
 
In general, private ownership stimulates a commercially-oriented approach, which is reflected, 
among other things, in the control instruments. The use of computers has led to more efficient 
production process and marketing activities. Work targets have become tighter with effective 
monitoring. Private owners instituted ad hoc and arbitrary (informal) controls over employees. 
The control systems hardly relied on proper incentives and transparent budgetary controls 
(Hopper et al., 2004b). 
 
Ansari and Bell (1991) conducted a longitudinal case study in which a Pakistani family-owned 
firm was being observed in the period from 1967 to 1989. The study dealt with a broad range of 
control issues, such as the organization’s formal structures and operational controls, its reward, 
planning and budgeting procedures. Ansari and Bell established that the firm’s policies and 
business strategies were mainly based on the cultural background and beliefs of the 
organizational members. There were no shareholding agreements, the emphasis was on the 
needs of the employees rather than on performance, and family hierarchy played a major role, 
which was reflected, for example, in the way staff members were appointed. In addition, there 
was no separation between treasury and control functions, and rewards were not distributed 
equally and fairly. The authors therefore argue that cultural values and family relations have a 
significant influence on controls. Other studies show that the efforts of Third World countries to 
develop economically are undermined by their inadequate accounting techniques (e.g. Enthoven, 
1969; Scott, 1968; Hunter, 1964; Bevis, 1958). 
 
In-depth studies: The studies of Ogden (1994)8, Wickramasinghe (1996) and Uddin (1997) 
address privatisation issues from a socio-political perspective. The study of Wickramasinghe is 
an assessment of privatisation in the context of LDCs. Its starting point is the Mode of 
Production (MOP) theory, which is applied to compare the MCS practices in both capitalist and 
                                                           
8 This study deals with newly privatised water companies in the UK and focuses on management decisions and firm 
performance. The study explains the role of MCS in the attempt to translate a political objective into a business 
strategy aimed at meeting consumer needs. 
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non-capitalist settings. Wickramasinghe argues that in non-capitalist settings the nature of MCS 
is influenced by state policies and ineffective bureaucratic rules. After the process of ownership 
change, the accounting practices were modified, being no longer subjected to non-capitalist 
elements. Still, in LDCs cultural beliefs have a large impact on privatised businesses in general 
and MCS and accounting practices in particular. The economic theories do not take this into 
account. Wickramasinghe shows this limitation in a study on the MCS changes in a privatised 
Sri Lankan Textile mill. In Sri Lanka tradition and culture are still heavily embedded in society, 
and also the post colonial politics play a dominant role in its corporate world. Wickramasinghe 
argues that accounting researchers and policy-makers do not pay enough attention to the cultural 
beliefs and labour mentality in developing countries. 
 
It can be concluded that with the exception of Uddin (1997) and Wickramasinghe (1996), the 
current accounting studies fail to address privatisation issues more deeply from the perspective 
of LDCs. Although the studies of Ogden (1993) and Armstrong (1991) provide more insight into 
ownership change and MCS in developing countries, very little is known about the adjustment 
of MCS in these countries, in particular as a result of privatisation (Uddin, 1997). The examples 
given above show that in the case of LDCs, attaining the objectives of privatisation and 
improving MCS practices and firm performance is complicated by a range of contextual factors. 
These factors will be further elaborated in section 2.5 and in Chapter 3. 
2.4.2 Theoretical problems of privatisation  
As we already have pointed out, the privatisation of businesses in Western economies has not 
always led to a decrease in prices, higher efficiency and better services. Firm performance is in 
fact influenced by a large number of factors. For example, the efficiency of privatised 
enterprises is not only dependent on ownership, but also on the degree of competition, 
incentives, and the effectiveness of regulatory policies (Yarrow, 1986). Similarly, the 
improvement of firm performance requires much more than just a change in ownership resulting 
from privatisation (Chang & Singh, 1992: cited in Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995). It is also related 
to organizational issues, institution-building and politics. Firm performance should be 
considered in the wider context of socio-economic factors and political reform aimed at 
improving the general standard of living and welfare (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995). 
 
The following sections will focus on the viewpoints of those who are critical towards the current 
theories on privatisation. Although the privatisation process is vital to improve the economy and 
stimulate firm performance in LDCs, the Western approach is not always the most suitable one. 
There are a large number of specific factors that influence the outcome of the privatisation 
process in developing countries. These will be dealt with in section 2.5. It is argued that in the 
case of LDCs, privatisation issue should be approached from a broader perspective. Moreover, 
the current theories do not fully explain how organizational change processes actually take 
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place. Below a summary is given of the main points of criticism with respect to the various 
theories. 
 
Production Efficiency Theories: Principal-Agent relationships may be common in small firms, 
but in the large modern limited liability corporation the property rights are diluted. Diluted 
ownership reduces the control of owners over managers. As a result, managers have a 
considerable amount of freedom to back their own interests (Commander & Killick, 1988; 
Adam et al., 1992). Moreover, the implications of ownership with respect to production and 
efficiency depend to a high degree on the nature of the business environment. These 
environmental factors have a considerably larger impact on firm performance than ownership. 
Therefore, apart from ownership, these factors, including competition and regulation, have to be 
taken into account when assessing the privatisation process (Van Brabant, 1995). 
 
Agency Theory: Critics argue that the empirical validity of the views on which this theory is 
based is dubious. Full information is hard to obtain in practice and thus information processing 
is highly complex. Moreover, internal conflicts undermine communication between 
organizational members. In addition, in LDCs the competitive markets are still poorly organised, 
and the economic relationships and motivations are much more complex than is being portrayed 
by the agency theory. It is difficult to model them by means of this theory. For example, trust is 
not dealt with (Armstrong, 1991; Neu, 1991). Further, the relation between a manager’s efforts 
and the output in terms of profitability is more difficult to determine than is being suggested in 
this theory. 
 
Allocative Efficiency: Critics argue that allocative efficiency also applies to public enterprises. 
Deregulation, liberalisation and competition are important conditions for the success of 
privatisation programmes, but not essential (Jackson and Palmer, 1988). In addition, the fiscal 
effects of privatisation are overrated, especially the reduction in budget deficits through the 
elimination of financial subsidies (Adam et al., 1992). Subsidies are the result of budget policies 
(Ramaswamy, 1988), and they may continue after privatisation, for example, price support for 
farmers. 
 
Property rights: Property rights that are poorly defined, insufficient protection against theft and 
expropriation, breach of contract, these are all factors that undermine efficiency (Bocko, Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1995). Barzel (1989) points out that property rights are never entirely accounted for 
by the law, and that issues such as expropriation, free-riding, and eluding the law are quite 
common. In addition, Starr (1988)9 argues that the property rights school fails to recognise that 
the separation of ownership and management alters the nature and functioning of private firms. 
Further, property rights theory rules out the significance of aspects such as size, centralisation, 
                                                           
9 Available at: http://www.princeton.edu/~starr/meaning.html or Paul Starr, “The meaning of Privatization”, Yale 
Law and Policy Review 6 (1988): 6 – 41. 
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hierarchy, or leadership. Finally, it does not recognise the relationship between firm 
performance and the exchange of information or ambiguity about business goals.   
 
The general view of critics is that privatisation is not the answer to public sector problems. 
Wortzel and Wortzel (1989) argue that public enterprises do not perform that poorly at all. And 
there are many public enterprises that actually perform quite well, for example, those in Brazil 
and Korea. There are researchers who believe that the success of an enterprise depends on good 
management rather than on ownership. Important measures in this respect are creating a 
stimulating organizational culture (Schwartz & Davis, 1981), appointing good managers 
(Vernon, 1984), designing effective control systems (Ramamurti, 1987) and formulating 
attractive incentive schemes (Aharoni, 1981). These are crucial to achieving organizational 
success. 
 
Studies on ownership transfer show that privatisation alone is no guarantee for an increase in 
productivity and a reduction in costs. Other important factors are effective competition, 
regulation, and organizational or political changes (Parker & Kirkpatrick, 2005; Megginson & 
Netter, 2001). Research conducted in particular industrial sectors and firms shows that although 
privatisation has a positive impact on productivity, production efficiency, prices and service 
delivery, it is not solely sufficient to raise economic performance (Parker & Kirkpatrick, 2005). 
 
In order to ensure the improvement of economic performance, privatisation has to be introduced 
together with other measures of structural reform (Parker & Kirkpatrick, 2005). Moreover, the 
privatisation concept is based on theories (property rights theory, agency theory, productive 
efficiency theories, and allocative efficiency theories) that focus on, among other things, 
effective corporate governance reflected in particular behavioural patterns of management, for 
example, discreteness and an open exchange of information. This type of behaviour is often not 
associated with state officials. That is why these theories are less applicable in LDCs that lack 
effective corporate governance. Privatisation programmes can only be successful in LDCs when 
integrated with a broader development agenda (Parker & Kirkpatrick, 2005). 
 
2.5 Factors that affect the success of privatised firms and MCS change in LDCs 
 
In the previous sections we have briefly assessed the practical and theoretical problems of 
privatisation. In this section we will first introduce the major - however frequently neglected – 
issues that have a large influence on the development and performance of the private sector in 
LDCs. Next, we will deal with the relevant external contextual factors that determine the MCS 
practices after the enterprises have been privatised.  
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2.5.1 General factors that affect the success of privatised firms  
Factors that critically affect the development and success of the private sector include 
monopolies of state enterprises and bureaucratic rules and impediments, for example price 
controls, the lack of choice of geographic locations, and restrictive labour policies with respect 
to wage negotiation, productivity bargaining and the position of unproductive workers. Also 
factors such as requirements for the use of local supplies, ambiguity of the legal and policy 
framework, slow and arbitrary decision-making, and a large number of institutions that are 
corrupt seriously impede a favourable business environment. Moreover, if there is a limited 
access to resources and support services, such as financial information and stock markets, it will 
be more difficult for firms to operate successfully. Other factors that affect the functioning of 
privatised firms are foreign trade regulations and exchange controls, excessive government 
borrowing, heavy taxation, socio-political instability and monopolisation through public 
investment programmes (UNIDO, 1999)10.   
 
The UNDP Report (1998)11 mentions two conditions crucial for the success of privatisation. 
First, firms should operate in a competitive or open market. Second, the macroeconomic 
circumstances and policy frameworks should be ‘market-friendly’. Similarly, Kikeri et al., 
(1994) refer to these conditions as market and country conditions respectively. In this respect, 
Chisari et al. (1997) argues that privatisation in itself will not be successful if there is no 
macroeconomic stability, liberalisation and deregulation. Therefore, a precondition for 
privatisation in LDCs is to create a ‘suitable environment’, in which the private sector can 
effectively operate. In the case of Africa, the weakness of the private sector is the result of 
problems such as inconsistent macroeconomic policies, the lack of physical infrastructure and 
underdeveloped financial systems (Kennedy & Hobohm, 1999). In addition, the dominance of 
the state in the past has left its mark on today’s institutions. One aspect that hampers private 
sector development12 in Africa is the fact that there is a large fragmentation of small-scale 
economies. As a result, Africa’s status in the world trade is marginal. Further, there is a 
continuous political instability. Also Brunetti et al. (1997) emphasise that the institutional 
obstacles are undermining a healthy business climate in LDCs.   
 
In the majority of LDCs the condition of roads, ports and airports is poor. This also applies to 
the access to water, power supply and communication facilities (World Bank, 1994). In addition, 
on the macroeconomic level price volatility is a severe problem. In Latin America and sub-
                                                           
10 The UNIDO conference on ‘Industrial Partnerships and Investment in Africa’ (20-21 October, 1999) held in 
Dakar (Senegal) addressed ways of strengthening the capacity of private sector institutions in Africa. It stressed 
that although governments play an important role in supporting the private sector, services should be provided 
indirectly. 
11 Part 2: State and Market roles in Governance 
http://magnet.undp.org/Docs/!UN98-21.PDF/!PSMGSHD/!sec2.pdf. 
12 “The climate for private sector development in Africa”, by the International Finance Corporation, 2003: 
http//www.altassets.com/pdfs/AfricaIFC.pdf. 
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Saharan Africa the volatility level of prices has always been the highest, but in fact all 
developing countries have performed badly compared to the West (Hausmann & Gavin, 1996; 
World Bank, 1993). Therefore, these issues have to be taken into account in the privatisation 
process of firms in LDCs. Moreover, what the private sector requires is innovative 
entrepreneurs, skilled managers, a dedicated and well-trained labour force, and efficient 
administrative and operational procedures. Further, governments are responsible for creating a 
suitable business environment in which privatised firms can prosper and increase their 
performance.  
2.5.2 External contextual factors that shape MCS change in LDCs: 
As already mentioned, the results of privatisation in LDCs are influenced by various contextual 
factors. In the remainder of this chapter these factors and their influence on MCS practices will 
be discussed. Hopper et al. (2004a) argue that accounting practices are typically Western-based, 
representing Western systems and values. If the proper environment is created, MCS can also 
effectively be applied in LDCs (Little, 1982). This is difficult however, due to the socio-
economic legacy of the state-owned enterprises, ineffective institutions and, of course, the 
cultural differences (Nabli & Nugent, 1989). As a result, the capital markets are 
underdeveloped. Introducing MCS in LDCs is therefore rather complicated, and in order to 
make its implementation a success, a number of contextual factors have to be taken into account 
(Neimark & Tinker, 1986; Bauer & Yamey, 1957). 
 
So the way in which management control systems are modified as a result of the privatisation 
process is influenced by the historical, social and political dimensions of the economy in which 
the organizations are embedded (e.g., Broadbent, 1999; Hoque & Alam, 1999; Hoque & 
Hopper, 1997, 1994; Scapens & Roberts, 1993; Broadbent & Guthrie, 1992; Innes & Mitchell, 
1990). Therefore, in order to gain more insight into the exact nature of MCS change in LDCs, 
we will identify and assess these contextual factors (Scapens & Roberts, 1993; Luft, 1997). We 
will discuss such factors in relation to the concept of “market capitalism” as defined by Hopper 
et al. (2004a). Market capitalism fits well with the economic policy of the GOE. 
 
The structural adjustment programmes of the World Bank and the IMF are based on the market 
capitalism principle, a neo-classical approach aimed at free trade, competition, privatisation and 
limited government intervention. Institutional reform is generally focussed on marked-based 
prices, which means that markets have to be restructured (financial markets, agricultural 
markets, commodity markets). Quantitative restrictions have to be removed and entrepreneurial 
activities promoted. In addition, government involvement has to be restricted by taking over or 
closing public enterprises and contracting out government functions to private sector 
competitive bodies (Toye, 1994: cited in Hopper et al., 2004a). The contextual factors that 
influence the MCS practices of privatised firms include culture, race and ethnicity, the state and 
regulations, trade unions, aid agencies and market competition. We have also included war as an 
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important contextual factor. War has had an enormous impact on the economic situation and the 
performance of Eritrean firms. 
 
Culture, Race and Ethnicity: In the implementation of privatisation programmes in LDCs no 
particular attention is being paid to cultural issues. It is believed that modern capitalist beliefs, 
attitudes and customs either already exist or will spontaneously emerge during the process of 
privatisation. Workers are expected to adjust easily to the modern MCS practices, economic 
rewards, and labour contracts. The general assumption is that by introducing Western 
technologies and organizational structures workers will instantly conform to the economic 
individualism and individual responsibility associated with capitalism. They are expected to be 
familiar with concepts such as quality consciousness and continuous improvement. Moreover, 
social homogeneity would emerge in the workplace, which means that differences between 
ethnic and racial groups will become irrelevant as a result of the Western economic reward 
systems and private sector management methods based on the meritocracy principle. 
Performance measures as well as budget and compensation instruments help set the managers’ 
(or agents’) expectations. A loose budget or generous compensation may motivate an agent, but 
also create certain expectations that the opposite party will not be able to meet in a later stage 
(Hopper et al., 2004a). 
 
State and Regulation: Hopper et al. (2004a) argue that in LDCs the state has a great influence 
on the development of MCS. In LDCs the state plays a central role in the economy in the 
absence of a capitalist class that operates in Western countries. The state is the provider of 
capital and employment and it controls a large proportion of the GDP. Although the state plays a 
leading role in the process of modernisation, it is restricted by non-capitalist cultural factors, 
such as relations and ties based on family, village, caste, religion, region or ethnicity. So in the 
case of LDCs neutral instruments of regulation used in enterprises may become instruments of 
power for illicit and non-capitalist purposes. Accounting is not immune from this: as a result of 
the aforementioned cultural factors, the function of accounting systems as regards planning, 
control and accountability may be undermined. 
 
The introduction of privatisation within structural adjustment programmes paved a way to 
counteract political interference into the management of enterprises. The belief is that private 
ownership will introduce more effective controls and use measures  of the capital market to 
modify the deficiencies of the state-governed economy. However, because of the fact that in 
LDCs the concept of capitalism has no historical basis, these countries may respond differently 
to the sudden introduction of privatisation programmes (Hopper et al., 2004a). Moreover, in 
LDCs government policies usually still play a significant role after the privatisation of firms. 
These factors affect the business strategies adopted by firm owners (Macias, 2002), and may 
undermine the effectiveness of the instruments of capitalist mode of production such as MCS. A 
country’s political and institutional situation affects economic performance (de Haan & 
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Simermann, 1996) and has a significant influence on property rights and private investment 
(Feng, 2001). In the case of LDCs, politics hampers post-privatisation regulation and 
competition. 
 
From the perspective of privatisation, the state’s role should remain confined to supply-side 
economics, safeguarding the infrastructures, maintaining law and order, and correcting market 
distortions (Corden, 1974). The focus should be on providing an environment suitable for 
commercial mobility rather than on direct interventions into enterprise decisions. Regulatory 
structures facilitate market relations (Hopper et al., 2004a). However, in LDCs the role of the 
government is generally harmful (Campbell, 1993; Lal, 1983; Bauer, 1976), as its intervention 
creates enormous price distortions and inefficiency of the market. The degree of economic 
power of the state is considerably higher in these countries (Wickramasinghe, 1996). Moreover, 
government incentives are highly unequal in that some economic actors are given more 
privileges than others, which only decrease economic performance (Little et al., 1970). In order 
to achieve a successful implementation of the privatisation concept in LDCs, the role of the 
government should therefore be limited. In addition, it is the task of the government to facilitate 
provision of skilled labour force, finance, and an adequate infrastructure during the transition 
phase to privatisation. 
 
Trade Unions (TU): TUs represent the collective labour force on the basis of rules and 
regulations. Their function is that of arbitrator as well as protector of the rights of the individual 
workers. They monitor law enforcement with respect to misconduct in the area of contractual 
obligations (Burawoy, 1979; Weinstein, 1968; Selznick, 1969; Habermas, 1975: cited in Hopper 
et al., 2004a). The ‘internal state’13 mediates in shop floor conflicts through negotiation in a 
framework of collective bargaining (Reuther, 1958). The aim is to achieve common goals on the 
part of both the union and the companies in terms of entrepreneurial growth and survival 
(Przeworski, 1978). In LDCs the political power of trade unions is substantial, both on the local 
and on the national level (Hopper et al., 2004a). Globally, TUs are the strongest opponents of 
privatisation, since they are given substantial benefits by government-owned firms in exchange 
for political support (Lopez-de-Silanes 1997, Lopez-de-Silanes et al. 1997). 
 
In the context of market capitalism, TUs are expected to collaborate with the privatised 
enterprises within the structures of collective bargaining. Their role is that of mediator between 
the work floor and management (Tsamenyi & Hopper, 2003). Links to parties and politics 
should be abolished. Labour markets start from the market-based reward principle with the aim 
to stimulate the mobility of workers. Recruitment should therefore be based on employee 
training and qualifications. The task of the government is to establish education and training 
institutions, while focussing on the development of skills and ‘technical’ work, and promoting 
                                                           
13 The ‘internal state’ consists of a number of institutions that mediate in conflicts on the enterprise level (Hopper et 
al., 2004a). 
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social values consistent with a market economy (c.f. Hopper et al., 2004a). In capitalist societies 
the economy is dominated by labour markets. However, LDCs have no labour market tradition 
and thus the legal position of employees is vulnerable.  
 
Aid Agencies [International Finance]: Many LDCs are suffering from factors such as poverty, 
fiscal crises of the state, bad governance and natural disasters. Moreover, their domestic markets 
are weak. As a result, LDCs are dependent on capital from multinationals with business 
locations in these regions as well as on loans and grants from international aid agencies, foreign 
governments and international financial institutions (such as the World Bank and the IMF). This 
dependency has facilitated the transfer of Western accounting technology to these countries. The 
World Bank and the IMF stimulate LDCs to adopt a neo-classical approach in their economic 
development. These institutions expect the LDCs to follow their advice in policy adoptions and 
restructuring of their economic and social structures. 
 
Especially because of the concerns of the World Bank and the IMF regarding the repayment of 
their external loans, the LDCs are pressurised into restructuring their economies (IMF, 1986; 
World Bank, 1981). LDCs can borrow money on the condition that they privatise their 
inefficient public enterprises (Prager, 1992; Nellis & Kekiri, 1989). They rely heavily on the 
structural adjustment loans of the World Bank and the IMF (Moseley et al., 1991). Further, 
through bilateral exhortation and their dominant influence on lending policies, also external 
agencies put pressure on LDCs to liberalise their economies and privatise their public sector 
enterprises (Moseley, 1988). 
 
War [Political instability]: Another variable that has an impact on a country’s economic 
situation is war. The resulting unstable political climate and the way it influences the economic 
growth in LDCs is one of the IMF’s major topics of study. It is argued that policy-makers 
behave in line with their own political and ideological objectives when developing policies of 
taxation, expenditure and monetary expansion (Edwards, 1994). This implies that policy-making 
is an endogenous variable, which depends on a country’s economic, political and institutional 
circumstances. If the economic and political situation is unstable, the result is inflation, which 
undermines economic growth. Inflation hinders long-term planning and encourages firms to 
increase their inventories and debts (USAID/Zambia, 1993)14. Political instability increases the 
problem of commitment and affects institutional self-government. The IMF report of 2003 
shows that the effects of the Ethio-Eritrean border war (1998-2000) are clearly reflected in the 
economy’s key variables: growth has declined, inflation has risen, public expenditure and the 
current account deficit have increased, and the foreign reserves have almost been depleted. Also, 
due to the rigidity of the exchange rate regime the exchange rate has become subject to duality 
with a strong parallel market. As a consequence, transparency, competitiveness, domestic 
                                                           
14 A study by USAID on ‘Country Programme of Strategic Planning’ see: 
http://pdf.dec.org/pdf_docs/PNABN964.pdf 
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growth, as well as the confidence to make investments are being undermined. At the same time, 
the fact that people are forced to join the military has considerably decreased the size of the 
work force in Eritrean private firms. 
 
Competition: Given the hostile nature of the competitive environment, formal control and 
sophisticated accounting instruments are crucial (Khandwalla, 1972; Otley, 1978). Libby and 
Waterhouse argue that competition stimulates the initiative to change MCS. Yakou and 
Dorweiler (1995) affirm this, since an insight into costs and performance levels is the key to 
economic survival. In addition, Chenhall and Langfield-Smith (1998) state that the increase in 
competition on a global level and the dynamic nature of the business environment requires MCS 
techniques to be adapted on a frequent basis. 
 
Evidence shows that the environmental uncertainty caused by the system of competition is 
related to a strong emphasis on budgetary control (Otley, 1978), a reliance on formal control 
(Imoisili, 1985), accounting, production and statistical control (Khandwalla, 1972). However, in 
some cases environmental uncertainty is not linked with a strong budgetary focus (Brownell, 
1985). And there are also examples of a combination of strict budgetary control and a more 
interpersonal and flexible approach. Ezzamel (1990) shows that in other cases of environmental 
uncertainty, budgetary information is used for evaluative purposes by means of variance 
analysis methods, and there is a great deal of superior-subordinate collaboration. Also Merchant 
(1990) indicates that the pressure to meet financial targets is related to environmental 
uncertainty. In addition, Chenhall (2003) observes that hostile and turbulent conditions require 
formal budgetary control systems. 
 
In summary, we can conclude that management control systems are essential tools for market 
capitalism, and in LDCs they are expected to take form similar to the way they operate in the 
West. However, the improvement of MCS requires a number of preconditions, such as market-
oriented strategies, pricing and resource allocation decisions, and no state intervention in the 
management of enterprises. Further, efficient capital markets are required where managers can 
be sanctioned for inadequate decision-making. Other important conditions are transparent 
accounting systems and regulation, control structures - free from bureaucratic control – on 
which both management and employees can exert influence, a well-established labour market, 
efficient collective bargaining systems, and a climate in which decision-making is based on 
organizational criteria rather than on personal or political considerations. In general, the impact 
of factors such as culture, political history and TUs is expected to be minimal (Hopper et al., 
2004a). 
 
With respect to the promotion of goods and services as well as the appointment and training of 
the labour force, the internal labour markets in LDCs are assumed to function just as efficiently 
as those in the West. No influence is expected of TUs. The market forces create the labour 
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market. In this context, TUs, as internal state organs, operate within the framework of industrial 
relations. Private owners/enterprises provide the conditions required for collective bargaining. 
Further, a relatively transparent, modern and market-oriented accounting system would be 
introduced to assist firms in their decision-making processes, their reporting practices and the 
achievement of their overall objectives. However, since the concepts of capitalism and 
privatisation are relatively new to LDCs and have not yet been fully embedded in their socio-
economic structures, the aforementioned predictions may not be valid. What has to be 
considered here is the reality of LDCs (Hopper et al., 2004a). It is worth to mention in this 
respect that researchers recognise the necessity of finding out ‘what accountants in Third World 
Countries ‘actually do’ rather than imposing Western accounting practices upon LDCs 
(Peasnell, 1993). 
Table 2.1 summarises the main issues dealt with in this section. It contains a list of the 
contextual factors, the key issues related, and the theoretical expectations with respect to market 
capitalism in LDCs. 
 
2.6 Summary and Conclusions 
 
In this chapter we have dealt with the principles and objectives of the concept of privatisation. 
We have in particular discussed its outcomes as expected by its advocates and we have stressed 
the importance of MCS. The empirical evidence provides us with an insight into post-
privatisation MCS practices in LDCs. The evidence shows that the actual effects of the 
privatisation process in LDCs do not correspond with its theoretical outcomes. The expectations 
with respect to the results of privatisation are based on studies conducted in the West but these 
studies fail to take the contextual factors of LDCs into account. These factors are generally 
described as country and market conditions, and they are briefly addressed in this chapter. In 
addition, although it is generally recognised that privatisation has an impact on MCS and firm 
performance, the studies conducted so far do not provide a sufficient analysis of the changes 
taking place. 
 
On the basis of past studies, we may conclude that the research into the impact of privatisation 
on MCS and firm performance should be conducted from a wider socio-economic, cultural and 
political perspective. Some of the studies referred to in this chapter do in fact indicate that the 
success of privatisation programmes and the realisation of effective management control 
systems depend on a number of contextual factors (see figure 2.1 below). However, they do not 
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Table 2.1 Contextual factors that influence the privatisation outcomes (MCS & Firm performance) 
Contextual 
factors 
Key issues Expectations 
Culture, Race 
& Ethnicity 
- Culture: attitudes,  
   beliefs, and  
   customs 
- Modern capitalist attitudes, beliefs, and customs either exist already or 
will develop; 
- A large degree of individualism and self-improvement; 
- The traditional culture will be replaced by a new work mentality: quality 
consciousness and a focus on continuous improvement; 
- Employees will positively respond to modern MCS, economic rewards, 
and labour contracts; 
- Social homogeneity in the workplace;  
- Ethnic & racial differences will not hamper the new capitalist system and 
are considered irrelevant; 
State and 
Regulation 
- State regulatory  
  bodies and policies 
 
- To safeguard infrastructures, to maintain law and order, to facilitate 
financial and commercial mobility, to oil market relations, to prevent 
market abuse, and to interfere less with the private sector affairs; 
- Stable policies, legislation and political systems that motivate investment 
as well as a fair functioning of the financial market; 
- To solve problems, such as the absence of stock markets and merchant 
banks, price controls, foreign exchange controls, excessive borrowing by 
the government, heavy taxation, restrictions to employment, and 
requirements for the use of local supplies; 
- To ensure internal and external transparency. 
Trade Unions 
(TU) 
- Collective  
bargaining 
- TUs are expected to protect the rights of the employees (with respect to 
issues such as appointment, dismissal, rewards, sanctioning, raise in salary, 
benefits, etc), and to stimulate the consensus between the union and 
enterprises;  
- Labour markets are expected to discipline labour and stimulate 
recruitment based on qualifications and training;  
- Government agencies are expected to develop education and training 
programmes to increase employees’ skills. 
Aid Agencies - Development Loans 
- Loan conditions   
  set by the World  
  Bank and the IMF, 
- Advanced  
industrialised 
countries 
- To encourage LDCs to adopt structural adjustment policies and to assist 
them in creating suitable business environments by means of privatisation 
and financial liberalisation aimed at establishing stronger capital markets, 
introducing export zones, public sector reform, TU activities, party politics, 
state intervention, developing a market economy, increasing financial 
regulation and decreasing political intervention; 
- To assist in the transfer of Western MCS to LDCs.  
War - Inflation, access to 
foreign exchange, 
macro-economic and 
political instability  
- Unstable economic and political conditions give rise to inflation, which in 
turn affect growth, make long-term planning difficult, encourage firms to 
increase their inventory and debts, and frustrate investment. 
- An unstable political situation leads to a reduction in employment and the 
size of the labour force due to obligatory military conscription, which 
negatively affects productivity.  
Competition - competitiveness of  
  the environment or the  
  market 
- A high degree of competition requires knowledge of cost issues, the 
utilisation of performance measures, formal control, budgetary control, a 
high degree of participation, and the use of improved MCS.  
- Competition stimulates a change of strategy, which requires MCS 
changes. 
 




In our study we use the contextual variables discussed in this chapter to develop our conceptual 
framework (see chapter 3). This framework is suitable for examining the situation in Eritrea. We 
hope and expect that our findings will contribute to expanding the body of knowledge in this 
field and that our research will strengthen the evidence provided by other studies. It is our aim to 
gain more insight into the actual situation in Eritrea after the privatisation of its economy.     








Figure 2.1 The relationship between privatisation, its outcomes, and contextual factors. 
 
Both in the West and in LDCs, most research studies dealing with MCS change and firm 
performance have a narrow focus. They are based on surveys and do not consider the broader 
contextual perspective. In addition, most research conducted in LDCs only concentrates on a 
limited number of common MCS practices. We intend to use a framework that enables us to 
address a broader range of MCS practices adopted in LDCs as well as the internal and external 
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3 Management control system changes, influencing internal 
factors, firm performance, and the conceptual framework 




In chapter two we have seen that the theory of privatisation has been challenged. On the basis of 
empirical evidence gathered in the West as well as in LDCs, critiques argue that improved 
control systems do not materialise automatically. Mangement control systems are influenced by 
various external factors, such as socio-economic, political and cultural contexts as well as the 
internal firm environment. These external factors have been dealt with in chapter two. In this 
chapter the internal factors will be addressed. In this respect, our research aims at elaborating on 
former MCS research focussed on the wider socio-economic and political contexts (e.g., Uddin, 
1997; Wickramasinghe, 1996; Ogden, 1993; Neimark & Tinker, 1986).  
 
This chapter gives an overview of the relevant literature available on MCS practices dealt with 
in this study. First, we will present the definition of MCS and explain its formulation. Next, we 
will go into the various MCS techniques and assess the recent developments that have 
necessitated changes in MCS practices, while focussing on the internal factors. Then, we will 
give an outline of the empirical evidence on firm performance of former studies and the 
variables used. Furthermore, we will deal with the relationship of improved MCS practices 
[mainly non-financial] with firm performance. After that we will present our conceptual 
framework. The final section of this chapter contains a general summary and conclusions.  
 
3.2 The definition of MCS 
 
Prior to presenting the MCS definition, we will briefly describe the developments on the basis of 
which it has been formulated. These developments are related to the need for changes in the 
MCS practices of enterprises. Both internal and external contextual factors play a role here. 
 
In the accounting literature there are various interpretations of the concept of control. See, for 
example, Anthony & Herzlinger, 1986; Marciariello, 1984; Hopper & Berry, 1983; Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976; Hofstede, 1968; Arrow, 1964; and Cyert & March, 1963. This diversity of 
interpretations of control implies that the control literature does not claim a single dominant 
paradigm representing coherent and consistent laws, theories, applications and methodologies 
(Macintosh, 1995). The traditional definitions of control as given in accounting books published 
in the US mainly apply to large organizations with many divisions. Here control is exercised to 
monitor the performance of division managers. Robert Anthony, for example, defines 
Post-privatisation changes in management control, firm activities and performance 
  
 38 
management control as ‘the process by which managers ensure that resources are obtained and 
used effectively and efficiently in the accomplishment of the organisation’s objectives’ (1967: 
cited in Otley et al., 1995, p.S32). However, this particular definition of control solely focuses 
on controlling the behaviour of division managers (Puxty, 1989: cited in Otley, 1994). 
According to the definition of Anthony, the organizational strategy is the starting point, on the 
basis of which MCS serves as a tool to support its adoption. Traditional MCS definitions also 
start from the assumption that employees are not allowed to participate and that control is 
exercised in favour of the owners (Wickramasinghe, 1996). Control systems of this kind may 
result in tight control, disciplinary actions and unfair wages. Moreover, they may create a 
climate in which employees are not being motivated to improve their productivity. In this way, 
firm performance is not stimulated and the development of a nation is undermined (ibid). 
 
Both internal and external environmental changes have determined the nature of businesses 
today. This process of change started in the 1990s (Otley, 1994). Otley stresses that the 
management of today’s businesses requires flexibility, a wider focus, a larger degree of 
adaptation and a willingness to learn. The traditional control systems, however, are not based on 
these concepts. Otley therefore argues that Anthony’s definition is no longer up-to-date and that 
it is obstructive to the development of the field of management accounting. The more recent 
MCS literature particularly aims at worker-oriented control systems (e.g. Macintosh, 1995). 
Here the focus is on a clear participation of the workers in the decision-making process. The 
notion is that if workers are being trained in this direction, they will become more motivated in 
their work, and as a result the labour productivity will increase. In such circumstances, the firm 
will be inclined to pay its workforce more, encouraging investors to make additional 
investments (Wickramasinghe, 1996). 
 
In business organizations management control systems play a pivotal role, as they serve as an 
instrument to survive in an uncertain environment. Otley argues that in a climate of continuous 
change management is forced to adapt itself constantly, which requires the active involvement 
of a larger number of organizational participants. This means that there is a need for the 
empowerment of the lower levels of the organization. In this context, MCS can be used as a 
control tool by work groups on all levels. Empowerment means giving the lower levels in the 
organization both authority and responsibility, so lower-level managers are encouraged to take 
whatever action is necessary to achieve the organizational goals. 
In addition, studies on performance measurement suggest that the integration of both financial 
and non-financial control methods facilitates the achievement of organizational objectives (e.g., 
Flapper et al., 1996; Eccles, 1991). According to Simons (1995) an MCS-definition should 
include the ‘inherent tension’ between freedom and constraint, empowerment and 
accountability, top-down management and bottom-up creativity, and experimentation and 
efficiency. 
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In this study the definition of Simons (1995: p.5) is adopted: ‘Management control systems are 
the formal, information-based routines and procedures managers use to maintain or alter 
patterns in organizational activities’. This definition is broader than that of Anthony’s since it 
enables us to address the internal and external contexts of firms. Simons’ definition also shows 
how managers control strategy (that is strategy formation and implementation) by balancing the 
above-mentioned tensions (Simons, 1995). Moreover, this definition encourages the integration 
of financial and non-financial performance measures and takes into account the wider 
participation and empowerment of employees. In this way most of the issues left out in earlier 
MCS definitions are being covered. 
 
In sections 2.5 and 3.3 we investigate the external and internal environmental changes that may 
necessitate adaptations in MCS practices. We prefer Simons’ definition because it allows the 
possibility of observing MCS practice changes in the wider socio-economic and political 
contexts of LDCs. Simons (1995) distinguishes between four control systems relevant in the 
analysis of the average firm. These control systems are diagnostic systems, beliefs systems, 
boundary systems, and interactive systems. 
 
Diagnostic Systems: are the formal information systems that managers use to monitor 
organizational outcomes and to detect deviations from the objectives set. Examples of diagnostic 
systems are business plans and budgets. They function as tools for the manager in monitoring 
and evaluating the business results. It is argued that the evaluation of business processes and 
results improves the allocation of resources and stimulates managerial motivation. The data 
produced by diagnostic systems are expected to be accurate. The systems are also used to 
measure the output variables, or performance levels, of business strategies adopted by 
organizations. They are based on performance variables, such as effectiveness and efficiency. 
However, these performance variables may change when organizations alter their business 
strategy. 
 
Beliefs Systems: are formal systems used by top managers to define, communicate, and reinforce 
the basic values, purposes, and direction of the organization. Belief systems state the 
organization’s core values, the performance level desired, and the way in which the individual 
workers and staff members are expected to handle relationships both internally and externally. 
Beliefs systems are conveyed through formal documents, such as credos, mission statements, 
and business objective statements. They are used to set the direction of strategic change, and to 
energise and inspire the workforce in the process of entrepreneurial growth. Beliefs systems are 
generally used to empower and commit the individual workers to the organization’s objectives 
and to its direct search for new opportunities. 
 
Boundary Systems: are formal systems based on predefined business risks, which are used to set 
limits on opportunity-seeking behaviour. They set the boundaries of both strategic choice and 
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business conduct. For example, when environmental uncertainty is high or internal trust is low, 
senior managers may take measures that define business conduct on the basis of these systems. 
Boundary systems may constrain the degree of freedom of managers, and as a result make 
creativity more focused. Boundary systems are stated in negative terms, for example sanctions. 
However, they serve as an instrument to curtail high costs resulting from commercial 
experiments and they allow managers to delegate decision-making. If improperly set though, 
boundaries may hinder the adaptation to changing product, market, technological, and 
environmental conditions. 
 
Interactive Systems: are formal information systems managers use to engage directly into the 
decision-making of subordinates. The data are provided by underlying systems and available for 
managers throughout the organization on a recurring basis. These control systems help in 
focussing attention on particular issues, creating dialogue, and stimulating learning, thereby 
allowing new ideas and strategies to emerge in response to opportunities or threats in the 
competitive environment. However, this requires a climate that values openness and accepts 
constructive criticism and debate. Interactive systems are highly useful in case of strategic 
uncertainty, when inventive change and opportunity seeking is required. Examples of strategic 
uncertainty are changes in technology and customers’ tastes, government regulations and 
industrial competition. The design of interactive systems is based on the analysis of these 
uncertainties, and their aim is to facilitate pro-active decision-making. 
The relationship between an organization’s business strategy and the four control systems can be 
depicted as follows: 
 
          
    Beliefs         Boundary  




  Interactive     Diagnostic 
    Control      Control 
    Systems     Systems 
 
                                                  
Figure 3.1 Relationship between business strategy and the four control systems 
 
In general, beliefs and interactive control systems stimulate inventive and innovative action, 
whereas diagnostic and boundary control systems serve to constrain decision-making and ensure 
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results and facilitate ‘single loop’ learning15, whereas interactive control systems focus on 
processes and facilitate ‘double loop’ learning. Beliefs and boundary systems are important 
when opportunities expand and the pressure to increase business performance grows. Simons 
argues that an effective strategy implementation requires a balance between the four control 
systems. In this way a strategy can be approached from several perspectives; its planning stage, 
its structure and pattern, and its position within the context as a whole. 
 
3.3 Recent developments and internal change drivers of MCS: 
 
Little is known about the change processes of MCS in firms in LDCs. In the case of LDCs the 
privatisation process may cause organizational change in terms of ownership form, additional 
investments, the composition and powers of the accounting staff, managerial attitude, etc. These 
changes may affect the way in which management control systems are being used. For example, 
firms may decide to automate their production process, involving the development of machine 
and equipment performance measures. Or cost structures may change, requiring a revision of the 
overhead cost application rates. Furthermore, competition may increase the focus on quality 
standards and their related cost information. However, MCS change may be hindered by 
problems applying particularly to companies in LDCs, such as shortages in accounting staff, a 
lack of authority, difficulties in recruiting new staff members, a lack of effective means of 
communication within firms, a strong emphasis on external reporting and a lack of interest and 
support on the part of managers and owners. 
 
In our assessment of MCS changes and our description of the internal factors, we have partly 
drawn on contingency theory, since it enables us to explain MCS change on the basis of a 
number of influencing variables (Innes & Mitchell, 1990). In order to collect evidence on the 
use of new management control systems attention will be paid to recent innovations in MCS 
techniques. In our evaluation of MCS innovations, we will identify the problems associated with 
the traditional MCS practices and address the motives for innovation. In this way we will be 
able to obtain more insight into the necessity for MCS change and analyse the prediction of 
privatisation advocates that LDCs will be eager to adopt new MCS techniques. The aim of this 
chapter is to assess developments in MCS practices and how these are internally influenced. We 
will then build our conceptual framework on the basis of our findings. First, we will describe the 
innovations in the area of MCS. After that, we will discuss the internal factors that necessitate 
changes in MCS practices. 
                                                           
15 Single loop learning refers to process control by means of single feedback, whereas double loop learning serves 
to analyse the motives for the strategy chosen. Double loop learning involves a double feedback loop that 
connects the detection of error with both the strategy chosen and the norms that define effective performance 
(Simons, 1995: 106). 
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3.3.1 Innovations in MCS:  
As already mentioned, development accounting researchers and aid agencies claim that 
privatised firms are likely to implement improved MCS techniques to help them deal with the 
continuous environmental changes. This section will describe the developments in MCS 
practices, which will enable us to obtain a view of the type of MCS changes that can be 
expected to take place in privatised firms. 
 
Why MCS change? As already explained, the problems associated with the traditional 
management control systems are mainly the result of its underlying old conceptions. For a long 
time, the definition of MCS was narrow, leaving no room for adjustments required as a result of 
internal and external changes as well as environmental developments. It has been suggested that 
economic, social and political forces drive organizational change in ways not yet entirely 
understood. For example, Shields (1997) and Scapens (1999) argue that changes in the 
environment cause changes within organizations, which in turn cause changes in MCS practices 
(see also Atkinson et. al., 1997). Generally, accounting is expected to respond to environmental 
changes, since these changes have an impact on the stability of organizations. If no attention is 
paid to external influences and management is not capable of dealing with them, an organization 
may be seriously undermined, and even be in danger of bankruptcy (Sunder, 2004). Therefore, 
managers should continually be aware of existing and potential threats and be capable of 
anticipating them by adjusting their policies in a timely, vigilant and creative manner (Sunder, 
2002). So management control systems should be designed to provide information that supports 
management in decision-making, and they should be modified each time environmental changes 
occur (Lee, 1987). 
 
After firms have been privatised, they are faced with the challenges associated with the private 
market environment. In general, newly privatised firms are expected to readjust their core values 
and mission statements instantly, and adopt a more focussed and goal-oriented approach. Such 
an approach is crucial in achieving a successful standard of performance. In this respect, the 
firm’s management are the main actors responsible for the company’s future. They are the ones 
who may adopt proactive strategies and anticipate environmental changes. That is why after the 
privatisation process top-management may have to be replaced. As pointed out by Ramaswamy 
(2001), in most LDCs the managers of public enterprises are bureaucrats rather than 
businessmen. They are often political appointees or seconded by the Civil Service (Shirley & 
Nellis, 1991). It is therefore not surprising that most of them lack the necessary management 
skills and are less qualified than their counterparts in the private sector (Ramaswamy & Von 
Glinow, 2000). Moreover, in LDCs they have less opportunity to develop these skills. In 
addition, they are not familiar with the concept of involving lower levels of the organization in 
the decision making process, which entails aspects such as selecting employees, training and 
development, reward and compensation systems and performance measurement.  
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It is argued that the traditional approaches towards management control systems do not result in 
the vital provision of information that managers need to be able to develop their strategic 
priorities. Private ownership demands proactive business strategies that anticipate the erratic 
movements of the market (Okeahialam & Kedslie, 1999). So accounting practices should 
produce effective, timely, and accurate information that supports the decision-making process 
(United Nations, 1991: cited in Okeahialam & Kedslie, 1999). MCS practices should be, among 
other things, focussed on generating accurate costs, relate processes and activities to strategic 
outcomes, and provide elaborate performance evaluation (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998b). 
They should be in line with the privatisation policies, and if this is not the case, they should be 
renewed. The MCS in sub-Saharan Africa require fewer adjustments, since they are based on 
systems already used in the UK and France (Okeahialam & Kedslie, 1999). 
 
Critics observe that the traditional MCS techniques do no longer fit in with the conditions of the 
contemporary business environment, involving global competition, rapid technological change 
and the development of new management approaches (see Adler et al., 2000; Bunce et al., 1995; 
Bromwich & Bhimani, 1994; Kaplan, 1994; Johnson, 1992; Cooper, 1988). As a result, new 
MCS practices16 as well as new management and production techniques are being introduced. 
The focus is especially on cost control, for instance by means of better estimations of resource 
quantities (IFAC, 1998). Often cost control goes hand in hand with employee empowerment. It 
is generally acknowledged that by updating their MCS techniques firms substantially improve 
their competitive position on the market (see Adler et al., 2000). 
 
However, in a number of Asian countries the adaptation of new MCS practices has not yet been 
introduced (Sulaiman et al., 2004). These countries are Singapore, Malaysia, China and India. 
Here the traditional systems are still being used, in particular for cost control, product pricing, 
and the assessment of investments and management performance (Adler et al., 2000). In these 
countries the traditional systems are still considered to be beneficial. In addition, the mentality 
of managers is conservative and they are inclined to avoid risk. Moreover, implementing new 
MCS techniques involves high costs. Adler et al. (2000) also report on lack of time and the 
availability of the relevant software, a passive attitude of management, and the costs involved in 
hiring skilful employees. In general, important factors in the reluctance towards MCS 
innovation are the lack of awareness of new systems as well as the minor degree of expertise 
and support on the part of top-management. The study conducted on Saudi firms also reveals 
that the factors hindering innovation in MCS practices include vast oil revenues, low level of 
competition, and nominal use of computers (El-Ebaishi et al., 2003).   
                                                           
16 Examples of recent innovations in MCS include activity-based costing (ABC), activity-based budgeting and 
activity-based management (ABM), strategic management accounting, the balanced scorecard, non-financial 
performance measures and economic value analysis (see Chenhall, 2003; Anderson & Young, 1999; Ittner & 
Larcker, 1998). Other examples are cost modelling, quality reporting, target costing, back flush costing, 
throughput accounting, just in time (JIT) methods, benchmarking, product and customer profitability analysis, 
and life-cycle costing (Baines & Langfielf-Smith, 2003; Adler et al., 2000; Berliner & Brimson, 1988). 




In brief, the literature indicates that internal factors determine whether or not enterprises decide 
to change their MCS practices. 
3.3.2 Internal factors that influence MCS change 
Innes and Mitchell (1990) state that MCS change involves the interaction of several variables, 
for example the availability of an adequate accounting staff, computing resources, and the 
degree of authority that a firm ascribes to the accounting function. These variables relate to 
conditions favourable to MCS change. Other variables are associated with factors that in fact 
influence MCS change. These are competitiveness of the market, production technology, and the 
product cost structure. Finally, there are conditions that are directly connected with MCS 
change. The variables associated with these conditions are, for example, the loss of market 
share, a new accounting staff member or a decrease in the firm’s profitability. 
According to the contingency theory, organizational design and MCS practices are affected by 
contingency factors (Sharma & Nandan, 2000; Fisher, 1995; Otley, 1980). An effective design, 
which matches internal organizational elements with contingency factors (Burrell & Morgan, 
1979), is believed to lead to an effective business performance (Langfield-Smith, 1997; Otley, 
1980). In this study we will use the following contingency factors as relevant predictors of MCS 
change: competition, size, the capacity to change (Libby & Waterhouse, 1996), the introduction 
of new technology, and change of strategy (Haldma & Lääts, 2002). In addition, we include the 
institutional factor ‘capacity to undertake action’. We selected the internal factors on the basis of 
their relevance as confirmed by the results obtained in our pilot study and fieldwork. We believe 
that the above-mentioned factors play an important role in MCS change and that they may 
enable us to analyse and explain the phenomenon more thoroughly. As competition is an 
external factor, it has already been discussed in Chapter 2.  
 
The contingency approach views MSC change from two perspectives. The first is MCS change 
in relation to the entire spectrum of changes within a firm at a given period of time (Damanpour, 
1987, Daft & Becker, 1978; cited in Libby & Waterhouse, 1996), and the second refers to the 
extent to which MCS change is being integrated into business operations (Downs & Mohr, 
1976). Other research methods are aimed at determining the rate at which enterprises adopt new 
MCS techniques or on measuring MCS change by establishing the extent to which a particular 
set of MCS techniques is being applied. Some researchers base their findings on cross-country 
comparisons, whereas others conduct comparative studies in one country. 
In the following sections we will deal with MCS change on the basis of the internal change 
factors mentioned-above. 
 
Size: Firm size appears to be an important factor in the use of management control systems. 
Large enterprises use MCS quite extensively, whereas smaller firms are less inclined to do so 
(Chiu, 1973; Savage, 1966: cited in El-Ebaishi et al., 2003). The costs associated with MCS 
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innovation are considerable. It should therefore not be surprising that cost is the major 
impediment for introducing new MCS techniques (Libby & Waterhouse, 1996). Size is 
generally defined as the number of employees working in an organization. Many studies have 
shown that a firm’s size declines after privatisation (see section 3.5.1). We expect that this will 
have an impact on the use of MCS, which indeed appeared to be the case in some of our case 
firms. 
 
Organizational capacity to learn: The introduction of innovations in MCS techniques mainly 
depends on whether the enterprise has sufficient know-how to implement them (Cohn & 
Levinthal, 1990), and if not, whether it is capable of providing the necessary training, or whether 
it is in the position to hire skilled employees (Firth, 1996). Another condition for a successful 
implementation of new MCS techniques is the full support of senior management and a 
sufficient degree of commitment on the part of the organization as a whole. Further, it appears 
that the organizational capacity to learn is enhanced through the formation of joint ventures with 
multinational firms (see Firth, 1996). 
 
Public firms are generally considered less efficient than private enterprises. This can be 
explained by the nature of public sector management, involving a lower degree of incentive and 
interest alignment (Kumar, 2004). In addition, it is argued that managers of public enterprises 
have fewer decision-making responsibilities, and so they do not require elaborate management 
control systems. However, in order to survive in privatised environments managements need 
more sophisticated MCS. In addition, Dzakpasu (1998) shows that especially in Ghana, 
Tanzania and Uganda ‘effective managerial practices’ are crucial because in these countries the 
privatised environment has not yet fully developed and matured. His study also indicates that 
improvements in the effectiveness of the management of the privatised enterprises in these 
countries have increased firm performance. 
 
The introduction of new technology: The introduction of new technologies has changed the 
structure of manufacturing costs. New technologies, such as computer-integrated manufacturing 
and JIT systems, indicate that the proportion of variable direct labour and inventory costs is 
declining. The speed of an operation is no longer determined by how fast an operator can work, 
but by the type of automation and manufacturing system used (Dhavale, 1996). And since the 
traditional cost control systems are mainly focussed on variance analysis, aggregation of costs 
and inventory do not provide management with the proper information about resource 
consumption. In addition, they may fail to give the proper information about the manufacturing 
performance achieved on the basis of new technological processes (Bruggeman & Slagmulder, 
1995; Kaplan, 1994; Gosse, 1993). That is why new MCS techniques, such as ABM, life-cycle 
costing, target costing, and benchmarking, are clearly gaining momentum (Granlund & Lukka, 
1998). These techniques provide better approach to resource management and are focussed on 
the customer (e.g., Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998a; Elnathan et al., 1996). Concurrently, 
Post-privatisation changes in management control, firm activities and performance 
  
 46 
quality improvement programmes are introduced, directed at the elimination of waste, the 
development of employees’ skills and cost reduction (Sim & Killough, 1998). There is clearly a 
positive relation between the introduction of technology innovation and the degree of 
specialization of the staff (Kimberly & Evanisko, 1981). El-Ebaishi et al., (2003) however, 
argue that although developing countries recognise the necessity of updating their technology, 
they fail to pay sufficient attention to the development of management skills. In some LDCs, 
therefore, the low performance of public firms could partly be explained by their poor 
management (e.g., Dzakpasu, 1998). 
 
Strategy changes: The same applies to the basic strategic management processes of both family 
and non-family businesses in that a strategy, either implicit or explicit, has to be formulated, 
implemented and controlled on the basis of a set of goals. The owner(s) of a family firm are 
likely to control each single step in the business process (Sharma, Chrisman & Chua, 1997). 
According to Govindarajan and Shank (1992), in order to make MCS effective they have to be 
matched with a suitable strategy. Achieving success in a dynamic business environment requires 
strategies aimed at quality improvement, flexibility with respect to customers’ requirements as 
well as a reduction in lead times, inventories and production costs (Lucas, 1997: cited in 
Sulaiman et al, 2004). In addition, Anderson and Lanen (1999) examined the relationship 
between the competitive strategies of firms and MCS change after the 1991 Indian liberalisation 
process. They argue that MCS change accompanies other organizational changes, and that the 
traditional systems are used in qualitatively different ways. Chenhall and Langfield-Smith 
(1998b) and Callahan and Gabriel (1998), however, show a direct relationship between high 
business performance and the introduction of new MCS techniques, such as quality 
improvement programmes, benchmarking, balanced performance measures and ABM in firms 
that emphasise product differentiation strategies (see also Chenhall & Morris, 1995). Modern 
MCS techniques are focussed on differentiation priorities such as quality, delivery and customer 
service, whereas the traditional systems are more finance-oriented. Strategies focussed on the 
requirements of the customer are usually combined with empowerment of the lower staff 
(Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998b). In this customer-oriented context, the traditional 
performance measures are no longer effective (Shank, 1989). 
 
There are also firms that try to achieve cost efficiency by improving the traditional systems. 
These improvements include the downsizing of operations and reducing non-value-added 
activities (Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998b). Another way of achieving cost effectiveness is 
by investing in new plants (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). Enterprises that adopt low price strategy 
generally use the traditional control systems, such as budgetary performance measures and 
variance analysis, to realise cost control (Johnson & Kaplan, 1987). Moreover, ABC systems are 
well recommended for controlling costs. 
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Capacity to undertake action: This factor includes issues such as the development of skills, the 
availability of resources, the influence of power, management attitude and institutional 
isomorphism. The capacity to undertake action is expected to play an important role in MCS 
change. The ability to cope with the dynamic and constantly changing internal and external 
forces has become a key determinant of organizational survival and gaining competitive 
advantage (Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). In this context, the neo-institutional theory provides a 
model of change that enables one to link the organizational context with intra-organizational 
dynamics. An important factor in intra-organizational dynamics is the capacity to undertake 
action17. Closely connected with this factor are the elements ‘availability of skills’ and 
‘resources’. We expect the capacity to undertake action to be an influential factor in MCS 
change. Another element that is expected to improve this factor is former experience of the 
organization with change processes (Amburgey et al., 1993).  
 
Generally, groups in an organization vary in their ability to influence organizational change due 
to their power differential. Some have more potential than others to facilitate or resist change. 
The pressure to change may emanate from behaviour of dominant groups in organizations that 
are not satisfied with the way in which their interests are promoted. Thus, change is expected to 
take place when those in privileged positions and with sufficient power are in favour of it 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996). Therefore, with respect to MCS change the support and 
involvement of top-management is imperative (Bruns & Kaplan, 1986). In the case of small 
privately-owned firms, Young (1987)18 suggests that the owner/manager’s personal behaviour 
highly influences the enterprise’s strategic course and ultimately its success. This behaviour 
actually reflects the owner/manager’s power to determine the direction of the firm, developing 
as a result of his/her unique influential position (Collins & Moore, 1970). The manager’s 
perceptions also influence the organizational task processes. For example, the owner or the 
manager is the one who dictates the decision criteria regarding issues such as product and 
service quality. And he or she may be either a good or an inadequate budgeter or negotiator, 
may spend too much or too little time on developing new ideas, or be extremely focussed on 
particular processes while neglecting others (Young, 1987). 
 
According to El-Ebaishi et al., the nature of the Saudi society, described as closed and 
conservative, hinders the introduction of new MCS practices. It is to be expected that it will take 
a long time to convince company managers to start using new management control systems. 
Therefore, El-Ebaishi et al. argue that management attitudes play a crucial role in the decision to 
introduce new MCS. So in this respect education and information on the importance and 
benefits of up-to-date control systems are desirable. As stated by Goldkuhl and Nilsson (2000), 
                                                           
17 The ‘capacity to undertake action’ is the ability to manage the transition process step by step. This involves three 
aspects: 1) having a clear conception of the new destination, 2) adopting an adequate strategy to reach this 
destination, and 3) having the skills and competencies to operate successfully in the new environment 
(Greenwood & Hinings, 1996).  
18 http:// www.sbaer.uca.edu/research/sbida/1987/PDF/23.pdf. 
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the continuous improvement and expansion of knowledge is vital for the development and 
performance of organizations. If knowledge and techniques are not continuously updated, an 
organization’s progress is obstructed. In the case of Eritrean firms, the dependence of business 
owners/managers on family and friends is also a factor that impedes proper development of 
MCS. 
 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983: cited in Firth, 1996) mention institutional isomorphism as an 
example of a process by which accounting innovations are transferred. It involves the adoption 
of the accounting practices, the performance and evaluation policies and the budgetary plans of 
the parent company by the subsidiary. Transfers of this kind are in particular facilitated by the 
formation of joint ventures with foreign firms. For instance, the decision of the Chinese 
government to form joint ventures with foreign firms was motivated by the objective to 
modernise the technology of the public enterprises by introducing more sophisticated accounting 
and management techniques (Firth, 1996). In this context, studies suggest that US firms are 
more persistent in sharing their management styles, structures (Firth, 1996) and home-country 
practices (Björkman & Xiucheng, 2002) than countries such as Japan. 
One of the methods to stimulate the transfer of MCS practices is providing formal training to the 
accounting staff. In addition, the size and age of a joint venture play a role in the diffusion of 
improved MCS techniques. 
 
The literature presented in this section describes the influence of internal factors on MCS 
change. It is claimed that there is a positive relationship between the improvement of MCS 
practices and the increase in firm performance. The relation among MCS practices, internal 




Figure 3.2 Relations among change drivers, MCS practices, and firm operations and performance.  
 
To sum up our discussion, we present table 3.1 below, containing a list of internal change 
drivers discussed in this section together with their measurement criteria and their expected 
relationship with or implications for organizational and MCS change (Waweru et al., 2004; 
Haldma & Lääts, 2002; Libby & Waterhouse, 1996).  
 
So far, we have described the internal factors that drive MCS change and the way in which MCS 
practices are expected to develop as a result of them. The literature will help us to investigate 
how MCS practices are evolving and what role(s) internal factors play in the process of 
transition. Besides studying the role and effects of the above-mentioned change drivers, we will 
conduct an in-depth study on the individual MCS techniques of firms to obtain a wider picture 
Change Drivers MCS practices Firm operation & 
performance 
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of the changes made. In the next sections we will present the most common MCS techniques 
and their expected changes.  
 
Table 3.1 The implications of change drivers for organizational and MCS change 
MCS change 
drivers: 
Criteria to be used as measures 
for the change drivers 
Expected implications for organizational and 
MCS change 
1. Size - Number of employees in a firm - Smaller firms are presumed to have fewer resources 
for innovation, to be less divisionalised, and employ 
few MCS practices relative to large companies. 
2.  Organizational 
capacity to 
learn 
- Extent or amount of MCS 
techniques and management 
accounting staff present in an 
organization 
- Support of top-management for 
MCS innovations and managerial 
effectiveness  
- A high degree of organizational capacity to learn 
facilitates MCS change 
- The extent of MCS knowledge, the interest in and 
approval for use, and the expertise of owners and/or 
managers affect the design and operation of MCS 
3. Introduction of  
new technology 
- Nature of the production 
processes, their degree of routine 
- Change of production 
technology 
- Firms that operate with computerised or automated 
technologies mostly use new MCS practices, they are 
also stimulated to use budgets as control devices 
4. Change of 
strategy 
- Change of strategic orientation 
towards differentiation or low 
price directions (Provision of: on-
time delivery, high quality 
products, effective after-sales 
service and support) 
- Ability to make changes in 
design and introduce new 
products, to make products widely 
available, to make rapid volume-
product mix changes, and 
emphasis on cost control 
- Product differentiation strategies: encourage firms 
to adopt new MCS techniques to serve customer 
preferences and enhance firm performance; 
employees need to adopt a  customer-oriented 
attitude and should be given empowerment  
- Traditional MCS practices do not allow the pursuit 
of customer satisfaction and quality improvement  
- Low price strategy leads to the downsizing of 
operations and the reduction in non-value-added 
activities; it also motivates cost control using both 
traditional MCS practices and ABC 
5. Capacity to 
undertake 
action 
- Availability of skills and 
resources 
- Power to enforce 
implementation of MCS practice 
change 
- Personal behaviour, perceptions, 
trust, experience and knowledge 
of managers/owners concerning 
MCS 
- Institutional isomorphism 
(diffusion of practices from parent 
to joint-venture firm) 
- High organizational capacity to undertake action is 
associated with rapid organizational and MCS 
change in new joint-venture firms 
- Possession of the required skills, resources and 
determination play a significant role in MCS change 
- The behaviour of managers combined with their 
knowledge and experience with MCS influences the 
strategic course and ultimately firm performance 
- The reliance on family members is expected to 
affect the operation of formal MCS practices in 
privatised firms 
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3.4 MCS techniques: 
 
Agency theory predicts that privatisation will lead to the design of improved MCS including 
accounting systems (Macias, 2002). Advocates of privatisation presume that subsequent 
superior MCS will induce more transparent accounting and improved firm performance (Vickers 
& Yarrow, 1988). Their assumption is that MCS practices of privately owned firms including 
their accounting techniques are superior and can be established in privatised firms. Thus, 
privatisation is expected to facilitate introduction of MCS similar to the one practiced by 
Western private firms. It is therefore assumed that the replacement of the traditional 
bureaucratic and inefficient control systems by new MCS techniques, which are product-
oriented and more effective, will instantly result in an improved economic welfare (Uddin, 
1997; Waters, 1985). The assumption is that privatised firms would introduce MCS that is 
coupled to economic rewards and more efficient allocation of resources, supplemented by new 
initiatives such as total quality management, continuous improvement and enhanced benefits to 
employees. Moreover, internal control becomes more sensitive in adjusting operations to market 
information and communications would improve along with advances in information 
technology. Also, a relatively transparent, modern and market oriented accounting system would 
be established in order to assist firms in their decision-making processes, reporting and overall 
achievement of firm objectives (Hopper et al. 2004a). Like wise, the World Bank and the IMF 
encourage LDCs to pursue privatisation policies with the expectation that ownership change will 
induce improved [or superior] MCS and firm performance (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). Here, 
superior MCS is presumed to be a transparent, incentive based control with market driven 
budgets that are free from politics and bureaucracy. Also, improved MCS is expected to be a 
system that ensures participation of both managers and employees in the control process, and 
that enforces proper accountability and responsibility for managers and employees. 
 
For this study we have selected the most important and common MCS techniques. These have 
been documented in detail in the literature, and will serve as our starting point in investigating 
the expected MCS change. They include planning and budgeting, internal reporting and 
decision-making, product costing and pricing, cost control and waste minimisation, and 
performance measurement and evaluation. We will discuss their concepts, the degree to which 
they are used, their importance and the changes they are expected to undergo. As already 
mentioned, there is not much documentation on MCS change in LDCs, and the current literature 
may not provide us a suitable framework for our research topic. It mainly includes survey 
studies that do not offer detailed information. We will, however, present a review of former 
studies on MCS change to help us develop our framework. This review will enable us to identify 
the various new MCS components and techniques and to assess their usefulness.  
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3.4.1 Planning and Budgeting 
The budget has various functions. It serves as a system of authorisation, as a means of 
forecasting, planning, performance evaluation and control, as a channel of communication and 
co-ordination, as a motivational device, as a basis for decision-making and as a tool for the 
efficient allocation of scarce resources (e.g., Sulaiman et al., 2004). In the private sector, the 
budget is considered as an instrument for the objective and rational control of sub-units. 
However, this approach has its limitations. Accounting researchers argue that control based on 
the budget is only effective if socio-political and cultural factors are being taken into account 
(Hopper et al., 1986; Tinker et al., 1982; Tinker, 1980; Burchell et al., 1980). Hoque and 
Hopper (1997), for example, show the way in which the budgeting process within the 
nationalised jute mills in Bangladesh has been constrained by political factors and industrial 
turbulence. Their study indicates that contextual factors affect budget-related issues. They argue 
that there is a significant connection between the budget-related behaviour of managers and 
environmental factors, which is in line with the claims made by the contingency theory. Besides, 
factors such as political and industrial relations, that were previously neglected, play an 
important role. 
 
Anderson and Lanen (1999) state that after the economic reform in India in 1991 the planning 
process became more decentralised, giving employees more insight into the firms’ strategic 
objectives. Consequently, budgeting policies have now become more realistic as a result of the 
adoption of standard procedures. Furthermore, there is a greater involvement of employees in 
these policies and their revisions. In this respect, the information on customer expectations and 
satisfaction has gained importance. 
 
El-Ebaishi et al. (2003) reported that more than 74 percent of Saudi firms use master budget and 
prepare sales budget. Production budgets are mainly used by larger firms. More than 60% of the 
sample firms revise their budgets. Moreover, evidence shows that some firms use new 
management control systems, such as product life-cycle and JIT. However, most Saudi firms are 
family-owned businesses managed in the first place by the owners; the level of participation of 
the other managers is relatively low. Here accounting and budgeting control techniques are less 
common, but ‘management attitude’ seems to play a crucial role in the choice of MCS use. 
Other studies indicate that family businesses rely more on informal controls than non-family 
firms do (Hopper et al., 2004b; Daily & Dollinger, 1992; Geeraerts, 1984: cited in Sharma et al., 
1997). 
3.4.2 Product Costing and Pricing 
The traditional absorption costing systems, generally based on labour costs/hours, have been 
criticised as inaccurate instruments for decision-making in highly automated firms where labour 
is negligible. Traditionally, overhead costs are allocated to cost centres (departments and 
products), depending on labour cost percentages as a blanket rate. This approach, however, does 
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not yield the cost information required for automated firms, and therefore forms no sound basis 
for decision-making (Duck R.E.V., 2001). That is why ABC was introduced (Ahmed, 1992). 
ABC identifies ‘cost drivers’. It is, however, not widely used in LDCs (e.g., El-Ebaishi et al., 
2003). 
 
According to Abdel-Kader and Luther (2004) only fifty percent of the firms studied separate 
their costs into variable and fixed components, although most of them believe that this method 
supports the decision-making process. Survey results indicate that especially the smaller firms 
do not apply this technique because it is rather complicated (e.g. Duck R.E.V., 2001). Abdel-
Kader and Luther note that variable costing is much more common than the various forms of 
absorption costing. A study by Anderson and Lanen (1999) shows that after the 1991 reforms in 
India, firms have been using cost data for quoting, pricing, planning and process improvement 
purposes. Prior to the reforms, cost data was primarily used to evaluate production employees. 
El-Ebaishi et al.’s survey on Saudi companies (2003) shows that only 60 percent apply standard 
costing, although almost all firms sampled consider this method to be important. Adler et al. 
(2000) show in a study on New Zealand manufacturers that full costing is the most popular 
MCS technique used in this country. It appears to be more popular than any of the new MCS 
techniques. 
 
Surveys suggest that the majority of enterprises rely on full cost rather than on variable cost 
information for their pricing policies (e.g., Drury & Tayles, 2000; Shim & Sudit, 1995; 
Govindarajan & Anthony, 1983). However, the accounting literature states that short-run prices 
should be based on variable costs (e.g., Garrison & Noreen, 1997; Horngren et al., 1996). On the 
other hand, in the long term all costs are treated as variable (Pashigian, 1998).  
3.4.3 Internal Reporting and Decision-making  
Macias (2002) argues that efficient decision-making requires information provided on a timely, 
uniform and regular basis. It involves choosing among alternative courses of action by means of 
an incremental analysis approach (Weygandt et al., 2002). Studies observe a tendency towards 
the regular provision of information within the decision-making process, whereby non-financial 
measures play an increasing role (Libby & Waterhouse, 1996). Drury et al. (1993) list a number 
of challenges with respect to the effectiveness of management accounting reporting. They are: 
transferring accurate information on-line to the shop floor in a timely manner, adapting the 
information system in such a way that it interfaces with other systems and becomes real-time. 
 
Anderson and Lanen (1999) state that, after the reforms in 1991, Indian companies started to 
apply accounting techniques for managerial purposes along with external reporting 
requirements. Improvements were in particularly promoted by obtaining internal information on 
process variation by means of quality measures. Their study also shows an increased demand for 
data and a focus on decision-making based on facts. 
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3.4.4 Cost Control and Waste Minimisation 
Duck R.E.V. (2001) claims that cost reduction methods involve a periodic reappraisal of issues 
such as components used, design, possible substitution with cheaper materials, and production 
methods. Scrap control can also be used for cost reduction purposes. With regard to the control 
of labour costs, labour efficiency and labour productivity techniques are commonly used to 
assess the production levels attained. Labour productivity measurements result in output 
measured in physical units and calculated as output per man-hour, however only for productive 
labour. 
 
Quality is a vital component in business strategies of which the improvement is closely linked to 
the competitive environment (Adam et al., 2001). In this respect, the focus of firms on the 
customer as well as on the involvement of employees is positively related to quality 
improvement. Adam et al.’s study shows that an increase in the involvement of employees in 
Mexico and the USA led to quality improvement in terms of decreased costs of internal failures, 
defective items and costs of quality. 
3.4.5 Performance Measurement and Evaluation 
The literature generally classifies performance measures into two broad categories, named 
financial and non-financial items. The changes that are expected to take place refer to 
performance measurement on both the individual and the organizational level and evaluation of 
performance in terms of quality and customer services. Details on the relative importance and 
use of financial as well as non-financial measurement tools are presented below.  
 
Financial Measures: Firms compare their budgeted figures of sales, profit and income, mostly 
based on standard costing, with their actual figures. Budget variance is also used for setting 
goals and evaluating performance (Joye & Blayney, 1990). Other financial performance 
measurements are based on budget expenditure, operating income figures, return on 
equity/assets (ROE/A), return on sales, efficiency, output, and dividend. However, financial 
measures focussed on profits, ROI, standard costs and variance analysis have been criticised 
because they provide a picture that is too narrow and have a tendency to manipulate data. 
Moreover, when using these instruments factors such as cost of capital and non-financial 
measures are not taken into account (e.g. Ittner et al., 1997; Shields, 1997; Kaplan & Norton, 
1996). Despite their disadvantages, however, they are considered functional by a large number 
of firms, as indicated by studies of Abdel-Kader & Luther (2004) and El-Ebaishi et al. (2003). 
Duck R.E.V. states that smaller businesses show a lack of interest in MCS techniques.  
 
Non-financial measures: Non-financial measurements are based on issues such as on-time 
delivery, employee training/education, customer satisfaction, employee turnover, material scrap 
loss, market share, product defects, team performance, supplier evaluations, set-up times, and 
employee satisfaction (Baines & Langfield, 2003). Research shows that the importance of non-
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financial measures is increasing; in a number of countries they are widely being applied 
(Bhimani, 1994). Other examples of non-financial measures adopted in different countries are 
based on issues such as inventory turnover, throughput, quality, innovativeness, economic value 
added, benchmarking, the balanced scorecard and working conditions (e.g. Abdel-Kader & 
Luther, 2004; Chenhall & Langfield-Smith, 1998). Research conducted by Langfield-Smith 
(1998) shows that firms that use product differentiation strategies benefit from both new MCS 
techniques and non-financial information. There are no significant data on the extent to which 
performance measures are used in LDCs. 
 
Table 3.2 contains a list of MCS techniques, including their components. The list is based on the 
work of Libby and Waterhouse (1996) and Waweru et al. (2004) and has been slightly modified 
to fit our research. 
 
Table 3.2 MCS techniques and their components   
List of MCS techniques: Components of MCS techniques to be investigated: 
1. Planning & Budgeting - Budgeting (its uses, process of preparation and level of participation) 
- Profit planning 
- Operations planning (production) 
- Co-ordination of activities 
- Long-term planning (Capital Budgeting) 
- Strategic planning 
2. Product Costing & 
Pricing  
- Type of costing system 
• Actual costing vs. Standard costing 
• Absorption vs. Variable costing 
- Nature of cost accumulation and allocation  (e.g., manufacturing 
overhead, marketing, etc) 
- Type of pricing system and use of MCS information 
- Freedom in product pricing 
3. Internal Reporting &  
    Decision-making  
- Communication of MCS information 
• Frequency of reporting information  
• Timeliness 
• Accuracy 
- Use of more non-financial measures 
- More detailed exchange of information 
- Use of existing systems but a different interpretation of the results 
- Decision-making responsibility 
4. Cost Control & Waste 
    Minimisation 
- Quality control methods 
- Waste minimisation techniques 
5. Performance 
Measurement 
    & Evaluation 
- Individual or team-based performance measures 
- Organizational performance measurements (extent of using financial 
and non-financial measures) 
- Measurement of performance in terms of quality 
- Measurement of performance in terms of customer satisfaction 
- Measurement of performance in terms of delivery innovations 
- Reward systems (pay for performance plans) 
- Reward systems (bonuses and salary increments) 
- Extent of employee benefits 
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3.5 Privatisation and Expected Firm Performance  
 
This section presents additional material on the effects of privatisation on firm performance, 
which we will compare with our case findings (chapter eight). We will describe the data 
collected and address performance measures as described in past studies. We will interpret our 
data on the basis of the performance measurement tools selected for our case study. In addition, 
we will present evidence on improvements in firm performance as a result of improved MCS 
techniques, mainly non-financial performance measures.  
3.5.1 Evidence on firm performance and measurements used  
There are several approaches to measuring and evaluating firm performance. Some studies 
mainly focus on measuring the performance of firms after the privatisation process, others 
compare the pre- and post-privatisation results of firms, and there are studies that compare the 
performance of privatised firms with that of public enterprises in a specific period. The methods 
most frequently used for measuring firm performance are based on issues such as profitability, 
labour productivity, efficiency, output, employment, leverage, and capital investment. In this 
sub-section we will give an outline of the empirical findings of different studies. First, we will 
present the positive results. Next, we will address the studies that report on negative results, and 
finally, we will deal with studies with a specific focus.  
 
Studies with positive outcomes:  
A number of theoretical as well as empirical studies support the proposition that private firms 
outperform state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and that privatisation increases the efficiency of 
divested firms. A theoretical study by Boycko et al. (1993) shows that privatisation only leads to 
efficiency improvements if both cash flow and control rights are transferred from the 
government into private hands. Boardman and Vining (1989) analysed the performance of 500 
major non-US mining and manufacturing companies in 1983. They found that private 
companies are more profitable as well as more efficient in terms of sales per employee and per 
asset than both SOEs and firms under mixed ownership. In fact, their study shows that the 
performance level of firms under mixed ownership is not significantly different from that of 
SOEs. 
 
Study by the World Bank: The World Bank made an empirical analysis of the post-privatisation 
performance of twelve companies in Britain, Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico to assess whether or 
not ownership change actually improved the efficiency of firms (Galal et al., 1994). The study 
indicates that in eleven of the twelve cases an increase in net welfare was achieved. There was 
no company where the situation of employees deteriorated, and in three cases their position 
improved considerably. Other studies have also observed significant changes in the operational 
performance of privatised companies, both in developed and developing countries (e.g. 
Megginson et al., 1994; Boubakri & Cosset, 1998). 




Comparative study: Megginson et al. (1994) conducted research in 18 countries to compare the 
pre- and post-privatisation operational and financial performance of 61 companies in 32 
industries during the period from 1961 until 1990. Their study includes both developed and 
developing countries, and shows strong improvements in the performance standards after 
privatisation without any decrease in employment. The privatised firms increased their output 
(real sales), became more profitable, raised their expenditure on capital investment, improved 
their operational efficiency in terms of output per employee (adjusted for inflation), and 
increased their labour force. Moreover, debt levels were lowered and dividend payout was 
increased. These results applied to both competitive and non-competitive industries.  
 
Studies conducted in LDCs: Boubakri and Cosset (1998) examined the financial and operational 
performance of 79 firms that were fully or partially privatised in the period from 1980 until 
1992 in 21 developing countries. Their study shows that after privatisation firm performance 
increased considerably in terms of profitability, operational efficiency, capital investments, real 
sales, employment levels, and dividends. In addition, there was a decline in leverage. Another 
study conducted in Mexico by La Porta & Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) also produced positive 
results. Data were collected in 218 non-financial privatised Mexican firms during the period 
from 1983 until 1991. The effects of privatisation on firm performance were assessed by using 
seven measurement tools. The results showed that there was a large increase in profitability; 
sales rose, while fixed assets basically remained the same. However, the number of employees 
decreased considerably. Profitability gain was illustrated by an increase in both operating and 
net income to sales ratios. La Porta and Lopez-de-Silanes explain the decrease in employment 
by the circumstance that before the introduction of privatisation these companies had an excess 
capacity of both employees and physical capital. Moreover, privatisation has led to increased 
output and government revenues in the form of taxes. 
 
The increase in firm performance as a result of privatisation is also indicated by a study of 
D’Souza et al. (2001). They conducted research in 29 countries to assess the performance of 118 
privatised companies in 28 industries during the period from 1961 until 1995. They applied 
financial and operating performance measures. D’Souza et al. observed significant 
improvements in profitability, efficiency, output per employee, real sales, and capital 
expenditure. These were achieved without any loss of employment. In addition, there was a 
decrease in leverage. 
 
Another study was conducted by Ramaswamy (2001), who explored the relationship of 
ownership status and competition on performance of SOEs as well as private firms in India 
during the period of 1990 until 1992. Performance was measured in terms of return of sales and 
return on investment. Operating efficiency was measured as a ratio of cost of goods sold to 
sales. He applied statistical analysis and found out that private firms outperformed SOEs on all 
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performance measures. In addition, the performance of SOEs sharply declined as the intensity of 
competition increased. 
 
Studies conducted in LDCs - Transition Economies: Frydman et al. (1997) examined the impact 
of privatisation on firm performance by studying about 150 Czech, Hungarian and Polish 
privatised companies during the period from 1990 until 1993. Their research was based on 
statistical tests; they compared the performance of state firms with that of privatised firms 
covering the pre- and post-privatisation period. The general conclusion of this study is that 
private ownership highly improves the performance of firms. Already in the transitional stage 
both revenue and productivity increased and costs decreased. Further, in comparison with the 93 
SOEs fewer workers lost their jobs. According to Frydman et al. their data show that once the 
subsidies have been abolished or reduced and macroeconomic reform has been introduced, the 
employment strategies are based on the principle of supply and demand.      
 
Studies with negative outcomes: 
Comparative study: A study by D’Souza and Megginson (1998) indicates that in both developed 
and developing countries employment reduced as a result of privatisation. This is because SOEs 
are usually overstaffed due to the political structure of the state-governed economies 
(Aussenegg & Jelic, 2002). 
 
Studies conducted in LDCs – Transition Economies: Harper (2001) examined the operating 
performance of 178 Czech companies that were privatised during the first wave of the voucher 
privatisation. During a two year post-privatisation period, the firms’ profitability (return on sales 
and return on total assets), net income efficiency, real sales and employment declined 
significantly. Sales efficiency increased slightly, but was not statistically significant. The study 
also shows that factors such as size and ownership have no significant effect on firm 
performance. 
 
Aussenegg and Jelic (2002) conducted research on the operational performance of 154 Polish, 
Hungarian and Czech companies that were fully or partially privatised in the period from 1990 
until 1998. Their study shows that the privatised firms did not increase their profitability. 
Moreover, their efficiency and output decreased significantly. In addition, the sales efficiency of 
more than 70 percent of the firms deteriorated, while the average net income per employee also 
decreased. There were no real changes with respect to leverage and capital investment spending, 
and the employment levels of more than 80 percent of all privatised firms dropped after 
privatisation. Aussenegg and Jelic argue that the results they found are not in line with the 
findings of similar studies conducted in countries with a transition economy. It can therefore be 
stated that the results of studies on transition economies are not conclusive. 
 
 
Post-privatisation changes in management control, firm activities and performance 
  
 58 
Studies with a specific focus: 
Studies focussed on management: Lauterbach and Vaninsky (1999) examined the effect of 
ownership structure on firm performance. They studied 280 Israeli firms, collecting data on net 
income in the period from 1992 until 1994, the total of assets and equity in 1994, and top 
management remuneration as well as ownership structure in 1994. Their conclusion, particularly 
with respect to generating income, is that owner-manager firms are less efficient than companies 
managed by a professional (non-owner) manager. Family firms that are run by their owners 
relatively performed the worst. Firms managed by non-owners generally performed better than 
those managed by owners. 
 
Studies focussed on ownership structure: Qi, et al. (1999) conducted a study to investigate 
whether and, if so, how the corporate performance of listed Chinese firms, which were partially 
privatised, was affected by the proportion of shareholding structure. Their sample consisted of 
firms listed in the Shanghai Stock Exchange in the period from 1991 until 1996. Their research 
shows that there is a positive relation between firm performance in terms of return on equity and 
legal-person shares, and a negative relation between firm performance and state-owned shares. 
So, performance appears to increase as the amount of legal-person shares exceeds that of state 
shares. 
 
Walsh and Whelan (2000) assessed the performance of 220 firms in a number of Central and 
Eastern European countries during a transition period of seven years. Performance was 
determined in terms of employment growth. The results indicate that firms owned and managed 
by outsiders outperform both the companies managed by the owner and the state-owned 
enterprises. The study shows that in various countries the effect of privatisation on employment 
tends to be ambiguous. 
 
From the evidence presented above, it can be concluded that the impact of privatisation is 
mixed, that is both positive and negative. In addition, most past studies focus on the post-
privatisation stage and fail to give a thorough analysis of MCS change and the factors that 
influence firm performance. 
 
The expected outcomes associated with the performance measurements used are given in Table 
3.3. This table serves as our basis for assessing the firm level impact of privatisation on firm 
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Table 3.3 Measurements of firm performance and expected results 
Measurements of 
Firm Performance: 
Components of the Measurement Tools: Expected results 
after privatisation 
1. Profitability - Amount of Revenues, Return on Sales, 
  Return on Assets, and Return on Equity 
Increase 
2. Labour Productivity - Growth in Labour Productivity  Increase 
3. Operational 
Efficiency 
- Sales Efficiency and Net Income Efficiency Increase 
4. Output - Real Sale (sales adjusted to inflation by using CPI)  Increase 
5. Employment & 
    Salary level 
- Growth in Employment  
- Improvements in Salary Level 
Increase 
6. Leverage - Total Debt to Asset Ratio, Long-term Debt to Asset  
   Ratio, and Long-term Debt to Equity Ratio  
Decrease 
7. Capital Investment - Capital Expenditures to Sales and Capital  
  Expenditures to Assets  
Increase 
8. Dividend Payout - Dividend to Sales Ratio and Dividend Payout Ratio Increase 
9. Taxes - Total Tax Revenues paid and Tax per unit of Sales  Increase 
 
3.5.2 Improved MCS practices in relation to firm performance 
In this sub-section we will give an overview of the Western literature on the role of improved 
MCS in firm performance. The literature presented supports the proposition that MCS 
information that provides data on both internal conditions (e.g. firm strategy and manufacturing 
technology) and external circumstances (e.g. competition, customer preferences, etc.) will 
positively contribute to the enhancement of firm performance. We use Western literature as our 
point of departure since there is no sufficient literature available dealing with the context of 
LDCs. The literature will help us structure our study and clarify the role of improved MCS. 
 
It has been argued that financial performance measures alone may not improve a company’s 
financial results, since they merely indicate the outcomes of past activities, which may not help 
to improve future performance. Non-financial measures, on the other hand, provide an insight 
into the factors that influence future financial performance. This is corroborated by, for 
example, Banker et al. (2000) and Ittner and Larcker (1998). It can therefore be concluded that 
in order to provide management information that can be properly used to address, data on, for 
example, manufacturing operations should also be included (Nanni et al., 1992). 
 
The majority of the current research supports a positive relationship between the inclusion of 
non-financial information and firm performance. Mia and Clarke (1999) observe an indirect 
relation between the use of MCS information and business unit performance. Studies of Davila 
(2000) and Chong and Chong (1997) show that an increase use of non-financial information by 
firms following customer-focussed (or prospector-type) strategy has a positive impact on 
performance. Sim and Killough (1998) and Abernethy and Lillis (1995) also argue that firms 
have improved their performance on the basis of non-financial manufacturing information. Scott 
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and Tiessen (1999) reported that firm performance has improved when they applied 
comprehensive performance measures [that combine both financial and non-financial 
information]. Sim and Killough (1998) and Ittner and Larcher (1995) observe a positive 
interaction among total quality management practices, MCS information and performance. 
Moreover, a study by Lin Sum (1979; cited in Hopper et al. 2004b) indicates that the 
implementation of Western MCS in China, aimed at increasing autonomy and responsibility, has 
led to an improved economic performance. 
 
However, factors such as organizational strategy, the type of technology, and structural as well 
as environmental issues may also have an influence on firm performance and the degree to 
which non-financial performance measurements are being used (Ittner & Larcker, 1998; Daft & 
Lengel, 1986). Research conducted by Baines and Langfield-Smith (2003) shows that the 
increasing competitiveness of the business environment has led to an increased focus on 
differentiation strategies, having an impact on the nature of the organizational design, the 
manufacturing technologies and improved MCS practices. This impact requires a greater 
reliance on non-financial accounting information in order to improve firm performance. 
Furthermore, for companies to be successful they should not only aim at improving their 
financial performance and operational efficiency, but also pay attention to issues such as 
customer satisfaction and human resources. In addition, there has to be clarity on the 
organizational level with respect to the strategies chosen (Lingle & Schiemann, 1996). These 
strategies should be based on the proper success criteria. For instance, financial performance 
will not improve on the basis of quality criteria if these are not of value to the customers. A 
strategy of innovation may fail unless it is initiated in an environment that values renewal and 
realised by a company that is fit to do so. Similarly, adjusting the organizational design to the 
environment will be ineffective if the strategy selected is inappropriate (Pelham, 1999; Miller, 
1982). 
 
It can be concluded that information is now being recognised as one of the most powerful tools 
for improving the wealth of firms (Mangaliso, 1995). And in view of the dynamic nature of the 
business environment it is the function of MCS to provide up-to-date information that helps 
managers in making the proper decisions and to motivate these managers to establish 
organizational change beneficial to the firm (Horngren, 1995; Stokes & Lawrimore, 1989). 
Inadequate and incomplete accounting information will certainly undermine the effectiveness of 
resource management and hinder the improvement of firm performance. 
 
3.6 Towards a conceptual Framework 
 
In this section we will present the conceptual framework on which we will base our data 
collection and analysis. We will describe its components and their relations. We developed our 
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conceptual framework on the basis of the literature and discussions referred to in the previous 
chapters and the present one. 
 
As already mentioned, former studies on MCS have mostly been conducted in the West. In 
addition, it is generally assumed that accounting is a neutral practice, which can be implemented 
and developed in any part of the world, regardless of the country-specific differences of the 
socio-economic, institutional, political and cultural environments. Due to this assumption, the 
accounting research in LDCs has been conducted on the basis of Western perspectives and 
models (e.g. Tinker,1980). Typically Western management control systems and practices were 
introduced in LDCs. This approach, however, has led to problems in the ontological sphere 
(Hopper et al., 2004b). Western theories are not suitable for application in LDCs because of the 
cultural, political and socio-economic differences between the West and the developing 
countries (Hulme & Tuner, 1991; Hewagama & Warnapala, 1989). It is therefore crucial for 
future research to adopt an approach that includes the contextual circumstances relevant in 
LDCs. In most of the current studies the issues that influence the nature and functioning of MCS 


























Figure 3.3 Conceptual Framework: The relations among privatisation, MCS change, firm activities, performance, 
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A conceptual model that includes the wider context of LDCs is therefore indispensable. In 
designing our framework we have adopted the following criteria: 1) the model has to meet the 
objectives of our study as described in section 1.4, 2) it has to be suitable for application in the 
privatised Eritrean business environment and its socio-economic and political contexts. Our 
pilot study has indicated that these criteria were valid. This study focuses particularly on the 
issues playing a role in the actual accounting practice and includes the internal and external 
contextual factors that shape MCS and influence firm performance. In short, the aim of our 
research is to describe and analyse the effect of privatisation on MCS and to evaluate firm 
performance while taking into account the contextual factors addressed in this and the previous 
chapter. MCS change, firm performance and the contextual factors will be approached with the 
aid of our conceptual framework. It is presented in Figure 3.3 above. 
 
On the basis of our conceptual framework, privatisation is expected to improve efficiency by 
offering new owners the right to appropriate the returns from assets; it brings incentives, and 
would positively impact productivity and innovation. Generally, competition and the transfer of 
property rights to private hands is presumed to bring better MCS practices that ultimately 
improve firm performance and promote development goals. The new owners would likely be 
well informed, pursue profitability goals, and possess higher capacity to monitor firms via MCS 
practices than the government. Based on the literature, we can anticipate privatisation to bring 
higher output, increased investments, supply of quality goods and services at low prices, advent 
of modern technology and know-how, higher profits and dividends, improved employment and 
salaries while reducing leverage, effective corporate governance, and government benefits in 
finance and increased taxation income (see Makalou, 1999; Fahy et al., 1999; Kikeri et al., 
1992). MCS would become tightly coupled to economic rewards and more efficient allocation 
of resources. Consequently, we anticipate fast decision-making processes, efficient reporting, 
and overall achievement of firm objectives. However, the above expectations are likely to be 
mediated by the internal and external factors indicated in figure 3.3. Normally, we expect less 
pressure from politics, bureaucracy, and Trade Union (TU) activities. The government is 
expected to help in creating conducive market environment, establish efficient capital markets, 
bestow unconstrained access to capital, uphold a fair taxation system, and reduce socio-political 
instability. It would be possible that privatisation may lead to the emergence of informal 
controls in LDCs (see Hopper et al., 2004b; Uddin & Hopper 2003, 1999). We expect that 
cooperation with multinational firms leads to introduction of improved knowledge and MCS 
practices. Conversely, small firms would use few and traditional forms of MCS with more 
emphasis on informal and direct controls by the owner(s). Adoption of innovations in MCS 
practices would be influenced by the presence of adequate skilled labour for its implementation 
(Cohn & Levinthal, 1991) and the level of training offered by firms (Firth, 1996). Most 
importantly, the support and involvement of top-managers and owners is believed to facilitate 
MCS practice changes (Bruns & Kaplan, 1987). 
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The first-hand data gathered by means of our conceptual framework will provide us with 
information about the way in which MCS change has developed after the introduction of 
privatisation and the role of the contextual factors. Further, we will obtain insight into how firms 
deal with their business and investment plans. The way in which they approach these plans can 
be partly explained by the contextual factors. As former studies conducted in LDCs have 
indicated, both internal and external contextual factors are believed to affect MCS practices, 
firm activities and performance. Our research has been conducted by means of interviews and 
analysis of documents and quantitative figures. The interviews served for gathering information 
about issues such as competition, capacity to learn, technology changes, the state and regulation, 
TUs, aid agencies, and war. Information from documents and quantitative figures on firm size 
and technology changes served to supplement the data obtained through interviews.  
 
We believe that insight into the impact of the internal and contextual factors will enable us to 
explain the inconsistencies in the theoretical arguments with respect to the outcomes of 
privatisation. Moreover, it would allow us to obtain an image of the practical problems and 
challenges faced by Eritrean firms during the transition period. 
We conducted interviews with officials of the Ministry of Trade and Industry, the Ministry of 
National Development, the Department of Inland Revenue, the Eritrean National Chamber of 
Commerce, the National Confederation of Eritrean Workers, The World Bank Country Office in 
Eritrea, and the Business Consultant. These interviews served to obtain information on the role 
played by governmental and non-government institutions in assisting privatised firms. The role 
involves providing assistance in the form of creating conducive business environment, solving 
practical problems related to business operations, granting access to foreign exchange services, 
facilitating industrial relations and so on. On the basis of our findings, we will assess the role 
that the government has so far played in the transition period to privatisation. 
 
3.7 Summary and Conclusions 
 
The literature shows that the internal and external businesses environments are continuously 
changing in such a way that firms have to make the necessary adaptations to their MCS. The 
development and updating of these control systems has stimulated the development of new 
MCS practices, equipping firms more efficiently to increase their firm performance and gain 
competitive advantage (Adler et al., 2000). This chapter has dealt with internal change drivers 
and new developments in MCS. The external contextual factors have been described in chapter 
two. Change can be conceptualised as the degree of changes adopted in a given period or the 
extent to which changes are being integrated into operations (Libby & Waterhouse, 1996). The 
previous studies on MCS change have mainly been conducted in the West and are mostly based 
on statistical analysis. So far, the amount of data on post-privatisation MCS change in the 
context of LDCs has been very limited. 




This chapter has provided us with a relevant body of literature that will enable us to conduct our 
research from the perspective of LDCs, while including internal and external contextual factors. 
The internal factors are mostly explained by contingency theory and institutional theory. The 
literature presented in this chapter clarifies how the internal environment stimulates MCS 
change. In view of this fact, it is claimed that improved MCS will eventually lead to 
improvements in firm performance (see Figures 3.2 and 3.3). We have described the details of 
MCS techniques on which our conceptual framework is based. This framework serves as an 
instrument for data collection and analysis. The definition of MCS and the further analysis of 
MCS techniques have revealed the importance of recognising the role of employees in firms. If 
employees are given more influence and incentives, such as additional training, compensation, 
benefits etc., their job satisfaction increases, which in turn encourages a customer-oriented 
approach and improves firm productivity. 
 
With regard to firm performance, this chapter has presented some of the current evidence, and 
addressed the performance measures commonly used. Further, it points at the importance of 
deploying non-financial performance measures and their impact on firm performance. Finally, 
we have introduced our conceptual framework, based on the insights obtained from the literature 
as well as the results of the pilot interviews. MCS change is inevitable in privatised firms and 
strongly related to internal and external contextual factors. The data on MCS change in 
privatised firms in LDCs are limited. In order to gain more insight into this particular field, we 
therefore strongly suggest that more research should be conducted, preferably by means of case 
studies.  
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This chapter presents the research methodology used in this study. We will describe the relevant 
issues required for the design of the research process. The chapter contains four parts organised 
as follows. Section 4.2 gives an outline of the components of the conceptual framework and the 
measurements used. Section 4.3 discusses the research methodology in detail. This section 
particularly deals with the research design, the selection of the research setting and the cases, the 
data collection approaches, the data analysis methods, and the credibility of the results. Section 
4.4 concludes this chapter with a summary. 
 
4.2 Operational definitions of the concepts and measurements used 
 
In chapter three we developed the conceptual framework of this study. In this section we will 
explain how we have used its main components and the measurement tools. We will particularly 
focus on the following issues: privatisation, contextual factors, MCS change, and firm activities 
and performance. 
 
Privatisation: In our literature review chapters we highlighted that privatisation is claimed to 
result in improved MCS practices and increasing levels of firm performance (Wickramasinghe 
et al., 2004; Uddin & Hopper, 2003). Due to this belief and other reasons, many LDC 
governments have adopted privatisation as a reform policy. In the case of Eritrea, the GOE 
especially focussed on the transfer of ownership through the direct sale of publicly owned firms. 
The main objectives of privatisation are considered to be: to improve the overall operational 
efficiency and competitiveness of enterprises, to accelerate the adoption of new technology, 
production processes, and systems, as well as the expansion of investments, and to increase the 
role of the private sector in the ownership and management of national economic resources. In 
the light of these objectives, the GOE selected the potential owners of the privatised firms on the 
basis of their business plans and financial bids. In evaluating these business plans the GOE 
particularly emphasised the extent to which their implementation would contribute to the 
realisation of the country’s overall development plan. The main interest of this study is to 
investigate the most recent changes and possible improvements made in MCS as well as in firm 
performance by our case firms in their attempt to implement their business plans. 
 
Contextual (internal and external) factors: When selecting the relevant contextual variables for 
our study, we used a triangulation of theories. With respect to the contingency theory approach, 
the relevant factors that affect MCS practices include: competition, size, organizational capacity 
to learn, the introduction of new technology, and changing a firm’s strategy. In addition, 
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research conducted in both LDCs and in the West on the basis of institutional theory has 
identified the following factors: the capacity to undertake action, the attitude of management 
and employees, state and regulation, trade union activities, war, and the influence of aid 
agencies. These factors are generally classified as internal and external issues, as shown in 
figure 3.3. The expected changes in MCS pursuant to the internal as well as the external 
contextual change factors are presented in sections 3.3 and 2.5 respectively. Further, table 2.1 
presents the issues related to the external contextual factors as well as a summary of the 
expected results. In this chapter we will therefore only focus on the details of the internal 
contextual change factors and those of the firm performance measures. 
 
When studying the internal factors the following procedures were adopted. We measured the 
intensity of the competition by the number of firms operating in the industry sector, along the 
lines of La Porta & Lopez-de-Silanes (1997) and Perevalov et al. (2000). Second, the intensity 
of competition was assessed by asking questions about issues such as the competition with 
respect to raw materials, technical personnel, selling and distribution, the quality and variety of 
products, and price-fixing (Khandwalla, 1977). We have represented firm size as the number of 
employees working in an organization. Larger firms have more resources and were therefore 
expected to introduce innovations in their MCS practices. Moreover, they were expected to be 
more diversified (in their product lines) and divisionalised, to employ mass production 
techniques, and to adopt more sophisticated MCS practices (Khandwalla, 1972). 
 
The capacity of organizations to learn is influenced by the existing knowledge of and 
experience with MCS practices. So firms that possess more knowledge, adopt MCS practices 
more intensively, and that employ a larger accounting staff are expected to respond to changes 
in or challenges arising from their environments by changing their MCS. Therefore, when 
measuring the case firms’ ability to learn and change, we took these issues into account. In 
addition, we particularly concentrated on the background knowledge of the enterprises’ top 
management and/or owners and their attitude to MCS change, since these two groups are 
considerably influential (see Libby & Waterhouse, 1996). Similarly, the capacity to undertake 
action also served as an important factor in studying MCS change. Capacity to undertake action 
is associated with the presence of skills and resources within an organization, its mobilisation 
and power differentials, and the management’s attitude towards these assets. If the 
owner/partner of a newly privatised firm is powerful and possesses a great deal of international 
experience, this will have an impact on the company’s MCS practices. Further, the 
management’s attitude is also an important factor that influences the development of strategy 
and firm performance. Issues such as the owners’ views with respect to product and/or service 
quality, their knowledge of business practices and their choice of either accepting or rejecting 
accounting information as a tool in their decision-making processes have a clear influence on 
the extent to which firms make use of MCS.  
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The introduction of new technology can be studied by looking at the degree of new investments 
made in fixed assets and newly introduced MCS practices. The introduction of computerised 
and advanced machinery can be associated with advanced MCS practices. A change of strategy 
can be considered as a firm’s means to achieve higher levels of product diversification, quality, 
customer services, etc. Therefore, this study concentrates on the question whether the case firms 
have made any changes in their strategies that involve the adaptation or replacement of their 
management control systems.  
 
MCS Change: The MCS techniques dealt with in this study include: Planning and Budgeting, 
Product Costing and Pricing, Internal Reporting and Decision-making, Cost Control and Waste 
Minimisation as well as Performance Measurement and Evaluation. We will not elaborate on 
these techniques since they are well-known concepts in the accounting literature. In order to 
determine in what way MCS practices are actually carried out and whether or not they have 
changed after the privatisation process, we have investigated a number of components of each 
MCS technique (see table 4.1). These components were also useful in comparing the pre-
privatisation MCS practices with the post-privatisation MCS practices. So we have particularly 
focussed on changes in the use of the components. Additionally, the question how or to which 
extent the case firms used MCS techniques and whether they impacted firm performance is dealt 
with. 
 
Firm activities and performance: To assess the impact of privatisation on firm activities and 
performance, we used a combination of methods. The first method was to compute simple ratios 
and conduct trend analysis based on the quantitative data obtained from the case firms and other 
sources. The second method was to describe the qualitative information (obtained through 
interviews) regarding the impact of the contextual factors on firm activities and performance. To 
analyse our quantitative data, we employed eight performance measures: Profitability, Labour 
Productivity, Operating Efficiency, Output, Employment, Leverage, Capital Investment 
Spending, and Taxes (see Table 4.2 below). Table 4.2 presents the ratios and numerical figures 
used to compare the financial and operating performance before and after privatization. For all 
the case firms, the growth of the performance measures was annualised for both the pre- and 
post-privatisation periods. The major quantitative data sources used were audited financial 
statements and reports obtained from the Ministry of Trade & Industry. Next, we will discuss 
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Table 4.1 List of MCS techniques and their components: 
Techniques used to 
measure MCS change: 
Components of the MCS technique to be studied: 
1. Planning & Budgeting - Budgeting (process of preparation and level of participation) 
- Profit planning 
- Operations planning (production) 
- Co-ordination of activities 
- Long-term planning (Capital Budgeting) 
2. Product Costing 
    & Pricing  
- Type of costing system 
• Actual costing vs. Standard costing 
• Absorption vs. Variable costing 
- Nature of cost accumulation and allocation 
- Type of pricing system and use of MCS information 
- Freedom in product pricing 
3. Internal Reporting &  
    Decision-making  
- Communication of MCS information 
• Frequency of reporting information  
• Timeliness 
• Accuracy 
- Use of more non-financial measures 
- Information reported more broadly 
- Use of existing systems but interpreting the results differently 
- Decision-making responsibility 
4. Cost Control & Waste 
    Minimisation 
- Quality control methods 
- Waste minimisation techniques 
5. Performance   
    Measurement 
    & Evaluation 
- Individual or team-based performance measures 
- Firm performance measurements (extent of using financial 
and non-financial measures) 
- Measurement of performance in terms of quality 
- Measurement of performance in terms of customer 
satisfaction 
- Measurement of performance in terms of delivery innovations 
- Reward systems (bonuses and salary increments) 
- Extent of employee benefits 
 
 
Profitability was measured by assessing the growth of the annual revenues and by computing 
the return on sales, the return on assets and the return on equities. The pre- and post-
privatisation results of firm performance in terms of profitability were computed on the basis of 
the above-listed variables and then compared. We compared the revenues (measured in constant 
local prices) to help us evaluate the annualised rate of revenue growth. In this way, we could 
conduct a trend analysis by using the annual revenue figures taken from the financial statements 
of case firms. Additionally, we calculated the return on sales by means of two alternate methods, 
one focussed on the operating income and the other on the net income. Evaluating changes in 
operating income was a reliable method to measure efficiency gains, while the assessment of the 
changes in net income provided a useful summary statistic of the full impact of privatisation on 
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Table 4.2 Firm Performance measurement techniques: 
Types of Measurement Tools: Components of Measurement Tools: 
1. Profitability • Revenues: Trend Analysis of annual Sales Revenues 
• ROS1 = Gross Profit (Operating Income) ÷ Sales 
• ROS2 = Net Profit after tax (Net Income) ÷ Sales 
• ROA = Net Profit after tax (Net Income) ÷ Total Assets 
• ROE = Net Profit after tax (Net Income) ÷ Total Equity 
2. Labour Productivity • Labour Productivity = Annual Revenue ÷ Number of Employees 
3. Operating Efficiency • Sales Efficiency = Real Sales* ÷ Number of Employees 
• Net Income Efficiency = Net Income ÷ Number of Employees 
4. Output • Real Sales* = Normal sales deflated by the consumer price index 
5. Employment  • Total employment = Total Number of Employees 
6. Leverage • Total debt to asset = Total debt ÷ Total Assets  
• Long term debt to asset = Long Term Debt ÷ Total Assets 
• Long term debt to equity = Long Term Debt ÷ Equity 
7. Capital Investment • Capital Expenditures to Sales = Capital Expenditures ÷ Sales 
• Capital Expenditures to Assets = Capital Expenditures ÷ Total Assets 
8. Taxes • Total annual amount of taxes paid 
• Tax per unit of sales = Total Taxes ÷ Sales 
* Real Sales = Nominal Sales ÷ Consumer price index,   ROS1 = Return on Sales based on operating income figures,  
   ROS2 = Return on Sales based on net income figures, ROA = Return on Assets, ROE = Return on Equity  
(Owner’s Equity) 
 
Labour productivity was measured as an annualised rate of revenue growth per employee. 
Hence, we measured the revenues in terms of constant local prices. With regard to operating 
efficiency, we looked at the common indicators to capture the changes in the ability of firms to 
extract output from any given level of input. Except for real sales, sales efficiency, and net 
income efficiency, we used nominal data for the calculation of the ratios. For the calculation of 
real sales, sales efficiency, and net income efficiency, the sales and net income data were 
deflated by using the consumer price index of Eritrea. This was important in order to make our 
findings comparable with similar studies. 
 
Output: The privatisation programmes are expected to improve profitability, efficiency, 
production growth and output as well as to increase investment spending. We used sales levels 
adjusted to inflation as a measure to determine the output of firms during the pre- and post-
privatisation periods. In this study employment refers to the annualised average number of 
employees working in an enterprise. Although the empirical evidence was not conclusive about 
the outcome of privatisation in terms of employment, privatisation is generally expected to 
enhance firms’ profitability and stimulate investments, which would create job opportunities. In 
this study employment was measured as an annualised rate of employment growth. 
 
Capital Investment Spending: Privatised firms are expected to invest in growth and expansion 
opportunities (Megginson et al., 1994). To calculate the degree of capital investment spending 
we used two measures: capital expenditures divided by sales and capital expenditures divided by 
total asset ratio (Aussenegg & Jelic, 2002). On the other hand, due to the high cost of 
borrowing, privatisation was expected to result in a decline in leverage. The measurements used 
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for leverage were: total debt to asset ratio, long-term debt to asset ratio, and long-time debt to 
equity ratio. 
 
Taxes: Makalou (1999) indicates that one of the motives for governments to privatise is the 
increase in their tax income (see chapter 2). For this reason some studies use tax income as a 
firm performance measure (e.g. Frydman, 1997). In this study an assessment has been made of 
the extent to which the case firms paid annual taxes to the government. We have considered 
taxes in terms of their absolute value and the ratio of taxes relative to sales. Further details on 
the formulas used for computing firm performance are presented in table 4.2. 
 
4.3 Research Methodology 
 
Research methodology is “the application of scientific procedures towards acquiring answers to 
a wide variety of research questions” (Adams & Schvaneveldt, 1991: cited in Hailemariam, 
2001: p. 84). It provides the tools for conducting research and obtaining useful information. The 
methodology incorporates the entire process of conceptualising and observing the problem to be 
studied, the formulation of research questions, the data collection and analysis, and the 
generalisation of results.  
 
A number of authors (Ryan et al., 2002; Ghauri et al., 1995; Yin, 1994) have presented 
alternative research methods. Literature on research methods is helpful in the process of 
identifying the appropriate and suitable method for conducting a particular type of research. 
Ghauri et al., (1995) argue that selection of which method to use depends on the research 
problem and its objective. The selection of an appropriate method also depends on the nature of 
the potential study and whether a sufficient amount of adequate literature is available to properly 
investigate the research topics. If this is not the case, additional studies will have to be 
conducted to fill this gap. There appears to be a lack of literature on MCS change, firm 
performance, and the influence of contextual factors on firms in LDCs during the transition to 
privatisation. This is why a number of accounting researchers have called for a stronger focus on 
research dealing with these issues. By choosing Third World countries as its research setting this 
study tries to make a contribution to filling this hiatus in the accounting research. 
 
In this study we try to gain insight into the development of MCS practices, the way in which the 
case firms carry out their activities and their performance levels. Further, this thesis investigates 
how the process of transition has been influenced by the various internal and external factors, 
while taking the socio-economic and political context into account. The study’s aim is to map 
out how the privatisation process has changed the MCS practices and firm performance in 
LDCs. To this end, in-depth data had to be collected on the firms’ MCS practices, their 
performance standards, and the influence of contextual factors during both the pre- and the post 
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privatisation periods. These data were gathered by interviews, secondary sources and other 
means. 
 
The research method used in this study is the case study approach, which enabled us to collect 
qualitative data. As indicated by the literature, change in MCS practices and firm performance 
take place after privatisation. However, a large number of issues have remained un-tackled, such 
as the way in which change actually takes place and the influence of contextual factors, either 
facilitating or impeding the change process. As described by Flick (2002), this study has 
benefited more by following a qualitative research approach since it adheres on the use of an 
inductive strategy. This means that rather than starting from existing theories and testing them, it 
requires sensitizing concepts for approaching the social contexts to be studied. Qualitative 
research also helps one to include contextual conditions, and serves as a tool in detecting new 
issues as well as developing empirically based theories.   
 
Qualitative data is rich, full earthly, holistic and real. It also offers a high level of face validity; it 
preserves the chronological flow of data and is hardly susceptible to retrospective distortion 
(Miles, 1979: cited in Ghauri et al., 1995, p. 85). Many accounting researchers have questioned 
the adequacy of the quantitative approach with respect to the study of accounting and control 
systems within organizations (e.g. Hopper & Powel, 1985). The following subsection will deal 
in more detail with the relevance of the case study method. 
4.3.1 The case study approach: 
First, this method helped us investigate a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, 
as the boundaries between the two were not clearly defined (Yin, 1994). In this respect, the case 
study method enabled us to gain access to various data sources, and to process an extensive 
variety of material, such as documents, artefacts, transcripts from interviews, and observations. 
The method also allowed a systematic observation of the policies, people, structures and context 
of an organization (Birnberg et al, 1990).  
 
Second, case study research is a suitable method for gaining insight into less-known areas into 
which little research has been conducted and on which only a limited amount of theory is 
available. Therefore this approach enabled us to thoroughly examine the execution of and 
changes in MCS practices within privatised firms. The research into MCS change conducted in 
LDCs is rare and its results inconclusive. So there is an obvious need for an increase in this type 
of research. Moreover, as stated by Ryan et al. (2002), case studies have become quite common 
in accounting research, especially in the area of Management Accounting. 
 
Third, the investigation of MCS changes by means of firm level case fieldworks provides more 
insight for explaining the observed differences in practice and for understanding the process by 
which MCS develops. In addition, the case study approach is particularly useful in determining 
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the reasons why companies have chosen their control systems, how they use them, for what 
purpose, and in which circumstances (Hoque, 1993; Jones & Sefiane, 1992; Ansari & Bell, 
1991; Hopper et al., 1986; Berry et al., 1985). 
 
Fourth, case studies allow investigation of various controls including those that are difficult to 
measure by means of surveys (Langfield-Smith, 1997). In this way, more extensive qualitative 
information can be gathered, facilitating a more in-depth analysis and understanding of the 
phenomena dealt with in the study (Hopf, 1985: cited in Flick, 2002). The literature on 
privatisation studies suggest that the case study method is a rich source of descriptive data and 
addresses both qualitative and quantitative effects (Parker & Kirkpatrick, 2005). Finally, from 
an interpretative perspective, the case study approach enables one to examine whether the case 
observations are in line with the existing theory (Ryan et al., 2002). In this way, the texts of our 
qualitative data have been used as a basis for reconstruction and interpretation. 
 
There are different kinds of accounting case studies. The type we have opted for is descriptive 
and explanatory in nature. In accordance with this type we used the theory to help us describe, 
understand and explain MCS practices, firm performance and the impact of the socio-economic 
and political contextual factors. According to Ryan et al. (1992), the value of theory in case 
study research is measured by the extent to which it explains the practice. In order to properly 
explain and make sense of case study observations the theory is therefore of significant 
importance. 
 
It has been our objective to extend the current theory in the field of Management Control, in 
particular the theory on the subject of privatised firms in LDCs. On the basis of the findings of 
this study we have been able to analyse and explain the circumstances in privatised firms in 
LDCs with respect to MCS change and firm performance. The case study approach has allowed 
us to explain the way in which the different contextual factors influenced the outcome of the 
privatisation process during the transition period. As already mentioned in the literature review, 
privatisation theories do not include these contextual factors. Therefore, with this study we have 
attempted to make a contribution to the expansion of the theory on MCS practices in LDCs. We 
have conducted our research by means of multiple individual case studies dealing with the 
particular circumstances of individual cases. This approach requires theoretical rather than 
statistical generalisations. Theoretical generalisation particularly focuses on the description, 
explanation and exploration of general practices rather than on specific observations. In our case 
studies, we have investigated MCS change and firm performance in privatised enterprises from 
the perspective of a developing country. We have investigated three privatised firms in their 
wider socio-economic and political context. Our approach is holistic in that it includes the firms’ 
internal practices and the external contextual factors, as discussed in earlier sections. 
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Selecting a research setting 
When adopting the case study method the selection of a research site is of major concern (Yin, 
1994). In view of the study’s final objective Eritrea was selected for a number of reasons. First, 
Eritrea is a less-developed country and the author of this thesis is an Eritrean national who is 
acquainted with the Eritrean environment and culture. In this position it was easier for him to 
approach the various authorities and firms than it would have been if he had chosen another 
country. Moreover, as he is a native speaker of the local language, it was easy for him to 
communicate with the interviewees and translate the interview questions. The author conducted 
the interviews himself in the local language. This advantage was exploited during the whole 
period of data collection for both the pilot and the final study. It helped the researchers to 
significantly minimise the social desirability bias and to avoid any misunderstanding and 
misinterpretation of the concepts used in the interview questionnaire. 
 
Selection of the case firms 
The selection of the three case firms was conducted systematically on the basis of a number of 
criteria: the research objectives, accessibility of the firm, firm size, the composition of the firm’s 
ownership, the business in which the firm was engaged, a mixture of strong (successful) and 
weaker firms, and the number of years the firms stayed in operation after being privatised. 
Another criterion was to include privatised firms that were taken over by former managers or 
those have retained their former personnel, who acquire good knowledge of operations. 
 
One of the problems of case study research is getting access to information (Yin, 1994; Smith et 
al., 1988). In order to deal with this problem, the firms had to be willing to co-operate fully and 
to give full access to their data. First, we obtained a list of manufacturing companies privatised 
since 1997. We decided to approach five of the listed firms that had been privatised earliest, and 
that were relatively large in size and fairly diversified with respect to the composition of their 
ownership and their strength. By selecting firms that had been privatised relatively early, we 
were able to obtain a maximum amount of data on MCS change and post-privatisation firm 
performance. It is believed that the longer a firm stays in operation after being privatised, the 
easier it is to observe MCS change and measure the trend in firm performance. Additionally, 
firm size was considered important since larger firms are presumed to use more sophisticated 
management control systems. However, in our preliminary firm selection we learnt that no 
privatised firm had been owned by its former manager, and therefore this criterion was rejected. 
 
The firms initially approached during the pilot study are: the Red Sea Soap Factory (RSSF), the 
Bini Shoe Factory (BSF), the Dahlak Shoe Factory (DSF), the Baraco Textile Factory (BTF) 
and the Asmara Sweater and Garment Factory (IMA). DSF was privatised in 1999 and the other 
four during 1997/98. In order to convince the top-managements of the study’s significance, a 
formal letter was presented to them from the University of Asmara, explaining the study’s 
objectives and requesting the managements’ co-operation. The firms were also visited in person 
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to explain the study’s goals. They were given the assurance that the information they provided 
would be kept confidential. In this way trust was being built. As also documented in former 
LDC-studies, data access is very hard and it is therefore vital to establish a good relationship 
with management and to gain its confidence. 
 
Among the firms approached, RSSF and BTF refused to co-operate and DSF promised to do so 
only during the final study, as they had a tight work schedule during the period when the pilot 
study was conducted. Therefore, initially only BSF and IMA were selected to participate. 
However, BSF was later dropped due to its long bureaucratic processes. In addition, 
appointments were often cancelled and we were not allowed to interview the lower levels of the 
organization until we had completed all the interviews with BSF’s manager. 
In the second phase of the data collection process RSSF as well as the Red Sea Bottler’s Share 
Company (RSBSC) and the Asmara Wine and Liquor Factory (AW&LF) were approached, 
which differed from IMA with respect to their ownership composition and strength. Again, 
RSSF was not willing to participate but RSBSC and AW&LF (also privatised firms) were. 
 
The main purpose of selecting three case firms was to achieve a maximum degree of variation in 
terms of ownership composition, firm size, firm strength, and the type of business the firms 
conducted (for details see chapters 5 up to and including 7). In addition, our time schedule and 
resources were limited. We expected that MCS change would be influenced in different ways, 
depending on the firms’ ownership composition and structure (Patton, 1990). Further, we 
believed that studying more than one case would strengthen the validity and robustness of our 
findings (Miles & Huberman, 1994). Moreover, in this way we were able to conduct cross-case 
comparisons when analysing our data. For further arguments for investigating more than one 
case see subsection 4.3.3.   
 
Selection of the participants 
As participants in our study we selected people working in the case-enterprises and the 
governmental and non-governmental institutions. We selected those who possessed the 
knowledge and experience relevant to our research topic and who had sufficient time and were 
willing to participate in the interviews (Morse, 1998). We also received access to the lower 
levels of the firms’ organizational structure. Top officials brought us into contact with the staff 
working at the lower levels of the case firms. The top included managers, administration 
officials, heads of the finance and the production and sales departments, various section heads, 
people from stores, employee representatives and others. The procedure was to approach the top 
management group of each department to ask them whether they could recommend people 
whom we could address for our data collection on both the current operations and the pre-
privatisation period. The systematic way in which we approached the participants in our 
research study is supported by Morse (1989: cited in Flick, 2002), who claims that qualitative 
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samples are goal-oriented rather than random. In addition, we approached some of the 
interviewees through friends. 
 
For the selection of participants outside the case firms we followed a similar procedure. The 
government ministries and the non-governmental institutions were approached by means of a 
formal letter, as explained earlier. The heads of these organizations then identified the most 
relevant participants to be approached. The help of friends in approaching some institutions was 
also helpful, as in the case of the Department of Inland Revenue, the Eritrean National Statistical 
Office, and the Ministry of Trade & Industry (MTI). 
4.3.2 Data collection 
Both primary and secondary data were collected during two periods (from February until July 
2003 and from October 2003 until March 2004). Fieldwork provides answers to the “how” and 
“why” of the issues under study by offering an extensive range of evidence through documents, 
artefacts, interviews and observations (Yin, 1994; Smith et al., 1988). In this case study the 
focus was typically on both qualitative and quantitative information delivered by archival data, 
interviews, informant reports, and direct observation. The process of data collection was divided 
into two parts. The first part contained a pilot study and the second the major fieldwork. In 
addition, supplementary data were collected during the data validation trip from March until 
May 2005. During this trip data were collected to update our data bank and additional 
information was obtained. 
 
The pilot study 
The pilot study’s objective is to collect the study’s initial data and to allow the researcher to 
modify the initial research design if it proves to be faulty (Yin, 1994). In our case, another aim 
was to obtain an overview of the firms’ current MCS practices, and to determine whether our 
research questions were correctly formulated, which aspects of MCS required emphasis, which 
issues were relevant to our research topic, the way in which MCS change and firm performance 
evolved, and which factors influenced the outcome. The data collected during this stage helped 
us to understand the actual situation in Eritrea. Our pilot study gave us the opportunity to 
improve our research design. For example, we learnt effective ways of approaching potential 
firms, we made a selection of relevant MCS practices, we identified the contextual factors, we 
refined the research questions, we evaluated the relevance of including both government and 
non-government institutions, and we were able to improve the appointment schedule for the 
interviews with the participants. All in all, the pilot study enabled us to make the data collection 
more focussed. In addition, it helped us to improve the way in which we carried out the 
fieldwork. 
 
By means of unstructured interview questions we collected a wide spectrum of data on various 
issues. These included the role of MCS practices in privatised firms, current control problems as 
Post-privatisation changes in management control, firm activities and performance 
  
 76 
well as factors that influenced firm activities and performance. We also focussed on the process 
of the appointment and removal of managers, hiring and firing policies concerning employees, 
and their salary levels as well as other benefits during the periods before and after privatisation. 
In addition, we concentrated on issues such as the degree of the employees’ involvement in the 
firm’s decision-making, the employee’s motivation, investment decisions as well as production 
and pricing decisions, capacity utilisation, and diversification of the product lines. Finally, 
secondary sources were addressed, such as the Ministry of Trade & Industry (MTI), the National 
Confederation of Eritrean Workers (NCEW), the Eritrean National Chamber of Commerce 
(ENCC), and the World Bank Group in Eritrea (WBGE). 
 
Accounting researchers such as Uddin & Hopper (2001) and Wickramasinghe & Hopper (2000) 
argue that research issues should be gathered from the site itself through pilot studies or similar 
means rather than obtained ‘indirectly’ by means of documented information. Recent studies on 
LDCs conducted by these authors have generated valuable issues about difficult politics, rigid 
and inefficient bureaucracy as well as cultural barriers. In similar vein, the pilot study prior to 
the actual fieldwork was very helpful in identifying the relevant internal and external contextual 
factors that affect the design of MCS and post-privatisation firm performance. 
 
 
The Case studies 
Primary data was collected through direct observation and in-depth face-to-face interviews with 
the respondents. These respondents were staff members and employees of the three case firms 
and the earlier mentioned Government Ministries, parastatal organizations and NGOs (see tables 
4.3 and 4.4). They were firm managers, human resource and administration officials, department 
heads (from the Production, Finance, Marketing and Quality Assurance departments), section 
heads, knowledgeable accounting staff, employees, and workers’ union leaders. As stated by 
Hopper et al. (2004b), conducting interviews is the most common data collection technique in 
case studies. The interview questions for the final case studies were prepared on the basis of the 
pilot interviews, the literature review, and our research objectives. Their form was semi-
structured. We believed that this form would provide us with a broader spectrum of information 
than standardised questions or questionnaires (Kohli, 1978). The semi-structured interview 
technique enhances the data’s compatibility. Although the questions posed in the interviews 
were predetermined, the respondents were encouraged to elaborate on the issues under 
discussion. In this way we were able to obtain unexpected additional information related to the 
research topics. The questions served as guidelines; but of course, in order to avoid superfluous 
information we maintained some degree of structure. Also Hopper et al. (ibid) underline that 
unstructured interview questions are preferred to structured questions, because the latter are 
inflexible and involve the risk of missing important information. 
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Extensive interview sessions with firm managers were crucial since these participants were the 
main users of accounting information, and their policies influence the activities of the entire 
organization. The interviews with a number of employees from each separate department 
provided us with useful information regarding the changes in the employees’ behaviour, their 
perception of the new ownership and the MCS changes, their motivation, and their involvement 
in the firm’s decision-making processes. After asking the respondents’ permission, the 
interviews were tape-recorded. 
A major task was to find knowledgeable personnel working in the case firms during the period 
of public ownership in order to obtain data on past MCS practices. This was not easy, since the 
majority of the former personnel had been replaced. 
 
Because the interview questions had been formulated in English, some top-management 
participants and most of the employees in lower positions needed additional explanations 
regarding the meaning of the concepts addressed in the local language. Therefore, all of the 
interviews were conducted in the local language, thereby optimising the reliability of the 
information and facilitating cross-case comparison. 
 
In the second phase of the study, interviews were conducted with relevant officials from the 
Ministry of National Development (MND), the Department of Inland Revenue of the Ministry 
of Finance (DIR) and a business consultant. In addition, follow-up interviews were conducted 
with responsible officials from the MTI and the NCEW. The data provided by these interviews 
were important in obtaining insight into the firms’ operations during the period of public 
ownership, the role and involvement of government bodies, the governments’ expectations of 
the privatisation process, and the influence of external factors. 
 
Secondary data were extracted from company records, audited annual firm statements, statistical 
reports, books, journals, publications, business and investment plans of the case firms obtained 
from the MTI, and annual consumer price index reports. Data obtained from sources other than 
the case firms included documents on privatisation policies, government reports and regulations, 
newspaper publications on the progress of the privatisation process, and legal documents (such 
as acts, legislation reports on privatisation and purchase and sale agreements, reports of the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank (WB) and other NGOs).   
 
Hopper et al. (2004b) argue that the gathering of data on management accounting issues in 
LDCs is relatively difficult because of their complexity and their cultural and political 
sensitiveness. As a consequence, the response rate to surveys tends to be low and the data’s 
validity and reliability may often be poor, especially in countries that lack democracy and 
transparency and have corrupt and autocratic governments. However, in Eritrea the situation is 
somewhat less severe. Firms are obliged to conduct annual audits and present their reports to the 
tax authorities. They are also required to provide statistical figures to the MTI on a regular basis. 
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Moreover, the accounting system that the Eritrean firms use is based on methods used in the 
West. It is similar to the British accounting system and has been operational since the end of the 
Second World War. 
 
Table 4.3 presents an overview of the participants interviewed and the time spent on the 
interviews during the whole period of the fieldwork. Table 4.4 shows the interviews conducted 
and the time spent on them outside the case firms.     
 
Table 4.3 People interviewed in case firms and time spent (in minutes) 
People interviewed from case enterprises 
Departmental Managers/Heads 













IMA 210 - 120 60 180 30 - - 30 20 30 
AW&LF 120 - 90 - 180 45 - 30 30 15 - 
RSBSC 120 90 120 60 120 125 120 30 30 45 75 
N.B.: DH* = Department Head; UH** = Unit (or Section) Head(s)  
 
Table 4.4 People interviewed outside of case firms (time in minutes) 
Government Ministries Parastatals NGOs Others  
Description MTI MND DIR NCEW ENCC WBGE Consultant 
Number of People interviewed 3 2 2 5 1 2 1 
Total time in minutes 285 100 50 330 30 40 90 
 
4.3.3 Data Analysis Methods: 
Data analysis can be considered as an ongoing process rather than a one time event. Marshall 
and Rossman (1989) describe data analysis as a process of bringing order, structure and meaning 
to the multitude of collected data. It is a chaotic, ambiguous, time-consuming, creative and 
fascinating process. Qualitative data analysis is a quest for general statements about 
relationships between categories of data; it forms the basis for the building of basic theoretical 
concepts. In this study, the whole process of data collection, analysis and formulation of the 
conclusions was of an iterative nature. Our data analysis was based on ‘the ladder of analytical 
abstraction’ developed by Carney (1990: cited in Miles & Huberman, 1994: 92) and consisted of 
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The multiple data collection methods used in this study has produced a triangulation of evidence 
(Yin, 1990). Data gathered included financial data, internal reports of the case firms, interview 
responses, and data on both pre- and post-privatisation MCS practices. 
The combined data have been analysed by means of a qualitative approach focussed on the firm 
level and including the impact of contextual factors (see Figure 3.3.). The types of qualitative 
data analysis methods used in this study consist of qualitative descriptions, descriptive statistics, 
and financial data analysis. By means of an open coding technique the interviews and visual 
data were converted into transcripts and descriptive texts. After that, we analysed these 
documents on the basis of their content in order to eliminate the data that were not relevant in 
relation to the research questions and objectives. The open coding involved various concepts 
related to MCS practices, firm performance and contextual factors (see Figure 3.3). During the 
content analysis, less relevant passages and paragraphs of the text were removed and similar 
fragments combined and summarised. This data reduction facilitated data clustering and, finally, 
the formulation of the conclusions. 
 
Our firm level analysis focussed on determining whether the privatised case firms had indeed 
achieved the results as predicted with respect to improved MCS practices, firm performance, 
and the implementation of business plans. In addition, it included the influence of the contextual 
factors on the MCS practices and firm performance and activities during the transition period as 
well the pre-privatisation period. After that the pre- and post-privatisation periods were 
compared in terms of the firms’ MCS practices and performance levels. With respect to firm 
performance, the emphasis was on whether the case firms had managed to improve their 
profitability, labour productivity, operating efficiency, output, leverage, employment, capital 
investment, and tax payments. For each firm we calculated financial ratios and trend 
computations as indicated in Table 4.2. During the course of the analysis we also concentrated 
on the wider context of MCS, that is the influence of contextual variables. To obtain more 
insight into the contextual factors playing a role in MCS practices and firm performance, we 
used the data gathered from the government bodies, parastatal institutions, NGOs and business 
consultant. In addition, we particularly looked at the way in which government policies and 









clustering of text for 
further analysis by 
means of concepts 









Post-privatisation changes in management control, firm activities and performance 
  
 80 
There are two types of methods used by former studies for the analysis of the changes in the 
MCS practices and firm performance of privatised firms. The first one is to compare the MCS 
practices and firm performance of privatised enterprises with those of firms that remained under 
public ownership. The second one is to compare the MCS practices and firm performance of 
individual companies during the pre- and post-privatisation periods. In our study we preferred to 
apply the second method, because a pre- as well as a post-privatisation analysis of individual 
firms allowed us to gather information on the individual firm-specific effects of privatisation. As 
there were no examples present of firms that were still under public ownership, this was the best 
method. In order to obtain an elaborate picture of the MCS practices and firm performance in 
Eritrea we therefore collected similar data on both the pre- and post-privatisation periods of the 
case firms. Also, we have tried to find out to what extent usage of same MCS techniques 
differed in both periods. 
 
In its attempt to identify the effects of privatisation at the firm-level, this study has gone beyond 
the comparing of the results of financial measures. It has focussed on the benefits gained by 
employees as well as on the effects of both internal and external factors. We believed that this 
thesis’ final analysis should tell us whether the business plans as agreed upon by the case firms 
were in fact implemented, and whether there were problems that hindered their realisation. On 
this basis we would be able to draw relevant conclusions that can be communicated to the case 
firms and the government. 
 
In our study, we have taken each case firm as a unit of analysis and also conducted cross-firm 
comparisons to identify the similarities and differences of these separate units. We believed a 
cross-firm analysis would facilitate the comparison of our case findings with those of similar 
studies conducted in other LDCs. In addition, our analysis of the three firms provided a good 
basis for making reliable analytical generalisations. Nevertheless, it was not possible to find 
similar case studies on MCS practice changes that were conducted in less developed countries 
using the contingency theory approach. The ones available were conducted using a survey 
approach lacked depth and have not assessed the impact of privatisation. 
4.3.4 Credibility of the research results 
The quality of the case study findings can be assessed by means of a number of criteria. These 
criteria are related to concepts such as construct validity, internal validity, external validity and 
reliability (Yin, 2003). 
 
Construct validity: in order to establish construct validity the correct operational measures with 
respect to the issues under study have to be adopted. In this thesis multiple sources were 
addressed by means of interviews and the appointment of key informants to review the draft 
version of the case study report. These informants gave us feedback on the findings of our 
research. As Denzin (1989a) put it, ‘an alert and observant actor in the setting is bound to know 
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more than the researcher does about the realities under investigation’. Additionally, the variables 
used for measuring data, those listed on table 4.2, were taken from the literature reviewed earlier 
in this thesis. 
 
Internal validity (also referred as Credibility/Authenticity): in order to establish internal validity 
a research study has to show causal relationships. The concept of internal validity only applies 
to explanatory or causal studies. Although this study did not offer much room for internal 
validity, we were able to achieve some of it by means of our time series analysis. We gathered 
both financial and interview data on the impact of privatisation as well as on the contextual 
factors during a time span that covered the pre- and the post-privatisation periods. In this way 
we managed to collect solid evidence on the relationships described in our conceptual 
framework. 
 
External validity (also referred to as Transferability/Degree of fit): in order to establish external 
validity the study findings have to make sense (Miles & Huberman, 1994) and have to be fit for 
generalisation (Yin, 2003). The means available to reach external validity, in the case of single-
case studies, are the use of theory and in the case of multiple-case studies the application of 
replication logic. The case study form generally aims at developing new insights for the building 
of theory. The theory should then be tested in a comparable context to establish whether it can 
be applied to other cases as well. Yin calls this ‘replication logic’ (Yin, 1994). In order to 
facilitate our ‘analytic generalisation’, we have also used the replication logic method in this 
thesis. According to Firestone (1993: cited in Miles & Huberman, 1994), there are three levels 
of analytic generalisation: the sample-population level, the analytic level, and the case-to-case 
transfer level. So although statistical generalisation was not possible, we were in fact able to 
apply the case-to-case transfer level on the basis of our multiple case designs. This approach 
enabled us to develop a rich theoretical framework. In addition, it showed us whether our 
findings were relevant and applicable to other similar settings. Cross-case analysis enables one 
to generalise one’s research findings and increase the understanding of the issues under study 
(Denzin, 1989b). 
 
Reliability: if a research study is reliable, the research methods applied, such as the data 
collection procedures, can be repeated while producing the same results (Yin, 2003). 
Instruments used to establish reliability include the case study protocol and the development of a 
case study database. During our research we documented the procedures adopted so that other 
researchers following the same approaches would arrive at similar conclusions. Case study 
databases serve to strengthen a study’s reliability and preserve the data collected for future use. 
The objective of establishing reliability is to minimise a study’s errors and biases, and to 
strengthen the quality of the findings. 
In this thesis we have taken a triangulation of information approach by using multiple data 
sources. In addition, all interviews were tape-recorded for verification and future use. 




4.4 Summary and conclusions  
 
In developing our conceptual framework for this research, we greatly benefited from our pilot 
study. The pilot interviews helped us identify the relevant issues and contextual factors. In 
addition, the pilot research enabled us to increase our insight into the case firms’ MCS practices 
and the change processes they are going through. This chapter has dealt with the research 
methodology of this thesis, which includes the research design, the selection of the research site 
and the case studies, the data collection methods, the data analysis methods, and an assessment 
of the credibility of the results. Further, we have discussed the relationship of the main building 
blocks of our conceptual framework with the instruments used to measure the data. 
 
This thesis presents a multiple case study conducted by means of a qualitative research 
approach. The multiple case study variant has helped us understand and describe the MCS 
practices and firm performance of three manufacturing enterprises during the pre- and post-
privatisation periods in Eritrea. To obtain a complete picture the research has focussed on the 
wider context by incorporating contextual factors and assessing their influence on the process of 
change during the transition period. We have gathered a broad range of evidence consisting of a 
series of interviews and quantitative information acquired from the firms and other sources. The 
analysis of the interviews and qualitative data has helped us gain insight into the process of 
change and the influence of the contextual factors. Our research method has enabled us to 
evaluate at the firm level whether or not the privatised firms have been able to achieve the 
desired outcomes of the privatisation process in terms of improved MCS practices and firm 
performance.   
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5 Changes in the MCS practices, firm activities and 
performance of Asmara Sweater & Garment Factory 
(IMA) 
 
This chapter presents the results of our case study in the Asmara Sweater and Garment Factory 
conducted on the basis of our conceptual framework presented in chapter three. First, we will 
introduce the case firm (IMA), its production process and its administration. We will make a 
division into two periods in which important developments took place with respect to the 
formulation of business and investment plans and the influence of external factors. The first 
period relates to the transition phase. Relevant issues here are the implementation of the 
business and investment plans and the changes in the firm’s MCS practices, activities and 
performance. The second period deals with further changes taking place after 2002. In our data 
presentation, we have integrated the impact of both internal and external contextual factors. We 
will end this chapter with a summary and a conclusions section. 
 
5.1 Introduction and Background of the Firm 
 
The firm is located in Asmara, the capital city of Eritrea, and the administrative centre of the 
Central Region. More specifically, it is situated in Zone 1 Sub-Zone 05, which is in the centre of 
the city. The enterprise was established in 1954 by an Italian sweater expert, Mr. Gargano, and it 
takes up an area of 3,200 square metres. Since its establishment up until 1975, it was known for 
its competitive quality products both in the domestic as well as in foreign markets. By February 
2, 1975, when the factory was nationalised by the Ethiopian military regime, the ‘Derg’, the 
share capital had increased to Birr 1,600,000 and the factory had a new building. In addition, 
new production equipment had been installed. Like all other industrial firms IMA became part 
of the national textile corporation. It had its own general manager to run its day-to-day 
operations, but this manager possessed too little authority to decide upon the future course of the 
factory. It was the corporation that determined the production quotas and targets. After the 
nationalisation by the Ethiopian government, the factory operated by order of the Ethiopian 
Domestic Distribution Corporation (EDDC), the sole distribution channel of that time. As a 
result, the marketing concept did not really take root. During the period 1975-91 the factory 
remained stagnant and its production declined. The enterprise continued its operations under the 
control of the Ethiopian Government until the independence of Eritrea, on May 24, 1991.  
 
After the liberation in 1991, the enterprise was taken over by the Government of Eritrea (GOE) 
and has been managed as a public firm under the name of the Asmara Sweater Factory. The 
GOE gave more autonomy to firms’ managements with regard to what to produce and how to 
sell their products. Moreover, the GOE encouraged exports. Since 1991 IMA has been engaged 
in the production of overalls and shirts/trousers for the military. To deal with these large orders, 
the factory recruits workers on a contract basis. Although its competitors computerised their 
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knitting systems, initially the firm did not make such an investment. In 1994 it was encouraged 
to form a non-equity joint venture with a South Korean company to acquire new production 
technologies and make new products for the export trade, such as leather jackets. The factory 
obtained 24 new machines purchased from South Korea. The joint venture led to a joint 
management by the two companies in the years 1994/95. During the joint venture period, which 
lasted for one year, IMA had to supply Canadian firms with 1,400 leather jackets every quarter, 
but managed to supply only 500 due to the limited supply of raw materials. Although new 
sources of supply are emerging in the market [e.g., Gejeret Tannery & Ghindae Tannery 
established since 1996], the supply problem still remains an issue. One of the reasons may be 
that some tanneries process their raw leather into finished products rather than selling it in the 
market. The firm tried to enter the European and North American leather jacket markets. To 
promote its products, it prepared an advertisement leaflet in 1996 and made contacts with firms 
located in Norway, Switzerland and Germany. Before privatisation there were 190 permanent 
employees (of which 170 were in production and the rest in administration), including about 40 
extra contract workers. 
 
In line with the government’s policy aimed at the privatisation of public enterprises, on May 13, 
1998, the plant was purchased in a public bid at a price of 3.5 million Nakfa by the present 
owners, and was re-named as the Asmara Sweater and Garment Factory PLC. (IMA). The 
factory has a parent company in Italy called ‘LA PERLA’, which offers support with respect to 
the supply of raw materials and finding export markets.  
 
Production process: The firm’s production capacity at the time of privatisation was 800 pieces 
of overalls, 400 shirts and trousers, 300 sweaters or 40 leather jackets per day. Its production 
mainly aims at knitwear and garments. The knitting process is mechanically prepared by 
winding yarns from acrylic, cotton, wool or wool-like materials on cones. The yarn on cones is 
used to make knitted fabrics manually, or to weave knitted fabrics on machines. The knitted 
fabrics are cut according to design, lock-stitched, ironed, and machine-tailored. Thereafter, the 
knitwear goes to the finishing unit, where - depending on the design - button holes are made and 
buttons secured. After inspection, the knitwear is ironed, put in plastic bags and stored in the 
finished goods store, from where it is marketed. Garments are produced by cutting fabric 
according to a particular design, after which it is lock-stitched for inspection. The garments 
produced include leather and other jackets, uniforms and gowns. Finally, they are tailored, 
inspected, packed and marketed. Garments made by order are delivered to the organization that 
has placed the order. 
 
Generally, IMA is engaged in the production of three types of products: sweaters, garment 
products, and leather jackets. The firm also provides production services for export clients who 
bring their own raw materials. Except for the leather products, the sweater and garment product 
lines are mostly export-oriented. Leather products cannot be exported, since the supply of 
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locally processed leather is not sufficient to satisfy the export demand. The factory therefore at 
times imports raw leather from China. There is enough supply of raw materials for making 
sweater and garment products to engage in exports. The major source of raw materials is the 
export market. Some raw materials are locally available, but their supply is not reliable and they 
are mostly of low quality. 
 
Firm administration: During the derg regime, the state-owned enterprises were administered 
under the Ministry of Trade & Industry (MTI) of Ethiopia in a command economy. The public 
enterprises did not have the autonomy to manage their own affairs. They formed part of 
different corporations, and all the planning, marketing and decision-making activities were 
centralised under the ministry. After the liberation, all enterprises continued to be state-owned, 
the Department of Industry being in charge of their supervision. To conduct the supervision and 
monitoring of firms’ activities the Department of Industry was divided into two to three 
divisions. One of them monitored their development plans and the other divisions supervised 
their day-to-day activities. However, the GOE wanted to replace the former command economy 
by a free market-oriented economy aimed at delegating the responsibilities to the public 
enterprises themselves in order to make them autonomous. To this end, the government started 
to motivate the public firms to exercise their autonomy by preparing their own plans, purchasing 
their own raw materials, adopting their own hiring and firing policies and selling their products 
by themselves.  
 
5.2 General changes during the transition period (1998 up to the end of 2002): 
 
Before submitting their purchase offer and the business and investment plan to the government 
in 1997, the prospective firm owners assessed the strengths, weaknesses and bottlenecks of the 
organizations. The technical part of this assessment was aimed at inspecting the situation of 
production machinery, production capacity and quality control practices. At the time of 
purchase, the owners signed a ‘Sale and Purchase Agreement’, stating that they would offer 
reorientation and training opportunities to the employees to enhance the firm’s performance. In 
addition, the purchase offer as well as the business and investment plans had to be in line with 
the privatisation policies and national socio-economic aspirations. The agreement further 
stipulated that the purchaser had to ensure within the time frame indicated in the business plan 
(1998 – 2007 for IMA) that the firm’s technology would be modernised and the quality 
standards and value of its products would be upgraded. With respect to marketing, the purchaser 
was expected to exert a maximum effort to enhance the firm’s export potential. Further, the 
government retained its authority by demanding that all of the Purchase Agreement’s 
requirements were met as stipulated. 
 
The owners pledged to conduct measures such as the expansion of the factory buildings, the 
redesigning of the plant’s lay-out, and the renovation or replacement of the old machinery. In 
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addition, employees would receive training and new specialised personnel be recruited. Further, 
new products be introduced and productivity as well as product quality enhanced, and over time, 
even more employees would be hired. With respect to IMA’s capital structure, the focus was on 
equity rather than on debt, and to adopt a penetration strategy, entailing the setting of low prices 
relative to those of the competitors as well as more aggressive campaigning strategies to 
promote the firm’s products both domestically and on foreign markets by establishing networks. 
The owners predicted that as a result of these measures, in the period from 2003 to 2007, sales 
would steadily grow. In fact, they expected sales to triple the original (1998) figures. During this 
period the capacity utilisation was also expected to reach a 100%. 
 
We will now discuss the developments in the first phase (1998-2002). During this period the 
environment changed dramatically due to the outbreak of the border war between Eritrea and 
Ethiopia. The war brought a great deal of uncertainty, and created a shortage of manpower. 
Moreover, during this time the government stopped the provision of foreign exchange services 
to the private sector. 
 
Once the ownership transfers had been completed, important decisions were made and the 
business as well as the investment plans were implemented. These decisions involved 
organizational structure, potential markets to operate on, product lines, sources to acquire raw 
materials, capital investments, employment, training, and MCS practices. In our analysis we will 
concentrate on the implications for the MCS practices and firm performance. In addition, we 
will incorporate the influence of the contextual factors (chapters two and three) during the 
transition period. This wider scope will enable us to increase our insight into the way in which 
the privatisation process changed firms’ MCS practices as well as their activities and 
performance. 
5.2.1 Realisation of the business and investment plans:  
The realisation of business and investment plans depends on the efforts firms make to fulfil their 
commitments, the extent of support they get from the government, and the impact of internal 
and external factors. It can therefore be concluded that the government’s role is central in the 
implementation of their organizational measures. In this respect, the GOE is expected to support 
the private sector. The government aims at both rehabilitating the light industries to meet their 
internal demand and building a strong export-oriented manufacturing sector (GOE, 2003). With 
respect to trade, the government has pledged to foster both the internal and external trade 
through a limited intervention and the support of export-oriented industries by providing 
financial assistance in their international market penetration activities (GOE, 1998).  
 
5.2.1.1 Organisational Structure: During the public ownership period the organizational 
structure of firms consisted of three main divisions: Administration & Finance, Marketing, and 
Production & Technique, each subdivided into departments and units. Many employees were 
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working in these departments, and the tasks they performed often overlapped. That is why 
during the transition period IMA’s new owners reduced the number of departments as well as 
redundancies. In this way they hoped to streamline the organization and reduce costs. In this 
respect, the new business plans included a new organizational structure. The former three 
divisions were replaced by five departments: Production, Marketing, Accounting, Materials 
Management, and Personnel. The Production Department was further divided into five units: 
Product Design & Quality Control (QC), Maintenance, Sweaters, Leather, and Other Garments. 
So nowadays the Production Department is based on a firm’s product lines, whereas prior to 
privatisation it was built around production processes (i.e. winding, knitting, cutting, stitching, 
ironing, and packing). In the pre-privatisation period the Marketing Department consisted of the 
following units: Procurement, Stores, and Sales. Now, it consists of three units: Market 
Research, Sales, and Promotion. The Stores and Procurement units are placed under Materials 
Management. The former General Service and Boiler units have been eliminated in the new 
structure. 
 
We see that during the transition period our case firm did not succeed in fully implementing the 
planned organizational structure. Some departments and units were not established, such as 
Product Design and QC, Maintenance, Marketing, Market Research, Sales, Promotion, 
Materials Management, Procurement, and Personnel. In addition, some functions were abolished 
after privatisation, such as those of chief accountant, cashier, and production clerk. Further, 
some posts of unit heads, shift leaders and store keepers have been eliminated. The reason why 
the firm did not succeed in implementing the proposed organizational structure is related to 
external factors that created uncertainty in the post-privatisation period. One of these external 
factors was the border war, which heavily affected the development of Eritrean firms. 
After privatisation, our case firm’s administrative body has been kept small. The senior 
managers are the manager, the finance head, and the production head. The owners of the factory 
are actively involved in the day-to-day activities, and they started to play a significant role in the 
decision-making process. However, the owners have no prior managerial experience in 
manufacturing enterprises. The Production Department is run by Mr. Tsigehannes, who is 
assisted by three to five unit heads. Initially one person ran the firm’s store, but in 2004 an 
assistant was appointed. What we see is that post-privatisation reform has congested tasks, led to 
elimination of inter-departmental reports and intensified reliance on direct supervision. For 
example, the head of finance and the chief of store handle all the activities related to their 
respective areas. No employees have been appointed to assist them. Although IMA has an 
expansion plan, the owners are discouraged by the multitude of problems they encounter, on 
which we will elaborate in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
After privatisation, one person became in charge of the Finance Department. This person 
performs a multitude of tasks, consisting of product costing, recording and effecting payments, 
cash collection and depositing, annual inventory control, and the preparation of annual financial 
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statements. In addition, the finance head has to check the price accuracy of each article sold in 
the local shop. In a normal situation these tasks would be assigned to several staff members. 
According to Mrs. Manna (head Finance), ‘a division of labour and the segregation of duties 
would help the department in minimising mistakes, facilitating jobs, and establishing better 
control systems, for the workload is immense. A single person cannot handle all activities. For 
example, checks are normally signed by two individuals. However, the owner can sign a check 
at any time for any purpose and authorise payments. In this way, the role of the Finance 
Department is diminished to collecting supporting documents in order to establish 
accountability. Private firms have problems in handling their accounting operations, and IMA is 
no exception. The number of staff members is far too limited to execute the activities. To share 
the workload, under normal conditions the minimum number of accounting staff should include 
a cashier, an accountant, and a chief accountant.’ So this multitude of tasks carried out by a 
workforce that is too small has resulted in the stagnation of some of the Finance Department’s 
major activities. For example, the inventory of goods was not conducted in time and the annual 
financial reports were delayed in such a manner that they were audited no sooner than by the 
end of 2003. On this basis we may conclude that the reduction in manpower has affected the 
firm’s accounting practices. 
 
Mr. Ghebrebrhan, the owner’s best friend, is a retired bank employee who joined the factory in 
January 2002 to become its manager. This was the first time he worked as a manager in a 
business firm. Most of his time is spent on carrying out day-to-day activities. At the time he 
joined the firm, the financial statements of the years 2000 and 2001 had not yet been completed. 
Since it was very expensive to hire free-lance auditors, Mr. G. decided to take on this task 
himself. He managed to finish it in 2002. By the end of 2003, external auditors were invited to 
complete the annual statements of 2003 and audit the financial statements of the past three 
years. In the meantime, the tax office offered its co-operation by basing the levy of the annual 
taxes on the information in the draft reports. The delay of periodic financial statements has made 
it difficult for the Finance Department to make the scheduled financial analyses. 
 
5.2.1.2 Investments: Since privatisation investment decisions were made by the owners in 
collaboration with the manager. The manager comments on the investment plans suggested by 
the owners and makes propositions for the purchase of machinery. The plans are executed on the 
basis of the mutual agreement of both parties; the owners and the manager. With the 
introduction of the business and investment plans, the firm purchased some new machinery and 
upgraded its old machines. Occasionally, Italian mechanics visit the factory to renovate the 
machines. The factory has automated its production of sweaters with a computerised knitting 
machine and also purchased a pressing machine. This has enabled the firm to replace some of 
the former manual design machines with computerised ones, as a result of which both product 
quality and output have greatly improved. The employees received a five-day training to get 
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acquainted with the new machinery. By this process of automation a significant reduction in 
wastage has been realised. 
 
After privatisation, the focus clearly shifted towards quality and upgrading the employees’ 
skills. In addition, raw materials are purchased with more care. Investments in new machinery 
stimulated strict quality control procedures. During the public ownership era the firm had a 
considerable waste problem due to the fact that its products were manufactured manually. The 
purchase of a new cutting machine has now minimised this production of waste. Sample clothes 
in all preferred sizes and designs serve as cutting patterns in the garment product line. In this 
way, no mistakes are made, and wasting fabric is considerably reduced. The material that is left 
is now used to manufacture the small parts of the product.  
 
Post-privatisation investments can also be analysed by means of quantitative tools. The capital 
expenditures with respect to sales (CES) and those with respect to assets (CEA) were high in the 
year of privatisation. As mentioned before, in May 1998 a border conflict erupted, which 
impeded further investments. Moreover, the government prohibited access to foreign exchange 
(forex) and obligated firms to obtain import permits (to be explained later). In general, one could 
say that the border conflict has adversely affected firms’ activities and performance. Against all 
odds, however, our case firm managed to improve its performance by reducing leverage as well 
as by its contribution to the national economy in the form of taxes (see table 5.1: p. 106). Prior 
to privatisation the level of debt to asset ratio (DAR) had climbed to 2.88. After privatisation it 
declined, reaching its lowest level of 38 per cent in 2000. After that, however, the DAR figures 
rose considerably and reached a rate of 72 per cent in 2004. The rise in DAR figures was 
directly associated with the rise in current liabilities (mainly the rise in bank overdrafts, creditors 
and accruals accounts). This percentage was higher than was expected. We are not able to 
discuss the remaining leverage ratios since there is no sufficient data available for the periods 
under study. 
We can conclude that due to factors such as the ones mentioned above and the border war, our 
case firm did not succeed in implementing the investment plan as intended. In general, the 
situation has not lent itself to a successful implementation of the plans. As indicated by the 
manager: ‘The right environment is not yet there and the prevailing situation is totally 
unexpected. The owners have lost hope. In the face of uncertainty, it is the encouragement from 
the managers that has motivated the owners to make some investments.’ 
 
5.2.1.3 Employment, training and benefits: 
Recruitment and training: At the time of the data collection, the manager explained that a 
severe lack of manpower (both skilled and unskilled, especially men) decreased the firm’s 
capacity utilisation well below a level of twenty five per cent. Consequently, more machines are 
being kept idle. The labour shortage has restrained IMA from accepting export orders. This 
problem is a direct consequence of the ‘eighteen-month’ national service programme that has 
Post-privatisation changes in management control, firm activities and performance 
  
 90 
now been implemented for an indefinite period of time. The manager expressed his frustration: 
‘We cannot enter into commitments since there is a severe scarcity of manpower. The factory 
has failed two or three times to meet its contractual agreements. This is mainly due to the 
shortage of manpower. Some employees disappeared or quit their jobs, and others had to sign 
up for the compulsory national service. As a result, the factory has not been operating 
normally.’ He added: ‘How could the factory achieve success in terms of productivity levels 
while working in such circumstances? The existing labour shortage has forced the factory to 
plan overtime schedules, which contributed to an unnecessary increase in overhead costs. 
Moreover, it is difficult to exercise formal planning and budgeting’. 
 
To solve the problems of labour shortage, productivity and the lack of skilled employees, the 
firm has taken recruitment and training measures. Female employees replaced the skilled 
workers who had to sign up for the military. It is more difficult, however, for female employees 
to weave manually, which is a task that is physically quite demanding; one has to stand up for 
hours at a time. IMA therefore assigned this and other tasks to the older men, which has resulted 
in a decline in productivity. In principle, the newly hired skilled employees receive training for 
one week up to a month, and the ones who are not skilled are trained during the sixth months of 
their probation period. The workers receive an all-round training so they can be assigned to all 
kinds of jobs. The factory retains only those employees who have improved their skills after the 
training. In addition, on a continuous basis Italian experts visit the factory to provide on-the-job 
training. The QC was also trained by Italian experts. Studies indicate that higher productivity 
levels are closely related to training (World Bank, 2002a). As a policy, the factory prefers to 
recruit technical school graduates because they need a shorter training time. It was, however, 
almost impossible to find them, since they were all forced to join the national service. 
 
After repeated requests to give the former employees permission to return to the factory, the 
government finally promised to do so. However, it did not happen. In addition, the firm 
suggested to the government to let them return in exchange for their full salaries. But the firm’s 
efforts to get its personnel back have not been successful. In addition, it suffers from the high 
number of female workers. In 2003 more than seventy-five employees left the firm because of a 
lack of interest. Most of them left during the probation period. They never explicitly express 
their complaints, but rumours indicate that they left because they hoped to get a higher salary 
elsewhere. Compensation expenses have therefore become a heavy burden to the firm. IMA’s 
annual manpower records give insight into the actual employment situation. They show that by 
1998 the firm’s manpower was reduced to 76%. In 1999 it increased to 77%, but after that it 
gradually dropped again until the end of 2004. Although these figures should be interpreted with 
caution, they give the impression that during the public ownership period the manpower 
situation was in fact more favourable. 
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To deal with the problem of manpower shortage, the firm initiated the plan to employ twenty 
Chinese employees. This was intended to solve labour shortage, enable the spill-over of Chinese 
know-how and expertise into the factory, and to enhance productivity and confidence of local 
employees. However, due to the constant threat of employees being forced to join the national 
service never to return again, the owners decided at the last moment not to hire the Chinese 
workers. So training is not really a solution to the problem of manpower. According to the 
production head training is expensive and only pays off if employees can be expected to 
improve their skills and if they stay at the firm. Some employees who have successfully 
completed their training are not satisfied with the salary offered. In addition, sometimes local 
competitors approach the newly trained employees and offer them a higher salary. In this way 
the firm has lost some of its trained manpower. The production head indicated that ‘it is costly to 
lose them after having incurred all the training and development costs, but the factory cannot do 
anything about it.’ During the research it became clear that the USAID served as one of the 
most co-operative aid agencies playing a role in the facilitation of training for employees from 
abroad and the provision of support with respect to travel expenses and lodging. The USAID 
also distributes invitations for seminars that are relevant for the Eritrean business community. 
 
Motivation and compensation: Senior managers indicated that ‘most factory employees are 
generally dedicated, hard working, and live up to the expectations. However, there are rare 
incidents of late-coming and absenteeism.’ Coming late was usually caused by issues of 
transport and absenteeism was mostly related to sickness, personal reasons, social occasions, 
and family affairs. Since privatisation unwarranted absenteeism has involved salary penalties, 
but taking a day off on valid grounds is always negotiable. During the public ownership period 
punctuality was not strict. This was mainly due to the fact that the employees were not 
motivated and did not take their work seriously. This has changed after privatisation. In 
addition, in the past simple excuses were enough for employees to be permitted to take the day 
off. This is no longer the case after privatisation. Since then, IMA has tries to motivate its 
workers by granting those who have no record of absenteeism a letter of appreciation. 
 
Since privatisation, most employees have not had job-related complaints and all of them have 
accepted the registration of their daily output. The finance head stated: ‘Employees who haven’t 
completed their tasks or those who have made errors are sometimes forced to stay and finish the 
job in their own time, regardless of the way they feel about it.’ With respect to the prevention of 
production delays, she indicated: ‘Creating some sort of pressure on employees is necessary to 
get the work done.’ Few employees, for that matter, have complained about this policy. They do 
express their discontent, however, if their working schedules are too tight. However, the finance 
head explained that such measures are required to speed up less productive employees, arguing 
that: ‘Employees have nothing to complain about; they should rather strive to improve their 
productivity.’ The factory has introduced a procedure for dealing with unproductive employees. 
First, they are given advice during an evaluative meeting. Then, if their work does not improve, 
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they receive a written warning. Employees can be dismissed in accordance with the regulations 
laid down in the labour laws. However, the unit heads observe that the senior managers at times 
tended to express no appreciation when jobs were completed in time, especially in the case of 
short notice orders. 
 
Employees with a large number of labour years as well as those with top productivity records 
received a salary increment. In addition, those who performed an excellent job were given lump 
sum payments. All of these bonuses were granted with the aim to retain the productive 
employees. In principle, salary improvements depended on the firm’s profits and growth. 
Further, promotion could be made through internal vacancies. The firm understood the 
employees’ dissatisfaction with their salaries. After the Ethio-Eritrean border conflict in May 
1998 the cost of living rose considerably. This is illustrated by one of the employees: ‘How can 
we survive with this salary? We do not have enough to pay for the house rent, support our 
family and cover other necessities.’ When authorities investigated the decline in the output and 
performance standards of the employees it appeared that the issue of salary played an important 
role. One unit head said: ‘The situation we are in seems a paradox. It is difficult to imagine how 
employees are surviving with their current salaries, given this unbearable situation. On the 
other hand, it is understandable of the factory not to continuously upgrade the salaries while 
being unprofitable. Also, the majority of the employees are new and their daily productivity is 
far too low as compared to the planned production levels.’ Both the manager and the owners 
were not happy with the situation. On their part, they are doing their best to retain the firm’s 
skilled manpower by paying them relatively better salaries. The amount of salary, however, was 
the employees’ only complaint. They had no problems with the daily production reports, which 
were recently introduced, or their workload. The production reports will be dealt with later. 
 
During the interviews the manager expressed his appreciation for the employees’ high morale 
and commitment, despite their problems. He stated: ‘The factory pays good salaries when 
compared to similar firms in the industry. For example, new employees are paid 400 Nakfas, 
whereas other factories only pay them between 300 to 350 Nakfas. But it is not enough to help 
employees survive under the prevailing economic circumstances. Regrettably, the factory cannot 
solve economic problems. We know how difficult the situation is and how much it frustrates the 
employees and affects their productivity. But the only thing we can do is to give them morale-
support and advice.’ The knitting experts confirmed that the factory actually paid better salaries 
compared to other textile factories in the country. They considered their salary low, however, 
compared to those paid by small family-owned firms across town. As a result, many knitting 
experts have left IMA, feeling that they were missing out on attractive opportunities elsewhere. 
Initially there were about fifty knitting employees, but there were only five people left by the 
end of 2003. 
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Trade Union representatives believe that most unskilled employees of privatised firms have 
worked under stressful circumstances due to the hire-and-fire policy. Mr Minasie, a trade union 
official, indicated that the TU disapproves of the way in which the labour laws are developing 
and the way the privatisation process was conducted. He also argued that the salaries paid in the 
Textile and Leather industry were generally very low when considering the prevailing economic 
situation, and blamed the majority of the private sector for not sufficiently representing the 
rights of the labour force. In the TU’s opinion the range of benefits for employees have 
decreased compared to that in the public ownership period. The TU argued that post-
privatisation labour laws have favoured the interests of the investors, and the management 
conducted within organizations seemed to be dominated by intimidation. The TU believed that 
the employees’ morale and progress are clearly affected by the attitude of the employers. Mr. 
Minasie added: ‘the employers’ view is: “you can work if you want or quit if you won’t.”’ In 
return, the manager blamed the TU representatives for having a negative attitude and a personal 
bias towards the firm as well as the private sector as a whole, saying: ‘TU people still seem to 
suffer from the old concepts of class struggle. They are keen to criticise private firms to gain the 
employees’ backing, portraying themselves as their saviours rather than the ones that merely 
train them to become hard workers.’ 
 
5.2.1.4 Product-market decisions: During the entire public ownership period until a few years 
after independence, about 80 percent of the factory’s knitted sweaters were marketed to 
Ethiopia. The rest was partly sold locally and partly exported to North American countries. The 
products were either directly sold to licensed businessmen or via the distribution corporation, or 
retailed in the firm’s outlet. Not long after independence, the Ethiopian market was lost, the 
distribution corporation was abolished, and the number of licensed businessmen decreased. A 
study conducted by the present owners at the time of privatisation indicates that there was a 
scarcity in sweater products in the home market. The local competitors could not produce the 
large volumes demanded by the government and schools. The only way in which they could live 
up to the large demand was by joining their capacity and offer their products at low prices. As a 
local retail business, IMA provides various designs for quality cloths (sweaters, garments, and 
leather jackets). So competition could be expected from firms that produce cheaper clothing or 
offer cheaper import products. In particular the rise in the costs of living has restricted the 
spending pattern of consumers to products for basic needs. 
 
IMA’s marketing strategy is aimed at delivering durable products of top quality produced on the 
basis of the wishes of customers. The products are meant for both the local and export market. 
On the other hand, the local competition focused on one criterion: low prices. Issues such as 
quality, design, durability and customer service were not given much weight. A competitor who 
offers products at the lowest price beats the competition. Most local competitors were small and 
produce their sweaters manually. In terms of quality these products were not comparable to the 
cloths that IMA produced. However, the sweaters of the small local businesses were colourfully 
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decorated, whereas IMA’s sweaters were not. IMA’s products were much stronger and durable 
though, and were not manufactured manually. For this reason, the firm did not perceive the 
competitive local climate as suitable for applying its strategy, which is based on quality, 
durability and customer service. Because of this climate the factory was not able to fully use its 
production capacity. As the manager explained: ‘Maximising the production by attracting local 
bids is possible, but this could only be done at the expense of quality and by offering low prices. 
However, the factory is not prepared to do this. In practice, enterprises that focus on the export 
market by delivering better quality (like IMA) are marginalised in the local market since their 
chance of winning bids is very slim. It is really difficult to achieve both ends and at the same 
time work with the same people. Employees cannot be asked to produce good quality products 
for the export market and products of poor quality for the local market.’ 
 
After the introduction of privatisation, the production quotas were abolished. This meant that the 
factory was not assured of a continuous production. It had to search for clients in a competitive 
environment; both locally and abroad, the export market. However, the firm did not have a 
marketing department that would support it in this process. The local market became the 
responsibility of the manager, while the owners dealt with the export sales and production 
services. The parent company has good connections with markets in the Far East, Europe and 
Italy. Forty percent of the firm’s output was meant for the local market and sixty for export. 
Products for the home market were sold via the factory shop, situated in the centre of Asmara, or 
delivered directly to local schools and government ministries. IMA could not distribute all of its 
products via the shop. For both local and export sales, wholesalers and other distribution 
channels were required. To increase sales, the firm started to focus on innovating cloth designs. 
It introduced new designs for sweaters on a yearly basis, which were only repeated on special 
demand. The inspiration for ideas regarding product diversification and new designs came from 
two sources. The first source was the designs of export clients. These were copied and/or 
modified for the home market as well as for export purposes to LA PERLA. The second source 
was the adoption of Italian garment designs for export orders. The product design process for 
leather products were developed in-house. With respect to the efficient execution of orders, it 
was mostly the experienced employees who contributed ideas and suggestions. The firm’s 
efforts to penetrate into the local market were not very successful. 
 
In 2002 the factory missed out on some orders by several government bodies. The clients 
preferred to import the products from India. IMA found out, however, that its products were 
cheaper and of better quality than the imported Indian goods. Therefore, the firm issued a 
complaint to the MTI, the Eritrean National Chamber of Commerce, and the Ministry of 
National Development. However, no action was taken to put a halt to the imports. Although the 
government claimed to support firms in increasing their competitiveness both locally and 
abroad, IMA was disappointed to see that the government nevertheless at times prefers to import 
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products. This is highly discouraging to IMA, since the firm is confident about its ability to 
handle any local order. 
 
IMA clearly aimed at continuously improving the quality of its products. This is crucial in a 
market characterised by constant changes, such as the fashion market. Measurements such as 
investments in new machinery, the appointment of a quality control staff member, employee 
training, and strict supervision, have helped the firm operate successfully on European markets. 
Slowly but surely, IMA has acquired a competitive position internationally. In this respect, 
privatisation has certainly been advantageous to the firm. In addition, it offered IMA the 
possibility to sell its products at significantly higher prices. One thing the firm has learned is the 
importance of meeting delivery deadlines. Further, as will be discussed later, the choice of 
entering the export market has required the provision of clear accounting information, product 
pricing and a different approach to the exercising of control. 
 
The firm considered any product or process that did not meet the required quality standards as 
incomplete and therefore unacceptable. The unit heads conducted meticulous quality checks. 
The production process had to be flawless from the beginning to the end. If something went 
wrong, processing was terminated. The manager became directly involved in the products’ daily 
quality check. The quality issue brought the manager more in touch with the lower level 
employees. The head of production indicated that the products’ defects were usually minor, and 
caused by machine faults or the breakage of needles. Sometimes, however, defects are caused by 
the negligence of employees. 
With respect to the fulfilment of its obligations the firm clearly benefited from the advice of its 
export clients. This information was used to improve the delivery standards. With respect to the 
supply of raw materials, an incident once occurred where the firm received poor garment 
shipments via the parent company. 
 
During the public ownership period delivery time was not an issue, since the factory was 
engaged in mass production. Of course this changed after privatisation. Now the firm was 
suddenly faced with meeting the delivery deadlines set by their clients. In particular the export 
clients provided the factory with detailed information regarding their orders, such as the sizes 
required, the quantities per size, the article number, the type of thread to be used (cotton, wool, 
acrylic, or a mixture), colour combinations, knitting tightness, delivery date preferred, etc. 
Export clients are more focussed on delivery dates because the various cloth lines depend on the 
seasons. If delivery is delayed, the clients risk severe losses, since a particular assortment is no 
longer functional if the season has passed. As a result the clients may claim compensation or fail 
to accept the delivery. Due to a lack of manpower, power failures, and the absence of ships in 
the ports of Eritrea, living up to delivery deadlines was sometimes a challenge for the firm. This 
is why it started to organise the work as efficiently as possible. Employees that had finished 
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their tasks had to assist other units, at some occasions they worked longer hours, and if 
necessary, part-time workers were recruited. 
 
In 2002 IMA received an export order to manufacture seasonal sweaters at a strict delivery 
deadline. However, in the midst of the production process the factory lost a large part of its 
manpower to the national service. As a result, the delivery deadline could not be met. The client 
was very unhappy with this, and refused to collect the products at a later date, since the season 
had almost passed by that time. The factory offered its products for half the price, which the 
client eventually accepted, but it became clear that the issue of losing manpower at crucial 
stages in the production process was a serious problem. Due to incidents such as these, the firm 
suffered heavy losses. In addition, it became difficult to accept orders with tight delivery 
deadlines. 
 
5.2.1.5 Sources of raw materials: Raw materials are purchased from both the local market and 
abroad. The factory possesses sufficient knowledge of raw materials (in terms of quality, 
strength, and colour) to deal with the local as well as the export markets. To be able to sell 
relatively cheap products on the local market, the firm selects acrylic. The manager is 
responsible for the local purchases. As already mentioned, the factory imports leather, yarn and 
garment fabrics, since these materials are not widely available in the local market, and if so, they 
are of poor quality. The import of raw materials is dealt with by the parent company, since it can 
purchase them on foreign markets against favourable prices. Besides facilitating the import of 
materials, the parent company offers IMA financial assistance. 
 
Most local textile factories diversified their product lines by bringing finished garments on the 
market. This limited the possibility of acquiring textile locally. In addition, the quality of 
locally-manufactured textile appeared to be unsatisfactory, but the manufacturers did not seem 
concerned about this. The manager indicated that this undermined the business of local garment 
factories. On the other hand, the interviews with employees tell us that there were also problems 
with the garment materials acquired via the owners. Often the boxes contained pieces of cloth of 
different sizes and colour. The manager expressed his suspicion that these garment shipments 
might not have come from suppliers but from other garment factories. Especially, because the 
shipments sometimes contained pieces that look like leftovers from production. The manager 
was convinced that the materials were bought on a second hand market at cheaper prices. Yet, 
the factory was charged with normal prices. The manager argued that these kinds of supplies 
were not suitable for successfully completing garment orders of government bodies. The 
manager succeeded in convincing the owners that the textile supplies should be obtained in a 
different manner. 
 
The problems with the import of raw materials started when the firm had been operational for a 
few years. Until 2000, the government banks provided the factory with forex services. However, 
these stopped in 2001, and the private companies were forced to acquire forex from parallel 
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markets, which lacked transparency, to buy raw materials. Since 2000, the forex rate has been 
unstable, and the import of raw materials purchased on parallel markets has had its 
consequences. First, the lack of source documents and the constant volatility of the rates has put 
severe pressure on management, which has threatened the relationship between the firm owners 
and the managers. Second, the customs office only recognises the official rates, on the basis of 
which the tax on the imported goods was calculated. Accordingly, in recording their 
transactions, firms were obliged to use these official rates, regardless of the actual cash paid to 
purchase the raw materials. This affected the accuracy of the firm’s books and accounts because 
the input costs were underestimated, which artificially raised the firm’s profits and, as a result, 
the taxes it had to pay. So firms that import materials using forex obtained from parallel markets 
at a higher rate are losing money (see World Bank, 2002a). 
 
Due to the differences in the exchange rates the firm sustained heavy losses. The fact that the 
actual costs of the factory’s import activities were not taken into account resulted in inflation. 
The firm tried to report the difference between the official and actual forex rates paid for the 
imports as a ‘loss on exchange’. However, the tax office did not accept this as an expense. 
Therefore, because of this ‘loss on exchange’ and the resulting high tax amounts, importing 
goods became less attractive to the firm. In addition, according to studies both the sea and air 
transport in Eritrea are more expensive than in its neighbouring countries (World Bank, 2002a). 
All of these factors affected the firm’s (production as well as sales) performance. 
 
5.2.1.6 Support for recovery: In mid 2001 the World Bank granted the GOE a soft loan with the 
intention of assisting local firms that had been affected by the 1998-2000 border conflict 
between Eritrea and Ethiopia. The loan formed part of a programme called ‘the crash 
programme’, or Emergency Recovery Programme, to help firms re-boost their export potential 
and expand their activities. The programme invited private firms to apply for the loan. IMA did 
not receive a loan, however, because the textile industry’s request was not approved of by the 
GOE. The firm’s circumstances have nevertheless improved considerably. The firm exported its 
products to Italy, Canada, the USA, Sweden, Norway and Zambia. IMA advertises by putting its 
trademark on its products, and through catalogues. The firm also made use of facilities offered 
by the Chamber of Commerce, and promoted its products on trade fairs. It also introduced its 
products in Kenya and South Africa. Further, the firm has participated in trade fairs held in 
Germany and attended various trade meetings and conferences of buyers and sellers. Its main 
challenge, however, remained the recruitment of a sufficient number of trained employees to be 
able to meet the export demands. 
5.2.2 Changes in MCS practices, firm activities and performance in relation to the 
influence of internal and external factors  
This subsection will deal with the changes in IMA’s MCS practices after privatisation and the 
impact these changes have had on its firm performance. In our analysis, which is based on our 
conceptual framework, we have mainly concentrated on planning and budgeting, product 
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costing and pricing, internal reporting and decision-making, cost control and waste 
minimisation, and performance measurement and evaluation. Our discussion will also include 
the internal and external contextual factors. 
 
5.2.2.1 Planning and Budgeting: Before Eritrea’s liberation, the public firms were required to 
prepare a budget, although this was just a formality. The budget’s main item was ‘raw 
materials’, which was based on the previous year’s consumption. With respect to matters 
concerning the firm’s administration, requests were made for the purchase of office equipment 
and furniture, and the hiring of employees. The finance head explained, however, that ‘all 
requests were disapproved of, except for those concerning raw materials.’ At that time, after 
approval of the budgets, the firm contacts its suppliers, opens a Letter of Credit (L/C) account at 
the Commercial Bank to import its raw materials, and notifies the MTI. Budgeting serves as an 
instrument to limit the level of spending. On the other hand, since privatisation budgeting has 
not been formally exercised. The heads of the Finance and the Production departments both find 
that the present size of the organization does not require very strict procedures for MCS 
practices. They prefer informal personal supervision to formal budgeting controls. Another 
reason why they are not particularly focussed on the introduction of formal MCS practices is 
that these measures are costly. 
 
Apart from the costs issue, there are also other reasons why IMA has not adopted formal MCS 
practices. For example, there is never real certainty whether the quantities produced will be 
actually sold. In addition, there is no sufficient knowledge of both the local demand and the 
actual lead-time between the orders and the delivery of the materials. Finally, there is a shortage 
of accounting personnel. Another issue is the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, 
which has made the circumstances in the country unpredictable. That is why the firm’s planning 
is generally characterised as short-term oriented and ad-hoc, except the five to ten years plan 
made by order of the MTI. An example of an ad-hoc approach is the preparation of short-term 
activities in connection with an order for sweaters. Prior to the purchase of the materials the 
work plan has to be approved of. Hence, the planning process is a demand- or order-driven 
activity. Based on the raw material combinations specified in the order, the factory determines 
the types and quantities required, and checks the inventory. Sometimes the manager and the 
production head go to the store to check the inventory themselves. In the case of shortages, 
materials are purchased on the local market or abroad (via LA PERLA), depending on the order 
received. 
 
The store uses a perpetual inventory system. The firm always makes sure it has a minimum level 
of stock to minimise possible delays when starting a job. Moreover, importing raw materials 
involves long and complicated bureaucratic procedures. For this reason the firm has purchased 
materials in large quantities, even though the workload is limited. For the production of military 
sweaters a very large inventory is required, which can, however, cause liquidity problems. The 
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purchase of stock in large quantities does not apply to raw materials that are available locally, 
since they can usually be delivered at any time. At present, the firm uses the same inventory 
methods, recording systems and documents as during the public ownership period. The only 
difference is that nowadays the procedures for the issuance and receiving of raw materials are 
not limited by rigid timetables. 
 
The co-ordination of activities: In general, production is initiated after obtaining an order, either 
through winning a local bid or via the parent company, which contracts out an export order to 
IMA. The manager usually forwards the information regarding the order to the production head. 
Then, in collaboration with the unit heads the production department prepares a working plan in 
which all the tasks and resources required are determined and assigned to the proper units. 
Based on the manpower capacity the plan also specifies the time needed to execute the order. 
The unit heads know the productivity levels of the employees. On the basis of the plan a pro-
forma offer is sent to the client, in which the price as well as the manufacturing and delivery 
time required are specified. After the client has approved the offer, the production head 
distributes the working plan among all units, and the production process begins. All local and 
export orders involve their own specific tasks and requirements, forming the basis for the 
working plans. 
 
During the production process, the unit heads monitor and supervise the employees. The tasks 
that the employees perform depend on their ability and experience. Before starting a product 
line, it is customary to make a sample product (mostly in the case of sweaters). This depends, 
however, on the uniqueness of the order. In the case of unforeseen circumstances, such as power 
failure or a sudden shortage of manpower, overtime schedules are made. The units try to 
perform their tasks as efficiently as possible. However, the production process of garments is 
more complex than that of sweaters. The manufacturing of garments requires highly skilled 
employees who have received formal training and utmost care. In the case of leather jackets, for 
example, the entire production process of a given item is handled by a qualified employee. 
Mostly though, the nature of the factory work is routine, and therefore the units do not use 
formal internal reports. All completed products are transferred to the quality control (QC) 
employee. 
 
Communication of management with the owners: There is contact between the manager and 
the owners of the firm via the telephone, fax and email on a frequent basis. The owners visit the 
company two or three times a year. According to Mrs. Manna ‘private ownership has witnessed 
an active participation of the owners in the affairs of the firm. The owners are truly committed 
and highly involved in the work. They do not let us handle things on our own, and we are 
required to provide them with various types of documents and reports to keep them informed 
about the firm’s activities.’  
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5.2.2.2 Product Costing and Pricing: Mrs. Manna explained that during the public ownership 
period a separate section of the Finance Department was engaged in product costing. Each 
resource item used was accounted for on a daily basis and included in the periodical financial 
reports. The present costing system is basically a continuation of the former one, although much 
of the paper work has been reduced. The factory applies standard costing. In general, there are 
standard sizes of sweaters for which the amount of input required for their production is known. 
In the case of leather products, the factory applies actual costing since these are manufactured 
by individual employees who possess different levels of skills and receive different salaries. In 
the case of processing custom-made products, the factory applies job-order costing. 
 
At present, the overhead costs are not calculated per department unlike that of the past. They are 
simply being aggregated and distributed to products on the basis of physical output. Overhead 
costs that become significant after privatisation include travel, telephone, as well as other 
personal expenses. These expenses inflate the normal costs of production and give wrong 
impression about product costs when the firm decides on local bids. During the public 
ownership period these kinds of expenses were negligible or even non-existent. 
 
During the public ownership period product pricing was based on a fixed profit margin on the 
total manufacturing costs, which was imposed by The Department of Inland Revenue (DIR). In 
this way, the DIR was able to control the profits made. If the gross profit margins were too 
limited, the public firms could submit a written request to the DIR to adjust their prices. The 
main cause of losses despite the use of cost plus profit pricing technique was a sudden decline in 
sales volume during a given period. At present, the firm is free to set any price without any 
interference of the DIR. But the freedom of pricing is dictated by competition in the home 
market. Normally, the firm bases its product pricing on the total manufacturing costs, an 
estimation of the expenses and taxes, and a profit mark-up. At times the prices are adjusted to 
those of its competitors or to the fluctuations in the forex rates with respect to the local currency. 
IMA also offers special discounts in the case of large volume orders. The firm does not, 
however, apply variable costing when competing in local bids. Also, it does not conduct 
investigations aimed at finding rooms for cost reduction. Further, export products are often sold 
at higher prices than originally set by the firm. 
 
5.2.2.3 Internal Reporting and Decision-making: During the Ethiopian administration, the 
publicly owned organizations had to carry out their internal reporting practices in accordance 
with an accounting manual prepared by the MTI. Each month the public firms sent their 
statistical sales reports, balance sheets, income statements and information regarding product 
and payroll costs to the MTI. In addition, the MTI received quarterly and annual financial 
statements, which were meant to be used for monitoring the firms’ activities and performance. 
After the liberation, the GOE adopted all procedures laid down by the MTI. Gradually however, 
these routine reporting processes stopped. 
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Having worked under both public and private ownership, Mrs. Manna indicated that she 
approved of the way in which the MCS practices were performed before privatisation. They 
were based on formal procedures and the routine tasks of all managerial levels were clearly 
defined. Additionally, there were internal auditors who monitored the firm’s day-to-day 
activities and traced and corrected any occurring errors in time. The different departments and 
hierarchies were well established and their activities were reported to the heads in a routine 
manner. After privatisation, however, these strict hierarchies and some MCS procedures were 
abolished. Nowadays, authority is concentrated at the higher managerial levels, which has 
resulted in a weakening of the lower ones. The owners on their part, however, try to obtain as 
much financial information as possible in the form of production reports, overviews of incoming 
bills, import and export documents, and cash-flow statements. In addition, they receive reports 
on the factory’s weekly production levels and deposits made as well as copies of client 
vouchers. Although this is certainly useful, the firm does not have an internal auditor who 
verifies the accuracy and authorisation of accounting records and reports. 
 
The Finance Department updates the inventories of finished goods and materials with the aid of 
internal reports. At the end of each month its records are compared to those of the store to check 
whether there are any anomalies. Daily production reports have in fact always formed the basis 
of the firm’s management information, both in the pre- and the post-privatisation era. The post-
privatisation reports differ in terms of lay-out and frequency of usage. It is important for the 
employees to have their daily production output recorded thoroughly and correctly, since their 
salary payments depend on their production levels. As a result they are motivated to take on any 
job to enhance their productivity. The unit heads submit the employees’ daily production reports 
to the production head who presents them to the manager together with a summary report. 
Products that are not finished yet are not included in the production report, but the manager is 
informed about them. The production head is directly informed about any defects in the product 
line by the QC staff member. 
 
During the public ownership period the units were relatively larger and therefore delivery 
vouchers were used for the internal transfer of products as well as for control purposes. At 
present, the workload is so limited that personal supervision by the managers is considered 
sufficient, and interdepartmental forms for communication purposes are not necessary. In fact, 
the owners regard the use of such tools as inefficient and bureaucratic. The production units 
record the quantity of the semi-processed items when they are internally transferred. The only 
section of the firm that still makes use of forms is the store. The store uses them to check 
whether it receives the correct number of finished products as laid down in the production order. 
If this number is not correct, the store notifies the production department. This control practice 
was not relevant in the public ownership period, since the production output was solely based on 
the fulfilment of quota. 
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During the public ownership period the main decision-making body was a management 
committee composed of the general manager and the heads of the Finance & Administration, the 
Production & Technique, and the Marketing departments. The decisions made by this committee 
concerning plans and measures were reported to the MTI for approval. Other issues than routine 
activities were dealt with by the MTI. Nowadays, the private firms’ managers are also 
authorised to make decisions upon matters other than standard issues. However, according to the 
TU the managers hired by the private firms lack skills and expertise, and tend to refer most 
issues to the owners. In addition, although the manager often consults the department heads, for 
example in local bids, the latter’s role is limited. If a manager comes across a situation that 
he/she has never encountered before, the owners are consulted. Any advice given by the 
department heads will also be communicated, but the owners will make the decisions. Besides 
the manager, another staff member who has a significant influence is the production head, who 
is a relative of the owners. Further, the owners decide upon the export orders to foreign clients 
and LA PERLA. Most of IMA’s export orders have been initially obtained by LA PERLA. 
 
5.2.2.4 Cost Control and Waste Minimisation: In general, the owners of the factory handle 
imports of raw materials and are therefore in charge of controlling the cost of inputs. With 
respect to the manufacturing of sweaters, the usage of raw materials is controlled with the aid of 
predetermined standard quantities. For the production of garments there are no standard 
measures, but the aim is to optimise utilisation of resources. The introduction of computerised 
knitting machines has significantly minimised the number of defective products. To save energy 
costs, the factory irons the garment products in large quantities. The amounts of raw materials 
for the production of leather products are controlled at the time of issuing materials by not 
exceeding the optimal quantities required for a given order or unit. 
 
The employees’ productivity is monitored by the unit heads and recorded in daily production 
reports. Aspects that also play a role in the evaluation of employees are family ties and trust. In 
addition, estimates are made of the optimum level of labour required in the case of orders that 
involve a large workload. In such cases, the Finance Department assesses whether additional 
employees have to be hired to reduce costs of overtime works. In other cases, when the 
workload declines, the finance head may advise to cut down on employees. In this way the firm 
tries to reduce the labour and overhead costs so as to increase profitability. Down-sizing the 
number of departments and units after privatisation was also a measure to stimulate efficiency. 
Finally, employees have to put a reference number on each item they finish. In this way it can be 
determined which employee performs good and which one underachieves. 
 
5.2.2.5 Performance Measurement and Evaluation: During the public ownership period, the 
MTI evaluated firms’ performance by comparing their actual results with the budget figures. In 
this way, the MTI could check whether the firms had carried out their activities within the limits 
of their approved budget. An MTI official, Mr. Sengal said: ‘The MTI tries to control the 
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activities and performance of the public firms in the first place to assure that they are working 
on a commercial basis and to check whether there is competition among them. Secondly, the 
ministry has to check whether the public firms are producing products that are actually 
demanded by and acceptable (in terms of quality) to the public. Finally, the MTI wants to check 
whether or not the public firms are making profit. This is important in view of protecting the 
public money from vanishing.’ He also stated: ‘The GOE has made the public firms go through 
a structural adjustment programme (called the Enterprise Rehabilitation and Recovery 
Programme (ERRP)). This helped them to reduce their redundant manpower and to replace 
some of their obsolete machinery. Thus, the public firms have managed to operate successfully 
and pay employees’ salaries without having to address the government budget.’ 
 
To evaluate its performance, IMA - as a public firm – used financial ratios. In addition, internal 
reports on the day-to-day activities and consumption of resources served for control purposes. 
To measure its profitability the firm annually compared the cost of goods sold with the 
revenues. In addition, the transfer of resources and (semi-processed) products among the units 
was monitored through documents. This also applied to the transfer of the finished goods to the 
store. Nowadays, as a privatised firm, IMA still uses some of these documents for evaluation 
and control purposes. Further, the firm adopts performance measurements based on quality 
control, productivity, capacity utilisation, and profitability. The main sources of information on 
these issues are the annual financial statements and the daily production reports. Monitoring and 
evaluation take place at three levels: the individual, departmental and firm level. At the 
individual level, the employees’ activities are monitored through the daily production reports. 
These reports give an image of the employees’ productivity patterns and indicate the reasons 
behind faults (e.g., poor work standards, technical problems, etc). When combined, the daily 
production reports show the actual output of a particular unit or that of the firm as a whole. They 
also give an indication of the firm’s ability to meet delivery deadlines. The interdependence 
among the separate production units makes it easy to determine which one(s) is/are causing 
delays, because stagnation makes the subsequent units idle. In general, the measures taken 
against inefficient and unproductive employees range from giving advice to giving punishment. 
On the other hand, hard working and productive employees are granted cash bonus, which also 
serves as an incentive for others. So far, if an employee’s productivity is poor, management has 
not as yet conducted any other measures than giving advice. When looking at labour 
productivity as indicated in table 5.1 (see page 106), we can see that it has tremendously 
increased after privatisation. As from 1999, however, a gradual decline can be observed, due to 
the external challenges the firm has been facing. Qualified youth are lost to the national service, 
and hard currency as well as regulatory hurdles (to be explained next) undermined the firm’s 
export business. 
 
During the public ownership period, the data of the daily production reports were kept in a 
separate register, which the manager addressed every four to five months. In those days, the unit 
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heads never checked the employees’ activities on a daily basis. The monthly payments and 
periodical increments were standard, regardless of the employees’ productivity levels. 
Consequently, the employees had no interest in improving their performance. The finance head 
stated: ‘The employees consider their job as a way to spend the day. They cannot be bothered to 
learn new skills to improve their productivity.’ After privatisation this has changed. At present, 
all information is recorded on separate cards and evaluated on a daily basis. Any significant 
deviation is thoroughly investigated. As already indicated, the main causes of fluctuations in the 
productivity levels are the failure of machinery, absenteeism, design changes, or the complexity 
of new orders. The new reporting system has positively influenced the employees’ behaviour. 
They are now much more motivated to improve their skills and achieve progress. Moreover, 
evaluative meetings take place on a regular basis, in which both work- and socially-related 
issues are discussed. During these meetings, management also communicates the results of the 
reports and informs employees on the plans and expectations for the coming period. 
 
Financial analysis: The firm annually prepares financial statements. The finance head 
explained that only after the accounts are closed, which is at the end of each fiscal year, can the 
firm’s performance be determined by analysing the data on profitability and inventory levels. 
The financial analysis is based on profitability indicators, such as gross profit/loss and net 
income/loss. In addition, annual assessments of sales trends and productivity levels are made to 
gain an insight into the causes of fluctuations in performance levels or changes in the nature of 
activities. Various profitability measures have served as the criteria for our comparison of the 
firm performance data of the pre- and post-privatisation eras. These are sales trend, ROS, ROA, 
and ROE (see table 5.1). We can see that during 1995 – 1998 the sales figures were poor, but 
after privatisation they gradually improved until they had tripled in 1999. In the period from 
2000 – 2001 they declined again due to labour shortages and the abolishment of forex services. 
In the period 2002 – 2004 sales fluctuations can be observed as a result of an uncertain business 
environment. During this period the firm dealt with stock accumulation problems and had to 
approach potential clients in an active manner to obtain orders. It had to search for new markets 
and it introduced price discounts as well as three-month instalment payments for clients. In view 
of its difficult financial position, the firm often had to negotiate the possibility to receive 
advance payments when obtaining an order. 
 
The figures show that during the public ownership period from 1995 to 1998 the firm suffered 
net losses, giving rise to negative ROS and ROA figures. During the transition period, 1998 and 
1999 showed profitability ratios relatively more favourable than those in the period from 2000 
to 2003. Except for a decline in 2001, after privatisation the net loss figures have improved 
compared to those of the pre-privatisation era. However, TU representatives recognise that the 
private sector has suffered from the fact that the labour force is mostly poorly educated, 
unskilled, and mostly female (see World Bank, 2002a). In addition, the local market is 
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dominated by the import of cheap leather and textile products, as a result of which the market 
share of local products is undermined. 
 
As table 5.1 shows, our analysis of operating efficiency and output has resulted in the following. 
During the public ownership period, sales efficiency was relatively lower than after 
privatisation, when the firm managed to enhance its performance considerably. In 1999 the firm 
achieved its highest performance figures, after which there was a decline in 2000 and 2001. In 
2002 sales efficiency rose again, but in the subsequent years there was a further decline. Output 
figures show that in 1999 and 2000 the firm’s real sales had increased by 193 and 68 percent 
respectively compared to that of 1997. However, as from 2001 the firm’s output has declined 
below 76 percent relative to that in 1997. To obtain an image of IMA’s contribution to the 
government income, we calculated tax per unit of sales (TPUS). The total taxes paid in 1998 
amount to 38 percent of the sales. As in the subsequent years the factory failed to generate net 
income, the level of tax payment also declined. 
 
From our discussion on MCS practices of IMA, the nature of control could be classified partly 
as a diagnostic and as a belief system on the basis of the categorisation of Simons (1995). We 
have noted that the factory was not practicing budgeting but it used the concept of standard 
costing by defining input-output relations and trying to control resource consumption through 
this system. The factory prepares short-term plans, controlled production and continuously 
worked to improve efficiency and reduce waste. However, the system reflected a weaker form 
of a diagnostic system, as budgeting was not utilized. Moreover, the present MCS practice 
reflected the emergence of informal controls that involved direct supervision and dependence on 
family links that are typical in family owned firms (see Hopper et al., 2004b, Uddin 1997, 
Wickramasinghe 1996, Hoque & Hopper 1994). On the other hand, we observed that the factory 
has set a clear strategy on quality and exerted relentless efforts to reduce waste. As a result, 
employees have become sensitive to quality and cost issues. 
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Table 5.1 Firm Performance of the Asmara Sweater and Garment Factory (IMA) during the pre- and post-privatisation periods (1995-2004) 
Measures 1995 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Sales Trend 21.33 100* 112.37 49.97 62.51 311.75 198.22 75.25 122.16 75.61 102.59 
ROS1 (%) (14.86) 15.87 (11.21) (56.43) 25.36 18.00 0.55 (26.11) 30.09 20.70 13.26 
ROS2 (%) (83.87) (51.45) (68.69) (190.53) 9.27 2.98 (16.60) (72.79) (11.11) (36.88) (41.79) 
ROA (%) (8.38) (25.79) (53.97) (103.44) 1.43 1.49 (6.43) (10.91) (2.47) (5.04) (8.39) 
Profitability 



























Sales 2,184 10,240 10,170 5,895 7,373 38,730 27,091 20,002 25,231 10,542 13,987 Operating 
efficiency Net income N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 683.24 1,153.91 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Output Real Sales (%) 21.47 100.68 100∗ 43.99 55.02 292.93 168.02 53.45 76.33 38.80 46.55 
Employment Trend (%) 100 100 100* 75.90 75.90 76.92 63.08 27.18 30.77 37.44 33.85 
DAR 1.44 1.73 2.56 2.88 0.54 0.69 0.38 0.49 0.58 0.65 0.72 
LTDAR N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.1370 0.03 0.02 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Leverage  
LTDER N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.4352 0.0426 0.0467 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CES N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 5.6177 0.0774 0.0158 0.0041 0.1968 0.0990 N.A. Capital 
investment CEA N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.8639 0.04 0.0061 0.0006 0.0438 0.0135 N.A. 
Tax TPUS N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.0341† 0.3824 0.2139 0.1202 0.1008 0.0469 0.1040 N.A. 
Notes: ROS1= return on sales [based on operating income figures], ROS2= return on sales [based on net income figures], ROA= return on assets, ROE= return on 
equity, Real Sales= Nominal Sales ÷ Consumer price index, DAR= debt to asset ratio, LTDAR= long-term debt to asset ratio, LTDER= long-term debt to equity 
ratio, CES= capital expenditure to sales, CEA= capital expenditure to assets, TPUS= tax per unit of sales. 
 These figures cover a period of three months. 
∗ Because of its stability, we have taken the year 1996 as a base year to study sales trend. For the same reason, we selected the year 1997 as the base year for calculating 
both output and employment trends. 
† The amount is the result of Sur tax because no other taxes have been included (available). 
1998A = Financial data of 1998 after the factory was privatised in May. 
1998B = Financial data of 1998 before the factory was privatised. 
The labour productivity and operating efficiency figures are in Eritrean Nakfa [ERN]. 
The full range of data sources and the detailed calculations that accompany table 5.1 are presented in Appendix-A.  




5.3 Developments during the beginning of 2003 until mid 2005: 
 
This section addresses the changes and developments taking place after 2002. The issues 
discussed include government regulations, computerisation, and matters concerning the 
implementation of the business and investment plan. Finally, a reflection will be given upon the 
control systems used. 
5.3.1 Government regulations:  
The government issued a regulation (Legal Notice No. 78/2003) with respect to import permits 
and declared goods in order to limit the access and usage of forex to only a few items. Initially, 
the banks were in charge of the forex services, but later on their mandate shifted to the MTI. 
This further complicated the import process and caused confusion in the business community. 
Moreover, it undermined the GOE’s credibility and questioned its commitment. The business 
sector failed to understand the objectives of its macro policy favouring a privatised economy. 
The changes of the governmental policies were confusing to the businesses and consequently led 
to stagnation of the private sector. Governmental regulations required firms to obtain an import 
permit from the MTI and deposit their forex by opening a L/C at the local bank in the case they 
wanted to import raw materials. Another option was to obtain forex from the black market; 
obviously at a higher rate. In the case of our firm, the parent company could finance the 
purchase of raw materials, either in cash or through the transfer of products. In general, the firm 
perceived the lack of access to forex as a major constraint in importing raw materials. 
 
Importing materials by means of a L/C system made it difficult to facilitate imports through 
easier means. According to the manager, IMA could obtain forex through friends who lived in 
Diaspora in exchange for arranging payments (in local currency) to their beneficiaries. 
Depending on the availability of forex in the local market, the usual way of most private 
enterprises to obtain forex was by means of direct remittance rather than by a L/C. Obtaining 
forex through friends or acquaintances was much cheaper, but required good connections. The 
manager remarked: ‘If the only option allowed remains to be the L/C system, the government 
penalises those who have cheaper options at their disposal to finance their import practices.’ 
The prices of raw materials were obviously affected by the governmental forex policies, tax 
policies and inflation. High inflation rates and scarcity of forex led to macroeconomic 
instability, which in turn, adversely affected the firm performance of businesses on the Eritrean 
market (World Bank, 2002a). 
 
The firm invested much effort in diversifying its activities in the production process to establish 
a link with the export market. This link helped the firm obtain clients’ trust, and receive raw 
materials without the L/C system and intermediation of the bank. Mostly, the only condition that 
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clients would stipulate was compliance with the delivery dates agreed upon. However, the 
import-export regulations still made it difficult for firms to provide export services. These 
regulations required them to obtain an import permit and open an L/C account in a bank to 
deposit the hard currency equivalent to the value of the clients’ raw materials. It did not 
distinguish between common imports of raw materials and the provision of manufacturing 
services. This required firms to pay bank service charges and custom duties upon receiving 
client’s raw materials. In accordance with the regulation, firms were obliged to bring 
repatriation of forex that is equivalent to the value of the products made for export. This 
complicated IMA’s export activities and created financial constraints. So the manager and the 
owners approached relevant ministries and institutions to help them find a solution to this 
problem. They tried to convince them that these unnecessary procedures undermined the firm’s 
export activities. They also requested to be exempted from any custom duties on raw materials 
obtained from clients just for production services. In addition, they explained that the local 
business community suffered from these unfair taxes. The authorities, however, stated that the 
rules and procedures had to be strictly followed. For this reason, the firm stopped accepting 
export production services. 
 
Besides the regulation mentioned above, the GOE issued a decree in 2004 that prohibited firms 
to purchase hard currency on the black market. This development further challenged the 
continuity of firms’ business activities, the more so because the government did not provide 
them with alternative means to solve their forex problems. Importing goods was only possible 
for firms that had a forex deposit on their bank account and possessed an import permit. Despite 
all these problems, IMA and its foreign clients hoped that the situation would change. In 2005 
IMA managed to obtain a new order from a German client. 
5.3.2 Computerisation:  
At the end of 2004 the firm introduced a custom-made D-base software program for use in the 
computer of the Finance Department. The finance head received special training on how to use 
this programme. With the aid of this system financial data could be processed serving as the 
basis for the periodical reports. In addition, the general ledger and stock records were 
computerised, enabling the firm to obtain accurate and up-to-date balances any time needed. 
Before the introduction of the system, all general, subsidiary and control ledgers were kept 
manually, which caused a considerable delay in the preparation of annual statements. 
5.3.3 Implementation of the business plan 
The current situation: At present, the company faces a number of problems. It lacks manpower, 
and does not import raw materials. As a result it is dependent upon the stock available, which 
means that currently business is slow. Although the firm’s position has become weak, drawing 
upon its stock is a conscious survival strategy in anticipation of a better future. It nevertheless 
remains a fact that the company is unable to pay its expenses and has considerable debts (see 





table 5.1). IMA’s bank loan is gradually accumulating because the firm has become dependent 
on overdraft services to finance its working capital. The preconditions for loans set by the 
Eritrean commercial banks are strict, and loan services are focussed on collateral rather than on 
project feasibility. The banks clearly put the emphasis on the way in which clients should return 
their loans. Mr. Ghebrebrhan remarked: ‘That is why the commercial banks have larger legal 
departments nowadays.’ As indicated in the World Bank Report (2002a), the high interest rates 
and the strict requirements for collateral are preventing firms from obtaining loans. 
 
Survival strategies: In 2005, at the time of the data validation, we found out that the firm has 
managed to obtain an order from a German client for a garment line. The client delivered the 
raw materials himself. The order contained a delivery of 20,000 pieces per month. For this 
particular assignment, therefore, the firm doubled its manpower, expanding its production from 
one to two shifts a day. This order mainly required tailoring tasks, for which the new recruits 
could be easily trained. IMA managed to hire some female employees who were married and/or 
exempted from the national service for various reasons. As a result, its manpower doubled in 
comparison with the previous years. Generally, the motive for new recruits to look for a job was 
to improve their poor living standards. 
As indicated by the finance head, the recent expansion induced the appointment of additional 
accounting staff as well as an improvement of the reporting and control methods. Specific MCS 
tools, such as budgeting, have now become essential. Due to the shortage of qualified people, 
however, increasing the accounting staff remained problematic. 
 
Future plans, expectations and firm activities: Although the macro-plan initiated by the GOE 
was intended to promote the private sector in playing a leading role in the achievement of 
economic progress, factors such as government policies on import-export, foreign exchange, and 
national security have undermined this process. IMA’s management firmly believed that the 
current environment had to change in order for the firm to successfully implement its business 
plan and become profitable. It is vital that qualified manpower became available and that firms 
were granted access to forex so that new machinery and raw materials can be imported. With 
respect to these issues, the firm certainly required help from the government. The government’s 
recruitment policies for the military, however, conducted under the name of ‘national 
development projects’, rather deteriorated than improved the business climate. The manager 
indicated that: ‘Solving the labour shortages would require the government to fully implement 
its long-awaited troop demobilisation programme. On top of that, the government is expected to 
exert efforts in strengthening the regional trade, paving the way for export by abolishing 
possible obstacles. In this way, firms can hire more employees, enhance their productivity 
(meeting local and export market demands), and eventually improve their profitability. Firms 
will then also be motivated to introduce salary increments to help employees improve their 
standard of living. So far the firm has tried its best to promote its products on 
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foreign markets. The firm’s diligent efforts have ensured an ample market demand and created 
opportunities that can be exploited.’ 
5.3.4 The owners’ views on control and the position of family members:  
Our findings show that IMA’s control system was confronted with issues such as nepotism as 
well as a lack of trust and centralisation. The manager indicated that ‘the owner does not believe 
in centralisation.’ He nevertheless emphasised, however, on the control of cash movements 
taking place within the organization. The owner tried to exercise control on the basis of the 
reports on the day-to-day activities. To facilitate disbursements, he provided the head of finance 
with signed checks. There was, however, no independent body that determined the accuracy of 
the documents that the owner addressed regularly. The manager explained that ‘inventory 
control has been insufficiently performed through the years. From the time the firm was 
established, in 1998, until the end of 2003 no physical inventory checks had been made. 
Therefore, the actual stock is unknown.’  Since IMA’s owners could not be physically present at 
the firm, it was difficult for them to exercise full control over the daily activities. The manager 
was of the opinion that this was in fact impossible, because the reports the owner receives are 
inadequate. Moreover, control was complicated by the intervention of family members. 
According to the manager it was difficult to monitor their activities. He argued: ‘Management is 
powerless since the production head is one of the owners’ brother and has full authority to do 
anything he wants. He has a good contact with the owner, who trusts him, and he tends to 
exceed the limits of his power. This is a large pitfall, as it violates the standard way of doing 
things.’ 
 
He added: ‘When unqualified family members hold key positions, they become a liability to the 
managers in the processes of day-to-day activities, controlling and making the organization a 
success.’ The manager stressed the importance of considering the qualifications of family 
members prior to their appointment. If these are not taken into account, rumours might start and 
the owner could lose the trust of the manager and other employees outside the family circle. In 
addition, at times the owners instructed the manager to settle personal bills through the factory 
accounts (e.g. rent payments, gas bills, financial support for family members, etc.).  
















Table 5.2 Summary of post-privatisation developments at IMA 
General Changes:  
1. Employment, 
training & benefits  
- employment declined due to the war that exacerbated lack of skilled & unskilled labour  
- salary had slightly improved but largely remained unsatisfactory 
- employees had become committed, responsible, and conscious of quality, cost, and duty  
- employees got training and some benefits 




- challenged by imports, local competitors, and customer behaviour  
- strategy focused on delivery of quality and durable products, expansion of market, high 
return, and customer satisfaction and on time delivery 
- major sales were exports but damaged by war and government regulations 
- the firm benefited from the support of parent company in marketing activities  
- new products and designs were introduced  
- major challenge from government regulations and tight delivery dates  
3. Source of raw 
materials [RM] 
- high dependence on imported RM via the owners  
- forex is obtained from parallel markets at higher rates 
- the current customs practice harms accuracy of records, product costs, profits and taxes 
4. Organisation 
structure 
- size/number of departments and sections declined but the owners were heavily involved  
- the finance department was poorly staffed and thus activities were overloaded; this 
implies poor organisational capacity to implement changes in MCS practices   
- family and friends, who had no managerial expertise, held key posts and enjoyed owners’ 
trust    
- the firm operated like a big shop with heavy use of physical supervision 
5. Investment - more autonomy to make investments 
- old machinery was replaced or renovated and became more automated 
- investment reduced wastes, improved quality, productivity, efficiency and leverage  
MCS Changes:  
1. Planning & 
Budgeting 
- no formal budgeting and the environment was uncertain 
- planning was mainly short-term oriented  
- information about standard input and output relationship was widely used 
2. Product costing & 
Pricing 
- product costs were combination of standard and actual costs 
- both process costing and job order costing were effectively used 
- costs were significantly affected by external contextual factors 
- firm was price taker in the local market but enjoyed freedom on exports 
3. Internal reporting 
& Decision-
making 
- reporting to the MTI was standardised 
- reduced internal reports and the owners get few reports and made regular visits  
- daily production monitoring relied on production reports  
- shared decision-making between the owners and top-managers; decisions were fast 
- computerisation has brought important changes  
4. Cost control & 
Waste 
minimisation 
- input requirements were standardised and effectively used for controlling 
- activities were conducted cost effectively  
- strict quality control was introduced  
- constant action to reduce costs of idle labour and overtime work 




- internal reports, some financial and non financial measures, and physical supervision 
were used for controls  
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5.4 Discussion and conclusions: 
 
This chapter discussed the changes made in the MCS practices and the improvements achieved 
in the firm activities and performance of IMA. The research was based on data covering both the 
pre- and post-privatisations periods. In studying these changes and improvements, we have 
taken into account internal as well as external contextual factors. We observed that our case firm 
has exerted great efforts to implement the business and investment plans and has accomplished a 
great deal. To summarise: IMA has introduced an all-round training for its employees to create 
job flexibility. It has diversified its product lines and established export markets. In the sweater, 
garment, and pressing divisions modern machinery has been installed. In addition, some 
machinery has been computerised and other machines upgraded. As a result, some of the manual 
designs have been replaced by computerised versions. In this way, product quality has 
tremendously improved and waste considerably reduced. The firm also improved its production 
reports to ensure that issues such as capacity utilisation and manpower efficiency are monitored 
on a daily basis. Further, meticulous quality checks are conducted during all production steps. 
Moreover, the owners and senior managers have become highly involved in all facets of the 
production process. It can be concluded that the factory has achieved considerable progress and 
managed to conduct business in compliance with the demands of its clients. The efforts of LA 
PERLA in helping IMA penetrate overseas markets and sell its products at higher prices have 
been successful. In addition, the firm has obtained orders for export production services through 
its client’s network. 
 
Another measure the firm took was to make its organisational structure more transparent and 
effective by reducing its number of departments, units and sections. In this way, costs could be 
saved and tasks could be assigned more efficiently. However, the reduction in size has left the 
firm without an internal auditor. In addition, there is congestion of tasks, and some of the former 
internal reports have been eliminated. Moreover, the appointment of family members at key 
positions as well as the owners’ preference for exercising control on the basis of information 
from often inadequate reports rather than actually improving the management control systems 
and strengthening the finance department, has resulted in an increased focus on physical 
supervision. Both the production and finance heads argued that IMA’s activities require an 
informal control system; a system similar to the ones small retail shops use. In spite of all the 
obstacles, however, the manager, who had no former managerial skills, is clearly focussed on 
keeping the firm running as smoothly as possible. Currently, the major decisions are made by 
the owners, and because of his familial affiliation the production head is in the position to make 
decisions beyond his scope. The owners supervise the firm’s day-to-day activities via the 
information provided by the reports and by visiting the firm regularly. 
 
Due to the owners’ preferences, the small size of the firm, and the lack of qualified accounting 
personnel, the firm’s MCS practices lack formal budgeting and long-term planning that were 





present in the past. This means that since privatisation the firm’s capacity to learn has declined 
in the sense of introducing modern MCS practices. The Finance Department is managed by only 
one staff member, as a result of which it has become more difficult to deal with the extensive 
range of tasks and activities. To give an example, the stock balance has been left unchecked for 
years now (since the factory got privatised) and preparation of the annual statements is always 
delayed. On the other hand, the introduction of computers and accounting software has 
facilitated the recording of data on activities and tasks. Since 2004, the accuracy of the reports 
has considerably improved, so also the timing of their delivery. 
 
Privatisation has enhanced the focus on quality and the firm has succeeded in improving its 
performance compared to that in the public ownership period (see table 5.1). This table shows 
that, especially during the first three years after privatisation, firm performance has increased 
considerably. There are also factors that hampered the implementation of the business and 
investment plans and impeded economic growth, such as the border conflict and the government 
policies of recruiting manpower for the military, abolishing the forex services and introducing 
import permits. In addition, the government prohibited the purchase of forex from parallel 
markets. The government’s military recruitment policy led to sudden labour shortages, in turn 
resulting in delivery delays, while its forex policies shattered IMA’s export market. Moreover, 
the planned training programme for employees was halted. Further, due to exchange rate 
differences and their tax implications the firm suffered heavy losses. And because the 
government failed to recognise the actual amount of cash paid for acquiring forex from parallel 
markets, which was used for importing materials, basic accounting principles, such as the ‘cost 
concept’, were violated. Some government bodies even preferred to import products while they 
could in fact acquire products of better quality at reasonable prices from IMA. The firm lost 
most local bids as these were based on low prices regardless of quality, the local retail market 
being heavily influenced by the import of cheap clothing. We believe that the implementation of 
a rigid pricing policy, involving full costs plus a profit margin, has partly contributed to IMA’s 
problems on the local market. No attempt has been made to use variable costing or obtain 
accurate cost information and to search for cost reduction ways that would strengthen the firm’s 
competitive position. 
 
IMA is hoping for a better future in which it can implement its business and investment plans. In 
order to do this, however, the firm needs the support of the GOE in dealing with the current 
obstacles (macro-economic imbalances, recruitment of soldiers, abolishment of forex services 
and restrictive trade and tax policies). In this context, it is of importance to IMA to update its 
MCS-tools, improve its performance and offer its employees better salaries and benefits. The 
latter would meet with the approval of both the employees and the TU. 
 
Based on our findings we conclude that privatisation has generated major positive 
outcomes. Examples are the improvement of firm performance, the expansion of markets, the 
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increase in investments, higher salaries and taxes, computerisation and modernisation of the 
firm’s machinery as well as of its accounting systems, and a significant waste minimisation. The 
nature of IMA’s post-privatisation MCS practices appears to be dominated by informal control, 
family ties and trust. Its formal control practices have become looser and less-focussed. There is 
no tight control via budgeting and long-term planning methods. The nature of MCS at IMA can 
be seen as a mixture of diagnostic and belief systems. Although formal budgets are not prepared, 
the factory tries to exercise short-term production plans. The firm also utilises the concept of 
standard costing, measures resource consumption, monitors production, and strives to reduce 
costs and wastages. The firm has managed to reduce the amount of paper work relative to its 
size. So MCS has become more cost effective and efficient. 
 
In general, the main factors that have shaped IMA’s MCS practices are the owners’ interests, the 
intensity of the competition, changes in strategy and firm size. Although we observed that daily 
supervision and internal reports have supported the firm in monitoring its efficiency and 
productivity, external factors have significantly shaped the business environment in general. 
These factors lie outside the firm’s scope but have nevertheless seriously undermined the 
development of its MCS practices and firm performance.  
 
In the case of IMA, privatisation has led to a decrease in the manager’s authority mainly in 
respect to decision-making. The firm’s key processes are partly controlled by the owners and the 
production head intervenes and at times takes independent actions. In general, privatisation has 
not led to the introduction of new MCS tools and modern techniques, as expected in the 
literature. This can be explained by the harsh business climate and the lack of initiative and 
support on the part of the owners and senior managers. Although the owners obviously aim at 
making the organization productive and profitable, they are reluctant when it comes to 
introducing new MCS techniques and hiring more accounting personnel, mainly for cost 
reasons. IMA’s most emphasised MCS practices are the daily production reports and quality 
control. Given the level of local competition, we expected that the firm would introduce 
improved practices to generate timely information. However, the owners’ preference for limited 
information, the concern for cost, the lack of adequate accounting staff and the primary focus on 
the larger export market had reduced the urge for further MCS improvements. The freedom to 
set any export prices did not require the factory to aim at accurate and timely cost information. 
 
The firm was presumed to benefit from the World Bank fund made available through the crash 
programme. However, government policies prevented IMA from gaining access to this fund. In 
this way, the implementation of the business and investment plans was frustrated. 
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6 Changes in the MCS practices, firm activities and 
performance of Asmara Wine & Liquor Factory (AW&LF) 
 
This chapter examines impact of privatisation on the Asmara Wine & Liquor Factory. First, we 
will introduce the case firm, its production process and its administration.  After that we will 
discuss our findings in chronological order. The first section deals with the changes straight after 
the introduction of the privatisation process until the end of 2002. The second part addresses the 
developments from 2003 until mid 2005. Our main focal points are the implementation of the 
firm’s business and investment plans, MCS change, and changes in the firm’s activities and 
performance. As with our first case firm, we have included the influence of internal and external 
contextual factors. We will end this chapter with a summary and a conclusions section.  
 
6.1 Introduction and background of the factory 
 
The Asmara Wine & Liquor Factory PLC (AW&LF) is a small-scale firm located in Asmara 
Zone 4, Sub-Zone 01. Formerly it consisted of two enterprises owned by two Italians, Fenili and 
Vitale. The companies were established in 1942 and 1947 respectively, with the objective to 
offer alternatives to import products, such as wines, liquor, syrups and aperitifs. Following the 
nationalisation of the economy in 1975, the firms of Fenili and Vitale were merged under the 
trade name of “Asmara Wine & Liquor Factory”. The firm is ideally located for the production 
of beverages. 
 
The company has two buildings in two different blocks. One is the Ex-Fenili building, which 
accommodates the offices of the firm’s general management, the finance, administration and 
sales departments, the stores, and the production lines of wine and syrup. The second building is 
the Ex-Vitale building, where the liquor and aperitif are manufactured. A Street called Menelik 
II Avenue separates the two buildings. The fixed assets of the firm include buildings, equipment, 
vehicles, and office furniture. Prior to privatisation, at 31 December 1996, the total value of the 
fixed assets was 1.306 million Nakfa. At that time, however, the firm’s value was depreciated by 
88%, resulting in a book value of 12%. Therefore, there was an urgent need to renovate the 
buildings and replace the remaining assets. On 13 May 1999, AW&LF was privatised for a total 
sale value of Nakfa 10,806,745.74. 
 
Production process: After AW&LF was nationalised, the division of the production department 
into two sections was continued. The former “Fenili” section was assigned to produce “Wine” 
and “Syrup”, and the “Vitale” section dealt with the production of “Liquor” and “Aperitifs”. The 
firm’s production system is quite labour-intensive and each production section can only produce 
one type of product at a time. Its production processes are simple; they consist of mixing, 
fermenting, decanting and filling bottles. With respect to liquor, syrup and aperitifs, the 
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necessary ingredients have to be mixed and sheet-filtered. Whereas the production of wine 
requires about 23 days of fermentation, the other products can be produced within one hour. 
 
The firm’s administration: Before independence, AW&LF was administered under the 
‘beverage corporation of Ethiopia’19. After 1991, the firm was put under supervision of the MTI, 
like all other public enterprises. After privatisation, one particular group that gained a 
considerable influence were the shareholders. These shareholders are highly involved in the 
daily activities of the firm. The owners have put much effort in making the factory productive 
and profitable. They monitor the firm’s affairs on a continuous basis and pay particular attention 
to market issues as well as finding timely solutions to market-related problems. By diversifying 
the current product lines, the owners want to expand the firm’s market share as well as enhance 
its productivity, sales and profitability. To make maximum use of its limited resources and 
manpower, the firm’s owners closely monitor the activities of each department. The 
shareholders also play a role in this. Their particular focus is on strengthening the control system 
and increasing the departments’ performance. 
 
6.2 General changes during the transition period [1999 up to the end of 2002]: 
 
Like all potential bidders, the present owners of AW&LF conducted their own assessment to 
gain a broader insight into the strengths and weaknesses of the firm by mapping out possible 
opportunities and threats. In 1998 they presented their business and investment plans and 
offered to buy the firm from the government. Their business plan included, among other things, 
cost-effective rehabilitation programmes to revive the firm. The potential owners also indicated 
that they would investigate the local and export market opportunities and study the possibilities 
concerning the supply of raw materials. Further, appropriate technologies would be selected and 
a new plant layout drafted. Major objectives were to reorganise the firm, modernise its 
machinery, improve its overall efficiency and diversify its product line, for example, by 
introducing the production of fruit juice. The latter would require the construction of a new 
building. In addition, the employees would be offered training to improve the quality (mainly 
flavour) of the beverages. To promote export, sales agents would be appointed in various parts 
of the world. 
 
The business plan indicated that the firm’s machinery and production facilities dated from the 
1940-s. So most of the machines were in a very poor state. The owners therefore made an 
inventory of the changes required in several areas, such as technology and hygiene. One of the 
tasks to be carried out was repairing and maintaining the existing wooden and cement tanks in 
the fermentation section, and to replace them eventually by fibreglass or stainless steel tanks. 
                                                           
19 The Beverage Corporation of Ethiopia is a central government body, located in Addis Ababa, which co-ordinates 
the activities of the beverage firms in the provinces, gives them directions and approves their budgets. 
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Filtration was still performed manually with the aid of cloth sheets and a machine. Also tasks 
such as filling, washing of the bottles, labelling and partial corking were carried out manually. 
All these tasks had to be automated, for the firm had hygiene as well as leakage problems. The 
plan proposed to automate the tasks performed by the liquor department. These tasks include 
filtering, filling, capsuling, and washing. In addition, tasks for the production of ginerino and 
aperitifs had to be upgraded, such as labelling, preparation mixer and the electrical corking 
machine, and filtering pump. Further, the production process of syrup products, requiring 
special care because of their sugary flavour, had to be improved. 
 
As indicated in chapter 5, the owners were bound to the commitments as stipulated in the ‘Sale 
and Purchase Agreement’. This agreement stated that an insufficient implementation of the 
business plan would be a valid reason for a total revocation of the contract. 
The firm significantly changed its organizational structure with respect to key managerial 
positions. In addition, target markets as well as raw material sources were selected, and capital 
investments were made. Further, training was offered to the employees, working schedules were 
adjusted and MCS practices re-assessed. In our analysis, we will address the firm’s policies in 
relation to MCS change and firm performance. In addition, we will integrate the influence of 
internal and external contextual factors. 
 
6.2.1 Realisation of the business and investment plans:  
In realising the business plan, the owners expected to receive support of the government. They 
expected that they would have sufficient access to raw materials and manpower. As we have 
seen in chapter five, however, the actual situation was quite different. As Mr. Alem indicated: 
‘When preparing a plan, the conditions for executing it should be favourable. It is then 
relatively easy to forecast next year’s operations on the basis of the current developments in the 
firm, market, and the wider environment.’ The major problems faced by the companies were the 
shortage of manpower and the abolishment of forex services. They had not anticipated these 
developments, assuming that the government would fully support them in implementing their 
business and investment plans. This, of course, also applied to AW&LF. 
 
6.2.1.1 Organizational structure: Like all public enterprises of the period, AW&LF consisted of 
three divisions that were directly accountable to the general management: Finance & 
Administration, Production & Technique, and Marketing. These divisions were again divided 
into departments and units, employing a large number of employees. In their business plan, the 
owners proposed to reduce the size of the administrative offices. So the Finance Department was 
reduced to only a few people, and the personnel of the main store was cut down to one 
employee. The firm has six owners, Mr. Rezene Tesfay (the general manager), Mr. Beyene 
Tsegay (production head), and Mr. Teclegergis Haile (head of commerce) and their respective 
spouses. The three gentlemen make up the Board of Directors, of which the general manager is 
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the chairman. Prior to being expelled from Ethiopia as a result of the border conflict, the owners 
were running their own individual businesses. They had their own truck repair garages and 
owned multi-storey apartments in Ethiopia. The three partners are graduates of a technical 
school. Mr. Rezene, who has a law degree, additionally practised as a lawyer. Although having 
an adequate technical background, the owners had no experience in running a firm such as 
AW&LF at the time of purchase, and neither did they possess any knowledge of accounting. 
They were; however, keen to learn about all issues involved in this business. The owners 
focussed on various activities, such as production planning, raw material purchases, marketing, 
monitoring and evaluation as well as decision-making. And of course they had to give their 
approval in all of the firm’s decisions and financial matters. 
 
Mr. Alem is a certified public accountant and the head of the Finance and Administration 
Department. He is the general manager’s cousin. During the transition period the duties and 
responsibilities were divided similarly to the way in which they were assigned in the public 
ownership period. The difference is, however, that since privatisation the firm has no longer an 
internal auditor to verify the accuracy of records and documents and check the related 
authorisation. Since the transition period the commerce department has been in charge of the 
procurement activities and the supervision of the sales units. The firm consists of two stores, the 
central/main store and the finished goods store. The main store contains various types of stock, 
such as raw materials, labels, spare parts and chemicals, to be processed by the production 
department. The finished goods store contains the firm’s finished products. In addition, there is a 
mini store resembling a kiosk, located next to the company’s entrance. This mini store sells part 
of the firm’s products by retail. During the public ownership period several employees were 
working in the main store under the supervision of the chief of store, who monitored and audited 
their daily activities. Nowadays, one employee is in charge of the entire store, which means that 
his workload has very much increased. This has caused considerable delays in the processing of 
information and the preparation of reports. 
 
6.2.1.2 Investments: Mr. Misghenna, the vice production head, explained that the firm 
introduced numerous changes to eliminate the bottlenecks of the pre-privatisation period. The 
firm has repaired damaged machinery and purchased new equipment, such as refining, pressing 
and capsuling machines. In addition, two distribution trucks were bought. Ever since 
privatisation, the factory buildings have been in a process of refurbishment. Moreover, the 
production site has been considerably improved. In general, the owners’ policies have been 
aimed at boosting sales. Some examples of annual investment figures are: 457,231 Nakfa in 
1999, 15,000 Nakfa in 2001, 266,868 Nakfa in 2002 and 324,673 Nakfa in 2003. An analysis on 
the basis of capital expenditures to sales (CES) and capital expenditures to assets (CEA) shows 
that in the post-privatisation period the situation has improved (see table 6.1, p. 139). The 
investments made in the firm’s machinery have been beneficial in the way that nowadays the 
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equipment can function flawlessly for at least a month. During public ownership this was not the 
case; even the production of one single batch often involved machinery problems.  
 
Before privatisation the firm’s storage facilities were poor. The containers were piled up outside, 
being exposed to the sun, rain and dust. This weakened the bottles, which is why many of them 
used to break during the washing process. To solve this problem, the firm constructed about 
seven storage places. Also the production area was in a poor condition and had to be renovated. 
Repair work included fixing the pipelines, the floor and the electric wires. Also the machinery 
was updated. All these improvements have stimulated the production growth. As already 
mentioned in the previous chapter, the abolishment of forex services was an issue. The firm’s 
investment efforts, however, were successful in terms of leverage. Prior to its privatisation, the 
company was faced with an enormous debt. Table 6.1 shows that the total debt to asset ratio 
(DAR) was between 42 and 83 percent from 1993 up to 1997. After privatisation the DAR ratios 
significantly improved. They declined from 41.6 percent in 1999 to 14.4 percent in 2003, which 
shows that the firm is no longer heavily indebted. 
 
6.2.1.3 Employment, training and benefits: During the ‘Derg Administration’ the firm had 
more than 100 employees. The purpose behind this large number of manpower was to decrease 
the national unemployment level. In 1996 the Government of Eritrea (GOE) reduced this 
amount to 47 (comprising 35 male and 12 female employees). This number remained stable 
until the privatisation process started. Two third of this workforce was engaged in service 
provision and one third worked in the production area. Table 6.1 shows that the workforce has 
decreased. In 1999 a policy was implemented to eliminate the redundancy of the workforce and 
to appoint people who were more qualified. The years 1999 and 2000, however, were turbulent, 
and the firm did not manage to increase its production. In 2001 AW&LF raised its production 
and sales levels and was in the position to hire additional people. Further progress was 
undermined, however, by the firm’s obligations to the national service and the abolishment of 
the forex services. 
 
Mr. Alem argued that during the public ownership period employees received fixed salaries 
(irrespective of their competence). After privatisation this changed. Now salaries are paid on the 
basis of the employee’s skills and productivity. The firm maintained most of the employee 
benefits dating from the public ownership period. Every year the employees receive working 
overalls and rubber boots. Every working day, they are provided with tea and bread services at 
fixed hours. After privatisation, benefits such as medical services and bonuses were no longer 
maintained, but their introduction is again being considered in the collective agreement20. This 
                                                           
20 The collective agreement contains the agreements reached after negotiation between employers and employees 
concerning the latter’s rights and duties, based on the country’s labour laws. The collective agreement serves as 
an instrument to correctly implement the national labour law in enterprises. It is referred to when dealing with 
employer-employee disputes. 
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agreement has already been drafted, but the partners still have to negotiate on its exact contents 
before its final approval. Due to the country’s frustrating business climate negotiations on 
benefits for employees have not yet taken place. One of the ideas is to establish a firm-based 
union. In general though, the treatment of employees is in accordance with the labour law; there 
is no intimidation or abuse of any sort. The TU people often visit the firms to check whether 
they provide medical care and other benefits. In addition, the establishment of separate base 
unions is propagated. 
 
The interviews conducted with Mr. Rezene, Mr. Alem, Mr. Misghenna and Mr. Tewolde 
indicate that privatisation has changed employees’ attitude towards their work. Their motivation 
to fulfil their obligations and maximise their performance has considerably improved. They are 
described as ‘highly disciplined, duty-conscious, committed to their work, and willing to accept 
orders from their bosses. They have no complaints about the routine procedures of the factory, 
and neither about their salaries. The employees feel responsible for their jobs, unlike the 
majority of those who work in publicly owned firms. These employees care less about their jobs 
and simply count off the days until they are paid again.’ If an employee performs inadequately, 
a meeting is arranged to discuss the issue. Mr. Misghenna described the relationship between the 
firm and its employees as ‘familial’. Twice a year the firm organises meetings for its employees. 
In addition, the Production Department holds quarterly meetings, and if required, even monthly. 
The interviewees all agreed that ‘the employees’ productivity and morale is good, and they 
support each other.’ There is no problem of absenteeism; only in the case of sickness or other 
serious problems do the employees stay at home. 
 
To encourage and reward employees’ good performance, regular salary increases formed a 
standard procedure in the firm’s business policies from 1999 until the end of 2002. In the light 
of maximising job satisfaction, salary increments were regarded as part of the employees’ 
benefits. For example, in 2002 no significant profits were made, nonetheless the shareholders 
decided to introduce salary improvements. In later years, however, profitability further declined, 
and it became problematic to sustain these benefits. The interviews indicate that the present 
level of salary is higher compared to that in the public ownership period. But the continuous rise 
in the costs of living makes it hard for the employees to make ends meet. 
 
Labour-related problems: Due to the mandatory national service AW&LF lost about eleven 
employees, which had a negative effect on the firm’s activities and performance. The firm’s 
management asked the Ministry of Defence (MOD) to send a number of the employees back in 
return for their salaries. AW&LF in fact succeeded in getting back some employees under these 
arrangements, but their productivity declined below expectation. This was partly because they 
no longer received their salary directly from the firm, but were paid a lower salary by the MOD. 
AW&LF tried to increase their motivation by compensating them, but the firm did not succeed 
in getting back its liquor expert despite its persistent effort. Another poignant example of losing 
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employees to the military is illustrated by an event in which a sales agent was picked up from 
the street just before making a delivery. The distribution truck, still containing the whole supply, 
was left unattended for hours until the firm was finally notified. Similarly, the chief of the main 
store was taken from his home for the compulsory national service. He still had the keys to the 
main store at his home, which was collected later. AW&LF was forced to assign another to the 
stores to resume operations. Months later, the former store employee was released from the 
army because of health reasons. He was given a job at a governmental office, but the firm 
managed to get him back eventually. Because the salaries paid by the MOD were lower than 
those paid by the firm, the chief of stores was given an extra amount each month to be able to 
support his family. 
 
Mr. Misghenna explained that the seven to eight employees that had left to join the national 
army were replaced by female employees and pensioners who had formerly worked with the 
firm. Data obtained from the MTI indicate that in 2000 the firm’s female workforce was thirty-
six percent; rising to forty-six percent in 2001 (see appendix-B). Also the shortage of manpower 
in the Commerce Department was solved by appointing retired former staff members. These 
employees were well-acquainted with the work but less productive than the younger staff. In 
sum, a combination of factors, including a lack of employees, governmental measures, rising 
costs of living and fierce competitive circumstances, affected the firm’s performance in an 
unfavourable way. The labour problem could get even worse if the firm would be required to 
work at full capacity. Especially the female workforce posed a problem in that the factory work 
was heavy, requiring a great deal of physical strength. In order to improve its firm performance, 
the AW&LF was therefore clearly in need of young male employees. 
 
Given the situation depicted above, the protection of the remaining workforce became one of the 
firm’s major concerns. This was not easy, since some employees tended to take advantage of the 
circumstances by asking for a salary raise when another employee left to join the military. If the 
firm refused, it ran the risk of losing yet another employee. Those demanding a salary raise 
clearly had a strong case, since there were plenty of opportunities elsewhere. Mr. Rezene said: 
´It is difficult to confront employees when they make mistakes or are inefficient. To some extent 
the prevailing situation motivates the employees to be disobedient to their bosses. The firm 
treats the employees well, just as one would treat a child, for fear of losing them.’ 
 
6.2.1.4 Product-market decisions: The firm had four product lines and adopted two marketing 
strategies. The first strategy was aimed at ensuring a wide distribution of the firm’s products 
throughout the country by opening up distribution centres and/or appointing sales agents at the 
administrative centres in the major cities. On the local market, AW&LF distributed its products 
directly to the wholesalers and retailers by employing sales agents and making use of its 
networks. Generally, privatisation changed the approach to marketing and the distribution of 
products. After privatisation, the firm’s shareholders started to conduct extensive market studies 
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to acquire information regarding sales, market demand and customer behaviour. This 
information helped them in their goal to improve firm performance. In addition, together with 
the sales agents they regularly visited restaurants, bars or other establishments to advertise the 
firm’s products and observe customers’ reactions. During these visits they tried to convey the 
message that making quality products requires a certain price level. 
 
Having three trucks improved the firm’s product distribution. In addition, the number of sales 
agents was increased. In this way, more products could be distributed to a larger number of 
places, such as the city centre and the suburbs. The major factors improving the sales figures 
included a good service provision as well as the ability to keep appointments and to meet 
deadlines. In addition, the firm also delivered products to individual customers. It managed to 
improve both the quality and quantity of its products. Moreover, it put a great deal of effort in 
diversifying its assortment by introducing new products, such as champagne. Although this 
product is seasonal, its demand was high. Some test trials conducted by the firm showed that the 
customers liked it, and retailers managed to sell it at a price almost double to the amount they 
paid for it themselves. Next, the firm had to get access to forex to import the raw materials for 
its production. 
 
The second strategy was establishing a network to stimulate export activities. This network was 
based on contacts with the local Chamber of Commerce and other trade associations within 
Africa. The firm’s ultimate aim was to expand its business to overseas markets, such as those in 
countries of the Horn of Africa (Ethiopia and Sudan), Eastern and Southern Africa (Kenya, 
Uganda, Rwanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo) and the Middle East (Saudi Arabia and 
Yemen). In the light of these export objectives the owners planned to conduct a market 
assessment that would form the basis for the firm’s marketing plan. Market assessments together 
with the renovation of the firm’s machinery and a clear focus on product quality were important 
measures taken as a result of the privatisation process. 
 
Because of their high demand, liquor products formed about 80% of the firm’s production 
output. AW&LF’s biggest competitor in this period was the Asmara Brewery Factory (ABF), a 
well-established public enterprise that had been in operation for a long time. ABF’s market 
share was relatively larger than that of AW&LF, and it made use of the forex services provided 
by a government bank. It had its own distillery plant, and its production capacity was large. 
AW&LF, on the other hand, produced its liquor in small volumes. To be competitive, however, 
it was forced to adopt similar prices. So high input costs, a low production volume and 
difficulties in obtaining resources clearly undermined the firm’s position in terms of 
competition. Mr. Rezene stated that ‘in principle, AW&LF should set its liquor prices below 
those of the competitors in order to gain market share. But the circumstances as they are do not 
allow us to do that.’ 
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Another problem was formed by a new group of small liquor producers selling products at 
prices of two to three Nakfa less than those sold by the larger companies. According to Mr. 
Rezene these prices were not realistic in terms of production costs. He also had serious doubts 
about the quality of these products. He indicated that the price of the imported alcohol was fixed 
and that AW&LF sold its products at a minimum profit margin. He stated: ‘Whatever efficiency 
levels competitors maintain, in the case of standard products costs can not differ so much. 
Therefore, it is odd that they are able to operate in this way. They could only sell them at such 
prices if they reduce the amount of alcohol.’  Mr. Alem added: ‘Competition is mainly 
controlled by prices. The firm and the small competitors import their raw materials at the same 
prices. And on this basis we are all required to deliver products of acceptable quality. So if the 
competitors produce their products in smaller volumes than we do, they are not expected to 
offer them at cheaper prices.’ Despite these issues, interview responses indicate that some of the 
firm’s unique products, such as gingerino, succeeded in competing with coke products. 
 
Other factors contributing to the decline in sales of some AW&LF’s products (liquor and wine) 
were the lack of export opportunities and the import of foreign beverages. Before privatisation, 
the firm’s products were exported to neighbouring countries, such as Ethiopia and Sudan. These 
export transactions were conducted via businessmen who sold the products by illegal means. 
They collected the beverages from the local shops at standard market prices. These indirect 
exports stopped as a result of the border conflict between Eritrea and Ethiopia, causing a severe 
decline in demand. During the transition period export activities were no longer possible. 
 
With regard to the import of beverages AW&LF’s management hoped that the government 
would take measures to protect the local producers. Another measure required was the 
introduction of quality standards.  As Mr. Rezene had heard from some restaurant owners, 
foreign customers often ordered local wine with their meals, whereas the local people ordered 
the expensive imported wines. But when asked whether they had ever tasted the local beverages, 
the answer was in most cases ‘no’. It appeared that drinking imported wine was generally 
considered as a sign of prestige and status. So the notion that ‘imported beverages are of better 
quality than the locally made liquors’ was mainly a commonly shared prejudice. Mr. Rezene 
was given a tip by an owner of a local tissue manufacturing plant how to become successful on 
the local market. This owner had decided to remove his firm’s brand name from the label. 
Instead he used four different brand names. As a result, his sales had risen dramatically. The 
owner suggested AW&LF should do the same. Apparently, the local people were not 
appreciative of indigenous products. The firm’s incessant market efforts, however, made a 
significant amount of clients see that it delivered products of better quality than those of the 
small competitors. 
 
Particularly in this line of business, success depends on the quality of the product. As Mr. 
Rezene indicated: ‘Quality should be a thing that the organization can openly advertise with 
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and count on.’ This required a great deal of the firm’s efforts with respect to upgrading its 
machinery and training its manpower, which was a time-consuming process. Moreover, it was 
forbidden to advertise the quality improvements, which made it difficult to reach clients. They 
actually had to taste the wine to realise how good it was. In this way, the firm’s sales promotion 
strategy was seriously undermined. Despite all these problems, however, the firm managed to 
expand its market. The Commerce Department conducted market surveys on a regular basis and 
made variance analyses each quarter to acquire knowledge on how the products were 
performing in the market. If significant differences occurred between the planned and actual 
sales, these were investigated. In general, sales were affected by the lack of forex, unfair 
competition, the prohibition to advertise, consumer behaviour, and a shortage of bottles. 
 
6.2.1.5 Sources of raw materials: The raw materials required by the firm include raisins, sugar, 
chemicals, essences, colour, alcohol, bottles, capsules, water, filters, corks and crown corks. 
During the public ownership period, the alcohol and crown corks were locally obtained from 
ABF. The bottles were obtained from the Denden Glass Factory, and the remaining materials 
were imported from countries like Turkey, Italy, Greece, Belgium and Spain. In the transition 
period, there was no guarantee of getting the alcohol and crown corks. Other raw materials were 
also hard to come by or not available at all. For example, in 1995 the glass factory was shut 
down and the government did not invest in a new one, as it had promised. Although AW&LF 
managed to continue its production and did not have to import bottles, the shortage sometimes 
caused delays in production due to the fact that the firm was dependent on the refillable bottles 
collected from its clients. The run for bottles increased by the emergence of small local 
competitors. To avoid production interruptions, the Sales Department spent a great deal of time 
on collecting empty bottles from clients. 
 
The firm had to import its alcohol because that of ABF was too expensive. With respect to 
various issues, AW&LF relied heavily on import during this period. In 1999, however, an 
interesting development took place. Some local farmers started growing grapes at a small scale, 
particularly in the vicinities of Elabered and Decamere. It would, of course, be of enormous 
value if input sources could be obtained locally. Therefore it was of great importance that 
initiatives, such as growing grapes and sugar cane for wine as well as citrus fruits for fruit juice, 
were stimulated. The import of resources still continued, though, with the aid of forex from the 
black market. Alcohol and bottles were the items on which the highest amounts of forex were 
spent. Mr. Rezene expected the MTI to undertake action to solve the problems of the beverage 
industry, at least with respect to the availability of alcohol and bottles. Main issues were the 
forex problems and the high level of production costs, which will be addressed later. 
 
6.2.1.6 Changes in working hours: During the transition period the shareholders proposed to 
change the employees’ working schedule. The new schedule introduced a one-hour lunch break 
each day as well as a 10 to 15 minutes morning break during which free tea and bread were 
Chapter 6: Changes in MCS practices, firm activities, and performance at AW&LF 
  
 125 
served. The working schedule was as follows: from Monday to Friday from 8:30 until 17:30 
hours, and on Saturday from 7:30 until 13:00 hours. The new work schedule meets requirements 
of the labour laws and was supported by employees. 
 
6.2.2 Changes in MCS practices, firm activities and performance in relation to the 
influence of internal and external factors: 
 
6.2.2.1 Planning and Budgeting: During the public ownership period, AW&LF prepared 
annual budgets consisting of the reports of each department. Sales were forecasted first, forming 
the basis for the production budget. The production volume was set at five percent above the 
expected sales volume. Before being compiled into one report, the departmental budgets were 
always first discussed internally by the production head, the sales head, the purchase unit, the 
finance administrator and the management. After that, the final document was sent to the MTI 
for approval and defended by a representative of the firm at a meeting organised by the 
Beverage Corporation. It was usually not difficult to get approval for the budget, as long as the 
targets were set higher than those of the previous period. When the budgets were approved of, 
monthly and quarterly overviews were made of the figures resulting in schedules that were 
executed on a day-to-day basis. Any deviations were generally due to water shortages, power 
failure, downtime, absenteeism of employees, etc. The achievement of targets was usually 
rewarded with bonuses, salary increments or prizes. During regular meetings the employees 
were kept informed about developments with respect to issues such as budgets and performance. 
After privatisation, however, the firm stopped following these procedures. Budgeting practices 
were merely performed loosely at top level. The firm mainly let its budgeting policies depend on 
factors such as competition, the availability of empty bottles, hard currency, etc. 
 
Mr. Misghenna indicated that ‘The factory should apply budgeting practices and ensure the 
equal participation of the departments. This would stimulate guidance and performance 
measurement, and improve the structure of the resource consumption plan. At the moment, the 
factory benefits from the knowledge of the expected output provided by a given production 
batch. This knowledge helps predict the necessary input of raw material ingredients, manpower, 
empty bottles, production time, and the expected output of each batch. This input-output 
relationship is used as a means of planning and controlling the factory’s resource 
consumption.’ With respect to planning, Mr. Rezene explained that the Sales Department 
prepared the annual sales forecast, to be discussed in the shareholders meeting. If the plan 
contained issues that the members of the meeting did not entirely approve of, adjustments were 
made. The forecast was, however, treated as a best estimate from which the actual sales figures 
tended to deviate. This approach clearly differed from the one adopted during the public 
ownership period. 
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During the transition period, the MTI ordered all firms to prepare a five-year business plan. This 
plan had to include estimates regarding sales, production, the requirement of raw materials and 
manpower as well as a strategy to enhance the firm’s profitability. In addition, firms were 
required to conduct assessments of the size of manpower and inputs on a regular basis. 
AW&LF’s main focus was to capitalise on labour efficiency, productivity and waste 
minimisation. In realising these objectives it was difficult to avoid the impact of external factors, 
such as the lack of forex, which prevented the firm from importing a sufficient amount of raw 
materials. 
 
AW&LF introduced some changes with respect to its planning and control. For example, the 
firm’s management made its purchase decisions on the basis of a monthly stock status reports 
that included priority lists indicating how the materials should be ordered. Then, the finance 
head together with the shareholders determined when to place the purchase orders. To prevent 
production disruptions due to shortages and delivery delays they mainly based this decision on 
the delivery lead-time. With respect to increasing its profits, the firm put a great deal of effort 
into promotion activities. In addition, achieving customer satisfaction was an important issue. In 
view of the firm’s growth strategy these were major objectives. Another point of interest was 
making optimal use of the scarce hard currency. During the public ownership period the chief of 
the main store did not feel the responsibility to follow-up purchase requisitions. After 
privatisation, the shareholders were the ones deciding upon the orders on the basis of the 
monthly stock status reports. When deciding upon the orders, attention was particularly paid to 
making sure that the amounts would correspond with the capacity of the containers. In this way 
costs could be saved. In this respect, Mr. Tewolde remarked that ‘the present control system is 
fast and effective.’ So after privatisation the firm managed to improve its planning procedures 
considerably. There were, nevertheless, still other factors that hindered the firm’s planning 
process, such as the lack of forex, fluctuations in the prices of materials, and finding optimal 
sources of supply. 
 
Before Eritrea’s independence, the import of raw materials involved opening a letter of credit 
(L/C). First, a team comprising people from Purchase, Production, Technique, Accounts, and the 
stores made a selection of potential suppliers and sent the resulting list plus some 
recommendations to the MTI. The MTI usually took two or more weeks to study the matter. In 
order to get feedback more quickly it was therefore common practice to make some phone calls 
or have people visit the MTI. The MTI was entitled to make adjustments to the size of the order 
or ask firms to look for additional sources of supply in order to save forex costs. Only after this 
procedure was carried out did the MTI approve of the purchase order, and could the formal 
contacts with the supplier commence. Due to the considerable time period required for this 
procedure, the production processes were often interrupted because the firms were short on raw 
materials. Thanks to privatisation these bureaucratic hurdles were eliminated. The shareholders 
were now the ones who financed the import of the raw materials through their own means. They 
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decided on how to acquire forex and determined the size of the orders. Like IMA, AW&LF was 
dependent on the parallel market to obtain forex. 
 
The inspection of the incoming raw materials was carried out by the head of the main store. This 
labour-intensive task was performed by a number of people during the public ownership period. 
The firm adopted all procedures with respect to the ordering, issuing and recording of raw 
materials from this period. Generally, the resources were ordered for one week at a time, but the 
firm’s management preferred daily deliveries for control reasons and because it wanted to avoid 
creating a ‘mini store’ inside the production department. The firm therefore planned to construct 
a small storage place next to the production area. In this way materials could be ordered per 
week and the paper work involved could be reduced. 
 
The firm kept records of the standard quantities of the raw materials required, such as alcohol, 
colour, and essences for a given output level. In this way the resource consumption could be 
estimated, making it easier to plan the production process. Although AW&LF’s production 
capacity was adequate at the time, an increase in demand would cause problems due to the 
capacity limitations of machinery and the shortages of bottles. This is why the firm made sure it 
had an extra stock to meet any unforeseen demand. In the case of wine this was actually a 
necessity because its production takes twenty-five to thirty-five days, whereas liquor can be 
produced within a day. 
 
During the public ownership period, the annual production targets were fixed. After 
privatisation, they were based on demand, and the planning and budgeting activities were co-
ordinated at top level. The production plan was now prepared by the production head in 
consultation with the shareholders. It includes the amount of products for a product line and the 
time required to finish its production. The production department kept track of the production 
process on the basis of the daily and weekly reports of the finished goods store. In this way 
product-mix adjustments could be made in the meantime if required; the stock of fast-selling 
products could be replenished, whereas the production of other items could be reduced. At 
times, priority was given to seasonal products (e.g. the production of syrup during the period of 
Muslim fasting). 
 
6.2.2.2 Product Costing and Pricing 
Product Costing: During the public ownership period, the firm’s accounting practices were 
based on a manual prepared by the MTI. Its Finance Department had a separate costing unit, 
which applied absorption costing. This method focuses on the standard costs of materials, labour 
and overhead. At the end of each fiscal year these were reconciled against actual costs. The 
overhead costs (OH) were classified per department and the operating expenses were kept 
separate. After privatisation the costing unit was abolished. The costs were, however, still 
classified and accumulated per department. Actual costs were used for materials and direct 
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labour, which were revised every quarter. The overhead costs were based on a predetermined 
rate. This aggregate figure was then allocated to products on the basis of output (i.e. total OH 
divided by total output in litres). The firm preferred the OH allocation system because of its 
simplicity. It is, however, not completely accurate. So the firm dealt with cost calculation in 
more or less the same way as the publicly owned firms. The main difference was that the 
depreciation expenses of office buildings were included into the manufacturing costs. This was 
because the administrative offices were located at the first floor right above the production area. 
This practice, however, decreased the accuracy of cost information. 
 
In addition, the accuracy of the material cost records was affected by a government policy that 
converted the value of imported goods to the local currency through the use of official rates 
when charging customs. Such a policy undermines the cost principle, resulting in loss on 
exchange (as the difference between actual cash paid to acquire forex and the equivalent value at 
the official rate is not treated as an expense). When calculating the manufacturing costs for 
internal use, however, the firm always recognised the actual costs of the materials. Mr. Tewolde 
indicated: ‘It is illogical and improper to ignore the actual costs, although the government does 
not want to accept this.’ The firm was forced to pay tax on the difference in value (i.e. loss on 
exchange). So if loss on exchange is not included in the manufacturing costs, it artificially 
reduces them, raises taxes and affects profits. IMA also faced this problem. 
 
Product pricing: Of the four product lines liquor was the most competitive one in the local 
market. Although during the transition period AW&LF was the sole local producer of wine, 
there were also a few imported brands that had gained some market share. The firm was also the 
only local producer of syrups and aperitifs, but sales of these products were affected by products 
such as soft drinks and mineral water. Therefore, the firm was not free to set any price it wanted. 
Mr. Alem said: ‘The only option left to us to enhance returns is by capitalising on customer 
satisfaction and promotional activities. This requires adjusting our prices to those of the 
substitute products, since it is impossible to improve our profitability by charging higher prices. 
As a result, the factory is a ‘price taker’, and hence, product cost information plays a limited 
role in product pricing.’   
 
The demand for AW&LF’s products was high in this period, and they were usually sold directly 
after their production. It was especially high in the case of weddings and during religious 
holidays (such as ‘Nigdet’). For the rest, the firm focussed on customer satisfaction to keep its 
business profitable. To achieve this it offered its products at competitive prices. Mr. Alem 
explained that ‘The liquor product line is mostly threatened by both the actions of small entrants 
on the market and customer behaviour. The small competitors sell the liquors cheaper and are 
spoiling the market. The present economic situation has also decreased the purchasing capacity 
of consumers. In addition, products like ginerino are seasonal. These factors have negatively 
affected our revenues. In our culture people mostly prefer to buy liquor as a present for special 
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occasions (religious, family, or social). Customers are generally price-sensitive and do not care 
about the type of brand they buy, as long as the products are similar. This makes competition 
very tough.’ 
 
He added: ‘The competition of the liquor line is not fair and thus every competitor should abide 
by the policies and guidelines to make it fair. The current competitor prices do not cover our 
total costs. There are means to engage in unlawful business to avoid taxes, such as avoiding 
formal bills when purchasing raw materials and selling products. However, AW&LF does not 
wish to indulge in such practices and thus cannot reduce its liquor price to match that of the 
competitors. Adopting the competitors’ prices might involve making compromises in quality. But 
no matter what, the factory is determined to maintain its quality standards.’ 
 
6.2.2.3 Internal Reporting and Decision-making: After privatisation, the shareholders were 
keen to adopt measures of record-keeping. They encouraged the employees to use the forms and 
procedures handed to them in an effective manner. Mr. Tewolde stated: ‘The owners have 
facilitated the recording and reporting processes in the departments, which is encouraging. It 
makes them different from other private investors.’   
 
The owners put much effort in ensuring that the internal reporting procedures were carried out 
smoothly. The firm adopted all internal control means used in the public ownership period, such 
as store requisition, store issue vouchers, production transfer form, and production receiving 
note. The Finance Department checked its stock records regularly with those of the main store. 
Further, the firm planned to introduce separate store issue vouchers (SIVs) for raw materials, 
stationary and other input items instead of using a single one for all items. In this way, 
movement of the goods could be monitored in more detail. The firm decided, however, to wait 
with this measure until the former forms had been used up. The Finance department also 
conducted periodic stock reconciliations in order to match its records with the main store. 
 
The factory conducted daily, weekly and monthly sales reports. All internal forms and reports 
were used in conducting monthly analysis and necessary actions were taken to investigate and 
correct significant variances. Focus of the monthly analysis was on sales trend, productivity, and 
input levels. Results of actual activities were compared with that of previous periods in order to 
get better insight. Product line performance evaluations were also conducted with the help of the 
daily, weekly and monthly stock movements and inventory level reports that were generated by 
the finished goods store. The reports include information about quantity of finished products 
received, those transferred to sales trucks and the return of daily unsold items. Mr. Tewolde 
explained that the main store and the finished goods store still use adopted forms. He claimed 
that ‘the system in place is well organised and no improvements are needed.’ 
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Each department had its own specific activities and procedures. The Production Department 
accounted for the raw materials usage by means of consumption reports and for the empty 
bottles by filling in finished goods transfer forms. Bottle breakage was also recorded. Mr. 
Misghenna indicated that: ‘Thanks to our effective control system there is nothing that remains 
hidden in the Production Department.’ The Commerce Department sent duplicates of the sales 
invoices and daily sales reports to the Finance Department. Unsold products were returned to the 
finished goods store at the end of the day, and registered on the ‘products return form’. In 
addition, the Ministry of Finance introduced a regulation stipulating that firms issue sales 
receipts instead of recording them on client’s records. This was, however, a time-consuming 
procedure for the Sales Department. 
 
The products were sold on cash basis, and the empty bottles were always returned to the factory. 
Records of the sales agents’ activities were sent to the Finance Department every day. Any 
anomalies were immediately investigated. The cash resulting from the daily sales plus deposit of 
containers was handed over to the firm’s cashier in exchange for an invoice. Similar procedures 
applied to the mini store. Control was exercised, however, once a week rather than each day. 
The weekly balance of unsold products was determined by counting them physically. At the end 
of each month the unsold items were returned from the mini store to the finished goods store to 
facilitate monthly physical counts. 
 
The Department of Finance prepared monthly reports, one dealing with ‘product sales and 
deposits payable income’ and the other with ‘bottles and container deposits’. The sales report 
was classified by product lines. At the end of each quarter and at year ends, the information of 
both reports was aggregated. In addition, an annual graphic report on the actual production 
volume plus information regarding the amount of the actual sales revenue (the total figures as 
well as a specification into product types) was presented to the firm’s management. These types 
of reports were introduced after privatisation and served as guidelines for the shareholders, who 
discussed them in their meetings. In the public ownership period, firms were obliged to send 
their monthly reports to the MTI. These reports also dealt with issues such as production, sales 
and purchases, but the MTI did not use them for evaluation purposes. The information in these 
reports was merely used for the MTI’s annual statistical overview of firm performance. After 
privatisation, firms were still ordered to provide the MTI with information, which had to be 
filled in on pre-designed forms. 
 
After privatisation, the quality control section performed various tests on the products. This 
section also prepared daily reports, which were sent to the general manager. The quality control 
section co-operated closely with the Production Department. In the case of change in product 
taste, usually due to the inferior quality of essences or flavours, management was informed and 
advised to consider a change of suppliers. The management also received sales reports on a 
weekly basis. Mr. Rezene said: ´In principle I prefer to collect daily sales reports. However, due 
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to practical problems the sales agents are not able to do this. We conduct door-to-door sales, 
delivering the goods with our trucks. Sometimes clients ask our salesmen to come back another 
day to collect the cash. So it would be unreasonable to demand daily reports when the collecting 
of cash is deferred.’ The Finance Department informed management about materials, containers, 
finished goods, disbursements and cash collections. Sometimes the finance head shared relevant 
information with management informally. After privatisation a number of internal reports were 
abandoned. These were down time, monthly raw material consumption and daily production 
reports, which were replaced by production transfer forms. 
 
Decision-making: During the public ownership period, firms’ main decision-making bodies 
were their management committees. In addition, the MTI as well as government regulations, 
such as hiring and firing policies and salary scaling, played a dominant role. After privatisation 
the Board of Directors became the highest decision-making entity. It had a considerable amount 
of freedom with respect to issues such as salary scaling and hiring and firing policies. In 
addition, the shareholders had an active role. They could take action whenever required and 
make quick decisions. Especially, the general manager did not have to consult the shareholders 
whenever immediate action was needed. Each party, however, was always being kept up-to-date 
on all relevant matters. 
 
Decisions leading to improvements in productivity, product quality, market share and 
competitiveness were generally stimulated. The firm’s management encouraged the departments 
in undertaking fast action to facilitate their operations. For example, if a department was of the 
opinion that for competitive purposes the quality of a product could be enhanced by adding 
more ingredients to it, the request to purchase additional resources was directly approved of by 
management. The shareholders were also actively involved in looking for opportunities to yield 
better results. However, the government prohibited firms to advertise their products. All in all, 
there was a high degree of flexibility in decision-making, resulting from the involvement of the 
owners in the day-to-day activities of the firm. Decisions could be made much faster than during 
the public ownership period, because the level of bureaucracy had been significantly reduced. 
During this period making a decision about selling redundant resources took so long that they 
had long perished by the time the decision was being approved of. After privatisation, this was 
no longer the case. 
 
Another difference was that with respect to matters that did not affect the firm as a whole the 
lower managerial levels also had some decision-making authority. This concerned issues such 
as, for example, the schedule for cleaning the production floor. Matters such as costs and 
profitability, however, were dealt with at the top level. The lower employees were entitled, 
though, to express their opinions as well as to supply management with information on issues 
that were of major importance to the firm. In the light of saving costs effectively and 
successfully, the owners required as much data as they could possibly get, and all information 
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(both internal and external) was welcome. This information covered various areas, such as 
salary payment, inputs, alternative sources of supply, appointing agents, and forex. As already 
mentioned, after privatisation quality care and the firm’s image became major focal points, 
which had been non-existent during the public-ownership period. 
 
Mr. Tewolde clarified that ‘There was no serious sense of responsibility during public 
ownership. Employees were negligent and could not be bothered to keep accurate records. They 
did not care that materials perished in the store. What they considered important was keeping 
the materials in the store regardless of the state they were in. At present, control is exercised on 
a daily basis and negligence is not tolerated. The factory takes appropriate action before the 
stored materials have a chance to perish. The physical presence of the shareholders also plays a 
significant role in making people conscious about their duties and responsibilities. If one of the 
shareholders is absent, the other two can take his place, and everything remains in control.’ A 
clear advantage of privatisation is that shareholders take a real interest in strengthening the 
position of firms. One way of doing this is closely monitoring the actions of the competitors. 
Mr. Tewolde called this a key element, which was not considered relevant during the public 
ownership period. 
 
6.2.2.4 Cost Control and Waste Minimisation: Prior to privatisation, public firms suffered from 
idle labour and low concern for performance. Thus the GOE retrenched the redundant 
manpower. Even after privatisation, the factory retained the most qualified and productive 
employees in order to improve its efficiency. Labour costs were controlled by keeping the 
workforce small but effective by means of job assignment plans. As a result, a significant 
increase in productivity was achieved (see table 6.1). There were, however, external constraints 
that impeded productivity, such as the lack of forex, inflation, government regulations and the 
shortage of young workers due to the compulsory national service. 
 
Overhead costs included the expenses incurred by the facilitation of operations and the 
deprecation of machinery and buildings. It appeared that as a result of the external factors the 
firm was not able to fully use its capacity. It tried, however, to exercise control over its materials 
and resources consumption as efficiently as possible by means of internal documents. In this 
way, knowledge could be obtained of the standard input requirements as well as of the 
relationship between input and output. In the case of inefficiencies, the Finance Department 
informed the Production Department. 
 
Prior to purchasing its raw materials, the firm always checked their brand, quality, transportation 
costs and input prices, the latter of which was directly influenced by inflation and the rates of 
forex that undermined the firm’s profits. In dealing with this problem, AW&LF selected 
reasonably priced raw materials of adequate quality (not necessarily top quality). In this way, a 
balance could be obtained between quality and competitive prices. To further improve the firm’s 
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general efficiency the shelving system of the main store was renewed, facilitating the 
monitoring of the inventory. The firm’s management requested every department to offer 
suggestions regarding the further improvement of its control systems. Measures were introduced 
for monitoring the amount of bottles required as well as bottle breakages. Hence, the above 
stated issues were not given much consideration during public ownership period. 
 
The production of beverages does not involve large amounts of waste. A batch of wine can 
easily be reprocessed if necessary. So the problem of waste did not really apply to AW&LF. The 
employees were specifically instructed to be careful during the process of filling the bottles. An 
issue more relevant to the firm was maintaining the quality standards of the beverages. A 
decrease in quality is directly related to the use of fewer ingredients. For this reason it is crucial 
not to economise on raw materials, which of course involves costs. In maintaining the product 
quality, Ms. Asefash, the firm’s chemist, worked closely together with the Production 
Department, and a great deal of attention was being paid to the beverages’ mixing process. In 
addition, the government’s central laboratory regularly made biological analyses of raw material 
as well as of beverage samples. On the basis of these samples the firm acquired a certificate of 
good quality. The firm also planned to replace its old lab-equipment and instruments. 
 
Mr. Alem said: ´It is quite clear that any quality problem (in the beverage industry) directly 
affects the health of clients. Therefore, strict product quality control is desirable.’ Sometimes, 
however, there were complications. For example, during the public ownership period the firm 
imported processed sugar especially prepared for making beverages. Due to the forex issue and 
the high price of the sugar, the firm could no longer obtain this resource. In order to stay in 
business it therefore decided to temporarily acquire normal sugar on the local market. 
 
Another factor affecting product quality was the condition of the tap water. It was sometimes 
muddy and unclean. Although this did not pose health risks, it changed the colour of the 
beverages, which was undesirable. Further, a special point of interest was filling up the bottles 
properly. The firm paid much attention to this task, making sure that the standards were met. It 
had replaced the old manual capsuling machine, which damaged the crown corks, with an 
electrical one. Now, only some leakage occurred during the filling process of the aperitif line, 
but this was just a minor inconvenience. 
 
6.2.2.5 Performance Measurement and Evaluation: During the public ownership period firms 
were allowed to include overtime work in their planning schedules, provided that the MTI 
approved of the budgetary arguments for this measure. After independence, however, this was 
no longer the case. The GOE prohibited the scheduling of overtime work, and budgeting and 
reporting procedures became mere formalities without a real function. Moreover, the MTI did 
not provide firms with any feedback on their reports, neither on their interim nor on their year 
end reports. 




AW&LF had adequate procedures for monitoring its manpower and production as well as its 
business processes. Productivity was assessed on a daily, weekly, monthly and annual basis. 
Sufficient information about input requirements and expected outputs were available on all 
product lines. In addition, the inventory of the main store was annually checked and its 
condition was assessed by a group consisting of the management together with the heads of 
Sale, Production, and Finance. Before privatisation, the labour productivity was between 39,500 
and 96,600 Nakfa per employee (see table 6.1). After privatisation, this increased up to figures 
between 58,500 and 123,100 Nakfa per employee. From 1998 until 2001 the growth rate 
continued, but after that productivity started to decline. Also in the case of AW&LF this was 
mainly due to external factors. Quite frequently it happened that there were no empty bottles, 
which caused delivery delays. In turn these delays affected the production and sales schedules 
and undermined the firm’s profitability. The bottle shortage issue became even more 
problematic when small local competitors entered the market. Furthermore, there were often 
delays in the distribution of the bottle labels, and there was a shortage of crown corks. On top of 
this, the forex situation, as already referred to, made the circumstances even more difficult. It is 
obvious that dealing with delays was one of AW&LF’s main problems. 
 
Also the firm’s sales performance was evaluated by means of daily, weekly, monthly and annual 
reports. The focus was on trend analyses, concluded each year with an annual variance 
assessment. The objective was to achieve a match between production and sales. Mr. Alem said: 
‘When production dominates sales, or vice versa, it shows in the inventory. And of course it 
shows in the records.’ In the case of anomalies, the department concerned was expected to 
investigate. For example, decreasing sales figures may be due to a decreased product quality, 
high prices, or inefficiency of the salesmen. Approaching clients to receive feedback usually 
formed part of the factory’s investigation. Further, the investigation included market surveys 
and departmental meetings in which the firm’s performance standards were discussed. Another 
control measure included monthly shareholders meetings and informal contacts. Here, the 
shareholders evaluated the firm’s performance, formulated guidelines and instructions, and 
usually exchanged information among one another. 
 
Besides the above-mentioned reports, the firm’s management also received quarterly analyses, 
such as financial statements, sales and production overviews and profitability reports. Mr. 
Rezene indicated that most of the time these reports were delayed by one or two months due to 
the shortage of qualified accounting personnel. The loss of staff was a result of the compulsory 
national service. The new employees, however, lacked sufficient experience and needed quite 
some time to get used to the systems. So the firm did not possess the amount of accounting 
information it actually required. This is why management clearly expressed the need for a full-
time staff as head of the Finance department. Mr. Alem is working as a part-time staff. 
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Prior to the liberation, AW&LF made internal records of its production efficiency, productivity 
per man-hour, and down time. After privatisation other methods were introduced. As Mr. Alem 
explained: ‘The production process is labour-intensive and often fluctuates, and so it is difficult 
to set hourly productivity standards. For many reasons people are not expected to maintain the 
same level of efficiency all the time, such as machines. But if the actual output drops below 
acceptable standards, the deviations are no longer tolerated. If the output declines, the batch 
group responsible is held accountable and has to give an explanation (e.g. output variations 
may occur due to leakage, bottle breakages, etc.). Control is exercised every day. The employees 
count their output items and report on variations, before the responsible section heads complete 
the output control procedure. In general, employees are open in telling about the errors they 
have made, asking assistance when needed.’ 
 
Despite the difficulties the firm tried its best to improve its productivity, maintain its product 
quality, and enhance its sales. Every now and then, people from the MTI came to check the 
standard to the firm’s products. It was important to AW&LF to at least maintain its current 
operations. What made this difficult was, however, that the prices of raw materials, labour, 
power and fuel was increasing, whereas the firm could not increase its product prices. In 
addition, the competition was severe. Further, the firm was not able to produce at a maximum 
level due to the forex issue, the shortage of raw materials as well as bottles, and inflation. This 
situation required the firm to turn to non-financial information, in the form of feedback by 
clients. In addition, the shareholders conducted market surveys to obtain information regarding 
the demand side. Often the heads of the Production and Sales departments visited bars or 
restaurants, and pretended they were customers. They ordered their own products and asked the 
opinion of clients about the firm’s beverages compared to those of other distributors. They also 
obtained information on the beverages’ peak sale periods. To stimulate sales, the firm offered 
clients’ credit facilities as well as free delivery services. 
 
Financial analysis: During this period the firm’s use of financial performance measures was 
limited to annual reports. In addition, the owners conducted various studies to acquire 
knowledge with respect to obtaining bank loans and ways of utilising idle cash. Table 6.1 shows 
the developments of AW&LF’s firm performance. After privatisation until the end of 2001 the 
firm was profitable. Its net earnings after tax increased steadily. In 2002, however, they started 
to decline, decreasing to a net loss before tax in 2003. The same trend applies to the sales 
figures. From 1993 onwards, sales grew steadily until the end of 1997, and again in the post-
privatisation period from 1999 until the end of 2001. In 2001 the firm achieved its highest sales 
figures. As Mr. Fekadu explained, this had several reasons. First, the firm had invested in its 
machinery. Second, it had become more experienced in conducting its business efficiently and 
effectively, resulting in a better access to the market. And third, in 2001 enterprises could still 
profit from the forex services provided by the government banks. After 2001, these services 
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were abolished and inflation rose, which negatively affected firms’ productivity and 
profitability. 
 
AW&LF’s believed that profitability depends on turnover. This is why it focussed particularly 
on the production of competitive goods. In addition, attention was being paid to stimulating 
customer demand and establishing good relationships with clients. To obtain an insight into the 
firm’s profitability during the transition period, we calculated return on sales (ROS), return on 
assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). The results show that all three ratios were clearly 
lower than those in the public ownership period. The only exception was the ROS percentage in 
2001 (based on net income). These figures can be explained by the increase in small local 
competitors and the rise in manufacturing costs, as reflected in the gross profit ratio (GPR)21. 
GPR was 43 to 55% during the public ownership period, whereas after privatisation it declined 
to rates between 17 to 41%. During public ownership ROA amounted from 9.42 to 26.65% per 
Nakfa of the investments made, whereas after privatisation it dropped between 1.18 to 11.99% 
per Nakfa. These differences are partly linked to significant variations in asset value. In the 
period from 1993 to 1997 the total asset value ranged from 2.26 to 4.53 million Nakfa. After 
privatisation it increased enormously to figures ranging from 14.04 to 17.54 million Nakfa, due 
to investments. Comparative financial statements presented in appendix-b give details on asset 
breakdown. With respect to ROE, prior to privatisation the ratios were higher than 28%, 
whereas after privatisation the maximum ratio was 16.5%. This can be explained by the fact that 
during the public ownership period the total capital was less than 2.08 million Nakfa, whereas 
after privatisation it increased to more than 9.67 million Nakfa (see Appendix-B). 
 
Results on operating efficiency, output, and tax are as follows. The firm’s sales efficiency 
improved considerably after privatisation, with the year 2003 as exception. Already before 
privatisation AW&LF’s sales figures had started to increase until the end of 1996, but decreased 
again slightly in 1997. Net income efficiency has increased from 4,500 Nakfa in 1993 to 24,800 
Nakfa in 1997. After privatisation the net income efficiency was 4,400 Nakfa (1999), but it 
increased significantly in the years after that, reaching its highest level in 2001 with 26,770 
Nakfa. In 2002 it declined to 4,800 Nakfa. In 2003, however, the firm reported a net loss, which 
obviously had implications for the income figures. The decline in net income was associated 
with a decrease in sales revenue and rising costs due to inflation. Prior to privatisation, the 
firm’s output performance was poor, with the exception of 1996, during which it was 6% higher 
than in 1997, the base year. In 1999 its output dropped to 72%, but after that it increased again, 
reaching its highest level in 2001 (117%). In 2002 it dropped to 84% and further declined to 
51% in 2003. 
 
The firm paid several taxes, such as excise tax, sales tax, personal income tax, profit tax, and 
municipality tax. Sur tax is meant for unexpected events such as draught or war. Sur tax is a flat 
                                                           
21 Gross Profit Ratio (GPR) = Gross Profit ÷ Sales. 
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rate tax charged on the amount of gross revenue. The firm paid this kind of tax during the period 
1999-2000. Excise tax is related to the production of specific local products and imported 
materials. It is based on a firm’s production costs and not dependent on sales. This type of tax 
stimulates inflation. The firm’s management indicated that the taxes the firm paid had increased 
since privatisation. Appendix-b shows that the percentage of total annual taxes paid by the firm 
ranged from 34 to 41% of sales revenues. This was a significant amount, which demonstrated 
that AW&LF made a positive contribution to the country’s economy. The shareholders, 
however, complained that the beverage industry was forced to pay a larger amount of tax than 
other industries. 
 
The discussions in this section displayed that the nature of MCS at AW&LF can be classified as 
a mixture of diagnostic and belief systems on the basis of the classification of Simons (1995). 
We have observed that the factory did not prepare formal budgets, but short-term production 
plans were exercised. The concept of standard costing was utilised to measure resource 
consumption, to monitor production, and for reducing costs and wastages. The physical 
involvement of the owners, informal contacts among them, plus use of direct supervision had 
reduced the need for some internal reports. Thus, the amount of paper work has been effectively 
reduced relative to its current size. Also, decision-making has become very fast. At present, 
MCS has become more cost effective and efficient. Another feature of the MCS practice was the 
emergence of family type controls that gave some emphasis to personal relationships and trust 
among the shareholders. Further, the factory has registered success in its strategy on quality and 
customer focus on top of efficiency gains. The employees have become cognisant of costs and 
quality and this indicates an aspect of a belief system in the current MCS system of the factory. 
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Table 6.1 Firm performance of Asmara Wine and Liquor Factory [AW&LF] during the pre- and post-privatisation periods (1993-2003) 
Measures 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Sales Trend 100%* 133.17 174.38 244.77 239.59 N.A. 192.43 306.32 411.79 359.12 272.50 
ROS1 (%) 43.20 47.59 54.56 49.78 53.62 N.A. 33.85 40.83 38.96 23.85 17.49 
ROS2 (%) 11.49 18.27 26.17 25.69 27.19 N.A.  5.47 10.01 27.25 5.35 (8.69) 
ROA (%) 9.42 16.23 22.18 26.60 26.65 N.A. 1.18 3.24 11.99 2.33 (3.13) 
Profitability 



























Sales 39,447 52,532 68,787 96,553 91,016 N.A. 80,823 119,194 98,226 90,086 58,479 Operating 
efficiency Net income 4,532 9,596 18,000 24,809 24,752 N.A. 4,417 11,933 26,770 4,818 N.A. 
Output Trend (%)  43.34 57.72 75.58 106.08 100∗ N.A. 71.80 100.31 117.11 84.24 50.58 
Employment Trend (%) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 100* 100 81 77 109 85 79 
DAR 83.15 42.50 45.57 62.29 58.39 N.A. 41.60 41.50 27.27 18.16 14.36 
LTDAR N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 29.65 15.10 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Leverage  
LTDER N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 50.77 25.81 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CES N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 12.82 N.A. 0.20 4.01 6.43 Capital 
investment CEA N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 2.76 N.A. 0.09 1.75 2.31 
Tax TPUS N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 38.57 41.06 39.40 34.97 34.16 
Notes: 
ROS1= return on sales [based on operating income figures], ROS2= return on sales [based on net income figures], ROA= return on assets, ROE= return on equity, Real 
Sales= Nominal Sales ÷ Consumer price index, DAR= debt to asset ratio, LTDAR= long-term debt to asset ratio, LTDER= long-term debt to equity ratio, CES= capital 
expenditure to sales, CEA= capital expenditure to assets, TPUS= tax per unit of sales. 
* 1993 functioned as the base year for sales trends. 
∗ 1997 functioned as the base year for computing output and employment trends. 
The type of currency used in connection with labour productivity and operating efficiency is the Eritrean Nakfa [ERN].  
Appendix-B presents the full range of data sources and the detailed computations that accompany table 6.1. 
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6.3 Developments from the beginning of 2003 until mid 2005: 
6.3.1 Government regulations:  
Mid 2003 the GOE issued a regulation on import permits and declared goods (Legal Notice No. 
78/2003). This regulation served as a tool to control the way in which firms spent their forex. 
The measure considerably limited firms in their freedom to make import decisions. It 
empowered the MTI to intervene in the activities of the government banks and enforced 
companies to import goods via the L/C system. In this way the import process became 
unnecessarily long and complicated. Mr. Alem argued: ‘The recent government regulation on 
import permits has taken us back to the old system of bureaucracy.’ 
 
As already explained, the customs office’s refusal to recognise firms’ actual forex costs and the 
fact that the tax office did not recognise the loss on exchange undermined the firms’ records and 
performance. In addition, the government prohibited firms to obtain hard currency in parallel 
markets. AW&LF’s management indicated: ‘Now it has become difficult to operate. We have 
money (local currency) and know how to use it, but the regulations are preventing us from 
doing so. It is like watching your family starve to death but there is nothing you can do about it.’ 
The new regulation also required firms to declare their hard currency at the customs office and 
exchange it at the commercial banks at the official rates. 
 
Further, in 2004 the Administration of the Central Zone issued a measure that enforces beverage 
firms to distribute their products within a restricted time range, namely from Monday to Friday 
between 9:00 and 12:00 a.m., including the evening hours. Mr. Rezene commented: ‘The new 
regulation has had a huge impact on our sales performance as compared to that of other firms. 
For example, clients of the Red Sea Bottler’s Share Company and ABF have to wait for their 
soft drinks and beer, since there are no other suppliers of these products. However, our clients 
do not have to wait, as they can also get their supplies from other sources.’ According to 
AW&LF’s management this situation poses a considerable threat to the firm’s operations. 
Moreover, recently the measure was extended to the Saturdays, to which the firm strongly 
protested. These developments show that the process of privatisation has not yet resulted in a 
suitable enabling environment in which firms can successfully conduct business (Abraha, 2006). 
 
The government administers the commercial banks centrally and determines the rules and 
regulations with which they have to comply in their service provision and activities. So far no 
restrictions have been introduced with respect to loans. To some companies, the amount of 
collateral or the type of loan permitted may be an issue, but in general there are no major 
obstacles. At times AW&LF has observed that commercial banks ask companies that want to 
borrow money to choose for bank overdraft rather than for a short-term loan, but there is always 
room for negotiation. The interest charged on bank overdraft is relatively higher than in the case 
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of a short-time loan, but its repayment period is longer. AW&LF prefers short-term loans, 
however, since it always aims at settling them quickly. 
 
6.3.2 Computerisation:  
In 2004 the firm introduced computers for administrative and accounting purposes. They are 
used for keeping stock records, for recording all kinds of data and for the general register. The 
accounting data are processed by an Excel programme, which generates the various reports. 
Computerisation has greatly improved the firm’s information processing and control practices, 
which in the early days were always performed manually. In addition, the amounts of excise and 
service tax to be paid can be calculated by formula specially developed for this purpose. In the 
beginning of 2005 the firm purchased a new computer for the Finance Department. Further, the 
firm is planning to install ‘Peach Tree’, an accounting software programme. With the aid of this 
programme the firm will be able to produce its reports accurately and in a timely manner. At 
least two accounting staff members will be trained to work with this programme. The 
shareholders want to install computers in all departments including in the main store. 
 
6.3.3 Revisiting implementation of the business plan: 
The current situation: At the present moment AW&LF’s production processes are running 
smoothly. However, since 2003 sales have declined somewhat. This is why the firm’s 
shareholders conduct market surveys on a regular basis. Besides competition, the major factors 
that hinder an increase in sales are the lack of hard currency and the small size of the market. 
Solving the problem of the lack of hard currency would certainly improve the possibilities for 
making investments as well as for enhancing product quality, productivity and profitability. 
With respect to problems such as the loss of workforce and restrictions in delivery the firm has 
turned to several organizations, among which the Eritrean National Chamber of Commerce, the 
National Confederation of Eritrean Workers, and the Employer’s Federation. The firm has asked 
these organizations for their support in its dealings with government ministries and institutions. 
The intervention of these organizations has, however, been very disappointing, and the firm’s 
circumstances have not been improved at all. 
 
Future plans: As already indicated, the introduction of new technology and the implementation 
of the business plan are being hampered by a number of factors of external nature. For example, 
the firm has chosen to wait with the introduction of new machinery until it is able to hire well-
educated young employees again. The present workforce, consisting of older men and women, 
simply do not possess the skills required for the operation of modern equipment and technology. 
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6.3.4 The shareholders’ plans and control methods:  
AW&LF is run by its owners, who form its management. This is in fact unique in the Eritrean 
business culture, where these kinds of partnerships are not very common. Prof. Abraham 
indicated: ‘In the past 40 to 50 years of colonisation, Eritrea has lost its resourceful people. 
Some of them were exiled, others died of old age, and others did not have the opportunities to 
own and run business firms. So there is a severe shortage of managerial capacity in the country. 
The problem is not the lack of capital but the lack of know-how; the lack of knowledge how to 
make the most of whatever little resources you have. This requires the ability to plan and to 
manage as well as the possession of knowledge of international marketing concepts and 
strategies on how to compete in the market. Here “knowledge” (the acumen and necessary 
skills to manage and make a business successful) is the most valuable resource, but one that our 
entrepreneurs lack. What Eritreans do have experience with, though, is running small business 
(import-export trade), either family-owned businesses or sole proprietorships. Before the 
liberation, the owners of family businesses managed their firms because they were theirs, not 
because of their knowledge. The idea of partnership was not common and corporations were 
completely unknown. After the liberation people started partnerships and corporations because 
they had the money and wanted the best for their country, but most of them did not do very well. 
They did not know what investments are and the risk they involve. Business people need to 
exercise more planning, budgeting and control practices to deal with unexpected events and 
force measures. The external situation should not be used as an excuse for not conducting MCS 
practices properly.’ The TU has a similar opinion about the way in which Eritrean entrepreneurs 
conduct business. 
 
After having been expelled from Ethiopia, AW&LF’s owners started a partnership, which was 
based on their similar background and ideas. Since then, they have put a great deal of effort in 
improving their management skills and increasing their insight into the market in general and 
the beverage industry in particular. The owners are confident that they will beat the competition 
of imported beverages and become market leaders. They have diversified their product lines and 
are continuously focussed on quality improvement. In addition, employee training programmes 
have been planned. However, the firm still faces problems, such as the unavailability of forex 
and the shortage of manpower. The plan to send employees abroad to receive training was not 
carried out because the risk of losing them once they had left the country was too big. To solve 
the forex problems and expand their investment activities, the owners tried to attract foreign 
investors via the Eritrean embassy in Italy, but so far this initiative has not been successful. 
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Table 6.2 Summary of post-privatisation developments at AW&LF 
General Changes:  
1. Employment, 
training & benefits  
- employment declined for lack of skilled labour 
- made salary increments but still remained unsatisfactory 
- employees had become committed, responsible, and conscious of quality, cost, and duty 
- employees get some benefits but no training 
2. Product market 
decisions 
- high input and product competition  
- strategy focused on market expansion, introduction of new products and delivery of 
quality products  
- efforts were hindered due to government regulations  
3. Source of raw 
materials [RM] 
- high reliance on imported RMs due to lack of local sources 
- impact of government policy on access to forex, customs, record keeping and taxes  
4. Organisation 
structure 
- the owners hold top-positions, although they had no managerial training 
- trust played an important role  
- the finance department had few staff that affected the capacity for MCS changes 
5. Investment - more autonomy on investments had produced real changes 
- gave rise to reduced wastes, improved quality, productivity, efficiency and leverage   
MCS Changes:  
1. Planning & 
Budgeting 
- no formal budgeting and planning was short-term oriented 
- knowledge of standard inputs and monthly stock balances were essential for planning 
and control 
2. Product costing & 
Pricing 
- there was some mix-up in manufacturing OH costs 
- cost estimates were quarterly updated  
- costs and product prices were greatly affected by external contextual factors 
3. Internal reporting & 
Decision-making 
- reporting to the MTI was standardised 
- the owners encouraged use of past MCS practices with some modifications 
- decisions were made fast by the owners who frequently had informal contacts 
- computerisation has introduced improvements 
4. Cost control & 
Waste minimisation 
- input-output relationships were standardised and often used for controlling resources  
- requirements for containers was effectively planed and their breakage checked  
- labour requirements were effectively monitored to reduce costs 
- quality was regularly controlled 




- internal reports and physical supervision were helpful to evaluate performance 
- financial analysis was conducted annually 
- poor profitability and fluctuating labour productivity, sales efficiency and output   
- the BOD met monthly to facilitate its activities 
- competition and other external factors significantly affected performance 
 
6.4 Discussion and Conclusions       
 
In this chapter we have discussed the changes in MCS practices and firm performance of the 
Asmara Wine & Liquor Factory during the transition period to privatisation period. We have 
described to what extent the firm has been able to implement its business and investment plans. 
In our analysis we have included internal as well as external contextual factors, which have 
played a role in the firm’s development process. Despite the significant challenges, the firm has 
succeeded in implementing part of its business plan. For example, it has repaired its old 
machinery and purchased new equipment as well as delivery trucks, it has improved its 
production areas and renovated its buildings, it has realised waste reduction, and diversified its 
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product lines. The CES and CEA ratios (see table 6.1) depict these results. The investment in 
assets significantly reduced the leverage ratios (as measured by DAR). In addition, the firm is 
especially focussed on improving the quality of its products. Further, to increase its 
understanding of the market it conducts surveys on a regular basis. It has even been able to 
increase the salaries of its employees. However, external factors such as the abolishment of the 
forex services in 2001 have hampered the full realisation of the business plan. This abolishment 
forced the firm to obtain forex on the black market at higher rates, which increased its 
manufacturing costs and narrowed its profit margin. In addition, since mid 2003 it has become 
difficult to import raw materials due to the introduction of strict regulations. Further, the firm 
was prohibited to base its records on the actual price paid for forex. As a result, the accuracy of 
its records was severely undermined. 
 
In accordance with the rules of the Customs Office and the Department of Inland Revenue 
(DIR) the actual value of imported items has to be converted to the value in local currency by 
means of the official exchange rates. In this way the actual price paid to obtain forex is not taken 
into account, resulting in a loss on exchange. The DIR does not treat loss on exchange as an 
expense. Instead it re-adds it to the operating income before tax levy, which artificially raises the 
operating income and consequently the taxes. As a result AW&LF sustained heavy losses and its 
import activities were hampered. Finally, in 2004 a regulation was issued that prohibited the 
purchase of forex on the black market. This meant the end of the firm’s import operations, 
which had significant implications for its production. The production process has become much 
more vulnerable, since for its empty bottles the firm is now dependent upon its clients and raw 
materials have to be acquired locally. In addition, the strict time schedules of the distribution of 
goods in the capital city have decreased the firm’s sales levels and market share. 
 
Except for some modifications, the accounting methods applied by the firm are about the same 
as those used in the public ownership period. These modifications concern systems for the 
control of bottles and annual sales forecasts that serve as estimates rather than targets. The 
purchase of materials is determined by demand based on the sales activities and the availability 
and price of forex on the black market. So the planning of obtaining raw materials is very much 
influenced by short-term events. Further, as the firm’s owners determine the firm’s operations, 
the decision-making process has significantly improved. They have developed clear strategies to 
increase product quality as well as productivity and sales. More investments in technology are 
planned in the near future. In addition, computerisation has made it possible to deliver timely 
and accurate management and control information. On the basis of our findings, the nature of 
MCS at AW&LF can be classified as a mixture of diagnostic and belief systems. The factory 
does not prepare formal budgets, but it exercises short-term production plans. The concept of 
standard costing is utilised by the firm and it measures resource consumption, monitors 
production, and attempts to reduce costs and waste. Generally, the factory has reduced the 
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amount of paper work associated with its MCS practices relative to its current size. Thus, MCS 
has become more cost effective and efficient. 
 
The obligatory military service has created a shortage of qualified young employees and 
accountants in the labour market. Due to this shortage as well as the present economic situation 
the firm has been forced to raise its employees’ salaries in order to retain them. However, 
because of the increasing costs of living these higher salaries are not satisfactory to the 
employees. However, in spite of all these problems AW&LF has succeeded in motivating its 
present workforce to stay with the firm, and it managed to instil a sense of responsibility in 
them. Compared to general standards, though, the workforce is small. The Finance Department 
is run by a part-timer, and there is no internal auditor. Moreover, most of the staff members have 
no college degree. This means that the firm is not sufficiently equipped to facilitate changes in 
its management and control practices. In addition, because the firm’s management and other 
shareholders lack managerial and accounting skills, its capacity to undertake action is minimal. 
The shareholders do their best to catch up on their knowledge and skills, however, and also 
stimulate the other departments to improve their ways of working. In general, all steps in the 
input and output processes are recorded. In addition, sales analyses are made on a daily, weekly, 
monthly and quarterly basis. Some procedures adopted in the public ownership period have been 
abolished. The working hours have been adjusted to enhance productivity. With respect to 
determining costs, we observe that non-production costs (e.g. depreciation of buildings) are 
included in the overhead costs. Further, the application rate does not reflect the actual resource 
consumption, because it is based on the same amount for each litre of beverage that leads to 
inaccurate information. As the capacity utilisation is currently low, the overhead costs are, 
relatively speaking, too high. Although, the senior managers are complaining about low 
competitor prices, they have failed to investigate their own costs in order to find rooms for cost 
reduction. 
 
Table 6.1 shows that until 2001 the firm managed to improve its sales, labour productivity, 
operating efficiency, and output. After that, its performance declined. So what we can see is an 
increase in firm performance after the introduction of privatisation, which lasted for three years. 
The decline after this period can be explained by several external contextual factors, such as the 
abolishment of forex services, inflation (which increased the manufacturing costs), the shortage 
of bottles, the import of similar products, the competition of small local businesses, 
governmental regulations, and the obligatory participation in the military. In addition, at times 
the quality of the water is poor, which is of course specifically problematic to manufacturers of 
beverages. Further, an aspect to which the firm could have paid more attention is cost reduction. 
In addition, taxes are an issue to the firm; these are unfair in comparison with the taxes that 
firms in other industries have to pay. Another external factor that AW&LF has to deal with is 
the status-orientedness of the local customers and the fact that at the same time they do not 
appreciate quality. They are inclined to buy the expensive imported beverages, even though 
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these are of lesser quality. Foreigners, however, prefer to buy the local drinks. To tackle this 
problem, the shareholders decided to design new labels that do not show that the beverages are 
manufactured locally. 
 
Future improvements are clearly related to government measures in the areas of labour, forex, 
product distribution, advertising possibilities, and taxation. In addition, in order to improve its 
MCS practices and information provision AW&LF has to hire more qualified people and offer 
training to its present staff. Computerisation obviously plays an important role in this process. 
So a mixture of internal and external measures is required to ensure a successful implementation 
of the firm’s business plan and to improve its performance. These measures are in fact crucial 




7 Changes in the MCS practices, firm activities and 




This chapter deals with the findings of our third case study, which was conducted in the Red Sea 
Bottlers Share Company. The structure of this chapter is similar to that of chapters 5 and 6. First 
we will give an outline of the company’s history, activities and administration. Then we will 
discuss two periods, the first covering the changes after the introduction of privatisation until the 
end of 2002, and the second dealing with the developments after that, until mid 2005. As in 
chapter 5 and 6, we will include both internal and external contextual factors in our analysis.  
 
7.1 Introduction and Background of the Company 
 
RSBSC was formerly known as the National Soft Drinks Factory [NSDF], which was 
established in Asmara in 1964 and became operational in 1965. The enterprise was owned by 
Italians and an Eritrean imperial family. Its initial capital was US $ 290,000. At that time the 
firm’s product brands were Coca-Cola, Fanta Orange, Sprite and Fanta Tonic. In 1975 the 
Ethiopian Derg regime nationalised the company. In 1990, when the Eritrea Peoples Liberation 
Front (EPLF) captured the port city of Massawa, the company stopped its operations. On May 
24 the EPLF liberated Eritrea and took over the publicly owned companies. The firm resumed 
its production activities on February 21, 1992, with a daily production capacity of 2,050 cases 
per shift. After the liberation 216 employees worked with the company. Before the firm was 
privatised, hardly any investments had been made for a period of twenty years, and the 
production capacity and output were well below the market demand. In addition, there were 
about 4,000 private distributors. So at that period the firm was practically non-existent. 
However, in collaboration with the Coca-Cola Company (CCC) the government took measures 
aimed at reviving the company. 
 
In 1997 CCC formed a joint venture with NSDF. Fifty five percent of the shares of this 
enterprise were owned by the State of Eritrea and 45 percent by CCC, which was based in 
Atlanta, USA. In addition to NSDF’s net capital of 3 million US dollars, both parties provided 
equity. During the period from October 1996 to October 1997 the joint venture carried out a 
modernisation and expansion programme involving an initial investment of 13 million US 
dollars. Buildings were renovated, facilities realised and new machinery bought. In 1997 the 
production capacity was 8,000 cases per day per shift. RSBSC started its operations in 
September 1998 but was officially inaugurated on 28 January 1999. Its maximum production 
capacity increased to 24,000 bottles per hour, the production process taking place in two pre-
fabricated buildings. In the early years, from 1999 to 2001, the actual capacity was 20,000 
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bottles per hour. The firm’s product assortment included Coca-Cola, Fanta, Sprite, Krest Tonic 
and Krest Soda Water. To manufacture its products the firm had a CO2 plant as well as a 
chemical and biological waste H2O treatment plant at its disposal. In addition, it possessed 
compressors, boilers, a 450,000 litre water storage tank, a pumping station, and nine new 
delivery trucks and other vehicles. 
 
The firm’s administration: After the liberation the Ministry of Trade and Industry (MTI) was in 
charge of approving the public firms’ budgets and control activities. However, as already 
mentioned this was just a formality. As required, our case firm sent its quarterly reports to the 
MTI, but was never given any formal response, nor was it asked to clarify matters. The MTI 
only communicated with companies about their sales prices and the sales agents’ compensation. 
In accordance with the franchising agreement (between NSDF and CCC) our case firm was 
limited in determining its product prices. The pricing issue is discussed in more detail in sub-
section 7.2.2.2. After the liberation the company’s general manager had to follow the MTI’s 
instructions regarding the budget, and whenever changes were required he was obliged to ask 
the MTI for permission. After the introduction of privatisation, however, the information that 
the company sent to the MTI was mainly used for evaluation purposes and for the preparation of 
its statistical reports. For gathering this information the firm used pre-designed forms. 
 
When our case firm was privatised, the involvement of CCC increased significantly. CCC is 
clearly focussed on improving the methods of analysing, reporting and using information. As a 
rule, the company’s daily production and sales reports, its monthly financial statements and 
other management accounting reports were sent to the head quarter’s office in Nairobi, Kenya. 
Communication also frequently took place via email, fax and telephone. The daily reports 
enabled CCC to follow the joint venture’s activities closely. In addition, CCC checked sample 
products on a monthly basis to monitor the product quality. Further, two CCC representatives 
visited the company every quarter to attend the board meeting. CCC also advised the firm in 
dealing with government rules and regulations in the host country. In addition, it tried to 
stimulate the RSBSC’s awareness with respect to issues such as the environment and resources. 
 
7.2 General changes during the transition period [1997 up to the end of 2002]: 
 
During the public ownership period the government lacked sufficient know-how with respect to 
running a business. Our case firm’s machinery was out-of-date and it was dependent on spare 
parts. There was an increase in down time, the product quality was poor and the production 
volume was very low. Although CCC offered advice on issues such as product quality, record 
keeping, reporting and controlling, it was not directly involved in the company. CCC’s main 
interest was to keep the firm in business to sustain its own position and business image in the 
market. When concluding the joint venture agreement, however, both shareholders agreed to 




collaborate in developing the enterprise. Improving the performance of firms such as our case 
company was expected to enhance Eritrea’s economic prosperity and stimulate the general 
business climate. Another part of the joint venture agreement was that the firm would operate on 
the basis of a business plan approved of by the shareholders. In this business plan the main 
objectives of the Government of Eritrea (GOE) and CCC had to be reflected. These were: 
establishing an up-to-date production facility, renovating the firm’s site and buildings, renewing 
its infrastructure, and eventually privatising it. Both shareholders signed a memorandum of 
association requiring both parties to approve of each other’s decision in case they wanted to sell 
shares. This was the first time CCC was involved in a joint venture with a bottling company. Its 
prime interest, however, was to help RSBSC start up its business and then mainly function as a 
vendor in accordance with the franchising agreements. As will be discussed in more detail in a 
later section, CCC contributed a great deal; it made large investments, provided training for the 
employees, and assisted in expanding the product lines, increasing the firm’s market and 
improving its product quality. The partners never claimed dividends.  
7.2.1 Realisation of the business and investment plans:  
The ownership transfer was conducted smoothly and all former employees were retained. CCC 
had prepared itself well before deciding to take part in the joint venture. Prior to the agreement 
the company had conducted several studies on the feasibility of such a structure. After the joint 
venture was set up, many changes took place. The following sections will deal with these 
changes, while also including the impact of internal and external contextual factors.  
 
7.2.1.1 Organizational structure: During the public ownership period there were three 
divisions: Marketing, Production & Technique, and Finance & Administration. After setting up 
the joint venture the organizational structure was adjusted. Now there were five departments: 
Production, Finance, Sales, Human Resources & Administration (HRA), and Quality Control 
(QC). These departments operated under the supervision of the general manager (GM). He had a 
chemistry background and had been with the firm since the country’s independence. During this 
time he had acquired the necessary skills to run a company. His activities entailed dealing with 
day-to-day routine affairs, executing the decisions of the Board of Directors (BOD), keeping the 
accounts, records, books and inventories up-to-date, and informing the BOD by means of 
quarterly reports. Another body in the new structure was the General Meeting of the 
Shareholders, the supreme organ of the company, to which the BOD was accountable. The BOD 
appointed qualified employees to work in the departments. In addition, new functions were 
created, such as area manager, depot manager, sales service manager and distribution manager. 
Further, in collaboration with CCC distribution centres were established throughout the country 
and the distribution systems were redesigned. CCC also assisted in the opening of new depots, 
the appointment of sales agents, the training of employees, promotional activities, and the 
purchase of new delivery trucks. 




The structure of the Production Department was also adjusted. A bottling line manager and a 
maintenance manager were appointed who were directly accountable to the production head. 
The production floor employees were monitored by supervisors who were accountable to the 
bottling line manager. The Finance Department was staffed by a chief accountant, a 
management accountant, a purchase manager, an MIS manager and other junior accountants. 
These functions were occupied by qualified people, who regularly received additional training to 
improve their skills. This shows that the department has strong capacity to facilitate changes in 
MCS practices. Administrative matters were separated from Finance. The HRA department was 
engaged in personnel affairs, such as hiring and firing policies, the evaluation of the employees 
and the provision of training. In addition, HRA developed job descriptions for each function, 
and established a training centre. 
 
7.2.1.2 Investments: During the Derg regime, there were no significant amounts of profit to 
consider capital investment. The Department of Inland Revenue (DIR) collected 50% tax on the 
annual profits. Of the remaining profit the government took 95%, leaving the rest to be used by 
the company for expanding its activities. When the firm was privatised the shareholders made an 
investment of 16 million US dollars. Through this investment the company could be completely 
modernised. Its machinery was computerised and the wooden cases were substituted by plastic 
ones, the plant area was expanded, and the old buildings were replaced by new ones. As a result 
the product quality improved tremendously. Now the company operated with 22 trucks and 
1,500 coolers, and it distributed its products to about 11,200 outlets. The firm became 
particularly focussed on quality, cost consciousness and efficiency. In achieving these goals the 
new machinery played a significant role. It enabled the firm to produce better products and to 
reduce the costs of the production process. For example, the breakage of bottles decreased from 
700,000 to 15,000 bottles a year. To satisfy the market demand, the company even had to double 
its shift, resulting in a capacity of 20 hours a day (including 4 hours of preventive maintenance). 
 
The business plan included a follow-up investment of $ 200,000 in year two, which had risen to 
$ 500,000 in year seven. Investments in bottles and crates resulted in a considerable output 
increase. Table 7.1 presents the investments made as measured in terms of capital expenditure to 
sales (CES) and capital expenditure to assets (CEA). It was expected that customer deposits 
would cover about 62% of the bottle purchase costs and fully abolish the costs of the crates. In 
2001 the production capacity was upgraded from 24,000 to 27,000 bottles per hour by the 
increasing market demand. The company aimed at expanding its market share by doubling its 
bottling line and introducing new products, such as carbonated water and pure distiller water. 
Although CCC fully supported this initiative, forex problems hampered its realisation. That is 
why this plan was postponed until the forex crisis would be solved. Another investment entailed 
the replacement of the current H2O plant by an environmentally friendly one with recycling 




facilities. The realisation of this investment, however, depended on the country’s political and 
economic situation, which was problematic. 
 
Making investments and improvements was vital in view of the constant developments in the 
production technology used to manufacture Coca-Cola. The investments involved employee 
training and keeping the firm’s machinery up-to-date. As the leverage computations show, the 
company’s capital structure gradually changed. Data on debt to asset ratio (DAR), long-term 
debt to asset ratio (LTDAR) and long-term debt to equity ratio (LTDER) indicate that the firm’s 
debt reduced from a figure between 44 and 66 percent prior to privatisation to a percentage 
between 13 and 34 after privatisation. So privatisation clearly decreased the level of companies’ 
debts. 
 
7.2.1.3 Employment, training and benefits: Interview reports tell us that after privatisation the 
company’s manpower increased by 42% (from 216 prior to privatisation to 316 in 2004). One of 
the HRA’s tasks was the evaluation of employees and new applicants in collaboration with the 
departments. The HRA also formulated and standardised function descriptions for each function, 
and developed exams for new applicants. Further, CCC assigned a large budget to the training of 
employees working at all levels. Once the company was privatised, this training programme was 
initiated. It was based on the Coca-Cola quality system format (CCQS). This format offers 
guidelines in identifying the need for training in any given department, and provides instructions 
on how to prepare and execute the steps of the programme and how to assess whether they have 
been carried out properly. The type of training the employees received varied according to the 
type of job. Evaluation also formed part of the training. A British expert, who stayed for two 
years, supervised the training programme and helped in implementing the CCQS. CCC paid for 
his stay. Once RSBSC’s staff and employees had acquired sufficient knowledge and skills, the 
expert left. What can be considered as a remarkable achievement of the company was that, in 
contrast with bottling companies in other developing countries, all of its staff and employees 
were indigenous people. 
 
The production manager, Mr. Tewolde, indicated: ‘The shareholders have hired qualified 
people for each position. Especially CCC stresses that all jobs should be handled by qualified 
people, including the accounting functions, so relevant information is available at all times. The 
CCC has no intention of hiring less qualified people to reduce the labour costs. It focuses on 
hiring local people and offers them intensive training to improve their skills in performing their 
activities.’ CCC’s influence resulted in a larger focus on modern knowledge and technology as 
well as quality. And as already explained above, the new ownership pursued a policy aimed at 
the improvement of the employees’ skills. In addition, the senior managers and some lower staff 
were sent abroad to Tanzania, South Africa and Germany to receive training and to promote the 
company. The staff members of the Finance Department were offered a 15 days course on how 
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to work with the ‘Scala’ software programme. The Sales Department was planning to introduce 
supply management techniques. For this purpose a series of training sessions was organised. 
CCC provided RSBSC with manuals on training and reporting techniques and different styles of 
analysis as well as with guidelines on how to conduct its business successfully. The staff 
members’ training was specifically focussed on obtaining knowledge about their function in 
particular and the company in general. In this respect, the firm’s motto ‘The customer is king’ 
was an important issue. These initiatives had a favourable effect on the performance and morale 
of the employees. They were generally described as disciplined, dutiful, and capable of dealing 
with task-related issues in an independent manner. The Sales manager, Mr. Mahteme said: ‘The 
sales agents strictly limit themselves to conducting sales in the area assigned to them; they are 
extremely honest and disciplined, and follow their instructions carefully. They are committed to 
meeting their targets and conscious about distribution costs, which is why they plan their routes 
as economically as possible in terms of fuel usage.’ 
 
Similar to the two case firms described in the earlier chapters, RSBSC suffered as a result of the 
border war between Eritrea and Ethiopia. In 1999 the company started to lose its young 
qualified employees. This was in particular a challenge to the Production Department, whose 
former staff members (technical school graduates and experts) had to be replaced by low-
educated female recruits. By means of an intensive training programme, however, the female 
employees were taught all technical knowledge and skills required to work in this department. 
Their training was a success, making them worthy substitute workers. This was considered as a 
miracle. The company also managed to retrieve a number of its qualified employees after they 
had completed their military training. An arrangement was made in which it was agreed that the 
employees would perform their tasks for the military at the company. In turn the government 
collected their full salaries and paid them 150 Nakfa. Those who had completed their duties for 
the military but were held under its supervision for longer than the official period of eighteen 
months, were paid 500 Nakfa. This severe salary decrease put a great deal of strain on the 
employees and undermined their motivation, especially given the continuous rise in living costs. 
That is why the company decided to pay them an additional amount, by which their salaries 
were increased to 1200 Nakfa. Although this decision improved the employees’ economic 
situation, it raised the labour costs. The Sales Department mainly hired older employees to 
replace the former workers, which decreased the level of efficiency. To solve this problem 
overtime schedules were introduced. 
 
Benefits: CCC particularly aimed at motivating the workforce. The benefits offered by the joint 
venture included a provident fund of 18% (12% paid by the company and 6% by the employees 
themselves), 85% of medical coverage (including family members), annual salary increments of 
12% (9% compensation for inflation and 3% performance reward), bonus payments for good 
performance, work boots, coveralls and gowns, holidays, and free products. Most of these 
benefits were introduced after privatisation. The joint venture was the only company that offered 




their employees a provident fund until in 2004 the government introduced it on a national level. 
Another service to its employees was a canteen where employees could enjoy a free drink. In 
addition, the company supported its employees in dealing with the high costs of living by 
organising overtime work. Further, occasionally it organised entertainment. The firm also 
covered funeral expenses; the family of deceased employees received 4,000 Nakfa to pay for the 
funeral. In terms of salary payment and benefits RSBSC certainly distinguished itself from other 
local companies. The motto ‘Coca-Cola is an employer of choice’ was therefore justified. 
 
There were no problems with unpermitted absence. If employees wanted to take time off, they 
had to contact their immediate heads (as stated in the collective agreement), which they did. 
Giving prior notice was a rule. In this way the company could make timely adjustments to the 
working schedule. Although generally the base union (or workers’ union) was satisfied with the 
benefits offered by the company, it had some points of criticism. For example, the new uniform 
of the salesmen was not warm enough, and the union did not agree with the way in which the 
9% inflation compensation was calculated. A salary increase of 9% was not considered 
sufficient to compensate the high costs of living. Other options presented by the union were 
initially not accepted by the senior managers. It required some negotiation before the issue was 
satisfactorily resolved as far as the union was concerned. 
 
7.2.1.4 Product-market decisions: During the public ownership period, the sales were 
conducted door to door throughout the country. In addition, private sales agents distributed the 
goods in Keren, Massawa and Tigray (northern region of Ethiopia). In Tigray demand exceeded 
supply, and therefore the production had to be accumulated. However, there was no area-
specific planning and distribution system; the product distribution was mainly based on the ‘first 
customer is served first’ principle. After privatisation the sales practices became much more 
organised, and the agents appointed were well-trained. In addition, the number of distribution 
points was expanded. The agents also co-ordinated the sales activities in Asmara, Massawa, and 
Keren. Further, the company purchased new delivery trucks with a capacity almost twice that of 
the old vehicles (i.e., 416 cases per truck compared to 212 by the old trucks). The company also 
set up an ice factory that delivered ice to outlets at a minimum price. 
 
The company’s objectives were to increase its output and expand its market outside Asmara to 
improve its profitability. To stimulate sales, it distributed electric and kerosene coolers with its 
products, mostly in areas where there was no power supply. Further, it advertised its products, 
by, for example, posters designed by CCC and other promotional activities, such as radio 
advertisements. However, efforts were limited by the restrictions that the government had put on 
some promotional activities. In addition, the company invited experts to train its personnel. The 
focus was especially on improving the production planning and capacity and satisfying the 
clients’ wishes. The Sales Department designed a distribution system, called the route delivery 
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system. Each sales agent was given an individual distribution schedule containing instructions 
and a time table. In addition, the clients were informed about the day and times the products 
were distributed each week. In Asmara distribution containers were placed at convenient 
locations, so deliveries could be made at any day and any time (e.g. in weekends or during 
holidays), which was particularly useful in the case of additional orders. RSBSC sold fifty 
percent of its products within Asmara. In each town of the country there were distribution 
centres. The sales agents were paid base salaries plus additional commissions when they 
exceeded their daily sales target. 
 
To expand its market share the company approached potential clients, for example bars, shops, 
restaurants and hotels, and tried to persuade them to buy its products. In addition, the Sales 
Department was planning to place kiosks in the villages and distribute vending trolleys (or push 
carts). The aim of these initiatives was to make the products easily available and clearly visible 
to the customers. The Sales Department also appointed marketing managers and supervisors 
who monitored the daily business activities. These staff members could undertake immediate 
action whenever anomalies occurred. CCC assisted RSBSC in its marketing activities. It had to 
approve of RSBSC’s requests to make use of the various methods to promote its products. 
 
In order to stimulate its product distribution the number of depots outside Asmara, Massawa and 
Keren was increased. These cities formed the working area of the companies’ sales agents. In 
the other parts of the country private sales agents approached the outlets, although the company 
actually preferred its own sales agents. This had three reasons. First, the company’s own sales 
agents were more motivated and put more effort in their work. Second, although the firm offered 
the private agents grants and paid for their transport expenses, it was not able to motivate them 
sufficiently to increase the number of products they sold. And third, in line with the free market 
mechanism the private sales agents sold the company’s products to the outlets at different retail 
prices. So as soon as the country’s situation permitted the replacement of the private sales agents 
by company salesmen, RSBSC intended to start with this. The company also planned to open 
new depots at various places throughout the country in 2002 and 2003 and in Barentu in 2005. 
The 2002 and 2003 plans were hindered by a lack of forex. The firm’s main objective was that 
customers would pay the same prices for the products at each location, which was in line with 
its triple ‘A’ strategy: products should be ‘Available, Accessible, and Affordable’.   
 
To increase its revenues RSBSC introduced new products. These were first tested and promoted 
by offering samples, usually during holiday periods. The new products included Tonic Water, 
Krest Tonic and Krest Soda Water. Following CCC, the company’s prime objectives were 
product quality and customer satisfaction. Therefore a great deal of attention was being paid to 
delivering the products in a perfect state, for defective goods could harm the company’s 
reputation. In addition to increasing its number of depots, RSBSC had a plan to support 
disadvantaged families by offering them the possibility to work in the distribution centres and 




kiosks in Asmara. The authorities concerned, however, refused to co-operate, whereas they did 
allow other organizations and businesses (e.g., Raymoc Lottery, shoe polishers) to make use of 
and work in these facilities. The expansion of the depots required an expansion of the control 
activities. The products had to be transferred to these centres and then delivered to the clients. 
Next, the empty bottles from a previous delivery had to be collected. This process was executed 
with the utmost care and thoroughness. In addition, any complaints on the part of the customers 
were registered and dealt with. Further, in addition to the expansion of the control activities, the 
sales performance as a whole was evaluated. 
 
7.2.1.5 Sources of raw materials: The Company imported concentrate, sugar, crown corks, 
crates, bottles, spare parts and lubricants. In accordance with the franchising agreement, the 
concentrate was purchased directly from CCC at a pre-determined price. In some cases 
negotiation with CCC about prices was possible, for example when the price level determined 
would affect the firm’s profitability or if it would make the product unaffordable. RSBSC 
bought concentrate from CCC in South Africa. It participated in the meetings of the regional 
bottlers, which were held on an annual basis to discuss the quality of the concentrate resource as 
well as packaging and shipment issues. CCC covered all the costs RSBSC made during the 
participation in these meetings. CCC had recently opened a procurement office in Kenya. Each 
year this office invited the resource suppliers to hold a presentation about the products they 
offered. During these presentations detailed information was provided about issues such as 
quality, prices, and service provision. The company obtained sugar and crown cork from 
authorised Indian and Italian suppliers, who were approved of by CCC. In choosing its 
resources, RSBSC made a careful selection based on quality, price, services provided by the 
supplier and transportation costs. 
 
All authorised suppliers were held fully responsible for maintaining the quality standard of their 
output. If they did not succeed in doing so their contracts were terminated. Each year the 
company checked the suppliers’ prices for budgeting purposes. The purchase of sugar was 
organised regionally. RSBSC received its sugar supplies through contracts entered via the head 
quarter. It was important that sugar was delivered in containers rather than in open sacks. If 
there were any supply problems, CCC intervened. Similarly, there were strict procedures for 
goods purchased on the local market. Before placing an order, several offers were compared in 
terms of aspects of quality, price, delivery and transportation. In general, the raw materials were 
ordered on a quarterly basis. 
 
There were no local firms that could produce crown cork, bottles, or crates. This is why the 
company was thinking of buying plastic crates from a local private manufacturer. Another issue 
was the water supply, which was often interrupted. As a result the company had to store its own 
water supply in big tanks to prevent production interruptions. To transport the water to these 
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tanks it had to hire water distribution trucks. Just before concluding the joint venture agreement, 
CCC had already foreseen this problem and asked the GOE to support the company in looking 
for alternative sites. The GOE assured the company, however, that a new dam was under 
construction, which would take care of the water supply problems. In anticipation of this project 
CCC constructed an underground pipeline of fifteen kilometres long to connect the company 
with the main water reservoir located in a village called ‘Adi Nfas’. But the connection was 
never realised. The company feared that water shortages would get worse by the time a second 
bottling line gets installed. 
 
The company’s production capacity was sufficient enough to satisfy the ample market demand. 
The major limitation was the lack of adequate raw materials due to the scarcity of forex. It took 
a long time to collect forex from the black market before an import permit could be obtained to 
order raw materials. This process was protracted and often caused production interruptions due 
to stock-outs. In addition, it quite frequently happened that the materials ordered did not arrive 
at the date arranged in the agreement. This was because the deliveries from, for example, South 
Africa were not shipped directly to Eritrea. They went via Dubai to the port of Massawa. 
Because of this detour, the company suffered from production delays that could run up to two 
weeks, which in turn resulted in extensive losses. Another setback was the Iraq war, which 
impeded the firm’s import activities in 2003 because the Red Sea was unreachable during that 
time.   
 
7.2.1.6 Changes in RSBSC’s operating system: CCC designed a quality system to assist the 
company in improving its operating systems in three subsequent phases. This system was based 
on standard procedures and programmes. For each phase there was a detailed manual. Each 
manual offered steps to devise programmes and identify standard checking points. The 
company’s management also encouraged the employees to come forward with ideas to improve 
the firm’s operations. If these ideas were good, they were presented to the higher authorities for 
approval. In this way problems could be identified and reported. For example, if the operators of 
a system would find errors, they were expected to report them to the system’s mechanics or 
designers. On the basis of the CCQS manual, RSBSC successfully implemented phase one, and 
was certified for it. After a phase was concluded, CCC sent a team of experts to check whether 
all steps had been followed correctly and the company was operating smoothly. In addition, the 
regional office conducted quality checks every quarter. After having successfully completed 
phase one, the company started with phase two. Phase two focussed on the more detailed 
implementation of the operating system and control mechanisms. 
 
7.2.1.7 Government regulations: The GOE introduced a 15% excise tax on production costs. 
Excise tax was normally charged on manufacturing costs. So as a result the company’s 
manufacturing costs rose. And since RSBSC could not raise its prices in view of its competitive 
position and the terms of the franchising agreement, its profits decreased. At the time when the 




joint venture was established, excise tax on beverages did not exist. In 2001, however, the GOE 
suddenly introduced this tax. This unexpected measure made CCC question the GOE’s integrity 
and reliability. In addition, the DIR changed its tax policy in such a way that different tax rates 
applied to different income levels. In this respect, the interviews indicate that the country’s 
situation was unstable, which made it difficult to predict what would happen in the future. 
7.2.2 Changes in MCS practices, firm activities and performance in relation to the 
influence of internal and external factors: 
CCC used a control system widely adopted in beverage firms all over the world. It played a 
major role in the improvement of RSBSC’s MSC practices. As in the previous two chapters, we 
will describe the MCS developments by integrating the influence of internal and external 
contextual factors. 
 
7.2.2.1 Planning and Budgeting: During the public ownership period, the Beverage 
Corporation was in charge of drafting the policies for the beverage sector. In doing so, it did not 
recognise, however, the specific situation of each individual firm. So companies were forced to 
implement these policies, although they might not be suitable for them. If there were any 
problems, they had to report them to the MTI, but its response often took a long time. 
Companies were mandated to prepare a budget each year. CCC advised our case firm to prepare 
its budget more regularly to have more data available. Pre-designed forms were used to fill in 
budget estimates on the basis of actual performance data from the most recent three quarters. 
Due to the out-of-date machinery the company’s production capacity was critically low. As a 
result, the sales budget was based on the production plan. The planning process for raw 
materials requirement and purchase did not change after RSBSC was privatised. The 
departments prepared their budgets, which were put together in a report and sent to the 
management. Then, additional budget requests were made for new machinery, the hiring of 
employees, salary increments, etc. Next, the complete budget proposal was sent to the Beverage 
Corporation via the MTI. After that, the budget proposals of sister firms were studied and 
compared, and often some changes were made before their final approval. All budget requests 
outside the operational scope were usually rejected. The implementation of the approved budget 
was monitored through quarterly reports. After liberation of Eritrea, budget approval became 
less important and was mainly regarded as a formality. 
 
Each quarter RSBSC ordered its materials in accordance with the approved budget. The 
company collected offers from several suppliers and compared them. The supplier with the most 
favourable offer was selected, and the documents were sent to the former MTI for approval. If 
the MTI approved the offer, the materials could be purchased. This process was closely 
monitored by the MTI. The company was not allowed to make disbursements that exceeded 250 
Ethiopian Birr. After each purchase a cheque had to be signed by the GM and the finance head, 
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after which it was sent to the MTI. There it had to be signed by an auditor. This could take days, 
depending on how many cheques the MTI had to deal with. Apart from this procedure, however, 
there was not much bureaucratic interference. A more urgent issue was that the company had 
machine problems, which made it very difficult to meet the production targets. 
 
Privatisation gave RSBSC the opportunity to handle its affairs in an independent manner. The 
departments and staff members fully participated in presenting ideas about how activities should 
be organised, realised and controlled. Each department was responsible for the way in which it 
carried out its tasks. They fully embraced this responsibility, and were dedicated to do what was 
required of them. The company also started with the preparation of a three year budget plan. 
During the course of this plan’s realisation it was possible to review and adjust it whenever 
required by comparing sales and other data of a particular moment with those of a previous year. 
So in the case of sudden major changes, such as a shortage of forex or water, or power 
interruptions, budget revisions could be conducted within a year. After privatisation the 
budgeting process was decentralised. It started at the departmental level (area, depot and unit 
managers) and was finalised at the company level (heads, GM). The five year business plan 
formed the basis for setting the production target and for starting the budgeting activities. Once 
the production target was communicated to the Production Department, budgeting could 
commence. In the business plan issues were taken into account such as the maximum production 
capacity and sales forecasts. Each product line was assigned its own target. In preparing the 
budgeting proposals for the different product lines, the Production Department was well aware 
of the seasonal impact on sales. It also exchanged information with the Sales Department, which 
provided the Production Department with sales forecasts and brand-specific daily stock reports. 
 
Issues playing an important role in the budgeting process were the sales forecasts, the 
production plan, the amount of raw materials required and purchase plans. Each department 
made its own budget. Other points of interest were operating expenses and manpower. The sales 
data helped formulate the sales mix, which generally was as follows: 67% Coca-Cola, 18% 
Fanta, 12% Sprite, 1% Krest Tonic, and 1% Krest Soda Water. Determining these percentages 
was crucial for estimating the amounts of concentrate that had to be ordered. Other relevant 
information required in the co-ordination of the production and sales activities included data on 
empty bottles and full stock. During the quarterly meeting with the BOD, either the GM or the 
Finance manager (Mr. Tesfamariam) presented the final budget proposal. In this meeting the 
proposal was explained in more detail and any questions on the part of the Board were 
answered. Additionally, performance reports that contain volume variance analyses of 
production and sales as well as day-to-day evaluations of CCC were presented. In reaching the 
decision whether or not to approve the budget, performance data of the previous year were 
useful to the Board. If the Board requested additional clarifications on audited reports, an 
external auditor was invited. A debate was usually conducted to sort out suggestions for 




improvement. The quarterly meetings were helpful for sharing ideas, getting instant feedbacks 
and for finding prompt solutions to problems. 
 
In preparing its budgets the company used standard input requirements. It had full knowledge of 
the standard amounts of raw materials required for each product, such as concentrate, sugar, 
carbon dioxide, caustic soda and water. In addition, bottle breakages and the consumption of 
chemicals were taken into account. The company aimed at continuous improvement by 
gradually raising its targets. At an inter-departmental level plans were harmonised, taking into 
account all cost issues relevant to establishing the overall budget, such as production, purchase, 
labour, operating expenses, fixed assets, etc. If adjustments were made to the proposed budget in 
comparison to past year’s actual amounts, they had to be explained and motivated. Once 
approved, budgets served for controlling performance. 
 
There were four sales areas: the Central Zone, the Southern Zone, the Anseba and Gash-Barka 
Zone and the Red Sea Zone. Each area had its own area manager who co-ordinated and 
controlled the sales activities, conducted market studies and identified problems. Each area 
made its own budget. When planning product distribution, the data of the four area budgets were 
used. The Sales Department monitored the company’s market share by comparing the trends in 
the previous two to three years. The salesmen participated in this process by communicating 
their observations and ideas with respect to future market opportunities and threats. The Sales 
Department’s forecast covered a period of three years and was based on information about the 
factors that influenced the sales figures. The Regional Office also made an analysis of RSBSC’s 
proposed sales plan, and shared it with the company. 
 
The main factors impeding the realisation of the budgetary plans were the shortage of water, 
power failures, the loss of trained manpower (as a result of the war), and the abolishment of 
forex. The female employees who worked in the 14:00 – 22:00 hour shift were dissatisfied with 
their working hours. During these hours there was no public transport, and the women had to 
walk home at night, which they felt uncomfortable with. Another challenge was the breakage of 
parts, leading to production disruptions. Regularly, the company was faced with down time 
because of the delayed delivery of spare-parts, so that the maintenance work could not be 
carried out. This, in turn, was caused by the lack of forex. 
 
7.2.2.2 Product Costing and Pricing: 
Product Costing: The firm classified costs into three groups: direct costs, overhead costs (OH), 
and selling and administrative costs. OH costs were divided into three categories: production, 
sales, and administration. The company calculated the inventory costs by means of a weighed 
average costing method, and the product costs by means of process costing. The manufacturing 
costs were calculated per department and reported on a monthly basis to the Finance 
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Department. The monthly OH costs were aggregated and allocated to each product line on the 
basis of output in litres. The Finance Department considered this a fair method, since about 60% 
of these costs consisted of variable costs (e.g. indirect materials). Waste and drainage costs were 
not dealt with separately, but included in the manufacturing costs. The amount of waste was not 
significant. It mainly consisted of variation in fill heights resulting from filling the bottles (300 
CC), inaccurate content of CO2 and problems with the date-coding machine. These wastages 
were caused by mechanical problems and not by negligence. The Production Department 
considered these wastages as unavoidable and knew the standard yield of production per batch. 
 
Product Pricing: Both during the public and the private ownership period CCC influenced the 
price setting process. In both periods RSBSC determined the product prices (both at company 
and at retail level), which had to be approved by CCC as stipulated in the franchising agreement. 
The product price mainly depended on the price of concentrate. However, in accordance with 
the franchise agreement companies were not allowed to change their prices when the input 
prices changed. Customers would never accept sudden price increases and turn to cheaper 
substitutes or water. That is why the company maintained its price levels constant. 
 
CCC closely followed the pricing policies, sales volume and profitability of its clients. It 
charged low prices for its concentrate to prevent its clients from increasing their prices, which 
would affect their firm performance and make the products unaffordable to the customers. This 
approach served CCC’s own long-term interests. Generally, CCC set the price of concentrate at 
27% of its clients’ net sales revenue. CCC considered this a reasonable percentage. If client 
companies wanted to change their product prices, they had to negotiate this with CCC. The latter 
then reassessed the client’s business plan and compared its net profit figures with its net sales 
figures. CCC’s criterion was that net income figures should remain between 10 to 12% of the 
net sales figures. If the net income dropped below the amount required, in the case of inflation, 
or if clients incurred losses, negotiation with CCC was possible. The effects of inflation mainly 
presented themselves in the costs of raw materials, spare parts, fuel and power. 
 
At a certain point, CCC increased the price of concentrate to 200 U.S. dollars. Consequently, 
RSBSC had to increase the retail price of its beverages from 2 to 3.50 Nakfa per bottle. This 
measure induced a strong reaction on the part of consumers. They did not accept this price 
increase, arguing that the products had become too expensive. CCC therefore again reduced the 
price to 180 U.S. dollars. But in November 2003, it wanted to raise the price of concentrate 
again. This, however, did not happen. In 1997 the product price was 27.80 Nakfa per case. 
Between 2001 and 2003 there were some price fluctuations due to the high inflation level and 
the price per-case finally reached 62 Nakfa. Mr. Mahteme indicated: ‘The price increases and 
inflation have contributed to the sales decline.’ A general policy of the company was to closely 
monitor its performance in relation to the product prices. 
 




7.2.2.3 Internal reporting and Decision-making: Before the introduction of privatisation, the 
daily production reports did not include information about line utilisation and machine 
efficiency. Only quality control was dealt with. During the public ownership period the 
recording and reporting procedures were not yet computerised, which caused considerable 
delays. In addition, the MTI did not provide the company with sufficient feedback. After the 
country’s independence, the Finance Department informed the GM about the company’s daily 
cash movements on the basis of rough calculations. The firm’s Statistics Unit sent monthly, 
quarterly, and annual (financial and statistical) reports to the MTI. The company was not sure; 
however, whether the MTI actually viewed these reports, since it never received any feedback. 
The completion of the annual reports usually took six or seven months, and they were relatively 
concise as compared with the later ones. So due to the lack of computerised internal reporting 
systems, there was no up-to-date information of any sort available. 
 
After the firm had been privatised, its employees were taught how to work with the internal 
reporting forms designed by CCC. In the past they had never received any training in that area. 
In addition, the description and formulation of jobs and instructions became much more 
specified. Moreover, the internal reporting systems became much more advanced and the 
departments were connected in a network. Further, new forms were introduced, such as the 
customer complaint form. 
 
All departments sent their information about the movement of resources (materials, bottles, 
cases) and output to the Finance Department. The Production Department prepared its reports on 
a daily basis, covering issues such as labour and machine efficiency, line utilisation, 
reconciliation of bottles and crates and the functioning of key machine parts. The department 
continuously monitored these parts, for it was important that they remained in good condition. 
Information regarding the consumption of concentrate, CO2, sugar, H2O, chemicals, and crown 
cork were reported and evaluated per batch. On a weekly or monthly basis this information was 
sent to the Finance Department. In addition, the Production Department sent daily reports to all 
departments and the GM. Further, reports were made on the syrup preparation per batch, the 
hourly production per shift, the filler down time per shift, the daily and weekly rejected bottles 
and products, and bottle breakages. The performance of the employees was monitored by means 
of a performance progress control card, and a bi-annual manpower performance report. 
 
The GM also received reports on the consumption of the resources as well as on overtime. 
Overtime reports facilitated the planning procedures. Further, he received daily performance 
reports on production, sales, the stock balance, and quality control. To remain informed about 
the maintenance of the machinery he received copies of the request forms that were sent to the 
Maintenance Section. Each month the GM and the senior managers held a meeting to discuss 
the departments’ action plans. These plans included issues such as possible measures to improve 
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performance, the detection of problems and possible solutions, and suggestions for the future. 
CCC was authorised to monitor the day-to-day activities of the company including managerial 
duties on the basis of the daily reports it received. It also received the monthly, quarterly and 
annual reports. The BOD received detailed financial statements and performance reports. It 
discussed this information in quarterly meetings. One of the effects of privatisation was that it 
brought the managers and the shareholders closer together and reduced information asymmetry. 
 
The processes of recording and reporting information were improved by the introduction of 
computers and better software packages. This system was faster and more user-friendly, and old 
data could be retrieved easily. Further, storing of bulk data and conducting of analysis became 
easy. File keeping has been significantly reduced. Initially there was some resistance to this 
measure, but gradually everyone approved of the new system. The company had Internet 
facilities (cable lines, a MIS unit, and a webpage), but it had no access to the possibility of 
online information transfer because it still had to obtain a gateway. The departments sent their 
daily reports to the regional office via email. The monthly financial statements and performance 
reports that were sent to the regional office included issues such as targets, profits, production, 
sales etc. Other means of communication were the telephone and the fax. The quick exchange of 
up-to-date information was considerably improved through these means, and both local and 
foreign visitors regarded the firm’s accounting and MCS practices as efficient and thorough. 
The GM encouraged all departments to take initiatives aimed at further improvements. 
 
Each department had its own computer unit to record data and prepare the performance reports. 
The staff members were instructed on how to use the software systems and the Internet 
applications. In 1999, the ‘Scala’ software package was installed. RSBSC’s new owners were 
clearly more information-oriented, and the know-how of the company as a whole increased 
considerably. All business processes were computerised. When the computer systems were 
installed, the business data were still recorded manually for about two months, during which 
time the staff members received computer training. 
 
By computerising the business processes the company was able to operate much more 
efficiently. For example, the register cards, general vouchers and stock cards used by the 
Finance Department were replaced by electronic documents, which could be accessed at any 
moment in time. In the past, the Finance Department had to arrange a meeting with the 
storekeeper or purchase manager if records had to be cross-checked and compared, which took a 
great deal of time and effort. Now all documents were directly available and could be sent 
directly to all parties concerned. 
 
The performance of the area managers and the outlets was also monitored by reports. The 
detailed level of reporting and control was made possible by the departmental restructuring 
initiated after privatisation. The Sales Department based its monthly and annual reports on the 




information collected each day on sales as well as on full stock and empty stock. These reports 
were sent to all departments and the GM. A boiler operator, Mr. Simon, stated that during the 
public ownership period procedures for recording information did not exist. Now he registered 
his activities on a daily basis and if there were any problems, he could report them. 
 
The Quality Control Department (QC) also prepared daily reports, which had to be signed by the 
production manager and the maintenance manager before they were sent to the GM. These 
reports facilitated a timely detection of faults and problems. Moreover, through this procedure 
the shift supervisors were immediately informed if, for example, for some reason the production 
had to be stopped. In the past, the maintenance manager was informed afterwards in a memo if 
problems occurred. With the new system, information was transferred more quickly and the 
paperwork was reduced. Additional daily reports that the QC Department prepared were: H2O-
reports (dealing with alkalinity and hardness levels), chemical and parametric reports, QC 
charts, CO2 check-ups for density and odour, and statistical process control reports. In addition, 
each week a report was prepared in which problems were listed and possible solutions were 
communicated. This report was also sent to the GM and the regional office. Most of these 
reports did not exist during the public ownership period. The intensive exchange of information 
by means of detailed reports clearly improved the company’s business operations and reduced 
the number of problems. 
 
Decision-making: During the public ownership period, the company’s management committee 
was generally responsible for making the decisions. The management committee consisted of 
the senior managers and the GM. Issues of major importance, however, had to be submitted to 
the MTI. When the firm was privatised, each manager was assigned some degree of 
responsibility, but sometimes it was not exactly clear which issues had to be dealt with by the 
departments and which matters should be referred to the GM. If this was the case, the 
department in question discussed the matter with the GM, and a decision was made as a team. In 
general, privatisation increased the authority of the senior managers. They now had more 
freedom in executing their daily tasks and in creating incentives to motivate the employees to 
achieve their targets. In the case of emergencies, the managers could take immediate action 
without consulting a superior. However, the ultimate decision-making body was the BOD, 
which was in charge of all large-scale investments. The BOD also ordered the GM to investigate 
by means of an investment study whether is was possible to establish a second bottling line. 
New bottling machinery could be purchased in Germany or Italy. The GM completed this study, 
but the investment was postponed because of the forex issue. 
 
7.2.2.4 Cost Control and Waste Minimisation: Cost control mainly focussed on direct 
materials, direct labour, and factory overhead. The amount of actual direct materials consumed 
was compared against standards. Similarly, the actual yield of concentrate was compared with 
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standard. In addition, the purchase and store units checked the inventories on a daily basis. 
Further, the storage, unpacking, and use of sugar were checked systematically. It was important 
that with each batch the standard amount of sugar was used. Each month the Production 
Department held a meeting in which the performance reports were discussed as well as 
particular issues and problems. 
 
The section heads and the HRA were in charge of monitoring the labour productivity, which 
was determined by computing the output per man-hour. The average standard productivity rate 
was 45 cases per man-hour. If this standard was not met, it was considered as a sign of 
inefficiency. The HRA assisted the departments in taking manpower decisions in accordance 
with the collective agreement. If there was a conflict, it played an intermediary role by bringing 
the employee, the direct boss and the department head together. The focus was always on 
resolving a conflict in an amicable manner. The collective agreement also stipulated that at least 
once a month a plenary meeting had to be held in which the employees were kept informed 
about the developments within the company. In these meetings the employees were free to raise 
any work-related topic they had on their minds. According to Mr. Issac, these meetings were 
very effective, since they provided the firm’s management with a broader insight into the issues 
that engaged the employees. These meetings revealed more information than the bi-annual 
performance reports. 
 
The electricity and water resources were periodically checked. However, the company still 
sometimes faced power failures, which severely affected both the production process and the 
product quality. Power failures often caused resource waste. Whenever the power was 
interrupted, an alarm went of and the exact time of the interruption was recorded. Products that 
were manufactured during that time had to be checked. To improve this situation, a power 
generator was installed. The factory OH costs were controlled on the basis of line utilisation 
computations indicating the usage of the machinery. The line utilisation had to be at least 76%. 
After the introduction of privatisation, the intensity of control increased considerably. More 
attention was being paid to cost analysis by comparing the actual costs with the budgeted costs 
and finding explanations for variations. To maximise the product quality, the Production 
Department thoroughly checked the processing of each resource (concentrate, syrup, sugar, CO2, 
and H2O) before the beverage was transferred to the bottling machine. 
 
Mr. Mahteme indicated that wastage was mainly caused by the breakage of bottles and cases 
(about 500 to 600 bottles a month). Bottle breakage usually occurred during loading and 
unloading, and washing. In addition, a percentage of the bottles were broken in the bottling line. 
To deal with this problem, the company established a Breakage and Sanitation Committee, 
which had to report its findings directly to the GM. After the establishment of this committee 
the breakage of bottles reduced significantly. The employees of the empty bottles storage 
became in charge of checking the broken or damaged bottles and cases. They received 




commission for each breakage they detected. Also the salesmen were encouraged to check the 
bottles for breakages when collecting them from clients. According to the GM, Mr. Tesfai, the 
employees and salesmen were doing their work in a satisfactory manner. More insight had been 
gained into the causes of the breakages, for which appropriate measures could be taken. The 
tasks of the committee were more extensive than only monitoring bottle breakages. It also 
reported on health problems or accidents of employees, it monitored the distribution of the work 
clothes, and checked the work of the janitors. The TU was pleased with the progress the 
company had made. 
 
The company was actively focussed on cost minimisation. However, it stopped paying its 
contributions of 5 cents per bottle to a compensation fund established during the public 
ownership period. This fund was meant to financially support firms, but the compensation 
amounts never reached the beneficiaries. 
 
During the public ownership period, the company’s machinery was defective. Spare parts had to 
be often replaced or repaired, and leakage as well as the evaporation of CO2 was common 
problems. The firm’s quality results were less than 50%. A management accountant (Sara) said: 
‘There was wastage resulting from spillage that was drained or consumed by employees. But the 
Production Department adjusted the filling height when the wastage problem became 
significant. This action was not supported by the QC Department, which led to conflict.’ By the 
time privatisation was introduced, more insight had been gained into the causes of the wastage 
problem. These causes were poor maintenance, negligence on the part of employees, fill height 
errors, bottle bursting, crowning problems, and date coding errors. So supervision was very 
important in this area, which was conducted by shift supervisors, the bottling line manager, the 
maintenance supervisor and the production head. Much effort was put into making the 
employees aware of the wastage problem through, for example, regular meetings and training. If 
the employees detected a problem, the machine was stopped and the down time recorded. In 
addition, the QC Department took random samples of the beverages each hour, and if a problem 
occurred, the frequency was increased. Products that did not meet the standard were drained. 
The company considered a daily loss of five cases as normal. 
 
CCC was also closely involved in the process of quality checking. Only a quality level of 100% 
was accepted. Each month CCC took random product samples from the market to conduct its 
own quality checks. CCC’s five quality parameters were: fill height, the product’s microbiology, 
its gas volume, its appearance (colour), and its taste. For each product scores were assigned to 
these parameters, which were multiplied. In this way the products were rated, and their final 
scores were recorded on quality certificates, which were sent to the bottling firms. So in order to 
realise the quality level required, all parameters had to have a sufficient score. Based on the five 
quality criteria, the products of several beverage companies in the region were compared. 
Post-privatisation changes in management control, firm activities and performance 
  
 166 
RSBSC was one of the firms that received a gold medal for meeting the budgeted targets and 
producing quality products. CCC offered bottling companies advice to help them improve their 
quality levels. If problems could not be solved, CCC sent experts to assist the firm in question in 
finding a solution. If companies underperformed, they received a warning. If their performance 
did not improve they could lose their licence. During the public ownership period, our case firm 
had major quality problems. Mainly because of its obsolete machinery it was impossible to meet 
the quality criteria. After privatisation the situation improved significantly. Now RSBSC 
achieved a 100% quality score. The only problem the firm faced was that the bottles were 
wearing out. Until 2001 the company had bought new bottles each year, but after that it could no 
longer do this due to the forex problem.  
 
7.2.2.5 Performance Measurement and Evaluation: In the past neither the Beverage 
Corporation nor the MTI actively monitored the activities and profitability of the public firms. 
Their main concern was that the bottling firms met the production targets set by the government. 
However, if the companies did not succeed in this, no corrective measures were taken and no 
advice was given to them on how to improve their performance. A major problem was the lack 
of up-to-date information, which made it very difficult for the GM and the government 
authorities concerned to conduct adequate control policies and take the right decisions at the 
right time. This lack of information was due to the fact that the data were processed manually, as 
a result of which the financial reports were constantly delayed. 
 
After the sector was privatised, it became a common procedure to make weekly and monthly 
volume variance analyses. Actual performance figures were compared with both the planned 
figures and with those of the previous year. The Finance Department prepared monthly, 
quarterly, and annual performance reports for each activity and expense item. With respect to 
production, line utilisation and efficiency of the machines was assessed. In addition, the actual 
use of resources was compared with the amounts budgeted. In the reports possible variances 
were analysed and explained. The reports were also used internally to identify unused budget 
amounts and to enable departments to take corrective measures. The unused amounts were 
transferred to areas where there were shortages. The quarterly financial statements and the 
variance analyses were sent to the GM and the BOD. 
 
Taking into account the factors that slow down the production process, such as power failures 
and fluctuations in the employees’ production level, the expected line utilisation was 76%. 
Absenteeism was also registered. In addition, each month the employees were evaluated. And if 
an employee had a complaint about a co-worker, this was also recorded. In the case of errors and 
faults, employees were first given a warning by the supervisor. If the employee’s performance 
did not improve, he or she received a written warning. If this did not help, the complaint was 
reported, and the employee had to sign a written report that was used as evidence in case his or 
her malperformance occurred again. If the situation did not improve, higher bodies were 




informed. They would then take action in accordance with the collective agreement. Reports of 
this kind limited the possibilities of promotion and bonus payouts. 
 
Two times a year the unit heads filled in evaluation forms, which had to be signed by the 
employees themselves. If an employee did not agree with the evaluation, he or she had the right 
to ask for supporting evidence. Once signed, the evaluation form was sent to the department 
head, who also had to give his approval. He was entitled to make some more adjustments if 
necessary. If an employee disagreed strongly with the evaluation, the unit head was approached 
to discuss the matter. Mr. Tewolde indicated: ‘Employees are expected to be committed at all 
times. Failures cannot be ignored and there is no room for manipulation, because that would 
create a chain effect. The people in charge should be impartial and nobody should be excused 
when appropriate action has to be taken. Still, employees are advised to support each other, and 
no one should survive at the expense of another colleague.’ 
 
A fork lift operator, Mr. Jemal, said: ‘The employees are considerate, friendly, and have a habit 
of assisting each other. They advise one another when things go wrong. However, sometimes 
there are complaints about people who fail to share the workload equally with their colleagues 
in the bottling line. Such complaints are usually settled without involving higher authorities.’ 
And Mr. Simon (a boiler operator) and Ms. Ghidey (a packer operator) added: ‘The employees 
are hard-working, either under supervision or when working alone, and they become worried 
when the work stops due to machine failure. During the public ownership period, the employees 
were very co-operative, and at times they would help colleagues in other sections. They then 
used to gather in the department that faced the problem, which hampered the work in the other 
departments. This wandering around looking for help stopped after the introduction of 
privatisation, because now everyone is instructed to perform the tasks laid down in their job 
descriptions.’ 
 
The HRA was of the opinion that punishment did not necessarily result in correct behaviour; it 
should be the last resort. The HRA manager, Mr. Isaac, said: ‘It is always advisable to take steps 
in the form of advice and warnings to improve their performance. Instant punishment would 
only frustrate employees and give rise to confrontations and undesired behaviour.’ RSBSC 
conducted its personnel policies on the basis of CCC’s guidelines. Ms. Ghidey stated: ‘The 
productivity of the employees is influenced by the speed and condition of the bottling line. The 
employees do not feel any pressure and they are doing their best.’ Besides the labour control 
methods, senior managers believed that the chance of success would be higher when the 
company has swift management system, rigorous maintenance schedule and alert workforce. 
 
A common procedure was that senior staff members of the Sales Department made inspection 
tours to the various areas to speak with the area managers and the sales agents. The area 
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managers controlled the performance of the sales agents with the aid of the daily sales reports. If 
an agent’s performance was not satisfactory, the department allowed a second sales agent to 
operate in that area to stimulate competition. If after repeated warnings the sales agent’s 
performance did not improve, the company took his or her licence. If the sales report showed 
that there was a significant difference in the planned and the actual performance of a sales agent, 
the GM was authorised to take immediate action.    
 
The production report that the GM received was more detailed and included information based 
on key performance indicators, such as line utilisation, case per man-hour, machine efficiency, 
sugar yield, concentrate yield, CO2 yield, and the litres of H2O per bottle. Machine efficiency 
also included fuel usage per litre of beverage, the kilowatt hours of power used per litre of 
beverage, the crown cork yield percentage, and the bottle breakage percentage. The performance 
indicators had a minimum and a maximum value. If the value of an indicator was below the 
minimum this was considered as underachievement, which had to be investigated. The reports 
made by the QC Department included information regarding the activities as well as the CO2 
and H2O plants. The QC Department conducted quality checks at different intervals. 
 
The production process was fully computerised. It included activities such as filling, crowning, 
date coding, Para mix, bottle counting, washing the bottles and controlling their temperature. 
Since the products had to be manufactured within a given deadline determined by the customers 
and the various production steps were automated, the employees could not afford to dawdle or 
be idle. They did, however, not oppose to the company’s system of supervision and control. 
Because the date coding machine did sometimes not function properly, the employees had to 
record the times they started and finished each task. Initially, some employees skipped recording 
their times to avoid a reprimand. However, during their training and in monthly meetings they 
were convinced of the usefulness of this activity. Employees were also expected to report 
machine failures if they occurred. 
 
Financial and non-financial performance: The Company used a number of financial and non-
financial criteria to assess its performance, such as line utilisation, machine efficiency, package 
(bottles and crates) quality, customer satisfaction, the number of defective products, the 
manpower status, motivation incentives for employees, on time delivery, and yield levels. The 
Sales Department distributed a questionnaire to a number of clients to evaluate customer 
satisfaction. Clients were asked about issues such as delivery, product quality, and the 
relationship with the salesmen. In addition, sales data of different outlets were compared. 
Further, both cash and non-cash items were analysed. Until 2000 the following items were 
calculated: current asset ratios, asset turnovers, the direct materials inventory, liquidity ratios, 
profitability ratios, and working capital turnover. As from 2000 they were no longer checked 
because the shareholders no longer considered this information as useful. 
 




To investigate the changes in firm performance in both the pre- and post-privatisation periods, 
we performed some financial analyses on the following variables: profitability, productivity, 
operating efficiency, output, and tax payments (see table 7.1). Taking 1993 as the base year, we 
can see that until 1996 there was a constant sales growth. In 1997 and 1998 the sales declined 
because in that period the firm was taken over. From 1999 onwards, they increased again to 
reach their highest level in 2003. By then the sales figure had grown with 1,077 percent 
compared to the base year. The company ascribed the increase in the sales volume to measures 
such as investments in modern machinery, the introduction of a second work shift, the increase 
in the number of sale agents and delivery trucks, the expansion of the business area, and 
marketing activities (advertisements, subsidy on transportation costs, etc.) RSBSC believed that 
the market was by no means saturated yet and that the demand for its products would only grow. 
Other profitability criteria that we used were return on sales (ROS), return on assets (ROA), and 
return on equity (ROE). According to these criteria the firm’s profitability was higher during the 
public ownership period. In fact, in 1998 the figures were negative. This low performance could 
be explained as follows. First, the operating income figures differed significantly in the two 
periods. During the public ownership period, the cost of sales ratio was relatively low. Second, 
before the firms were privatised, the value of the fixed assets was extremely low because the 
machinery was obsolete. After they were privatised, the investments made increased the value of 
the assets and equity (see Appendix-C). In 1998 the value of the fixed assets increased with 
98,072,880 Nakfa (81 percent equity and the rest bank loans). In addition, the increase in 
investments led to a proportional increase in the depreciation expenses. Third, in the period from 
1996 to 2003 the commodity prices increased more than 133 percent due to inflation (see 
Appendix-C). Further, in 1993 one US Dollar was the equivalent of about 7 Ethiopian Birr (the 
currency used before the introduction of the Nakfa in 1997), and in 1993 one US Dollar was 
equivalent to 23 Nakfa. The inflation and the lack of access to forex greatly affected RSBSC’s 
activities, especially its import operations. In addition, these circumstances considerably 
increased the company’s expenses. In 2002 there was a sharp decline in the firm’s profitability, 
which improved again in 2003 as a result of increased sales volumes and adjusted product 
prices. After privatisation the company’s business costs rose due to salary increments (12%), 
discounts offered for transportation costs, high tax levels, and public utility and 
telecommunication expenses. 
 
The ROS figures (based on operating income) ranged between 45 percent in 1993 and 37 
percent in 1996, but decreased in the period from 1999 to 2003 to rates between 5 and 14 
percent. A low rate of return was quite normal during the transition period because of the 
investments and depreciation expenses and the fact that the company was not yet running at its 
full capacity. This is illustrated by the sales trend and productivity figures listed in table 7.1. In 
the period from 1993 to 1996 ROA ranged from 19 to 23 percent, whereas from 1999 to 2003 it 
declined to figures between 1 and 6 percent. ROE percentages ranged from 19 to 23 percent 
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from 1993 to 1996, but declined to between 1 and 10 percent in the period 1999 – 2003. The 
labour productivity (revenue per employee, see table 7.1), however, increased during 
privatisation. During the public ownership period the figures ranged from 77,700 to 128,900 
Nakfa, and during 1999 to 2003 they increased to amounts between 182,100 and 305,900 Nakfa. 
Also RSBSC’s sales efficiency improved considerably after the firm was privatised. In the 
period 1998 - 2002 there was a steady increase. However, in 2003 there was a decline in 
performance. During the public ownership period the net income efficiency figures were higher 
than after privatisation. The firm’s output was poor from 1993 to 1995 compared to 1996, 
although each year it improved. The 1999 output figures were three times higher than those in 
1998. This increase continued throughout 2002, after which there was a slight decline in 2003. 
 
Like all Eritrean firms, RSBSC had to pay various kinds of taxes to enhance the government’s 
income. During the period under study (1995 and 1996 excluded), the firm’s tax payments (tax 
per unit of sales) amounted to more than 20 percent of the sales revenue. From 1998 to 2000, 
sur-tax was added, resulting in a tax rate of higher than 27 percent. Although this was a 
considerable burden, the company put a great deal of effort into keeping its business running 
smoothly. In this respect, it benefited from financial as well as non-financial evaluation tools. 
Mr. Isaac added: ‘The major success factor in running a business is the background of the 
owners. If the owners possess the necessary qualities and experience, they can make the 
enterprise successful. Otherwise, if they lack leadership they will cause failure.’ CCC with its 
wide experience, the team of qualified senior managers and the motivated employees all 
contributed to RSBSC’s success. In a similar vein, Mr. Tesfai remarked: ‘Many private firms 
have problems associated with the background of the owners, because most of them lack the 
know-how required to run such businesses. These owners should compensate their weaknesses 
by hiring qualified well-paid and motivated people. However, some of them carry out all the 
activities themselves, such as those carried out by the manager, finance head and administrator. 
And those who hire experts do not give them enough freedom to apply what they know. All these 
factors contribute to the collapse of many privatised enterprises.’ 
 
The type of MCS currently used by the company could mainly be described as a combination of 
diagnostic and belief systems with some elements of an interactive system (Simons, 1995). The 
company exercised planning and budgeting methods, standard costing tools, and cost control 
and periodic performance evaluations. The firm uses both financial and non-financial 
information in its control practices. These are elements of a diagnostic system. The second 
nature of the current MCS practice includes the commitment to total quality, customer 
satisfaction, and reduction of costs and wastage. Customers were viewed very important and 
quality was the distinctive nature of activities in the whole input-output chain. This shows the 
application of a belief system. Further, the present MCS practice exhibits some characteristics of 
interactive system. The company allowed lower managerial levels to participate in the planning 
and budgeting activities but they were not expected to introduce major changes in the face of 




perceived opportunities or threats. The autonomy of lower levels was limited and that they do 
not have absolute freedom to set targets for their area. Normally, the planning and budgeting 
activity was controlled by the regional office of the CCC and targets were always negotiated 
with company managers. On other issues the organisation has taken some initiatives to solve the 
transparency problems when dealing with agents to import resources using forex from parallel 
markets. Such initiatives were taken by the managers when challenged by sudden government 
regulations. 
 
7.3 Developments from the beginning of 2003 until mid 2005: 
 
Government regulations: RSBSC expected to be granted unrestricted access to forex by the 
government in the implementation of its business and investment plans. Around November 
2001, however, the government abolished the forex services, which forced the firm to look for 
alternative forex sources on the black market. The company started to import raw materials with 
black market forex purchased at 23 Nakfa per US dollar, and recorded the materials’ value at the 
official bank rate (14 Nakfa per US Dollar, see IMF, 2003a). This affected the accuracy of the 
firm’s records and undermined the cost principle. RSBSC decided to keep the difference 
separate in a ‘loss on exchange’ account. However, the tax office was not willing to treat this   
amount as an expense, so the company had to pay tax over it nonetheless, which affected its 
profits. 
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Table 7.1 Firm performance of the Red Sea Bottlers Share Company during the pre- and post-privatisation periods (1993-2003) 
Measures 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Sales Trend 100* 125.22 148.14 165.84 147.04 141.12 386.97 568.15 781.59 1033.87 1176.99 
ROS1 (%) 45.07 44.21 41.82 36.86 21.47 (6.67) 7.04 12.98 13.67 4.86 10.97 
ROS2 (%) 22.41 24.13 25.71 22.66 12.63 (8.29) 2.71 6.14 7.96 3.04 6.84 
ROA (%) 22.80 21.80 20.86 19.34 2.38 (1.28) 1.04 3.15 4.87 2.50 5.75 
Profitability 
ROE (%) 67.49 39.09 58.43 57.17 2.73 (1.61) 1.42 4.51 9.96 3.66 8.56 
























Sales 76,877 96,743 114,751 128,478 110,033 70,769 182135 234,699 280,391 305,919 275,596 Operating 
efficiency Net income 17,228 23,346 29,498 29,113 13,897 (5,866) 4,942 14,414 22,318 9,313 18,858 
Output Real Sales (%) 59.84 75.30 89.32 100∗ 85.64 78.29 201.49 259.64 310.18 338.42 304.88 
Employment Trend (%) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 100* 142.13 142.13 142.13 142.13 142.13 142.13 
DAR 0.6622 0.4422 0.6431 0.6617 0.1276 0.2055 0.2678 0.3013 0.3432 0.3157 0.3278 
LTDAR 0.0862 0.0899 0.1107 0.1380 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Leverage  
LTDER 0.2551 0.1612 0.3103 0.4078 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
CES N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.3717 4.3495 0.1655 0.1357 0.0208 0.0011 0.0331 Capital 
investment CEA N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.0702 0.6709 0.0636 0.0697 0.0127 0.0009 0.0279 
Tax TPUS 0.2266∗∗ 0.2008∗∗ 0.1611∗∗ 0.1420∗∗ 0.3324 0.2698 0.2718 0.2777 0.2782 0.2960 0.2917 
Notes: 
ROS1= return on sales [based on operating income figures], ROS2= return on sales [based on net income figures], ROA= return on assets, ROE= return on equity, Real Sales 
= Nominal Sales ÷ Consumer price index,   DAR= debt to asset ratio, LTDAR= long term debt to asset ratio, LTDER= long term debt to equity ratio, CES= capital 
expenditure to sales, CEA= capital expenditure to assets, TPUS= tax per unit of sales. 
∗ 1993 functioned as the base year for observing sales trends. 1996 was used as a base year since it was the most stable and productive year for the enterprise during public ownership. 
Similarly, 1997 was used to study the trends in employment since it was the oldest record available. 
∗∗ The amounts indicated for the years 1993 to 1996 include only annual taxes. Total annual taxes and duties are reported for the remaining years (1997-2003). 
N.B.   The amounts of labour productivity and operating efficiency are in Eritrean Nakfa [ERN]. 
The full range of data sources and the detailed computations that accompany table 7.1 are presented in Appendix-C. 
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CCC allowed RSBSC to obtain forex from parallel markets by placing official bids to avoid 
problems with the tax office. These bids were announced in newspapers and directed at interested 
businessmen who could import raw materials with their own forex and receive payment from the 
company in local currency. Interested bidders were informed to buy the raw materials from 
authorised suppliers. An agreement had to be reached on the exchange rate as well as on the 
importer’s commission charges. This process was supported by an auditor. In this way the company 
managed to import its raw materials for 2003. The black market rate was high, unstable, and 
stimulated inflation, thereby affecting the prices of the imported raw materials and the 
manufacturing costs. However, not obtaining forex also undermined the business operations, while 
the same applied to delays in shipments. In addition, the rising costs of fuel increased the 
transportation expenses. Obtaining forex on the black market helped the firm for some time, but in 
2003 the government issued another regulation, which ordered enterprises to acquire an import 
permit and open an L/C account with their own forex for making their payments. This measure 
hampered the role of import-export business that offered firms assistance in dealing with valuation 
and tax problems. 
 
The situation became really difficult when in 2004 the government prohibited firms to buy forex on 
the black market. The GM approached all government banks as well as the HIMBOL Exchange 
Bureau both in person and in writing to persuade them to grant RSBSC access to forex, but they did 
not respond. He then brought the issue to the attention of the Ministry of National Development 
(MND). The situation was also reported to both shareholders. Mr. Tesfai commented: ‘It is 
necessary to keep pushing, be aggressive and obstinate, and make the authorities concerned 
understand the problem. Waiting patiently for solutions is of little use.’ Finally, RSBSC was given a 
one-time access to forex in 2004. The company continued its negotiations with the BOD and 
responsible government bodies. Eventually, however, the situation became so severe that by the end 
of 2004 the firm had to close down the Massawa and Keren depots. After that the product 
distribution was limited to Asmara and the surrounding areas. In the beginning of 2005, RSBSC 
formulated a plan to reduce its manpower. Finally, around May 2005, the company terminated its 
operations. 
 
Mr. Tesfai indicated: ‘The country should be in the position to offer soft drinks in view of tourism, 
although it is not a top priority item, like food and medicine. If soft drinks are not manufactured 
locally, businessmen will import them. This means the outflow of forex from the country. So why 
should we not have our own drinks rather than paving the way for import? After all Coca-Cola is a 
global product fit for the tourism industry, which the GOE strives to expand.’ 
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In 2004 the government put restrictions on the distribution times in the centre of Asmara. The 
delivery of the products to the outlets in the city centre was only allowed from 6:30 to 9:00 a.m. on 
weekdays. In the evening products could be delivered freely. Mr. Mahteme explained, however, 
that serving a client correctly involved a number of activities, including greeting the client, 
checking the stock supplies, informing whether there were any problems or complaints regarding 
the services and products, checking the empty bottles, delivering the product items, and issuing the 
invoice. This process took about twenty minutes per client. Mr. Mahteme argued: ‘The new delivery 
restriction puts major limitations on the distribution schedule and severely affects the sales 
revenues and distribution costs. Firstly, it is impossible and would be unfair to force the staff 
members of outlets to get up so early in the morning to collect the products. After all the company’s 
first goal is customer friendliness. Secondly, the sales agents cannot reach all clients within this 
restricted time frame while carrying out the usual sales procedure. Finally, the restriction will 
cause great concern about the working hours of the salesmen.’ 
 
The company tried to convince the authorities of the difficulties that the delivery restrictions would 
cause, but they were not willing to negotiate. RSBSC also addressed its complaints to the MND and 
showed them its product distribution chart. The MND was surprised about the introduction of the 
restriction measure and advised the company to discuss the matter at the Mayor’s office. There the 
authorities argued that the firm had to increase its number of distribution trucks. RSBSC indicated 
that it had to deliver its products to about seven hundred outlets (bars, cafés and restaurants), and 
that the restriction was not acceptable. Finally, the GM decided to ignore the restriction and to 
continue with the usual distribution schedule. 
 
Before privatisation the DIR ordered companies to register all the products sold to the different 
outlets. Based on this information the companies’ income was estimated as well as the annual tax 
amounts. After the firms had been privatised the DIR continued this procedure. At times it asked 
firms for records of specific past years. If companies complained about the tax rates, the DIR 
referred to the records. To RSBSC this practice meant an unnecessary increase in its workload and 
extra pressure. In addition, its clients did not approve of the fact that the company allowed the tax 
office to inspect its private information. Some of them even stopped buying RSBSC’s products. For 
this reason the company urged the DIR to carry out the tax assessments in a different way. It also 
asked the DIR why it did not order the local import-export traders to keep similar records. The 
company indicated that it was not willing to keep client records if the local import-export traders 
were not ordered to do so. However, the DIR did not take the firm’s arguments into consideration 
and simply forced it to co-operate. In 2003 the tax office obliged the entire business community in 
Eritrea to register its client data and bills, which RSBSC perceived as a slight relief.  




For a concluding summary of the post-privatisation changes and developments at RSBSC, refer 
table 7.2. 
 
Table 7.2 Summary of post-privatisation developments at RSBSC 
General Changes:  
1. Employment, 
training & benefits  
- employment had increased but lack of skilled manpower was a concern 
- employees got better salaries, benefits, annual increments, bonuses, and regular training 
- employees had become committed, responsible, and conscious of quality, cost, and duty 




- sales department emerged well organised and stronger, strived on expansion of market area, 
hired and trained sales agents, and extended assistance to outlets 
- the CCC offered regular marketing support  
- strategy focused on availability, accessibility, and affordability of products, customer satisfaction, 
high quality, and introduced new products 
- production and sales activities were affected by government regulations 
3. Source of raw 
materials [RM] 
- dependent on imported RMs from authorized suppliers 
- water supply and delays in shipments were a challenge 
- impact of government policy on forex, customs, record keeping,  and taxation was harmful 
4. Organisation 
structure 
- size increased and the number of departments and sections were expanded and gave rise to 
large capacity that facilitated MCS practice changes 
- hired qualified managers for top positions and empowered lower managers 
- little problem from gray-area of autonomy between departments and the GM   
5. Investment - more autonomy to decide on investments brought great changes 
- the firm was built completely new with automated bottling line and new delivery trucks 
- investment reduced wastes, improved quality, productivity, and efficiency and significantly 
reduced leverage  
MCS Changes:  
1. Planning & 
Budgeting 
- utilized formal [long-term and short-term] planning and budgeting tools, updated regularly 
- sales forecasts were made recurrently 
- employees were rewarded based on performance results 
- information on standard input-output relations was used for planning and control  
2. Product costing 
& Pricing 
- product prices set at company and retail levels were kept constant in line with CCC policies 
- the CCC intervened when profitability deteriorated and/or inflation affected costs  
- costs were significantly affected by external contextual factors 
3. Internal reporting 
& Decision-
making 
- reporting to MTI was standardised 
- the company adopted standardised coca-cola recording and reporting system 
- internal reports and customer feedback were used frequently 
- use of computers and software programs brought huge radical changes and decision-making has 
become swift 
4. Cost control & 
Waste 
minimisation 
- resource consumption was regularly monitored 
- rigorous quality checks at each plant and externally by the CCC  
- physical supervision and routine control of breakages were in place 





- internal reports, financial and non-financial data, and physical supervision were greatly used 
- tight monitoring on market areas, sales agents and outlets  
- the firm made periodic variance computations and compared results of different periods 
- there were regular meetings of managers on top of the BOD’s for monitoring performance 
- performance was good on sales, productivity, sales efficiency and output, but poor on profitability 
and net income efficiency 
- external factors strongly influenced firm activities and performance  
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7.4 Discussion and conclusions: 
 
RSBSC was privatised in 1997 and became part of a global company. As a result, its activities, firm 
performance, and MCS practices changed significantly. These changes took place in terms of 
investments, the firm’s organizational structure, its product-market strategy, operating procedures, 
and sales performance. After the firm was privatised it faced a number of challenges, both internal 
and external, which affected its activities and performance in an unfavourable manner. On the other 
hand, the company was completely modernised. Investments were made in buildings, new 
production machinery was purchased, the number of delivery trucks was increased, the production 
and sales processes were renewed and computerised, and quality as well as customer satisfaction 
became important focal points. As a result of the investments the leverage ratios were reduced and 
the CES and CEA figures rose (see table 7.1). In addition, the company expanded its market by 
opening new depots and hiring more sales agents. Its strategy was aimed at the availability, 
accessibility, and affordability of its products. Further, the company was an advocate of standard 
retail prices. In achieving its goals RSBSC was supported by CCC, which organised training 
courses for the employees and offered the firm’s senior managers the opportunity to visit bottlers in 
other countries. CCC also assisted the firm in implementing the Coca-Cola quality system and 
standardising its operating procedures. RSBSC was well aware of the severe competition that 
characterised the beverage industry. This is why it paid much attention to activities such as 
monitoring the outlets, advertising and introducing new products on a regular basis. The sales 
agents and area managers received a commission when they performed above average. 
 
General changes after the privatisation of the company included a rise in employment, the 
improvement of the employees’ working mentality and technical skills, and a clear focus on quality, 
applying to the raw materials, the firm’s end products and its service provision. To achieve a 
sufficient level of quality RSBSC strictly followed the Coca-Cola quality procedures. Further, the 
company succeeded in realising a considerable degree of waste reduction. This was achieved by 
automation, control systems, and the establishment of the Breakage and Sanitation Committee. 
With respect to the firm’s MCS practices major improvements were achieved through 
computerisation. The introduction of software programmes, email systems and access to the 
Internet highly contributed to the increase in the firm’s professionalism. 
 
After the privatisation of our case firm its departments and their activities were expanded. The staff 
was increased with a large number of qualified people who held key positions. Management and 
control information was given a high priority, both by CCC and RSBSC. We can conclude that 
RSBSC’s management control systems were more structured, direct and sophisticated than those of 
IMA and AW&LF. 





The challenges that RSBSC faced were identical to those dealt with by IMA and AW&LF. They 
included a shortage of trained young employees due to the border war, inflation, and issues such as 
delays in the import of supplies, power failure, and shortages of raw materials, water, and spare-
parts. Further, the government issued a number of unfavourable regulations, such as the obligatory 
military service, the introduction of excise tax, the abolishment of forex, limitations on the 
distribution hours as well as on advertising, and the obligatory provision of client information to the 
DIR. In addition, the DIR refused to recognise the loss on exchange as an expense. Of all these 
challenges, the forex problem affected the company the most. It severely undermined RSBSC’s 
business activities and firm performance, because the majority of its raw materials had to be 
imported. The abolishment of the forex services undermined the firm in such a way that it had to 
cease its operations in 2005. By introducing this measure the government undermined the 
development of a conducive business climate. It did not offer the companies the support they 
needed to start operating successfully and enable them to make a contribution to the country’s 
economy. 
 
Becoming part of a joint venture was a favourable development for RSBSC. It gave the company 
the opportunity to benefit from the experience and know-how of a multinational and start to operate 
on a higher level. Through the extensive support of CCC in the form of training programmes as 
well as guidance and the advice of experts, RSBSC managed to improve its position significantly. 
The company became one of the top bottlers in the region. Privatisation certainly improved the 
structure and organization of the company. It increased the autonomy of the GM and the senior 
managers, and it allowed the firm to modernise and improve its management control systems. The 
capacity to introduce new practice changes has grown. The company has also benefited from non-
financial information and has managed to use many of the unused forms and MCS practices of the 
public ownership period. Although the BOD was the highest decision-making body, it co-operated 
closely with the GM, who always participated in the quarterly meetings. The BOD considered the 
GM as a full-fledged partner, whose opinions and ideas were taken seriously. This would have been 
unthinkable in the public ownership era. In addition, privatisation had a major impact on the 
development of the firm’s MCS practices, which can be largely regarded as a combination of 
diagnostic and belief systems (Simons, 1995). The lower managerial levels were given some degree 
of participation, although they could not make major decisions. CCC’s regional office controlled 
the planning and budgeting processes, but the targets were always discussed and negotiated with the 
company’s management during the BOD meetings. With the exception of its profitability levels, 
privatisation led to a significant improvement of RSBSC’s organizational structure, firm 
performance, and MSC practices. 
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8 Conclusions and implications 
 
8.1 Objectives and research method 
 
This research study has investigated the changes in the MCS practices, activities and performance 
of three firms in a developing country. It was based on the following central research question: 
‘How do internal and external factors affect the relations among privatisation, MCS change and 
firm performance?’  The research was conducted in Eritrea. Its main objective was to gain insight 
into the process of change induced by the privatisation of Eritrean businesses. To make our analysis 
more extensive we took into account the influence of both internal and external contextual factors. 
The study particularly focussed on the role of the government in the privatisation process and the 
question whether it offered the Eritrean firms sufficient support to privatise successfully during the 
transition period. In addition, an attempt was made to develop a conceptual framework that can 
serve as a basic model for conducting research in LDCs. 
 
In order to perform an in-depth analysis we chose a qualitative research approach combined with 
the case study method. In this way we could collect a rich spectrum of data that enabled us to make 
a thorough and reliable description and analysis of our research topic.  
 
8.2 Theoretical arguments and expectations  
 
The first three chapters of this thesis discussed the necessity of privatisation for LDCs, while 
including the influence of internal as well as external contextual factors. Privatisation has generally 
been regarded as the solution to the failure of public ownership (Shirley & Walsh, 2001). Public 
ownership has a number of disadvantages. First, public firms are protected by the government and 
face no market pressure (competition). They are dependent on subsidies, which makes them 
inefficient (Lieberman, 1993). Second, public firms are not focussed on profitability. They are in 
the first place aimed at performing welfare functions (Young, 1995). In addition, there is a great 
deal of political interference in the appointment of the managers of public firms (Kumar, 2004). 
Further, an important objective of public firms is to reduce unemployment. Third, the degree of 
interference of government bodies in the firms’ daily affairs is high, resulting in overstaffing, bad 
product choices, a lack of investment measures, and poor incentives for managers (Shleifer & 
Vishney, 1994: cited in LaPorta & Lopez-de-Silanes, 1997). The principal (owner: the government) 
has less knowledge of the firm than the agents (the managers), which causes information 
asymmetry, making it difficult to monitor the agents’ behaviour and performance. Due to the long 
chain of principal-agent relationships, the control process in public firms is weak. In addition, due 
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to the bureaucratic structure of their decision-making process public firms are not capable of 
responding to market developments in a timely manner (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988). For these 
reasons the performance of public firms is often poor. 
 
Privatisation was expected to improve the public firms’ efficiency in LDCs in various ways. 
Moreover, it would give the owners the right to appropriate their returns for assets, and to introduce 
incentives (Hart & Moore, 1990; Hart, 1990). Further, privatisation was believed to encourage 
measures of innovation and stimulate the productivity of LDC firms (Erbetta & Fraquelli, 2002). In 
addition, the public finance difficulties were expected to be resolved by the market mechanism 
(Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1988). Competition and the transfer of property rights into private hands was 
considered to improve the MCS, including the accounting systems (Macias, 2002), as well as firm 
performance (Vickers & Yarrow, 1988) and to stimulate development goals (Rees, 1985). As 
privately owned firms operate in a capital market governed by the profitability principle, 
managerial non-profit behaviour is limited (Ott & Hartley, 1991). Studies claim that privatisation 
has resulted in higher outputs, an increase in investments, the production of quality goods and 
services at low prices, the introduction of modern technology and know-how, and efficiency 
improvements in firms’ corporate governance. The salaries of employees in private firms are 
higher, whereas the leverage is lower, and the government benefits from the increase in taxation 
income (see Makalou, 1999; Fahy, et al., 1999; Kikeri et al., 1992). It was assumed that the post-
privatisation MCS practices would be advantageous to the LDCs in the following ways. First, the 
newly introduced MCS practices would be less bureaucratic and more profit-oriented, thereby 
contributing to the economic welfare of the firms (Uddin, 1997; Waters, 1985). Second, they would 
be closely associated with economic rewards and a more efficient allocation of resources, combined 
with new initiatives, such as total quality management and improved employee benefits. Third, they 
would focus on market information. Post-privatisation MCS practices were increasingly linked to 
the developments in information technology, as a result of which they had become more and more 
transparent. Fourth, politics and bureaucracy played no role in post-privatisation MCS-practices. 
They were incentive-based and supported through market-driven budgets. Finally, they would 
require the participation of both managers and employees, thereby ensuring a thorough and reliable 
control process (Uddin & Hopper, 2003, 1999). 
 
Both a successful implementation of MCS and an increase in firm performance levels are related to 
internal and external contextual factors. External contextual factors are market and country 
conditions (DeCastro & Uhlenbruck, 1997), entailing government regulations, the political climate, 
industrial relations (TU), the influence of aid agencies, and competition (Kennedy & Hobohm, 
1999; Hoque & Hopper, 1997, 1994). The literature indicates that it is mostly the large Western 
firms that make use of modernised and improved MCS, and that their usage requires the non-




interference of the state in the firm’s management, the presence of efficient capital markets, a 
transparent structure of the firm’s management and control practices, and an unlimited access to 
capital. Unfortunately, these conditions are often absent in LDCS, which undermines the 
development and success of the private sector. Most privatised LDC firms have no access to 
resources and support services. Their operations are hampered by harsh governmental regulations 
on foreign trade, the abolishment of forex services, excessive borrowing by the government, heavy 
taxation, and socio-political instability. So in order for the private sector to operate successfully a 
favourable business environment is required (Kennedy & Hobohm, 1999). Some post-privatisation 
studies indicate that privatised LDC firms have adopted informal control systems that are different 
from those used by Western companies (see Hopper et al., 2004b; Uddin & Hopper, 2003, 1999). 
 
Internal contextual factors include firm size, the organization’s capacity to learn and act, the 
introduction of new technology, and strategy changes. Empirical evidence shows that the 
management control systems of firms that have formed alliances with multinationals or other large 
companies are usually more sophisticated than those used by firms owned by locals (Al-Namri, 
1993). The latter are inclined to make less use of MCS techniques than the larger firms (Chiu, 1973; 
Savage, 1966: cited in El-Ebaishi et al., 2003), since their financial resources are relatively limited 
(Libby & Waterhous, 1996). Because of their size the smaller firms can use control systems that are 
more informal, such as direct control exercised by the owner(s). The renewal of a firm’s 
management control systems is connected with the skills of its staff members (Cohn & Levinthal, 
1991), a firm’s capability to provide its staff members with training, or its decision to hire 
experienced personnel (Firth, 1996). Bruns & Kaplan (1987) argue that the support and 
involvement of firm owners as well as top-managers facilitates the introduction of MCS changes 
and innovations.  
 
8.3 The case firms under public ownership 
 
During the public ownership era, the three case firms (IMA, AW&LF and RSBSC) as well as the 
other firms in Eritrea stood under the supervision of the public corporations and the MTI. All plans 
and strategies of the firms were centralised, which meant that there was a great deal of 
governmental interference. This clearly undermined the firms’ autonomy. In addition, the long 
chain of bureaucracy and the inherent information asymmetry affected the decision-making 
processes of the businesses in an unfavourable manner. Firms were expected to limit their 
production output to predetermined quotas and adopt fixed salary scales. The role of the managers 
was restricted to the execution of the plans formulated by the governmental bodies. Moreover, these 
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managers were in fact appointed by these institutions, and lacked skills and authority. During this 
period the markets were protected, and therefore there was no competition. Budgeting policies were 
just a formality, requiring the firms to prepare statistical reports each quarter and financial 
statements each year, although no feedback was given on these reports. During that time 
management information was used poorly; it was merely subservient to financial accounting. Firms 
had no clear strategy and neither did they have long-term plans. In addition, training facilities for 
employees did not exist. The employees had no real sense of responsibility or commitment. 
Moreover, the firms’ products were of poor quality, partly resulting from the fact that the 
government did not allow them to make investments in new machinery and equipment. Further, the 
poor state of the public firms’ machinery also undermined their efficiency, productivity, waste 
management, and competitiveness. On top of that, their labour force was needlessly large, and 
through their access to bank overdraft facilities they were heavily indebted. All in all, the public 
firms had no profitability drive. 
 
8.4 The effects of privatisation  
8.4.1 New ownership:  
The new owners of the privatised firms had a different background than the former ones. For 
example, IMA’s owner lived in Europe, from where he ran a retail business. Although he had 
received no accounting or management training, he was an experienced retail business man and 
possessed knowledge of the European market. He was IMA’s manager and assisted the firm in 
importing raw materials and penetrating the export market. The owners of AW&LF were Eritrean. 
They had a technical background, but no training in accounting or management. They were, 
however, very motivated to gain knowledge about accounting practices, and they frequently 
conducted market surveys to assess the possibilities of expanding their market share. RSBSC was a 
joint venture between the GOE and CCC. The company was governed by a Board of Directors and 
the staff members who held key positions were qualified people. The manager was a chemist by 
profession and had gained a lot of experience from 1991 onwards. The owners of both IMA and 
CCC offered the joint venture assistance in the import of materials. In addition, RSBSC gained 
access to CCC’s knowledge. In general, the activities of the owners of all three case firms were 
clearly focussed on realising the business and investment plans. 
 
8.4.2 General changes:  
This section discusses and compares the changes in terms of investments, product market decisions, 
employment, raw material sources, the employees’ mentality, and organizational structure. The case 
firms accomplished the following goals. First, privatisation restored firm autonomy and stimulated 




new investments. In this way old machinery could be renewed or replaced. This generally meant the 
automation and computerisation of production and business processes, which led to a higher 
productivity, better product quality, and less wastage. Further measures included the provision of 
employee training, expanding the production capacity and sales activities, the purchase of delivery 
trucks by AW&LF and RSBSC, and the introduction of accounting facilities (computer software). 
The CES and CEA ratios presented in tables 5.1, 6.1, and 7.1 show the impact of the investments 
made. In addition, the investments reduced the firms’ leverage ratios. High leverage ratios as a 
result of public financing had been a burden to the companies during the public ownership period. 
The relief from this burden was one of the effects of privatisation (Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1988). In 
general we can conclude that the increase in post-privatisation investments is in line with the 
theoretical expectations as presented earlier. Second, privatisation resulted in the introduction of 
new products and the expansion of markets to enhance profits. So we observe that all firms 
achieved success in terms of increasing their sales growth, labour productivity, and operational 
efficiency (as measured by sales per employee). In the case of AW&LF, however, sales growth 
slowed down at a certain point. IMA shows mixed figures with respect to sales growth; in some of 
the post-privatisation years the figures were lower than in the base year. Apart from that, the firms 
positively contributed to the government income by paying higher amounts of tax than in the public 
ownership period. In terms of ROS, ROA, and ROE figures, however, all three firms show poor 
profitability results. In addition, their net income efficiency did not improve after they were 
privatised. This can mainly be explained by the influence of the contextual factors. Third, the firms 
started to adopt clear strategies with respect to product pricing, product types, and markets to 
operate in. These new strategies emphasised quality, customer satisfaction as well as higher 
productivity and return levels. Fourth, privatisation changed the employees’ working mentality; 
they became more committed, more productive, more duty-conscious, and more responsible. For a 
summary of the post-privatisation developments after the privatisation of the case firms, see 
Appendix-D. 
 
Differences: There were also differences among the case firms in the implementation of their 
business and investment plans. First, RSBSC improved its workforce in terms of both quality (by 
the provision of training) and quantity (by hiring qualified employees, both at the higher as well as 
the lower posts). This was made possible through the assistance of CCC and the installation of a 
new bottling line, which had a larger capacity. In addition, the firm’s lay-out was adapted to 
Western standards. At RSBSC, both the employees’ salaries and benefits were considerably higher 
than those at the other two case firms, resulting in a highly motivated and satisfied workforce. 
RSBSC’s policy was to upgrade the salaries on an annual basis and to compensate its employees for 
inflation. In addition, employees who performed well were rewarded. With respect to the size of the 
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workforce, IMA and AW&LF showed a decline in manpower after they were privatised, which is in 
line with findings of other studies (e.g., Aussenegg & Jelic, 2002; Harper, 2001; D’Souza & 
Megginson, 1998). These findings are not surprising; during the public ownership period the size of 
the workforce had become needlessly large, so the superfluous employees were made redundant. 
Unlike RSBSC, IMA and AW&LF were not in the position to offer their employees salary 
increases or to introduce incentive systems. Moreover, the activities of the two firms clearly 
suffered from contextual factors. Further, with respect to hiring skilled manpower costs were no 
issue to RSBSC, and decisions about personnel were not influenced by family ties. This is why 
RSBSC could appoint fresh talent with proper skills at key positions, thereby increasing its chances 
to improve its performance (Ramaswamy & Von Glinow, 2000). IMA and AW&LF, on the other 
hand, were limited to appointing friends and/or family members at management positions (GM, 
Production Department), because their main criterion for hiring staff was trust. Another reason was 
the lack of skilled labour in the market. 
 
Second, RSBSC’s firm performance and output figures were favourable, but those of IMA and 
AW&LF were mixed. The fluctuations in these companies’ figures were the result of the lack of 
labour and forex since 2001. Third, IMA’s production capacity largely extended the demand of the 
home market, which is why it aimed at exporting the majority of its products. The export market 
was large and quality-oriented, and required a timely and fixed delivery of goods. Further, products 
could be offered at higher prices. RSBSC’s Sales Department was unique; it was highly organised, 
operating with a large number of sales agents and some market developers. It also had a large 
number of delivery trucks at its disposal. In addition, it provided the outlets with various kinds of 
support. The department was fully supported by CCC. It can be observed that the experience and 
knowledge of both IMA’s owners and those of CCC contributed in expanding the market 
successfully. Locally, IMA as well as AW&LF were challenged by the activities of competitors, the 
import of cheap foreign products, and customer preferences. The local competitors sold their 
products cheaper, and the customers preferred these cheaper products, even though they were of 
lesser quality. In addition, IMA’s local trade activities were undermined by the governmental 
decision to import similar products rather than to buy them locally. Similarly, as market surveys 
indicated, local customers preferred imported to local wines because they considered foreign 
beverages to be of higher quality. This in particular hindered the activities of AW&LF. RSBSC did 
not face problems of this kind, since it had a monopoly position in a market that was still 
unsatisfied. Finally, the three firms varied in their measures with regard to the improvement of their 
organizational structure. RSBSC invested in the expansion of its departments, and formulated clear 
business plans and job descriptions. In addition, its GM was given more autonomy. In the case of 
AW&LF the owners had the power of decision-making and were closely involved in the day-to-day 




activities of the firm. IMA’s organizational structure was simplified. Here, family members played 
a key role in the management of the firm besides the owners.  
 
8.4.3 Changes in MCS practices and firm performance 
Planning and budgeting: After the case firms’ privatisation their planning and budgeting practices 
changed. IMA abolished its formal planning and budgeting procedures and introduced short-term 
plans based on customer orders. The reason for this was that its owners did not support long-term 
measures, mainly because they lacked sufficient knowledge of market demand issues. Moreover, 
there was a shortage of accounting staff. Also AW&LF did not prepare formal budgets, but made 
annual sales plans on which it based its activities. However, these plans were neither used for 
control purposes nor did they serve as criteria for the achievement of goals. The company’s 
production was targeted at replenishing the stock, and it made sure it had an extra wine supply in 
the case of any unforeseen demand, which was necessary since the process to manufacture wine 
took several weeks. The materials stock was checked each month to facilitate a good purchase 
policy. The reasons of AW&LF for not carrying out budgeting practices were similar to those of 
IMA. Also AW&LF was challenged by a fierce competition, a shortage of empty bottles, and forex 
problems. Further, both firms dealt with a lack of managerial knowledge, ability and experience. 
These restrictions together with cost issues blocked the introduction of significant changes in the 
firms’ MCS practices (Libby & Waterhouse, 1996). The restricted use of formal MCS tools at both 
IMA and AW&LF is in line with the theoretical argument that small firms are not particularly 
focussed on formal MCS techniques and procedures (Chiu, 1973; Savage, 1966: cited in El-Ebaishi 
et al., 2003). The firms’ lack of managerial skills and experience corresponds to the findings of case 
studies conducted in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Hopper et al., 2004a). In general it can be 
concluded that IMA and AW&LF adopted a short-term planning and control approach based on a 
short-term market demand and aimed at day-to-day activities, which were directly monitored by the 
managers. 
 
RSBSC, on the other hand, conducted both long- and short-term planning and budgeting activities. 
Market demand was forecasted on a regular basis, past sales trends were analysed, and the 
Production Department was provided with detailed product line information for planning purposes. 
In addition, in the case of changes in the inventory or in the sales movements of the product lines, 
the production plan was adjusted. In general, the budgeting procedures were based on the 
company’s strategic plan. The lower departmental levels also participated in the budgeting process. 
As a result the firm’s budgeting policies became more realistic and effective, giving a clear 
direction to the departmental activities. This outcome is similar to the findings of studies conducted 
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in Indian firms (see Anderson & Lanen, 1999). The improvements in RSBSC’s MCS were in fact 
initiated by CCC. As indicated by Al-Namri (1993), the MCS techniques adopted in joint ventures 
are generally more comprehensive and sophisticated than those used in small local firms. RSBSC’s 
MCS was clearly more formal and structured, and can be classified as a combination of a diagnostic 
and a belief system (see Simons, 1995). So the post-privatisation MCS developments that took 
place within RSBSC are consistent with the theoretical expectations presented earlier. 
 
Product costing and pricing: All case-firms used standard costing methods and possessed 
knowledge of input-output relationships. In the case of IMA, however, the overhead costs included 
personal expenses. Although the three case-firms did not use advanced costing methods, such as 
activity-based costing, RSBSC made an attempt to differentiate the costs of each activity for control 
purposes. In the case of AW&LF, product costing was affected by the integration of the office 
building depreciation costs into the manufacturing costs, which made the figures unreliable. IMA 
and RSBSC classified their costs in an adequate manner. 
 
The firms varied in setting their product prices. With respect to the export market, IMA was free in 
setting its prices, but in the local market it was forced to apply moderate price levels for competitive 
reasons. To attract its clients IMA offered quantity discounts and emphasised the high quality of its 
products. AW&LF was a price taker, since its competitors offered their products at lower prices. 
Both IMA’s and AW&LF’s commitment to maintaining a standard quality for input as well as 
output limited their price flexibility and made it difficult for them to compete in the home market. 
RSBSC adopted fixed product prices, because their customers could not afford to pay higher prices. 
In general, we can observe that the prices of raw material input were continuously rising due to 
inflation and changes in the import-export regulations. RSBSC, on the other hand, benefited from 
the input discounts offered by CCC whenever the firm’s profitability was impaired by external 
influences. 
 
Internal reporting and decision-making: We observed the following similarities among the case 
firms. All three firms continued most of the reporting procedures introduced in the public 
ownership period, and made additions and/or improvements if necessary. After the firms’ 
privatisation the reports and analyses became more sophisticated and detailed, and they were used 
for monitoring purposes, which had not been the case in the public ownership period. With respect 
to internal reporting and decision-making privatisation brought clear improvements and benefits. In 
addition, the firms introduced the use of non-financial information to improve their product quality 
and design and to increase their insight into the performance of competitors. 
 




Differences: First, IMA partly abolished the formal reports, and replaced them by personal 
supervision. This measure was taken because of the reduction in the organization’s size and the lack 
of interest on the part of the owners to receive detailed formal reports. In fact, the firm operated as a 
small shop, where personal supervision played a major role. Only short-term reports, such as the 
daily production report, were used. Second, IMA and RSBSC were clearly more focussed on daily 
reports than AW&LF. This was because the owners of IMA and RSBSC were not physically 
present in the firms, and these reports provided them with information on the companies’ day-to-
day activities. In general, automation and computerisation improved the standard and frequency of 
the reporting procedures to some extent. However, especially at IMA and AW&LF, further 
developments were hampered due to cost considerations. This did not apply to RSBSC; with respect 
to the introduction of innovations and investments in the field of MCS, its owners (i.e., CCC) were 
in the position to provide the company with means and know-how as well as financial support. Both 
CCC and the owners of AW&LF encouraged the effective use of reports. The accounting staff of 
RSBSC and AW&LF was therefore relatively larger than that of IMA. 
 
Third, our findings indicate that RSBSC was the first to computerise its accounting procedures and 
establish a network connection between the departments. In addition, a QC Department was set up. 
In 2004 IMA and AW&LF introduced computers in their Finance Departments. The firms mainly 
computerised their financial reporting tasks. Due to the limited number of skilled employees the 
computerisation could not be extended to other areas. Moreover, in the case of IMA the manager’s 
power was weakened by a family member. At AW&LF the shareholders shared the decision-
making power. In the case of RSBSC all departments possessed the autonomy to make decisions, 
the BOD being the highest decision-making body. We can conclude that initially privatisation 
stimulated a more efficient and effective decision-making process and facilitated the modernisation 
of certain business procedures. In addition, privatisation increased the involvement and interest of 
the owners in their businesses. 
 
Cost control and waste minimisation: The following similarities among the firms can be observed. 
They all committed themselves to improve the quality of their products. The process of quality 
checking started with the purchase of raw materials and continued until the end products were 
delivered to the customers. The owners were closely involved in this process. The standard input-
output relations were used to control the resource consumption. All steps of the production process 
were meticulously checked, and if there were any anomalies, direct action were taken. The 
employees’ mentality had clearly changed: they had become committed and quality-conscious. All 
three firms were aimed at working efficiently, increasing their productivity, and reducing their 
wastage. RSBSC and IMA introduced computerised new machinery, while AW&LF renewed its 
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machinery and built new stores. All in all it can be concluded that privatisation improved the firms’ 
quality standards, cost-consciousness, and waste minimisation, and that it strengthened their 
competitiveness. 
 
Differences: First, RSBSC reduced the issue of bottle and crate breakage by establishing a 
‘Breakage and Sanitation Committee’ as well as conducting regular checks. Further, it was able to 
control its costs by computing them separately, that is for each activity. Second, in the case of 
RSBSC, the joint-venture with CCC paved the way for the implementation of a quality system and 
improvements in the operating procedures. This is an example of the benefits that a strategic 
alliance can bring in terms of MCS improvements introduced by an international firm, as indicated 
by Firth (1996). This evidence also supports former research findings gathered in Syria (Abdeen, 
1980) and China (Chan & Lee, 1997), which show that some Western accounting concepts are 
indeed applicable in and beneficial to LDC firms. Furthermore, our results are in line with the views 
of Bruns & Kaplan (1987), who state that the support and participation of companies’ owners and 
top-management is vital for the realisation of MSC change in business firms. Finally, CCC 
conducted its own quality checks by taking random samples from the market on a monthly basis. 
 
Performance measurement and evaluation: After the three case firms were privatised they started 
to conduct similar activities in the field of performance measurement and evaluation. Either directly 
or indirectly, they collected non-financial information from clients. In addition, they became more 
focussed on both customer satisfaction and profitability. All of them monitored their production 
daily, controlled their resource consumption, and frequently had supervisors monitor their activities. 
They used their daily, weekly and monthly reports effectively for control purposes. In this way all 
steps of the production process could be identified, making it easy to detect any possible delays. 
 
Differences: First, with respect to managing its activities and the measurement and evaluation of 
performance RSBSC had access to the knowledge and experience of CCC. In controlling the firm’s 
actual performance, the standard yields of sugar and concentrate were used as a basis. Second, both 
RSBSC and IMA constantly evaluated the performance of their employees, which was laid down in 
formal reports. In the case of RSBSC, these evaluations served as guidelines with respect to 
promotions and bonus payments. AW&LF, however, did not evaluate individual performance, since 
it was merely focussed on the firm’s productivity as a whole. This was because the firm’s 
shareholders were in fact physically present in the departments, which was not the case with the 
other firms. Third, IMA’s control activities were hampered by familial ties similar to those reported 
by Uddin and Hopper (1999), who argue that a structure consisting of family members at top 
managerial positions weakens the authority and control practices of both middle management and 
the hired managers. Fourth, neither IMA nor AW&LF used formal budgeting tools for control 




purposes, which is in line with the findings of Hopper et al. ( 2004b), who observed the preference 
for informal ways of control to formal budgetary control systems after the introduction of 
privatisation. Finally, RSBSC’s daily sales reports were very detailed, classifying the firm’s sales 
by means of area, product line, and type of outlet. This approach enabled the company to exercise 
control at all levels. 
 
In brief, after privatisation RSBSC’s MCS practices became proactive in the sense that they helped 
the firm identify threats and opportunities (by means of market surveys and performance evaluation 
reports) in order to achieve its primary goal, namely improving its future performance. After 
privatisation, RSBSC’s MCS, which formerly could be typified as consisting of diagnostic 
methods, developed into more structured, direct and explicit systems, whereas the MCS of IMA and 
AW&LF became largely implicit. The MCS of the latter two companies could in fact be considered 
as a mixture of diagnostic and belief systems. Although both firms did not prepare formal budgets, 
they did formulate short-term production plans. In addition, both firms applied standard costing, 
measured their resource consumption, monitored their production, and tried to reduce costs and 
wastage. They succeeded in reducing the amount of paperwork considerably. Their MCS clearly 
became more cost-effective and efficient. IMA and AW&LF also became focussed on improving 
the quality of their products and workforce. Advising and training their employees regularly was an 
important issue. The firms did not have a formal incentive system as used by RSBSC. Instead they 
tried to motivate their employees by offering them salary adjustments to support them in dealing 
with the unfavourable economic situation. The discussions in the chapters about the individual 
firms indicate that after privatisation the owners became heavily involved in the companies’ internal 
matters. So the owners’ interest and capability played a vital role in the process of MCS change. For 
a summary of the case firms’ post-privatisation MCS practices, see table 8.1. For a more detailed 




Post-privatisation changes in management control, firm activities and performance 
  
 190 
Table 8.1 Summary of post-privatisation MCS practices at case firms. 
            Firms 
MCS 
Techniques 
IMA AW&LF RSBSC 
Planning & 
Budgeting 
- Short-term, demand oriented 
- No budgeting practices 
- Impact of capacity utilisation and 
uncertainty 
- Short-term, focus on replenishing inventory 
- No budgeting practices 
- Impact of uncertainty and competition 
- Both short and long-term orientation 
- Regular budgeting & strategic plan 
- Large capacity and size, support of owners and 
computer facilities 




- High interest and usage of reports 
- Finance department is weak and 
heavily overloaded 
- Limited usage of computers 
- Decisions are shared and fast 
- High interest but moderate usage of reports 
- Finance department is a bit slow and few 
people operate activities 
- Limited usage of computers 
- Fast decision-making process 
- High interest and frequent usage of various internal 
reports 
- Strong and fast Finance Department with qualified 
personnel and facilities 
- High usage of computers and soft-wares 
- Fast decision-making process 
Product costing 
& Pricing 
- Knowledge of standard costs, input-
output 
- external and internal factors affect 
costs   
- Price taker at home market but free 
on export pricing 
- Knowledge of standard costs, input-output 
- external factors affect costs   
- Price taker at home market 
- Knowledge of standard costs, input-output 
- external factors affect costs   
- Fixed pricing policy for wholesale and retail 
activities 
Cost control & 
Waste 
minimization 
- Strict quality control [QC] at each 
production step 
- Trained QC staff, employees, and 
role of automation 
- Strict QC mainly during production process 
- Renovation of machinery 
- Construction of stores 
- Strict QC on input, throughput, and output and 
regular monitoring 
- Role of automation and trained staff 
- Involvement of CCC  




- Monitor resource usage, labour 
productivity, and use of physical 
supervision 
- Some usage of non-financial 
information 
- Monitor resource usage, output, and use of 
physical supervision 
- Monthly meetings and moderate usage of 
non-financial information 
- Intensive usage of daily reports to monitor 
activities, rigorous physical supervision, conducts 
variance analysis  
- Monthly & quarterly meetings 
- Intensive usage of non-financial information 




 Firm performance: When comparing our findings on firm performance (tables 5.1, 6.1 and 7.1) 
with those of former studies, we can conclude the following. Our results show that during the 
post-privatisation period the firms’ performance generally improved in terms of sales growth. 
All firms managed to achieve an increase in their sales revenues, although these increases 
differed per firm. In the case of IMA and AW&LF sales did not increase instantly, whereas 
RSBSC’s sales figures rose significantly during the period under review. Our results are in line 
with the expectations with respect to the effects of privatisation and correspond to the findings 
of Megginson et al. (1994), Boubakri and Cosset (1998), LaPorta & Lopez-de-Silanes (1997), 
D’Souza et al. (2001), and Frydman et al., (1997), which are discussed in chapter three. 
Profitability as measured by ROS, ROA, and ROE, however, did not improve after privatisation. 
This finding is consistent with those  of Harper (2001) and Aussenegg & Jelic (2002). It is not in 
line with the theoretical expectations regarding the effects of privatisation, and neither does it 
correspond to the findings of Boardman and Vining (1989), Megginson et al. (1994), Boubakri 
and Cosset (1998), La Porta & Lopez-de-Silanes (1997), D’Souza et al. (2001), Frydman et al 
(1997), and Ramaswamy (2001). The results of our case studies should, however, be interpreted 
with caution. 
 
All three firms were confronted with unexpected problems resulting from changes in the 
institutional environment. In addition, our findings indicate that the firms’ post-privatisation 
ROA and ROE figures were affected by the amount of investments made. High investments in 
fixed assets yielded high depreciation expenses, which had to be weighed against the periodic 
revenues. 
 
Positive outcomes of privatisation included improvements in productivity and operating 
efficiency. Also the firms’ sales efficiency increased after they had been privatised. 
Nevertheless, RSBSC’s post-privatisation net income efficiency declined, but its output 
percentages increased. For IMA and AW&LF these figures were mixed. IMA’s output improved 
during 1999 and 2000 and that of AW&LF during 2000 and 2001. After that output declined in 
comparison with the base year 1997 due to inflation. The investment and leverage ratios results 
were positive, which is in line with the theoretical expectations. Especially to RSBSC applied 
that there was an increase in employment that could be associated with measures such as new 
investments and expansion activities. In all firms the employees’ salaries increased after the 
introduction of privatisation, which corresponds with the findings of Galal et al. (1991). With 
regard to tax payments, we observed that the amounts paid by the firms were significant in 
proportion to the sales revenues. In addition to the usual taxes, both AW&LF and RSBSC paid 
excise tax; AW&LF since 1999 and RSBSC since 2001. Compared to the public ownership 
period, the governments tax earnings increased after the firms were privatised. We can therefore 
conclude that our post-privatisation case firms contributed to the national income in a positive 
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manner, as expected (Cook & Uchida, 2004). Table 8.2 compares the firms’ performance in the 
post-privatisation period with that during the public ownership period. 
 
Table 8.2 Comparison of the case firms’ performance in the post-privatisation period with that during the former era: 
 
 
8.5 Developments in the contextual factors  
8.5.1 Internal factors: 
Firm size: As our findings indicate, the main internal contextual factors that influenced the 
expected effects of privatisation on our case firms’ MCS practices were reduction in firm size, 
cost considerations, lack of managerial experience, and the discontinuance of particular 
activities. IMA’s measure to cut down its Finance Department made it difficult for the firm to 
carry out its MCS practices in an effective manner. In addition, it undermined the assignment of 
tasks, which in turn made it difficult to carry out the routine accounting activities. Moreover, the 
fact that too little people performed too many tasks caused considerable delays. The introduction 
of computer software programmes brought some improvement but could not fully solve the 
accounting problems. Our findings also show that the MCS tools of the smaller firms (IMA and 
AW&LF), which were less divisionalised, were less sophisticated and formal than those of 
RSBSC. In addition, IMA’s and AW&LF’s resources were more limited, and neither did the 
firms have access to knowledge and experience in the way that RSBSC had. However, because 
of the limited size of IMA and AW&LF part of the routine internal reports could be replaced by 
informal direct controls. In the case of AW&LF, for example, the close participation of the 
owners in the firm’s daily affairs reduced the need for and reliance on comprehensive internal 
reports. It can therefore be concluded that firm size affected the use of internal reports and the 
reliance on formal sophisticated monitoring systems. In addition, the physical presence of the 
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Organizational capacity to learn: The literature indicates that both the size of a firm’s 
Accounting Department and the support of top-management as well as of the owners are vital to 
the facilitation of MCS practice changes. Our research supports this claim by illustrating that 
RSBSC was indeed in a better position to innovate its MCS than the other case firms were. 
RSBSC was able to hire personnel that was more qualified, while it was also in the position to 
offer its staff continuous training to upgrade its knowledge. IMA and AW&LF, on the other 
hand, could not implement drastic MCS changes, since they were too costly and the firms’ 
accounting staffs were too small. In addition, the owners of the firms lacked sufficient 
accounting background to recognise the importance of innovating and improving their MCS. 
And as already argued, it was in particular the owners’ knowledge, experience, and interest that 
determined firms’ choices with respect to MCS. 
 
Introduction of new technology: Our research shows that IMA and RSBSC modernised their 
machinery. To both firms applies that the automation of their machinery reduced their waste 
levels, enhanced the quality of their products and production processes, boosted their 
productivity, and enabled them to predict the input-output relations as well as the production 
timing. In particular RSBSC benefited from the bottle count and date coding reports. The 
company also computed its machine efficiency and line utilisation to monitor the production 
processes. The introduction of new technology clearly had a favourable impact on the stability 
of the firms’ business processes, which in turn was beneficial to the planning activities. 
Moreover, the accounting software reduced the burden of having to carry out the accounting 
tasks manually, and improved the accuracy and timeliness of the reports. 
 
Strategy changes: As our study indicates, all case firms became strongly focussed on strategies 
aimed at quality improvement and diversification. One of those strategies was adding new 
products to the existing product lines. Further, all firms introduced strict cost control policies 
and started to adopt strategies pursuing customer satisfaction and market expansion. IMA was 
unique in the sense that it introduced new cloth designs on both the local and the export market. 
 
Capacity to undertake action: Both IMA and AW&LF suffered from a shortage of qualified 
accounting staff and they lacked the resources to realise major changes in their MCS practices. 
In addition, we observed that IMA’s owners were very much concerned with saving labour 
costs, while disregarding the importance of detailed accounting reports. The cost issue made 
them reluctant to appoint new accounting personnel. Furthermore, the fact that family members 
had the highest positions in the firm undermined the authority of the hired managers. In the case 
of RSBSC, radical MCS changes did take place. In this respect RSBSC benefited from the 
support and commitment of CCC, who gave the company full access to its knowledge, 
experience, and resources. CCC also succeeded in conveying its mentality and business ethics to 
RSBSC. In sum, the strategic alliance with a multinational brought great advantages to RSBSC, 
enabling the firm to make use of an abundance of resources and experience and realise a 
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significant improvement of its MCS practices. In this sense RSBSC can be regarded as a 
standard example of a firm that fully benefited from its privatisation. 
8.5.2 External factors: 
When looking at the list of external factors presented in table 2.1, we see that Culture, Race and 
Ethnicity are less relevant in the context of Eritrean firms. As indicated in chapter 1, Eritrea has 
always been a trading nation where many colonial factories are located. This has resulted in a 
multi-cultural and -racial workforce, which gained a great deal of knowledge and experience 
over the years, in both manufacturing and non-manufacturing firms. So we did not encounter 
any significant culturally-, racially-, or ethnically-based elements that had an influence on the 
Eritrean firms’ MCS practices. For examples of the effects of such elements on firms’ MCS 
practices, see the study of Wickramasinghe and Hopper about Sri Lankan companies 
(Wickramasinghe & Hopper, 2005). We therefore dropped those factors as well as Aid Agencies 
and Trade Unions (TU), since also these latter two played no significant role in the Eritrean 
context. Although the literature indicates that the governments of LDCs are indeed motivated to 
implement privatisation policies with the assistance of aid agencies such as the World Bank and 
IMF (Craig, 2000; Cook & Kirkpatrick, 1995), in the case of Eritrea the introduction of 
privatisation was initiated by the national government on an independent basis. Aid agencies did 
not have any influence on the country’s privatisation process, neither during the process nor 
afterwards. Also the role of the TU was minimal, with the exception of a small conflict that took 
place with IMA, as described in chapter 5. The TU officials were in general not so satisfied with 
the privatisation process, and they pushed firms to form base unions and to respect employee 
benefits. The TU was of the opinion that there was a lack of labour enforcement, that the salaries 
were too low and the benefits too poor. Despite these views, however, its role was not relevant. 
So in this study we merely focussed on State and Regulations, War, and Competition. The 
critical problems encountered in this study that were associated with these external factors 
included the lack of access to forex services and to support institutions, the lack of skilled labour 
and political stability, and unfavourable government regulations. Some of these issues are 
consistent with those listed by UNIDO (1999). 
 
State and regulations: The success of privatisation is believed to be closely related to particular 
conditions, such as market competition, a market-friendly macroeconomic climate, and suitable 
policy frameworks (see UNDP, 1998; Chisari, 1997; Kikeri et al., 1994). It is believed that these 
conditions have to be met in order to avoid problems such as, among other things, inconsistent 
policies, the lack of an adequate physical infrastructure, underdeveloped financial systems, and a 
lack of supporting legislation (Kennedy & Hobohm, 1999). In the case of Eritrea, policy 
documents indicate that the government aims at rehabilitating the light industries and building a 
strong export-oriented manufacturing sector to meet the local demand and to develop its export 
market (GOE, 2003). The GOE’s trade policy claimed to promote liberal internal and external 
trade regimes to foster export- as well as import-based industries and services by providing 
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financing assistance, promoting exports, and encouraging the private sector to start playing a 
leading role in both domestic and external markets (GOE, 1998). These were some of the tasks 
that the government had set out to do to create a suitable business environment for the private 
sector. However, our findings show a different reality. All case firms faced a number of 
impediments similar to those documented by UNIDO (1999). 
 
First, the three case firms relied heavily on the import of raw materials, which means that they 
were dependent on the forex services provided by government banks, since no other source of 
foreign exchange was available. However, in 2001 the government blocked the access to forex, 
and the case firms were forced to look for alternative services on parallel markets at higher rates. 
These higher rates caused the firms’ costs to rise by more than 33%, which disrupted the 
companies’ planning, budgeting and business activities. Furthermore, in connection with 
customs duty and tax obligations, the government forced the firms to value their imports in local 
currency on the basis of the official rates. So because the companies had to keep their records in 
line with this policy, the ‘cost principle’ was violated and the accuracy of the information 
jeopardised. The costs seemed lower and profitability appeared higher than was actually the 
case, while on top of that the firms were exposed to higher taxes. Although the firms tried to 
report the difference in value resulting from the different currency rates (the official and the 
black market rate) as a loss on exchange, the tax office was not willing to treat it as an expense. 
In addition, new taxes were introduced, such as sur-tax, which was levied during the period 
1998 – 2000, causing an undesirable rise in costs and a decline in profits, and excise tax, which 
had to be paid by both AW&LF and RSBSC. On the basis of the joint venture agreement, 
however, RSBSC had not expected this. 
 
Second, mid 2003 the government issued a regulation concerning import permits that imposed 
upon firms the usage of an L/C system. This regulation caused a great deal of unnecessary 
bureaucracy, complicated the regular product import process, and closed the other options of 
acquiring forex and dealing with export partners. It also disrupted RSBSC’s well-documented 
transparent method of importing raw materials via local import-export traders. RSBSC 
managed, however, to gain access to forex in 2004, with which it could order one batch of raw 
materials. This shows that RSBSC had in fact some power to operate outside the government’s 
influence sphere, unlike IMA and AW&LF, which were not in that position. IMA’s approach to 
this problems was, however, to enter the export market and sell its products and services at 
higher prices. It managed to attract clients who were willing to send the firm their own raw 
materials. Unfortunately, the regulations concerning customs duty, import permits, and L/C 
again undermined this way of working. For example, due to these regulations the exports 
services were treated as client inputs for which the firms had to pay tax. As a result, IMA lost its 
market. In addition, the government did not allow the firm to benefit from a fund granted by the 
World Bank in mid 2001, which was meant to be used for making investments to expand its 
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activities and boost its export potential. This is a typical example of the difficulties that Eritrean 
firms encountered as a result of the fact that the government did not keep its promises. 
 
Third, the regulation that banned the access to forex on parallel markets, which was introduced 
in 2004, aggravated the unfavourable effects on the activities and performance of the case firms. 
RSBSC was forced to close down its sales areas in Keren and Massawa, and finally it had to 
stop its operations altogether in 2005. It is argued that this regulation made it impossible for the 
owners to continue their business, although they did in fact have the means to do so. The firms 
expected the GOE to encourage investments and to reduce the outflow of forex from the country 
by making part of the inputs locally available. Besides government-owned banks there were no 
alternative institutions that could provide the firms with financial support, which illustrates that 
the Eritrean business environment was not a suitable one for privatised firms to operate in. Saha 
& Parker (2002) state that the absence of a well-developed financial market limits investment 
opportunities. Our findings support this claim; the Eritrean private sector clearly suffered from 
the lack of forex, while forex was of great importance to the firms in conducting their routine 
activities. Contrary to the claims of property right theorists, there were no institutions in Eritrea 
with the task of supporting the private sector. In general it can be concluded that the 
government’s influence remained significant after privatisation. 
 
Fourth, the government prohibited the advertisement of beverages and issued restrictions on 
product deliveries in the capital city. Also these developments severely undermined the firm’s 
sales. The beverage delivery restrictions were introduced in 2004 and applied to the five 
working days of a week. RSBSC and AW&LF were allowed to conduct sales during a 
maximum of three hours per day. Of course this regulation disrupted the firms’ distribution 
schedules, and in particular AW&LF suffered from its weakened position in the small local 
market, where the competition was harsh. So there was in fact no support whatsoever for the 
beverage industry; it had to find its own solutions to its problems. 
 
Finally, RSBSC was affected by the measure of the Department of Inland Revenue (DIR) 
according to which it had to release client information to be used for estimating the firm’s 
income. This measure gave rise to complaints of clients, who did not approve that their supplier 
(RSBSC) disclosed sensitive information without their consent. Although RSBSC tried to find a 
way not to co-operate, it was ultimately forced to send the DIR the information it required. 
 
War (political instability): The 1998 – 2000 border war between Ethiopia and Eritrea caused 
labour shortages, uncertainty, inflation and salary rises. In addition, it frustrated investment 
policies. In all three firms the composition and quantity of manpower was affected. The 
qualified young employees were forced to join the military and were replaced by inexperienced 
female workers and older people, which undermined the firms’ productivity and operating 
efficiency. It was difficult for IMA and RSBSC to appoint qualified employees, for example 
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graduates from the technical schools. Although the female and older employees received 
training, they obviously lacked the skills and energy to perform the tasks optimally. Due to the 
labour shortages IMA was forced to reject several export orders that required a quick delivery. 
In addition, the overtime work organised to meet the delivery dates caused the overhead costs to 
rise. 
 
All firms negotiated with the government to get their qualified employees back and have them 
perform part of their national service tasks at their work place. AW&LF and RSBSC managed 
to come to some kind of agreement with the government on this issue, but IMA was less 
successful. The situation forced both IMA and AW&LF to raise their employees’ salaries in 
order to make them stay. Through these raises, however, their employees’ salaries exceeded 
those paid in comparable competitor firms. Still, the continuous rise in the costs of living made 
it difficult for the workers to survive economically, which resulted in a growing dissatisfaction 
on their part. So many qualified employees left IMA. Although the situation was not 
encouraging, our findings show that the employees of all three firms were in fact disciplined, 
eager to learn new skills and hard-working. 
 
In spite of all these difficulties, the firms tried to contain their costs, although there were 
elements they could not control, such as inflation and the costs of resources (raw materials, 
labour, energy, and utilities). As explained in chapter seven, the 9% annual salary increment 
introduced by RSBSC was meant to compensate the employees for their loss of income due to 
the escalation of the country’s inflation levels. This escalation was a reflection of the country’s 
macro-economic instability, and severely undermined the firms’ profitability, since they were 
largely dependent upon imported inputs. In addition, the economic instability affected long-term 
planning as well as making investments. IMA and RSBSC’s records show that uncertainty had 
led to a slight rise in the leverage ratios since 2001. As indicated by Chisari (1997), 
macroeconomic stability is certainly required for a successful realisation of privatisation 
programmes in LDCs.     
 
Competition: Privatisation increased the demand for inputs that were locally available and 
affected the firms’ local sales activities. Formerly, IMA used to obtain some of its raw materials, 
such as textile garments and leather, from local sources, but now the quality was poor and the 
suppliers had diversified their businesses by conducting value adding activities. Moreover, 
because of the lack of qualified manpower IMA was forced to refuse export orders that 
demanded a quick delivery. In the case of RSBSC, the water supply was an issue. And for 
AW&LF it became increasingly difficult to acquire refillable bottles, since they were taken by 
the small liquor factories that did not have their own imported bottles. The literature states that a 
high degree of competition requires knowledge of cost issues, the use of performance measures, 
formal control, and improved MCS practices. IMA and AW&LF introduced effective MCS 
practices, mainly consisting of physical supervision and the selective use of internal reports. 
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However, they did not take steps to analyse this information (for example with the aid of 
modern tools of cost control) to achieve cost reduction and profitability improvements. This of 
course does not alter the fact that the firms significantly increased their investment and waste 
reduction activities. 
  
With respect to the competition for output, we observed that clients of AW&LF chose those 
suppliers that first approached them. The fierce competition in the home market led to lower 
prices and firm profitability, and forced IMA and AW&LF to become price takers. 
 
As already explained, the firms’ profitability in terms of ROS, ROA, and ROE was poor, which 
was due to the impact of the war (e.g., labour shortages and the subsequent rise in salaries), the 
harsh government regulations (e.g., the abolition of forex, high taxes, the restrictions on product 
distribution and advertising, the strict control on import permits, etc), the fierce price 
competition on the home market, and the continuous rise in inflation, increasing both the 
manufacturing and the non-manufacturing costs as well as the power and fuel prices, as also 
stated in the World Bank report (2002a). Our findings clearly show the failure of the 
government to create a conducive and suitable market environment for privatised firms. The 
firms explicitly indicated that the implementation of their business and investment plans were 
severely undermined by the current situation. At the time that the privatisation policies were 
initiated the problems described above were not anticipated. They are similar to those presented 
by Kennedy & Hobohm (1999), who studied privately owned firms operating in other LDCs. It 
can therefore be concluded that political and economic stability in the country is a prerequisite 
for cost savings, price decline, the implementation of firms’ business and investment plans, and 
ultimately, the success of privatisation as a whole.  
 
8.6 Adaptation of the theoretical framework 
 
According to the literature the governments of LDCs are motivated to carry out privatisation 
policies with the aid of agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF (Craig, 2000; Cook & 
Kirkpatrick, 1995), and Western donor countries. This study shows that the GOE committed 
itself to the introduction of privatisation on the basis of its expected outcomes. The GOE 
believed it would bring economic growth. In our theoretical chapters we discussed the 
arguments of privatisation proponents and their expectations with regard to the privatisation 
outcomes (changes in firms’ MCS practices, firm activities and performance). Our observation 
is that the current literature does not sufficiently explain how expected post-privatisation 
changes take place in the context of LDCs. Former contingency-based studies have attempted to 
clarify the way in which some factors shape MCS practices, but they neither related these 
factors with the issue of privatisation nor did they place them in the context of LDCs. Recently, 
some studies were published that present a number of external factors drawn from the 
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institutional theory, which shape MCS practices (Hopper et al., 2004a). And although there are 
studies that indeed link the success of privatisation with the influence of market and country 
conditions, in general the research conducted in this field does not provide a detailed account of 
the way in which the interplay of contextual factors influences privatisation outcomes. In our 
study we have made an attempt to approach post-privatisation outcomes in a wider spectrum. To 
conduct our research we developed a theoretical framework. We argue that post-privatisation 
changes in the MCS practices as well in as the business activities and performance of firms are 
closely related to contextual factors (see figure 3.3). 
 
To carry out our research we chose the case study approach. As explained in chapter four, the 
data analysis during the pilot study phase helped us in refining our theoretical framework. In 
addition, the pilot study enabled us to gain an initial impression of the Eritrean business 
environment, so we could determine practical issues and assess the relevance of the contextual 
factors selected. After establishing the relevant contextual factors we classified them into 
internal and external factors. The internal contextual factors included size, capacity to learn, 
technology changes, strategy changes, and the capacity to undertake action. The external factors 
were state and regulation, the TU, aid agencies, war, and competition. All of these factors were 
analysed systematically in our case firm chapters. This chapter has presented a cross-case 
analysis of the post-privatisation changes by focussing on the similarities and the differences of 
our major case-specific findings (see section 8.4). In section 8.5 we came to the conclusion that 
in the privatisation process of our case firms’ aid agencies played no role whatsoever, which 
does not apply to other LDCs. In our study, privatisation was solely initiated and carried out by 
the GOE. Furthermore, the external factors like Culture as well as Race and Ethnicity appeared 
irrelevant in our study, so they were dropped. The same applied to TUs and Aid Agencies; since 
they did not offer data relevant enough to increase our understanding of post-privatisation 
changes, they were removed from the conceptual framework. 
 
The success of privatisation depends on particular preconditions, such as the establishment of 
support institutions, solid policies and regulations, the provision of training, and a labour market 
with a sufficient number of qualified people. The literature shows that a suitable environment in 
which these preconditions are met (Chisari, 1997) is missing in many LDCs (Kennedy & 
Hobohm, 1999). It appears that the situation is not different in Eritrea. The Eritrean business 
firms were not offered a suitable environment to operate in, and neither did they receive 
sufficient support of the government. On the contrary, in addition to the inconsistent 
macroeconomic policies that exposed the Eritrean private sector to inflation and high costs 
(World Bank, 2002a), the government regulations formed the main obstacle to a favourable 
healthy business climate. During the period of data collection, we realised that it was useful to 
include the transition period into our research. In this period the government’s responsibilities 
were determined and the sale and purchase agreements concluded. By integrating this period, we 
could establish whether the government had fulfilled its promises and whether the companies’ 
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performance was in line with the expectations. On the basis of the aforementioned we would 
like to refine our theoretical framework by specifically emphasising the role of the government. 
The role of the government should therefore be included as a single individual factor (see figure 
























Figure 8.1 Revised Conceptual Framework: The relations among privatisation, MCS change, firm activities, 
performance, and contextual (internal and external) factors. 
 
Furthermore, a refinement is needed of the lists of MCS techniques and the internal factors as 
presented in figure 8.1. Our study shows that informal controls, such as a direct supervision by 
managers, played a larger role in IMA and AW&LF than in RSBSC. This can be explained by 
the small size of these two firms and the physical presence of the owners. These informal 
controls replaced some of the formal tools, such as budgeting and inter-departmental reports. 
Therefore they should be added to the MCS techniques already listed. We also observed the 
involvement of family members in IMA and AW&LF. In the case of RSBSC, on the other hand, 
the active involvement of a multinational made a significant contribution to the realisation of 
MCS change by giving access to knowledge, experience, and resources already available. We 
found that studying both family owned firms and companies operating under the supervision of 
a multinational formed a good basis for comparison. Therefore we chose to add access to 
knowledge and experience to the list of contextual factors. This factor would allow us to 
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Next, our findings show a particular degree of interaction between the internal and external 
factors. First, the government’s regulations that prevented the access to forex damaged the 
firms’ investment plans and growth strategies to achieve goals such as productivity and sales 
increases, market expansions, and the appointment of additional employees. Second, the 
political instability (war) diminished the availability of manpower, which limited the firms’ size 
and their activities and caused a loss of export market. Third, with the help of CCC, RSBSC was 
able to avoid some of the government’s restrictions. In spite of the unfavourable business 
environment in Eritrea, RSBSC managed to expand its market, to create jobs (both within and 
outside the firm, for example for agents), to compensate its employees for the adverse effects of 
inflation, and to receive support from CCC in terms of cost discounts. Finally, both IMA and 
AW&LF managed at a certain point to find their own means to obtain forex. We see that the 
efforts of the case firms played a role in counteracting the harmful effects of the external factors. 
In order to show the relation between the two contextual blocks, we added an arrow between 
them. 
 
If change is viewed as the introduction and implementation of new MCS practices, the example 
of RSBSC shows that the influence of a multinational stimulates the attainment of the expected 
results. The firms owned by local people, however, did not introduce all of these newly 
developed MCS practices. So it appears that multinational firms have a greater capacity to 
undertake action. Another important determinant was the interest and background of the owners, 
either to facilitate MCS change or to hinder its development. Further, we observed that the 
introduction of modern MCS practices (e.g. the total quality system, the detailed operational 
control system used by RSBSC) caused no problems. This finding rebuts the claim that Western 
MCS techniques are not suitable for LDC firms. However, more research is still required to 
come to a definitive statement about this matter.              
 
In general, the outcome of privatisation with respect to our case firms can be summarised as 
follows. Privatisation intensified investments, and it improved the firms’ productivity, product 
quality, operating efficiency and output. Further, it resulted in a significant reduction in waste, it 
changed the mentality of both the employees and the owners, who became much more involved. 
In addition, the leverage ratios of all three firms declined. This shows that the firms no longer 
relied on bank overdraft to finance their activities. See for further details the comparative firm 
performance discussions in section 8.4. On the other hand, in the cases of IMA and AW&LF, 
firm performance and MCS improvement was hindered by the lack of experience of the 
managers and/or owners, which corresponds to findings of case studies conducted in Bangladesh 
and Sri Lanka (Hopper et al., 2004a). Also these findings were obtained by including socio-
economic and political contextual factors. So in order to make a reliable analysis of post-
privatisation outcomes we strongly support this approach. Our theoretical framework was broad 
enough for addressing post-privatisation changes in a wider scope. We have studied MCS 
practices and firm performance during both the pre- and the post-privatisation period. In this 
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way we could determine the changes that took place in the firms. So the inclusion of both the 
pre- and post-privatisation periods and the contextual factors has made  our framework a 
comprehensive and helpful tool for studying our research topic in its broader context. In the case 
of LDCs this is particularly important since the business environment and conditions there are 
often not favourable. We hope that the empirical evidence gathered in this study has increased 
the general insights into the developments in the MCS practices, the firm performance and firm 
activities of LDC firms (see for more details section 8.5). 
 
The contextual factors drawn from the contingency theory and the institutional theory were 
useful since they allowed us to make a thorough analysis of the post-privatisation changes in 
MCS practices, firm performance and firm activities. We believe that the theoretical framework 
can be suitably adapted to similar situations in other LDCs. However, there are some specific 
issues that need attention, such as the nature of the government’s interaction and regulations, the 
degree of competitiveness of the market, culture, the level of economic growth, the institutional 
environment, the type of firm ownership, and firms’ managerial capacity. If these issues are 
properly addressed and if the relevant internal and external contextual factors are taken into 
account, similar studies could be conducted with this model. We believe that our research has 
made a contribution to the development of a structure that enables researchers to study MCS 
practices and firm performance from the perspective of LDCs.  
 
8.7 Implications for actual practice 
8.7.1 Implications for the case firms:  
We recommend the following steps for improvement. First, the production capacity of IMA and 
AW&LF is relatively large in comparison with their local competitors. This indicates that both 
firms could maximise their productivity to such a degree that they could gain advantage of 
economies of scale, since unit costs decline as the production volume increases. This would 
enable them to sell their products at lower prices than their competitors. During the time of 
study, both firms’ competitors were setting lower prices, making IMA and AW&LF price 
takers. But assuming that these competitors spent the same amount of input costs while their 
capacity was lower, one would not expect them to set these low prices. This issue demands 
further investigation. An explanation could be that both firms had problems with their costing 
systems. IMA and AW&LF should make a critical assessment of their cost accumulation and 
allocation methods in terms of cost reduction. In addition, as both firms are focussed on low 
price strategies, it is advisable to aim at realising cost efficiency (see Chenhall & Langfield-
Smith, 1998b). Both firms could consider using the available MCS tools to look for possibilities 
to reduce costs, so they can offer lower prices. Our findings indicate that the quality level of 
both firms’ products was relatively better than that of their competitors. The customers, 
however, preferred the cheaper products, even though they were of lesser quality. And since our 
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case firms are not willing to compromise their quality strategies, it is important that they either 
revise these strategies or increase their efforts to convince the customers of the advantages of a 
product of good quality. 
 
Second, IMA and AW&LF need to improve the accuracy of their costing systems as well as the 
timing of their reports. In this respect, additional investments in the computerisation of their 
information systems would be beneficial, which would also facilitate the introduction of 
improved MCS. Further, IMA may consider setting up a Marketing Section, and AW&LF 
should strengthen its Marketing Department. A marketing unit provides information on the way 
in which competitors operate in the home market. And as RSBSC has shown, non-financial 
information is useful in developing strategies to attract more customers and to survive the 
competition. Third, IMA and AW&LF need to introduce an incentive system to motivate their 
employees by sharing profits. If the workforce is sufficiently motivated and content, firm 
performance will increase. Finally, both IMA’s and AW&LF’s managerial and accounting staff 
is too limited in size and insufficiently qualified. We suggest that both firms need to upgrade 
their managerial capacity in order to enhance the utilisation of accounting information. 
Moreover, the sophistication of MCS practices should go hand in hand with improving the 
knowledge and skills of the accounting personnel (see Ramaswamy, 2001; Ramaswamy & Von 
Gilnow, 2000; Shirley & Nellis, 1991). These issues can only be improved, however, if 
simultaneously the unfavourable government regulations and unstable political climate are dealt 
with.  
8.7.2 Implications for the government bodies and aid agencies:  
Normally, government bodies are expected to facilitate the process of privatisation by creating a 
conducive business environment consisting of financial markets and private banks. In addition, 
the government should ensure the supply of trained manpower as well as stable macro-economic 
policies and regulations. Further, it should encourage firms to enhance their export activities. 
Our findings, however, show that the case firms encountered many challenges. As already 
indicated, the government regulations concerning the forex services and import permits greatly 
affected the activities of the case firms. In addition, the tax levels were high in proportion to the 
revenues, while a number of new taxes were introduced during the post-privatisation period. 
Other restrictions of the government included an L/C system as the sole option for import-export 
activities, the time limits on the distribution of beverages in the capital city and the prohibition 
of advertising beverages. These measures disrupted the firms’ operations severely, and even led 
to their termination in some cases. Although privatisation was supposed to recover firms’ 
autonomy, during our research they were experiencing extreme pressure as a result of the 
governmental policies. 
 
Our findings support the statement of De Haan and Simermann (1996) that economic 
performance depends on political and institutional factors. We would like to bring the following 
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to the attention of the relevant government bodies. The primary role of the government is to 
create a favourable business environment. This is imperative. The government is expected to 
provide skilled labour and financing facilities. It should adopt stable policies and fulfil its 
promises. It could also encourage investments to diminish the import of input to minimise the 
flow of forex. So a conducive business environment without any interference is deemed to be 
vital to the realisation of a successful private sector (Kennedy & Hobohm, 1999). Our findings 
show that the interference of the Eritrean government had huge consequences for the outcome of 
privatisation. As we can see the situation became quite severe for our case firms. Our result also 
indicate that the involvement of a multinational (as in the case of RSBSC) proved to be highly 
beneficial in terms of financing as well as sharing the knowledge and experience essential in 
conducting business in a successful manner. 
 
In this respect, we expect of aid agencies, such as the World Bank, that they let themselves be 
informed properly about the situation in the county in question. Further, they should encourage 
the government to play a positive role in making privatisation a success. In addition, aid 
agencies could support governments in creating a favourable business environment. Our case 
firms indicated that they wanted to continue making investments, but that they needed access to 
forex. Supporting firms in making investments will stimulate employment as well as the 
increase in firm size and activities. We believe that the success of privatisation serves the 
interests of the government, investors, and society as a whole. Moreover, if governments 
actively support and facilitate privatisation, the provision of huge resources by aid agencies 
afterwards will not be necessary. It is therefore of the utmost importance that aid agencies and 
development partners convince the governments of developing countries to do everything they 
can to facilitate the establishment of a strong private sector. 
 
8.8 Limitations of the study 
 
During the course of this study we discovered that it was difficult to get access to data. The 
owners and managers of the firms did not seem to recognise the benefits to be gained from our 
research output, and were therefore reluctant to disclose their data. As a result, the number of 
firms we studied remained limited. So firm owners and managers could be made aware of the 
advantages of the participation in research studies by the provision of information and training. 
This training could also be directed at the type of data suitable for sharing with scholars. In 
addition, the data bank of the Ministry of Trade and Industry is incomplete. Another problem 
was the difficulty of obtaining data from the pre-privatisation period as well as finding 
respondents who could give information on the MCS practices in the public ownership period. 
For example, in the case of AW&LF, we did not manage to find accounting staff members who 
had also worked with the firm during the public ownership period. Moreover, our case firms had 
not kept their pre-privatisation financial records, and the information that the MTI could provide 
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was incomplete. In some cases, this complicated the assessment of issues such as leverage, past 
employment trends, capital investment and taxes. 
 
Next, we want to raise an issue with respect to the interpretation of the study’s results. The 
privatisation process in Eritrea was undermined by the border war with the neighbouring 
country Ethiopia. As explained in detail, this war had a tremendous impact in terms of labour 
shortages, the drainage of hard currency as well as a significant rise in inflation and the costs of 
living. It is highly likely that the outcome of this study had been different if the situation in the 
country had been peaceful at the time of research. If the war had not started, the firms would 
have had sufficient manpower and a better access to forex. In addition, they would not have had 
to suffer as much from the government regulations, which mainly resulted from the situation 
after the border conflict. As we observed that the firms were highly motivated to implement 
their business and investment plans, it is very probable that, had the situation been peaceful, 
they would have succeeded in expanding their markets, increasing employment, and enhancing 
their production, sales, and profitability. Further, to obtain a broader picture of the impact of 
privatisation it is advisable to extend the post-privatisation period. Of course in our case this was 
not possible, since the timing of our study did not allow us to do so. The most recent financial 
audits we collected dated from 2003. We therefore point out that the findings of this study 
should be interpreted with caution and not be associated with the results of privatisation studies 
conducted in other LDCs, where there is peace and stability. 
 
There is little literature that explains MCS practices form the perspective of firms in LDCs. 
Neither is there much literature available about the impact of MCS change on firm performance 
in the context of LDCs. Research dealing with this topic includes studies conducted in 
Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. The scope of these studies, however, is much more limited. We tried 
to compare our findings with those of former studies in section 8.4., but found that as yet no 
similar studies have been carried out in Eritrean firms. In order to describe some concepts in 
chapter three and to review some relevant empirical evidence, we therefore had to turn to 
Western-based literature conducted in this field. The former studies on MCS change addressed 
in chapter three are mostly surveys, which merely give an account of the implementation of new 
MCS practices in privately owned LDC firms. Most of the studies that analyse MCS practice 
change have been conducted in the West. The majority of these studies do not pay much 
particular attention to the way in which the same techniques are used after a change in 
ownership. We therefore had no significant empirical evidence to compare our findings with. 
This study attempts to make a link between the influence of contextual factors and MCS practice 
changes, firm activities, and firm performance. It has become evident that this relationship is 
complex, and we realise that this research field still requires a great deal of exploration. 
Therefore more empirical findings have to be gathered by similar case studies. 
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8.9 Suggestions for further research   
 
It is apparent that the body of literature still lacks sufficient knowledge of MCS change, firm 
activities, and firm performance in privatised LDC firms.  We therefore encourage accounting 
researchers to conduct more case studies on privatisation in LDCs. Particularly cross-country 
comparative case studies will provide more knowledge about the effects of privatisation and the 
influence of contextual factors. In this respect, we are convinced that our basic conceptual 
framework could serve as a stepping stone for similar future studies. As we indicated in section 
8.6, some modifications might be required in selecting the relevant conceptual factors, the range 
of MCS techniques to be investigated, or the tools to be used for measuring firm performance. 
Furthermore, we suggest that researchers may consider conducting comparative case studies that 
focus on identical firms in similar industries in similar periods for each country. In this way, the 
MCS practices and firm performance of privatised firms could be compared to that of firms 
newly started as private entities. A further focus on the post-privatisation period would diminish 
the need for data from the public ownership era, and would make the search for respondents that 
could provide data on past MCS practices no longer necessary. 
 
So a wider time range and the incorporation of contextual factors are two important issues in 
future research. In addition, before finalising one’s research design and starting the actual study, 
it may be advisable to first conduct a pilot study. This procedure proved to be very helpful in 
choosing the relevant elements for the framework, and it guaranteed a solid basis for the study. 
We believe that a solid basis makes the research and its outcomes more reliable. 
We have seen that it is difficult to explain the changes that have taken place solely on the 
basis of the introduction of privatisation or the adoption of new or improved MCS practices. For 
example, attracting foreign customers who do appreciate quality is possible by making firms 
committed to their quality strategies and via introducing strict quality controls. In addition, 
employees can be trained in internalising quality in their mentality and way of working. Other 
issues, however, such as profitability increase, operating efficiency and employment, are related 
to other factors. A broader sample of firms would shed more light on the relationship between 
the contextual factors and the firm performance results. 
Finally, we argue that future researchers should clearly define their domain within the 
range of studies emerging in this field. This also involves choosing the proper methodology. In 
addition, in order to increase the validity and reliability of the conclusions as well as the 
robustness of the results, a larger number of firms in more sectors should be studied. This 
expansion of the research area would pave the way for comparative analyses among studies 
conducted in different places. These analyses and follow-up studies might then be structured on 
the basis of surveys administered across a large number of countries. And in this way a solid 
basis would be created, enabling researchers to start making reliable generalisations. 
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Appendix A: Data from Asmara Sweater & Garment Factory [IMA] 
 
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET - Before Privatisation 
At 31 December 1995-1998          Table- A1 
ASSETS EMPLOYED 1995 1996 1997 1998 
FIXED ASSETS 678,979 571,115 477,596 - 
CURRENT ASSETS:     
Stock and Stores 3,330,826 2,965,304 1,927,973 1,395,354 
Debtors and prepayments 253,545 440,684 443,904 436,607 
Related enterprises - 6,508 5,998 5,998 
 3,584,371 3,412,496 2,377,875 1,837,959 
CURRENT LIABILITIES:     
Taxes - - - 34,056 
Creditors and accruals 573,389 339,715 819,529 323,139 
Related enterprises 135,972 95,517 95,517 1,189 
Short term loan 154,737 - - - 
Bank overdraft 5,268,696 6,470,470 6,406,595 4,937,603 
 6,132,794 6,905,702 7,321,641 5,295,987 
NET CURRENT LIABILITIES (2,548,423) (3,493,206) (4,943,766) (3,458,028) 
FINANCED BY:     
State capital 1,166,395 1,166,395 1,166,395 1,166,395 
General reserve 744,593 744,593 744,593 744,593 
Treasury - - - 2,738,576 
Accumulated loss (3,780,432) (4,833,079) (6,377,158) (8,107,592) 
 (1,869,444) (2,922,091) (4,466,170) (3,458,028) 
 
PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT - At 31 December 1995-1998  Table- A2 
 1995* 1996 1997 1998 
Sales 425,863 1,996,777 2,243,825 997,838 
Cost of products sold 489,136 1,679,933 2,495,270 1,560,887 
Gross operating profit (loss) (63,273) 316,844 (251,445) (563,049) 
Other income 12,245 32,886 10,251 1,442 
 (51,028) 349,730 241,194 (561,607) 
EXPENSES:     
Administration and selling 179,990 475,268 429,695 382,575 
Financial charges 120,648 568,795 625,617 636,981 
Audit fee 5,500 11,000 10,000 5,500 
Provision for bad debts - - - 280,424 
Non-operating costs - 321,946 234,687 - 
 306,138 1,377,009 1,299,999 1,305,480 
Loss before tax (357,166) (1,027,279) (1,541,193) (1,867,087) 
Tax there on:     
       Surtax - - - 34,056 
Loss after tax (357,166) (1,027,279) (1,541,193) (1,901,143) 
 
STATEMENT OF ACCUMULATED LOSS: 
Balance brought forward 3,316,588 3,780,432 4,833,079 6,377,158 
Loss for the period 357,166 1,027,279 1,541,193 1,901,143 
Prior period’s adjustment 106,678 25,368 2,886 (170,709) 
 3,780,432 4,833,079 6,377,158 8,107,592 
*N.B. The figures of 1995 were for three months. 
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ASMARA SWEATER AND GARMENT FACTORY, PLC 
DETAILED COMPARATIVE PROFIT AND LOSS ACCOUNT                                   Table- A3 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Sales 1,248,162 6,224,936 3,958,006 1,502,516 2,439,298 1,509,667 2,048,481 
Cost of Sales 931,683 5,104,593 3,936,398 1,894,793 1,705,398 1,197,193 1,776,927 
Gross Profit 316,479 1,120,343 21,608 (392,277) 733,900 312,494 271,554 
Gain from 
Revaluation of Assets 
113,860 178,366 178,366 178,366 178,366 178,366 178,366 
Gain on Exchange - - - - - - - 
Other Income - 50,936 240,112 58,474 57,964 287,637 28,561 
 430,339 1,349,645 440,086 (155,437) 970,230 778,497 478,481 
Administration & 
Selling: 
       
Salaries & Wages 76,842 211,478 156,313 114,380 177,541 171,853 162,657 
Employee 
benefits 
- 2,756 4,625 7,764 8,485 8,716 8,468 
Stationery & 
Printing 
2,665 13,776 68,564 33,947 9,875 10,960 13,767 
Postage, 
Telephone & Fax 
18,587 54,874 49,989 72,897 33,244 32,416 37,454 
Insurance 6,002 5,630 5,563 5,186 4,391 4,542 4,297 
Fuel and 
Lubricants 
2,681 17,137 8,654 8,406 8,397 7,657 11,809 
Repair & Maintenance 3,314 17,403 21,835 535 9,812 16,239 7,024 
Utilities 3,420 7,267 6,309 12,233 14,987 21,218 18,532 
Rent 45,000 91,500 119,734 115,500 121,000 133,500 134,235 
Depreciation 22,357 46,543 48,387 51,976 54,058 65,740 32,170 
Audit Fee 8,250 13,200 13,200 13,200 13,200 13,200 - 
Interest and Bank 
Charges 
13,918 209,577 308,967 411,135 606,868 681,513 710,346 
Travel & per-diem - 66,752 40,174 38,453 135,988 52,368 116,116 
Donation - 19,560 105,000 - - - - 
Loss on exchange - 111,242 - - - - 13,339 
Design charge - - 18,200 - - - - 
Sundry 25,142 29,112 58,605 52,696 43,294 115,404 64,419 
 228,178 917,807 1,034,119 938,308 1,241,140 1,335,326 1,334,633 
Profit (Loss) 
before Tax 
















ASMARA SWEATER AND GARMENT FACTORY, PLC 
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEETS                                                            Table- A4 
ASSETS 
EMPLOYED 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
FIXED ASSETS 6,714,137 6,688,611 6,749,846 6,191,190 6,074,187 5,586,952 4,861,649 
INVESTMENT - - 51,500 70,250 71,850 - - 
CURRENT 
ASSETS: 
       
Stock and Stores 525,387 3,804,087 2,612,341 2,567,576 4,531,898 5,386,453 5,027,601   
Sister company 874,912 1,044,895 744,758 1,052,462 - -  - 
Debtors and 
prepayments 
355 300,968 52,100 105,749 214,265 39,699 21,308 
Cash at bank and 
on hand 
1,328 608,939 12,593 41,230 57,078 29,033 296,243 
 1,401,983 5,758,889 3,421,792 3,767,017 4,803,241 5,455,185 5,345,152 
CURRENT 
LIABILITIES: 
       
Creditors and 
accruals 
452,198 1,796,533 265,992 287,877 393,778 743,795 2,260,876 
Bank overdraft 408,321 1,995,358 2,643,761 4,170,703 5,862,562 6,340,599 5,011,838 
Taxes 80,413 289,761 62,972 9,838 57,650 57,650 97,564 
Financial obligation 
(deferred credit) 
3,453,440 3,275,074 - - - - - 
Current maturity of 
long term loan 
- 969,080 622,980 238,200 - - - 
 4,394,372 8,325,806 3,595,705 4,706,618 6,313,990 7,142,044 7,370,278 
Net Current Assets (2,992,389) (2,566,917) (173,913) (939,601) (1,510,749) (1,686,859) (2,025,126) 
FINANCED BY:        
Share capital 3,600,000 3,600,000 3,600,000 3,600,000 3,600,000 3,600,000 3,600,000 
Legal reserve 6,087 15,848 15,848 15,848 15,848 15,848 15,848 
Revaluation (or 
Capital) reserve 
- - 3,096,708 2,918,342 2,739,976 2,561,610 2,383,244 
Accumulated profit 
(loss) 
115,661 301,124 (355,881) (1,449,626) (1,720,536) (2,277,365) (3,162,569) 
 3,721,748 3,916,972 6,356,675 5,084,564 4,635,288 3,900,093 2,836,523 
Long term loan - 204,722 270,758 237,275 - - - 
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Firm Performance:  
 
1. Profitability:            Table- A5 
Year 1995* 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Sales Trend 21.33 100 112.37 49.97 62.51 311.75 198.22 75.25 122.16 75.61 102.59 
ROS1 (percent) (14.86) 15.87 (11.21) (56.43) 25.36 18.00 0.55 (26.11) 30.09 20.70 13.26 
ROS2 (percent) (83.87) (51.45) (68.69) (190.53) 9.27 2.98 (16.60) (72.79) (11.11) (36.88) (41.79) 
ROA (percent) (8.38) (25.79) (53.97) (103.44) 1.43 1.49 (6.43) (10.91) (2.47) (5.04) (8.39) 
ROE (percent) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 3.11 4.73 (10.34) (21.51) (5.84) (14.28) (30.18) 
*N.B. The figures for 1995 are for three months. 1998B represents records before privatisation and 1998A reflects records after privatisation. 
 
2. Labour Productivity (LP):              Table- A6 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Revenues* 438,108 2,029,663 2,254,076 999,280 1,248,162 6,275,872 4,198,118 1,560,990 2,497,262 1,797,304 2,077,042 
CPI figures 100 100 113.14 114.38 114.38 107.15 118.78 141.73 161.13 196.18 221.90 
Annual Revenues** 438,108 2,029,663 1,992,289 873,649 1,091,241 5,857,090 3,534,364 1,101,383 1,549,843 916,150 936,026 
No. of Employees 195 195 195 148 148 150 123 53 60 73 66 
LP 2,247 10,409 10,217 5,903 7,373 39,047 28,735 20,781 25,831 12,550 14,182 
N.B. *   Revenues: indicate the total annual sales from operations plus other income. 
        ** Annual Revenue figures indicate deflated Revenue values using CPI figures from Appendix C, Table- C7.  
 
3. Operating Efficiency: (a) Sales Efficiency (SE):            Table- A7 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Sales (nominal) 425,863 1,996,777 2,243,825 997,838 1,248,162 6,224,936 3,958,006 1,502,516 2,439,298 1,509,667 2,048,481 
CPI figures 100 100 113.14 114.38 114.38 107.15 118.78 141.73 161.13 196.18 221.90 
Real Sales* 425,863 1,996,777 1,983,229 872,389 1,091,241 5,809,553 3,332,216 1,060,126 1,513,870 769,532 923,155 
No. of Employees 195 195 195 148 148 150 123 53 60 73 66 
SE 2,184 10,240 10,170 5,895 7,373 38,730 27,091 20,002 25,231 10,542 13,987 







(b) Net Income Efficiency (NIE):             Table- A8 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Net Income (357,166) (1,027,279) (1,541,193) (1,901,143) 115,661 185,463 (657,005) (1,093,745) (270,910) (556,829) (856,152) 
CPI figures 100 100 113.14 114.38 114.38 107.15 118.78 141.73 161.13 196.18 221.90 
Net Income* (357,166) (1,027,279) (1,362,200) (1,662,129) 101,120 173,087 (553,128) (771,710) (168,131) (283,836) (385,828) 
No. of Employees 195 195 195 148 148 150 123 53 60 73 66 
NIE N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 683.24 1,153.91 N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 
N.B. *Net Income: represents deflated nominal net income figures. 
 
4. Output:                Table- A9 
Year 1995 1996 1997** 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Real Sales* 425,863 1,996,777 1,983,229 872,389 1,091,241 5,809,553 3,332,216 1,060,126 1,513,870 769,532 923,155 
Trend (%) 21.47 100.68 100 43.99 55.02 292.93 168.02 53.45 76.33 38.80 46.55 
** 1997 served as a base year. 
 
5. Employment:                Table- A10 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Manpower 195 195 195 148 148 150 123 53 60 73 66 
Trend (%) 100 100 100 75.90 75.90 76.92 63.08 27.18 30.77 37.44 33.85 
 
6. Leverage: (a) Total debt to asset ratio:             Table- A11 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Total Debt 6,132,794 6,905,702 7,321,641 5,295,987 4,394,372 8,530,528 3,866,463 4,943,893 6,313,990 7,142,044 7,370,278 
Total Assets 4,263,350 3,983,611 2,855,471 1,837,959 8,116,120 12,447,500 10,223,138 10,028,457 10,949,278 11,042,137 10,206,801 
Debt to Asset ratio 1.44 1.73 2.56 2.88 0.54 0.69 0.38 0.49 0.58 0.65 0.72 
 
(b) Long term debt to asset ratio:              Table- A12 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Long term debt (LTD) - - - - - 1,704,722 270,758 237,275 - - - 
Total Assets 4,263,350 3,983,611 2,855,471 1,837,959 8,116,120 12,447,500 10,223,138 10,028,457 10,949,278 11,042,137 10,206,801 
L.T.D to Asset ratio N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 0.1370 0.03 0.02 N.A. N.A. N.A. 




(c) Long term debt to equity ratio:           Table- A13 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Long term Debt - - - - - 1,704,722 270,758 237,275 - - - 
Equity N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 3,721,748 3,916,972 6,356,675 5,084,564 4,635,288 3,900,093 2,836,523 
L.T.D. to Equity ratio - - - - - 0.4352 0.0426 0.0467 - - - 
 
7. Capital Investment: (a) Capital Expenditures to Sales:         Table- A14 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Capital Expenditure N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 7,011,850 481,655 62,645 6,162 480,061 149,447 
Sales 425,863 1,996,777 2,243,825 997,838 1,248,162 6,224,936 3,958,006 1,502,516 2,439,298 1,509,667 
Capital Exp. to Sales - - - - 5.6177 0.0774 0.0158 0.0041 0.1968 0.0990 
 
(b) Capital Expenditures to Assets:           Table- A15 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Capital Expenditure N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 7,011,850 481,655 62,645 6,162 480,061 149,447 
Assets 4,263,350 3,983,611 2,855,471 1,837,959 8,116,120 12,447,500 10,223,138 10,028,457 10,949,278 11,042,137 
Capital Exp. to Assets - - - - 0.8639 0.04 0.0061 0.0006 0.0438 0.0135 
 
8. Taxes:              Table- A16 
Year 1995 1996 1997 1998B 1998A 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total annual taxes N.A. N.A. N.A. 34,056* 477,281 1,331,395 475,742 151,448 114,418 156,957 
Sales 425,863 1,996,777 2,243,825 997,838 1,248,162 6,224,936 3,958,006 1,502,516 2,439,298 1,509,667 
Tax per unit of sales - - - 0.0341 0.3824 0.2139 0.1202 0.1008 0.0469 0.1040 












Details of Taxes & Duties:       Table- A17 
Types of Taxes: 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1. Customs Duty 223,378 293,832 - - - - 
2. Excise Tax - - - - - - 
3. Sales Tax 78,357 632,888 316,199 116,213 69,949 101,337 
4. Sur Tax 94,138 53,133 62,972 - - - 
5. Personal Income Tax 61,408 98,252 96,571 35,235 44,469 55,620 
6. Profit Tax - 148,476 - - - - 
7. Municipality Tax - 4,814 - - - - 
8. Others: Donations  













TOTAL 477,281 1,331,395 475,742 151,448 114,418 156,957 
 
 
9. Others:              Table- A18 
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Net Income (Loss) after tax 115,661 185,463 (657,005) (1,093,745) (270,910) (556,829) 
Long-term debt (loan) - 1,500,000 - - - - 
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Appendix B: Data from Asmara Wine & Liquor Factory [AW&LF] 
                 Table- B1 
Comparative Balance Sheet Reports During Public Ownership Period Reports After Privatisation 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Assets:           
  Cash 229,000 829,000 1,320,000 1,593,000 2,144,000 51,236 1,541,526 1,519,711 1,868,723 92,708 
  A/Receivable 111,000 64,000 72,000 15,000 32,000 211,783 110,570 49,607 38,869 664,963 
  Rec. from shareholders  - - - - - 6,210,000 6,015,886 6,015,886 4,992,545 4,992,545 
  Stock 1,852,000 1,825,000 2,180,000 2,579,000 2,202,000 1,273,046 1,365,048 3,993,540 2,447,743 3,617,835 
  Goods in transit - - - - - - 408,538 408,538 927,300 - 
      Current Assets 2,192,000 2,718,000 3,572,000 4,187,000 4,378,000 7,746,065 9,441,568 11,987,282 10,275,180 9,368,051 
  Fixed Assets (net) 69,000 61,000 242,000 197,000 155,000 8,807,492 8,102,840 5,367,341 5,000,897 4,673,720 
Total Assets 2,261,000 2,779,000 3,814,000 4,384,000 4,533,000 16,553,557 17,544,408 17,354,623 15,276,077 14,041,771 
Liabilities & Shareholder’s Equity:          
  Liabilities:           
       A/Payable 398,000 286,000 627,000 287,000 747,000 1,039,710 2,839,140 2,837,885 1,581,492 1,844,474 
       R/Enterprises 371,000 308,000 302,000 313,000 - - - - - - 
       Provision for taxes 239,000 295,000 475,000 664,000 692,000 176,349 443,461 1,398,538 193,100  - 
       Bank loan-current - - - - - 1,348,320 1,348,320 495,709 1,000,000 - 
       Overdraft  496,000 - - - - 763,379 - - - 171,713 
       C. Charge 49,000 - - - - - - - - - 
       R. Surplus 39,000 - - - 1,208,000 - - - - - 
       Dividends - - - 1,164,000 - - - - - - 
       Deferral 288,000 297,000 334,000 303,000 - - - - - - 
       Bank Loan (long-term) - - - - - 3,559,164 2,649,167 - - - 
            Total Liability 1,880,000 1,181,000 1,738,000 2,731,000 2,647,000 6,886,922 7,280,088 4,732,132 2,774,592 2,016,187 
 Capital:           
      State Capital 470,000 470,000 470,000 470,000 470,000 - - - - - 
      Share Capital  - - - - - 9,450,000 9,450,000 9,450,000 9,450,000 9,450,000 
      Legal Reserve (374,000) 391,000 759,000 1,183,000 1,416,000 21,663 51,657 312,698 331,477 331,477 
      Retained Earnings 285,000 737,000 847,000 - - 194,973 762,663 2,859,793 2,720,008 2,244,107 
            Total Capital 381,000 1,598,000 2,076,000 1,653,000 1,886,000 9,666,635 10,264,320 12,622,491 12,501,485 12,025,584 





Comparative Income Statements:              Table- B2 
 Reports During Public Ownership Period Reports After Privatisation 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Revenue:           
       Sales 1,854,000 2,469,000 3,233,000 4,538,000 4,442,000 3,567,590 5,679,138 7,634,511 6,658,073 5,052,112 
       Cost of Sales 1,053,000 1,294,000 1,469,000 2,292,000 2,060,000 2,359,812 3,360,412 4,660,146 5,069,978 4,168,733 
   Gross profit 801,000 1,175,000 1,764,000 2,259,000 2,382,000 1,207,778 2,318,726 2,974,364 1,588,095 883,379 
       Other income - - - - - 38,081 73,890 1,932,275 13,318 989 
 801,000 1,175,000 1,764,000 2,259,000 2,382,000 1,245,859 2,392,616 4,906,639 1,601,413 884,368 
Operating Expenses:           
     Selling & Distribution 125,000 122,000 107,000 195,000 216,000 360,387 365,039 733,814 493,528 600,433 
     Administration 271,000 295,000 333,000 214,000 248,000 203,727 481,244 352,274 523,309 615,618 
     Interest on bank 2,000 - - - - 281,061 490,030 99,197 2,336 63,252 
     Auditing & accounting fee 9,000 12,000 16,000 16,000 18,000 7,700 14,300 11,000 14,300 14,300 
        Total operating expenses 407,000 429,000 456,000 427,000 482,000 852,875 1,350,613 1,196,285 1,033,473 1,323,603 
Earnings Before Taxes 394,000 746,000 1,308,000 1,832,000 1,900,000 392,984 1,042,003 3,710,354 567,940   (439,235) 
   Less: Provision for taxes (181,000) (295,000) (462,000) (666,000) (692,000) (176,349) (443,461) (1,398,538) (193,100) - 
            Legal reserve - - - - - (21,663) (29,994) (231,182) (18,778) - 
Net Earnings after Taxes 213,000 451,000 846,000 1,166,000 1,208,000  194,973 568,548 2,080,634 356,062 (439,235) 
 
Product Sales for 2003:         Table- B3 
 PRODUCTS 
 Wine Liquor Syrup Aperitif 
TOTAL 
Sales Value 789,454.39 3,837,548.19 183,176.76 241,939.86 5,052,119.20 
Percentage Value 15.63% 75.96% 3.63% 4.79% 100% 
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Average Yearly Engaged Manpower:    Table- B4 
Year 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Manpower 38 36 51 40 37 39 
Trend (%) 100 94.74 134.21 105.26 97.37 102.63 
Female proportion 36% 36% 46% N.A. N.A. N.A. 
 
 
Firm Performance:  
1. Profitability:            Table- B5 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Sales Trend 100% 133.17 174.38 244.77 239.59 - 192.43 306.32 411.79 359.12 272.50 
ROS1 (percent) 43.20 47.59 54.56 49.78 53.62 - 33.85 40.83 38.96 23.85 17.49 
ROS2 (percent) 11.49 18.27 26.17 25.69 27.19 - 5.47 10.01 27.25 5.35 (8.69) 
ROA (percent) 9.42 16.23 22.18 26.60 26.65 - 1.18 3.24 11.99 2.33 (3.13) 
ROE (percent) 55.91 28.22 40.75 70.54 64.05 - 2.02 5.54 16.48 2.85 (3.65) 
 
2. Labour Productivity (LP):              Table- B6 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Revenues* 1,854,000 2,469,000 3,233,000 4,538,000 4,442,000 - 3,605,671 5,753,028 9,566,786 6,671,391 5,053,101 - 
CPI figures 100 100 100 100 103.84 109.02 116.16 132.35 152.40 184.77 233.49 252.81 
Annual Revenues** 1,854,000 2,469,000 3,233,000 4,538,000 4,277,735 - 3,104,056 4,346,829 6,277,419 3,610,646 2,164,162 - 
No. of Employees 47 47 47 47 47 47 38 36 51 40 37 39 
LP 39,447 52,532 68,787 96,553 91,016 - 81,686 120,745 123,087 90,266 58,491 - 
N.B. *   Revenues: indicate the total annual sales from operations plus other income.  









3. Operating Efficiency: (a) Sales Efficiency (SE):           Table- B7 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Sales (nominal) 1,854,000 2,469,000 3,233,000 4,538,000 4,442,000 - 3,567,590 5,679,138 7,634,511 6,658,073 5,052,112 - 
CPI figures 100 100 100 100 103.84 109.02 116.16 132.35 152.40 184.77 233.49 252.81 
Real Sales* 1,854,000 2,469,000 3,233,000 4,538,000 4,277,735 - 3,071,272 4,291,000 5,009,522 3,603,438 2,163,738 - 
No. of Employees 47 47 47 47 47 47 38 36 51 40 37 39 
SE 39,447 52,532 68,787 96,553 91,016 - 80,823 119,194 98,226 90,086 58,479 - 
N.B. *Real Sales = Nominal Sales ÷ CPI 
 
(b) Net Income Efficiency (NIE):              Table- B8 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Net Income 213,000 451,000 846,000 1,166,000 1,208,000  - 194,973 568,548 2,080,634 356,062 (439,235)  
CPI figures 100 100 100 100 103.84 109.02 116.16 132.35 152.40 184.77 233.49 252.81 
Net Income* 213,000 451,000 846,000 1,166,000 1,163,328 - 167,849 429,579 1,365,245 192,706 (118,117) - 
No. of Employees 47 47 47 47 47 47 38 36 51 40 37 39 
NIE 4,532 9,596 18,000 24,809 24,752 - 4,417 11,933 26,770 4,818 (5,084) - 
N.B.  * Net Income - represents deflated nominal net income figures. 
 
4. Output:                 Table- B9 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997** 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Real Sales* 1,854,000 2,469,000 3,233,000 4,538,000 4,277,735 - 3,071,272 4,291,000 5,009,522 3,603,438 2,163,738 - 
Sales Trend (%) 43.34 57.72 75.58 106.08 100 - 71.80 100.31 117.11 84.24 50.58 - 
** 1997 is taken as a base year due to its stability. 
 
5. Employment:          Table- B10 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Manpower 47 47 38 36 51 40 37 39 
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6. Leverage: (a) Total debt to asset ratio:             Table- B11 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total Debt 1,880,000 1,181,000 1,738,000 2,731,000 2,647,000 - 6,886,922 7,280,088 4,732,132 2,774,592 2,016,187 
Total Assets 2,261,000 2,779,000 3,814,000 4,384,000 4,533,000 - 16,553,557 17,544,408 17,354,623 15,276,077 14,041,771 
Debt to Asset ratio (%)    83.15 42.50 45.57 62.29 58.39 - 41.60 41.50 27.27 18.16 14.36 
 
(b) Long term debt to asset ratio:              Table- B12 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Long term Debt (LTD) - - - - - - 4,907,484 2,649,167 - - - 
Total Assets 2,261,000 2,779,000 3,814,000 4,384,000 4,533,000 - 16,553,557 17,544,408 17,354,623 15,276,077 14,041,771 
L.T.D. to Asset ratio (%) N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 29.65 15.10 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
 
(c) Long term debt to equity ratio:             Table- B13 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Long term Debt - - - - - - 4,907,484 2,649,167 - - - 
Equity 381,000 1,598,000 2,076,000 1,653,000 1,886,000  9,666,635 10,264,320 12,622,491 12,501,485 12,025,584 
L.T.D. to Equity ratio (%)    N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 50.77 25.81 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
 
7. Capital Investment: (a) Capital Expenditures to Sales:           Table- B14 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Capital Expenditure - - - - - - 457,321 - 15,000 266,868 324,673 
Sales 1,854,000 2,469,000 3,233,000 4,538,000 4,442,000 - 3,567,590 5,679,138 7,634,511 6,658,073 5,052,112 
Capital Exp. to Sales N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. 12.82 N.A. 0.20 4.01 6.43 
 
(b) Capital Expenditures to Assets:             Table- B15 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Capital Expenditure      - 457,321 - 15,000 266,868 324,673 
Assets 2,261,000 2,779,000 3,814,000 4,384,000 4,533,000 - 16,553,557 17,544,408 17,354,623 15,276,077 14,041,771 






8. Taxes:                Table- B16 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total annual taxes - - - - - - 1,375,847 2,331,879 3,008,129 2,328,037 1,725,674 
Sales 1,854,000 2,469,000 3,233,000 4,538,000 4,442,000 - 3,567,590 5,679,138 7,634,511 6,658,073 5,052,112 
Tax per unit of sales N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. N.A. - 38.57 41.06 39.40 34.97 34.16 
 
Details of Taxes & Duties:              Table- B17 
Types of Taxes: 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
1. Customs Duty NA NA     32,577 
2. Excise Tax NA NA 618,168 982,120 1024,966 1,064,877 708,638 
3. Sales Tax NA NA 429,993 688,647 429,993 800,944 606,506 
4. Sur-Tax NA NA 53,514 85,187 - - - 
5. Personal Income Tax NA NA 33,306 41,017 36,600 104,741 127,203 
6. Profit Tax NA NA 107,105 316,554 1,234,004 170,382 124,703 
7. Municipality Tax NA NA 15,729 41,720 164,534 22,718 16,627 
8. Others: Donations  















TOTAL NA NA 1,375,847 2,331,879 3,008,129 2,328,037 1,725,674 
 
9. OTHERS: Investment & Liability            Table- B18 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Capital Expenditure - - 457,231 - 15,000 266,868 324,673 





Appendix-C:  Data from Red Sea Bottler’s Share Company [RSBSC] 
 
Comparative Balance Sheets – I (Before privatisation)    Table- C1 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 to 
January 19, 
1997 
ASSETS:     
Current Assets:     
     Cash and bank balances 4,109,799 3,039,569 8,690,621 6,548,872 
     Related Enterprises 44,031 26,240 - 9,319 
     Debtors 2,140,605 1,898,521 5,077,337 3,161,339 
     Stocks 8,784,046 17,029,630 14,461,250 21,001,437 
     Total current assets 15,078,481 21,993,960 28,229,208 30,720,967 
Fixed Assets 1,238,548 1,134,539 2,318,917 1,789,424 
Investments    7,880 - - - 
Total Assets 16,324,909 23,128,499 30,548,125 32,510,391 
     
LIABILITIES & CAPITAL:     
Liabilities:     
    Current Liabilities:     
         Creditors 4,318,831 4,041,186 6,180,192 3,254,736 
         Related enterprises 11,349 1,172 28,578 - 
         Bank overdraft 795,464 - - - 
         Provision for taxation 4,193,716 4,105,890 4,345,519 4,291,115 
         Capital charge payable 85,170 - - - 
         Dividend payable - - 5,707,173 9,479,393 
         Total current liabilities 9,404,530 8,148,248 16,261,462 17,025,244 
    Long-term Liabilities:     
         Deferred Liabilities 1,406,631 2,079,583 3,382,959 4,485,930 
    Total Liabilities 10,811,161 10,227,831 19,644,421 21,511,174 
Capital:     
    State Capital 722,239 722,239 722,239 722,239 
    Grant 574,918 580,018 580,018 675,531 
    General Reserve (Loss) (1,106,083) 1,232,937 9,601,447 9,601,447 
    Unappropriated Profit 5,322,674 10,365,474 - - 
          Total Capital 5,513,748 12,900,668 10,903,704 10,999,217 




Comparative Balance Sheets – II (After privatisation)           Table- C2 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
ASSETS:        
Current Assets:        
     Cash at bank and on hand 48,569,714 2,148,646 1,276,791 1,563,178 4,066,295 5,878,191 33,093,272 
     Regional Office - 3,152,020 6,086 - - - - 
     Debtors and prepayments 2,695,978 3,229,977 1,426,613 9,660,197 6,103,489 6,395,064 6,925,525 
     Stocks and stores 22,105,638 36,264,989 59,975,205 72,076,365 111,307,071 117,888,264 119,553,110 
     Total current assets 73,371,330 44,795,632 62,684,695 83,299,740 121,476,855 130,161,519 159,571,907 
Fixed Assets 8,166,757 106,239,637 104,247,618 100,616,038 91,317,244 79,668,334 74,488,481 
Goodwill    2,843,583 2,530,528 2,217,473 1,904,420 1,591,363 1,278,308 965,253 
Project account 46,318,295 - - - - - - 
Total Assets 130,699,965 153,565,797 169,149,786 185,820,198 214,385,462 211,108,161 235,025,641 
LIABILITIES & CAPITAL: 
Liabilities:        
    Current Liabilities:        
         Deferred income 8,909,728 - - - - - - 
         Creditors and accruals 5,750,558 12,127,382 24,999,719 20,740,581 31,811,830 37,314,042 41,093,671 
         Provision for taxation 2,018,219 383,985 2,719,341 6,214,173 6,947,807 2,864,586 8,148,777 
         Bank overdraft - 19,053,001 826,266 5,256,527 9,408,590 - - 
         Regional office - - 16,747,804 23,784,768 25,401,642 26,469,771 27,805,596 
         Total current liabilities 16,678,505 31,564,368 45,293,130 55,996,049 73,569,869 66,648,399 77,048,044 
    Long-term Liabilities: - - - - - - - 
    Total Liabilities 16,678,505 31,564,368 45,293,130 55,996,049 73,569,869 66,648,399 77,048,044 
Capital:        
    Share Capital 107,340,400 107,340,400 107,340,400 107,340,400 107,340,400 107,340,400 107,340,400 
    General Reserve 3,400,000 13,343,415 13,343,415 13,146,182 13,146,182 13,146,182 13,146,182 
    Legal Reserve (Loss) 164,053 164,053 256,814 565,050 1,114,622 1,392,655 2,068,547 
    Retained Earnings 3,117,007 1,153,561 2,916,027 8,772,517 19,214,389 22,580,525 35,422,468 
          Total Capital 114,021,460 122,001,429 123,856,656 129,824,149 140,815,593 144,459,762 157,977,597 
Total Liabilities & Capital 130,699,965 153,565,797 169,149,786 185,820,198 214,385,462 211,108,161 235,025,641 
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Comparative Profit and Loss Statements – I (Before privatisation)   Table- C3 
 1993 1994 1995 1996 to 
January 19, 
1997 
Revenue:     
     Sales 16,605,537 20,896,553 24,786,255 27,751,255 
     Cost of Products sold 8,162,905 10,311,559 12,771,838 15,212,164 
Gross operating profit 8,442,632 10,584,994 12,014,417 12,539,091 
     Other income 178,971 121,346 78,607 83,640 
 8,621,603 10,706,340 12,093,024 12,622,731 
Operating Expenses:     
     Administration  475,929 647,901 702,514 900,765 
     Distribution 651,258 799,480 1,004,861 1,472,749 
     Audit fee 10,000 20,255 20,000 19,900 
        Total operating expenses 1,137,187 1,467,636 1,727,375 2,393,414 
Earnings Before Taxes 7,484,416 9,238,704 10,365,649 10,229,317 
     Less: Provision for taxes 3,763,152 4,195,904 3,994,103 3,940,934 
Net Earnings after Taxes 3,721,264 5,042,800 6,371,546 6,288,383 
Transferred to:     
     Unappropriated profit (3,721,264) (5,042,800) - - 
     Dividend payable - - (3,185,773) (6,288,383) 
     General reserve - - (3,185,773) - 





Comparative Profit and Loss Statements – II (After privatisation)    Table- C4 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
        
TURNOVER 
(Sales + Other 
income) 
24,679,789 23,685,662 64,951,240 95,361,404 131,186,190 173,530,530 197,551,373 
        
Profit (loss) 
before Tax 
5,299,279 (1,579,461) 4,574,568 12,378,899 17,939,251 8,425,254 21,666,612 
        
Tax thereon:        
        Surtax - 383,985 983,759 1,434,902 - - - 
        Profit tax 1,806,248 - 1,552,599 4,284,115 6,230,237 2,527,576 7,190,097 
        Municipal 
tax 
211,971 - 182,983 495,156 717,570 337,010 958,680 
              Total 
tax payments 
2,018,219 383,985 2,719,341 6,214,173 6,947,807 2,864,586 8,148,777 
Profit after tax 3,281,060 (1,963,446) 1,855,227 6,164,726 10,991,444 5,560,668 13,517,835 
Legal reserve 164,053 - 92,761 308,236 549,572 278,033 - 
Profit (loss) for 
the year 
3,117,007 (1,963,446) 1,762,466 5,856,490 10,441,872 5,282,635 13,517,835 
        




       
       Balance 
brought forward 
 3,117,007 1,153,561 2,916,027 8,772,517 19,214,389 22,580,525 
       Prior year’s 
adjustment on 
taxes 
 - - - - (1,916,499) (675,892)* 
       Profit (loss) 
for the year 
3,117,007 (1,963,446) 1,762,466 5,856,490 10,441,872 5,282,635 13,517,835 
 3,117,007 1,153,561 2,916,027 8,772,517 19,214,389 22,580,525 35,422,468 
*N.B. The amount of Nakfa 675,892 represents “transfer to legal reserve”.  
 
 
Manpower distribution in the organisation:    Table- C5 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
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FIXED ASSET CHANGES:             Table- C6 

















1. Construction in progress - - 5,386,153 (5,367,153) N.A. 41,153 5,118 
2. Use of Land and Buildings 3,333,750 35,160,774 3,214,813 10639766 N.A. - 200,690 
3. Plant and Machinery 2,584,235 43,749,363 1,614,556 139650 N.A. 11,243 333,100 
4. Motor Vehicles 2,602,095 8,637,296 148,331 - N.A. - 5,858,191 
5. Office Furniture & Equipment 479,685 12,765,235 (100,408) 2121564 N.A. 83,508 3,000 
6. Tools 103,988 (103,988) 145,700 11562 N.A. 13,100 100,895 
7. Laboratory Equipment 49,006 162,151 188,217 - N.A. 34,171 47,249 
TOTAL FIXED ASSET CHANGES  9,152,759 100,370,831 10,597,362 7,545,389 N.A. 183,175 6,548,243 
TOTAL ADDITIONS IN F.A. 9,173,129 103,020,716 10,752,006 12,944,193 2,731,206 183,175 6,548,243 
 
Consumer Price Index (CPI): Average annual CPI figures of commodities.    Table- C7 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Beverages & Tobacco 103.84 109.02 116.16 132.35 152.40 184.77 233.49 252.81 258.25 
Cloth & Foot wear 113.14 114.38 107.15 118.78 141.73 161.13 196.18 221.90 225.66 
N.B. The 1996 consumer prices were taken as a base (meaning set to 100%).  
Source: Provisional CPI release for March 2005 by the National Statistics Office [of the Ministry of National Development], Asmara - Eritrea. 
 
Firm Performance:  
1. Profitability:            Table- C8 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Sales Trend 100.00 125.22 148.14 165.84 147.04 141.12 386.97 568.15 781.59 1033.87 1176.99 
ROS1 (percent) 50.84 50.65 48.47 45.18 21.47 (6.67) 7.04 12.98 13.67 4.86 10.97 
ROS2 (percent) 22.41 24.13 25.71 22.66 12.63 (8.29) 2.71 6.14 7.96 3.04 6.84 
ROA (percent) 22.80 21.80 20.86 19.34 2.38 (1.28) 1.04 3.15 4.87 2.50 5.75 






2. Labour Productivity (LP):             Table- C9 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Revenues* 16,784,508 21,017,899 24,864,862 27,834,895 24,679,789 23,685,662 64,951,240 95,361,404 131,186,190 173,530,530 197,551,373 
CPI figures 100 100 100 100 103.84 109.02 116.16 132.35 152.40 184.77 233.49 
Annual Revenues** 16,784,508 21,017,899 24,864,862 27,834,895 23,767,131 21,725,978 55,915,323 72,052,439 86,080,177 93,917,048 84,608,066 
No. of Employees 216 216 216 216 216 307 307 307 307 307 307 
LP 77,706 97,305 115,115 128,865 110,033 70,769 182,135 234,698 280,391 305,919 275,596 
N.B. *   Revenues: indicate the total annual sales from operations plus other income. 
        ** Annual Revenue figures are deflated Revenue values using CPI.  
 
3. Operating Efficiency: (a) Sales Efficiency (SE):           Table- C10 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Sales (nominal) 16,605,537 20,896,553 24,786,255 27,751,255 24,679,789 23,685,662 64,951,240 95,361,404 131,186,190 173,530,530 197,551,373 
CPI figures 100 100 100 100 103.84 109.02 116.16 132.35 152.40 184.77 233.49 
Real Sales* 16,605,537 20,896,553 24,786,255 27,751,255 23,767,131 21,725,979 55,915,324 72,052,440 86,080,177 93,917,048 84,608,066 
No. of Employees 216 216 216 216 216 307 307 307 307 307 307 
SE 76,877 96,743 114,751 128,478 110,033 70,769 182135 234,699 280,391 305,919 275,596 
N.B. *Real Sales = Nominal Sales ÷ CPI 
 
(b) Net Income Efficiency (NIE):            Table- C11 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Net Income 3,721,264 5,042,800 6,371,546 6,288,383 3,117,007 (1,963,446) 1,762,466 5,856,490 10,441,872 5,282,635 13,517,835 
CPI figures 100 100 100 100 103.84 109.02 116.16 132.35 152.40 184.77 233.49 
Net Income* 3,721,264 5,042,800 6,371,546 6,288,383 3,001,740 (1,800,996) 1,517,274 4,425,002 6,851,622 2,859,033 5,789,471 
No. of Employees 216 216 216 216 216 307 307 307 307 307 307 
NIE 17,228 23,346 29,498 29,113 13,897 (5,866) 4,942 14,414 22,318 9,313 18,858 









4. Output:               Table- C12 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996** 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Real Sales* 16,605,537 20,896,553 24,786,255 27,751,255 23,767,131 21,725,979 55,915,324 72,052,440 86,080,177 93,917,048 84,608,066 
Sales Trend (%) 59.84 75.30 89.32 100 85.64 78.29 201.49 259.64 310.18 338.42 304.88 
** 1996 served as a base since it was the most stable and productive year for the enterprise during public ownership. 
 
5. Employment:            Table- C13 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Manpower 216 307 307 307 307 307 307 307 264 
Trend (%) 100 142.13 142.13 142.13 142.13 142.13 142.13 142.13 122.22 
 
6. Leverage: (a) Total debt to asset ratio:            Table- C14 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total Debt [D] 10,811,161 10,227,831 19,644,421 21,511,174 16,678,505 31,564,368 45,293,130 55,996,049 73,569,869 66,648,399 77,048,044 
Total Assets [A] 16,324,909 23,128,499 30,548,125 32,510,391 130,699,965 153,565,797 169,149,786 185,820,198 214,385,462 211,108,161 235,025,641 
D to A ratio 0.6622 0.4422 0.6431 0.6617 0.1276 0.2055 0.2678 0.3013 0.3432 0.3157 0.3278 
 
(b) Long term debt to asset ratio:             Table- C15 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Long term Debt (LTD) 1,406,631 2,079,583 3,382,959 4,485,930 - - - - - - - 
Total Assets 16,324,909 23,128,499 30,548,125 32,510,391 130,699,965 153,565,797 169,149,786 185,820,198 214,385,462 211,108,161 235,025,641 
L.T.D to Asset ratio 0.0862 0.0899 0.1107 0.1380 - - - - - - - 
 
(c) Long term debt to equity ratio:            Table- C16 
Year 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Long term Debt 1,406,631 2,079,583 3,382,959 4,485,930 - - - - - - - 
Equity 5,513,748 12,900,668 10,903,704 10,999,217 114,021,460 122,001,429 123,856,656 129,824,149 140,815,593 144,459,762 157,977,597 







7. Capital Investment: (a) Capital Expenditures to Sales:      Table- C17 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Capital Expenditure 9,173,129 103,020,716 10,752,006 12,944,193 2,731,206 183,175 6,548,243 
Sales 24,679,789 23,685,662 64,951,240 95,361,404 131,186,190 173,530,530 197,551,373 
Capital Exp. to Sales 0.3717 4.3495 0.1655 0.1357 0.0208 0.0011 0.0331 
 
(b) Capital Expenditures to Assets:        Table- C18 
Year 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Capital Expenditure 9,173,129 103,020,716 10,752,006 12,944,193 2,731,206 183,175 6,548,243 
Assets 130,699,965 153,565,797 169,149,786 185,820,198 214,385,462 211,108,161 235,025,641 
Capital Exp. to Assets 0.0702 0.6709 0.0636 0.0697 0.0127 0.0009 0.0279 
 
8. Taxes:               Table- C19 
Year 1993* 1994* 1995* 1996* 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total annual taxes & duties 3,763,152 4,195,904 3,994,103 3,940,934 8,204,460 6,390,598 17,653,322 26,479,936 36,491,548 51,358,841 57,616,257 
Sales 16,605,537 20,896,553 24,786,255 27,751,255 24,679,789 23,685,662 64,951,240 95,361,404 131,186,190 173,530,530 197,551,373 
Tax per unit of sales 0.2266 0.2008 0.1611 0.1420 0.3324 0.2698 0.2718 0.2777 0.2782 0.2960 0.2917 
* The amounts indicated for the years 1993 to 1996 included only annual taxes. However, total annual taxes and duties were reported for years 1997-2003. 
 
Details of Taxes & Duties:            Table- C20 
Description 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002          2.003           2.004  
Sales Tax  3,121,596   3,070,426     8,881,641   13,998,591   17,758,731   22,853,739   26,358,491   24,159,622  
Excise Tax             -               -                 -                 -      4,083,202   19,261,653   19,997,260   17,962,597  
Profit tax  1,806,248              -      1,552,599     4,284,115     6,230,237     2,527,576     7,190,097     9,418,567  
Municipality tax     211,971              -         182,983        495,156        717,570        337,010        958,680     1,255,809  
Sur tax             -       383,985        983,759     1,434,902                -                 -                 -                 -   
Development fee  1,562,921   1,468,885     3,712,760     4,259,945     5,014,356     3,314,293                -                 -   
Income tax     254,407      295,032        468,440        638,317        950,841     1,112,722     1,113,271     1,591,766  
Customs Duty  1,247,317   1,172,270     1,871,140     1,368,910     1,736,611     1,951,848     1,998,459     2,463,763  
Total  8,204,460   6,390,598   17,653,322   26,479,936   36,491,548   51,358,841   57,616,257   56,852,123  
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Appendix D: An overview of post-privatisation developments [or changes] in the three case firms. 
 







- decline in employment  
- lack of skilled & unskilled labour 
- females dominate the work force and elderly 
people hold difficult jobs 
- key positions held by friend & brother 
- salary [little adjustment] is not satisfactory for 
employees and new recruits leave for lack of 
interest 
- conflict with TU 
- employees get on the job training 
- employees are committed, responsible, 
disciplined, and duty, cost & quality conscious, 
don’t complain on the control system  
- employees get some benefits 
- decline in employment 
- lack of skilled labour 
- youth were replaced with females and 
the elderly  
- Key positions held by the owners 
- made salary increments for some years 
but employees are not yet satisfied and 
threaten the factory to leave when the 
youth go for national service 
- employees got no training but senior 
people did 
- the change in employees behaviour is 
generally same as in IMA  
- the firm got back some of its 
employees to work as part of their 
national service 
- employees get some benefits 
- employment has increased 
- lack of skilled manpower 
- the vacant posts of the youth were replaced with females and 
the elderly people 
- the company conducts continuous training 
- salaries got better, annual increments and bonuses are given 
- employees get better benefits and are satisfied 
- the change in employees behaviour is same as in the other 
firms 
- the firm got back some of its employees to work as part of 
their national service but these group are relatively less satisfied 




- threat from cheaper imports, competitor prices 
and customer behaviour [schools, individuals and 
government bodies] 
- focus on delivering high quality, durable 
products, expansion of market, high return, and 
satisfaction of customers in the local and export 
market 
- the manager is involved in monitoring quality  
- sales is focused on exports due to small local 
market, well penetrated European markets via 
effort of the owner 
- no marketing department 
- delivery dates are sensitive for exports 
- threat from imports, low competitor 
prices and shortage of bottles  
- aim to expand market and deliver 
better quality products in the local 
market 
- to engage in exports in the future   
- introduced new products 
- the owners approach clients to create 
market awareness for the level of quality 
they deliver 
- bought delivery trucks and strive to 
improve delivery time and packaging 
- restriction on delivery schedule and ads 
- strong sales department that has sales developers 
- expanded its sales distribution across the country,  and is 
much better organised  
- hires and trains sales agents, bought new delivery trucks, and 
provides assistance to outlets [e.g., ice at low price, coolers, 
push carts, etc] 
- the CCC offers help in sales development  
- aim at satisfying clients and high quality and adheres on 
availability, accessibility, and affordability of products 
- collects feedback from outlets 
- introduced new products 
- thorough control on bottles and crates, 




- introduced new products and designs  
- lack of ships to meet delivery dates  
- government regulations blocked exports 
from government bodies 
- efforts to produce more products is 
affected by government regulations  
bodies 
- efforts to produce more products is affected by government 
regulations 
3. Source of raw 
materials [RM] 
- RM are mostly imported due to quality 
concerns and non-availability of some 
- the owner is involved in importing RM 
- problems with access to forex, resorted to 
parallel markets that are expensive and unstable 
- customs is paid on imports at a value equivalent 
on official forex rates (consequences on accuracy 
of records, manufacturing costs, profits and taxes 
- major RM are imported 
- tough search for empty bottles 
- no local sources of RM since potential 
sources are closed or weakened 
- problem with access to forex like that 
of IMA 
- impact of government policy on 
customs, records,  and taxes as in IMA 
 
- almost all RM are imported from authorized  suppliers 
through the help of CCC 
- there is water supply problem 
- some delays in shipments 
- problem with access to forex like the other firms 
- impact of government policy on customs, records,  and taxes 
like the other firms 
- tried to solve transparency problem of using forex from 
parallel market but discontinued due to government policy 
4. Organisation 
structure 
- reduced the number of departments & sections   
- the finance is run by a single person [no 
segregation of duties, delay of recording and 
reporting and inventory checks] 
- family member holds key post and is more 
trusted and holds power   
- the owner is heavily involved 
- the firm is considered like a big shop where 
physical supervision is enough 
- the owners hold key top managerial 
posts, form the BOD and they trust each 
other  
-  finance is run by par time employee 
but he is trusted family member of GM 
 - three full time staff work in finance 
- no internal auditor 
- expanded the number of departments and sections 
- hired qualified people to hold key posts 
- gives clear job description, plans and mandate 
- GM enjoys more autonomy and is accountable to the BOD 
- some problem on defining clear boundary of departmental 
autonomy from that of GM   
 
5. Investment - more autonomy to decide on investments 
- replaced some and renovated other machinery 
with more automation 
- investment reduced waste generation, improved 
quality, productivity, and efficiency,  made 
exports possible 
- significantly reduced leverage ratios 
[dependency on bank loan for financing] 
- more autonomy to decide on 
investments 
- replaced some and renovated other 
machinery, renewed buildings and 
constructed new stores  
- investment reduced waste, improved 
quality, productivity, and efficiency 
- significantly reduced leverage ratios  
- more autonomy to decide on investments 
- completely built as new and installed new automated bottling 
line 
- investment reduced waste generation, improved quality, 
productivity, and efficiency   
- significantly reduced leverage ratios  
 
MCS Changes:  
1. Planning & 
Budgeting 
- formal planning & budgeting is not exercised 
[due to small size, lack of managerial capacity, 
lack of sufficient accounting staff, interest of the 
- no formal planning and budgeting, but 
prepares annual sales plan to serve as a 
best estimate of sales activities 
- formal [long-term and short-term] planning and budgeting is 
exercised on the basis of the business and investment plan that 
is updated periodically, no capacity problems 
Post-privatisation changes in management control, firm activities and performance 
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owner, environmental uncertainty and lack of 
knowledge regarding demand] 
- short-term planning to support daily operations 
[e.g., orders related work plans]  
- there is full knowledge of standard input 
requirements for products 
- short-term planning [e.g., production 
targeted at replenishing the stock of 
finished products] 
- standard inputs for a batch is known 
- materials inventory is monitored on a 
monthly basis to plan purchase 
- the firm keeps safety stock  
- sales forecasts are made regularly 
- such planning and budgeting is used for control purposes and 
employees get reward based on their performance 
- there is full knowledge of batch level input-output 
relationship, safety stock is kept  
2. Product costing 
& Pricing 
- standard costs are used for sweaters but actual 
costs for garment and leather items 
- it uses process costing and job order costing 
based on type of orders 
- OH cost contains significant personal expenses 
[travel, telephone, fuel, etc] 
- costs are affected by forex, inflation,  labour 
market conditions and loss on exchange 
- no pricing freedom on the tiny local market but 
enjoys freedom on exports 
- it allows volume discounts on local bids 
- exports attract higher prices than normal 
- manufacturing OH cost contains 
depreciation on office buildings 
- estimated actual costs are used, they are 
quarterly revised  
- costs are affected by forex, inflation 
labour market conditions, high taxes and 
loss on exchange 
- pricing is affected by tough 
competition 
- product prices [ at company level and retail] are fixed that are 
controlled by the CCC and there is no freedom to implement 
independent changes unless approved 
- it is possible to negotiate for input prices with the CCC if 
they affect profitability or when costs are affected by inflation 
- costs are affected by forex, loss on exchange, high taxes and 






- reporting to the MTI is limited to filling the 
pre-designed forms 
- the factory avoided some inter-departmental 
reports but regularly sends some reports to the 
owners as they have requested for them  
- daily production reports have emerged stronger 
and are used to monitor productivity 
- decision-making is shared by the owner, 
manager, and department heads 
- decisions are made fast 
- computerisation was introduced in 2004 and 
has replaced some manual records, facilitated 
speed of reporting, and improved accuracy 
- it fills information on the pre-designed 
forms for MTI 
- the owners encourage recording, 
reporting and use of relevant forms 
- past forms are used to a large extent, 
modified some and dropped few 
- introduced usage of separate store issue 
vouchers for each input item 
- introduced some analysis methods 
- decisions are made fast and the owners 
are cost conscious 
- computerisation [ has brought similar 
effects as in IMA] 
- sends few information to MTI using the pre-designed forms 
- the company follows coca-cola recording and reporting 
system that is more broad, structured, explicit and formal with 
details of forms, reports and analysis 
- internal reports are used frequently 
- employees’ knowledge & capacity has improved  
- use of computers and software programs speeded recording 
and reporting, improved accuracy, replaced manual records 
and files, facilitated analysis and tracing of old data, enabled 




- the owner visits at semi-annual intervals  - daily informal contact among owners  
4. Cost control & 
Waste 
minimisation 
- input standards of sweaters are effectively used 
for controlling resource consumption 
- garment and leather inputs are controlled at the 
time of issuance 
- activities are organised cost effectively   
- daily production reports are used to control 
labour productivity 
- size of manpower is continuously monitored to 
reduce cost of idle labour and/or overtime 
- the nature of job controls smooth flow of 
processes at each step 
- input-output relationship is known and 
is used to control resource usage 
- product quality is mainly checked 
during the production process 
- empty bottle requirement plan is 
prepared to facilitate production and 
control bottle breakages 
- size of manpower is monitored 
regularly to reduce cost of idle labour 
- customer complaints are used as an 
input for further improvements 
- input-output standards [e.g., yields] are used to monitor 
resource consumption 
- quality of each plant is checked 
- the breakage and sanitation committee controls breakage of 
bottles, crates, etc 
- continuous monitoring and supervision of quality 
- mechanical efficiency and line utilisation are used for control 
purposes 
- the CCC conducts its independent quality checks 
- customer complaint reports are effectively used 




- internal reports, resource consumption, and 
financial ratios are used for control 
- profitability is monitored annually 
- quality is checked at each step 
- results indicate fluctuating sales  and output 
trends, poor profitability ratios, but improved 
sales efficiency and labour productivity, 
- physical supervision is used to control activities 
- there is lack of managerial capacity  
- performance is monitored using daily, 
weekly, monthly and annual reports 
- sales trend and variance analysis are 
used and quality is constantly checked 
- results indicate fluctuating labour 
productivity, sales efficiency and output; 
but profitability is poor  
- the BOD have monthly meetings to 
monitor activities and plan purchases 
- the owners lack managerial capacity 
- competition affected firm performance 
 
- production and sales performance is monitored on a daily, 
weekly, monthly quarterly and annual basis  
- performance of areas, sales agents and outlets is monitored 
on a daily basis and supervision is heavily used 
- performance reports on each activity is conducted monthly, 
quarterly and annually 
- all performance reports are compared with actual 
performance of previous period 
- the firm implemented total quality system [CCQS] 
- labour productivity is constantly monitored 
- there is monthly management meeting to check on activities 
and resolve problems 
- the BOD meet quarterly to monitor performance 
- records show that the company has good results for sales, 
productivity, sales efficiency and output; but poor performance 
in profitability and net income efficiency 
- lack of forex caused closure of operations 
- action of the IRD caused customer complaints  
 





Dit onderzoek gaat over het effect van de interne en externe context van ondernemingen in 
ontwikkelingslanden op de effecten van privatisering, met name voor wat betreft het management 
control systeem (MCS) en de prestaties van deze ondernemingen. De Wereldbank en het IMF 
stimuleren privatisering van overheidsbedrijven in ontwikkelingslanden om op die manier de 
tekortkomingen van directe aansturing door de overheid te verminderen. De verwachting was dat 
na privatisering, de prikkel voor de nieuwe eigenaren om te innoveren tot belangrijke 
verbeteringen in de efficiency, het MCS en de prestaties zou leiden. 
 
Onderzoek over de effecten van privatisering heeft tot dusver vooral plaatsgevonden in 
ontwikkelde landen. Er zijn weliswaar ook enkele onderzoeken in ontwikkelingslanden verricht, 
maar die besteden nauwelijks aandacht aan de ontwikkeling van MCS-practices in hun context. 
Bovendien zijn de uitkomsten van eerder onderzoek naar de effecten van privatisering in zowel 
ontwikkelde als ontwikkelingslanden niet eenduidig. Waarschijnlijk zijn de resultaten van 
onderzoek naar de effecten van privatisering zo tegenstrijdig, omdat er onvoldoende aandacht is 
besteed aan de effecten van de externe en interne context van de betrokken ondernemingen. Om 
die reden is de doelstelling van dit proefschrift om licht te werpen op het belang van contextuele 
variabelen op de relatie tussen privatisering, MCS-veranderingen en de prestaties van 
ondernemingen. 
 
De vraagstelling van dit onderzoek is dan ook: hoe beïnvloeden factoren uit de externe en interne 
context van de onderneming de relatie tussen privatisering, MCS-veranderingen en de prestaties 
van de onderneming? Het onderzoek is verricht in Eritrea. In Eritrea is een aantal 
staatsondernemingen geprivatiseerd met als doel om een sterke markeconomie te laten ontstaan, 
die de economische ontwikkeling van het land een impuls zou moeten geven. We hebben 
geanalyseerd hoe het veranderingsproces is beïnvloed door de externe en de interne context van 
de geprivatiseerde ondernemingen om op die manier een brede verklaring op te stellen voor de 
uitkomsten van privatisering. De rol van de overheid tijdens de transitieperiode was een 
belangrijk punt van aandacht. Het resultaat van deze studie is een aangepast conceptueel 
raamwerk voor de analyse van privatiseringsoperaties in ontwikkelingslanden. 
 
Literatuuroverzicht  
De voor dit onderzoek relevante theorieën zijn: ‘ productive efficiency theories’, ‘property right 
theory’, ‘agency theory’ en de ‘theory of allocative efficiency’. Zowel de binnenlandse politiek, 
als externe druk spelen een rol in de privatisering van staatsondernemingen in 
ontwikkelingslanden. Privatisering wordt vaak gezien als een voor de hand liggende oplossing 
voor problemen in de publieke sector. Het marktmechanisme zou leiden tot verbetering van de 
efficiency en zo tot betere prestaties. In theorie leidt privatisering tot een efficiënte vorm van 
marktkapitalisme en tot de oplossing van de problemen die zijn verbonden aan de productie van 




geacht zich te onthouden van intensieve inmenging in de private sector en een redelijk en stabiel 
fiscaal beleid te voeren. Van de nieuwe eigenaren van de ondernemingen wordt op hun beurt 
verwacht dat ze goed geïnformeerd zijn, winst nastreven en de vaardigheid bezitten om via een 
verbeterd MCS de onderneming beter aan te sturen dan de overheid dat kan. Privatisering zou 
leiden tot een reeks aan positieve effecten: meer productie, verhoogde investeringen, verbeterde 
kwaliteit van producten en diensten tegen lagere prijzen, de introductie van moderne technologie, 
hogere winsten en dividenden, meer werkgelegenheid en hogere salarissen, beter 
ondernemingsbestuur en hogere belastinginkomsten voor de overheid. 
 
Uit ons onderzoek blijkt dat privatisering niet noodzakelijkerwijs leidt tot het realiseren van die 
positieve effecten. Er zijn verschillende contextuele factoren die gevolgen hebben voor het MCS, 
de interne processen en de prestaties van de onderneming. Belangrijke factoren uit de interne 
context zijn de schaal van de onderneming, het lerend vermogen, vernieuwingen in de 
technologie, veranderingen in de ondernemingsstrategie en daadkracht. Belangrijke externe 
factoren zijn de rol van de overheid (en de regelgeving), vakbonden en organisaties voor 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking. Verder hebben politieke instabiliteit (oorlog en oorlogsdreiging) en 
concurrentie een belangrijke invloed. Deze factoren, die zijn ontleend aan de contingentietheorie 
en de institutionele theorie, zijn bruikbaar in de analyse van de veranderingen in het MCS en de 
prestaties. Eerder onderzoek heeft reeds uitgewezen dat wijziging in de eigendom van de 
onderneming onvoldoende basis voor verbetering van de prestaties is. De ontwikkeling van 
instituties en de politieke omgeving zijn eveneens van belang. Privatisering zou daarom moeten 
plaatsvinden in een stimulerende omgeving, waardoor de nieuwe eigenaren worden geprikkeld 
om het MCS te herzien, om interne processen te versterken en om hun doelstellingen te 
verwezenlijken. 
 
Conceptueel raamwerk en methodologie 
Het conceptuele raamwerk dat wij hebben ontwikkeld, geeft structuur aan ons onderzoek naar het 
effect van de sociaal-economische en politieke context op de privatisering van Eritrese bedrijven. 
Het conceptuele raamwerk betreft de relatie tussen privatisering, MCS en de prestaties van de 
onderneming, alsmede de invloed van contextuele variabelen in die relatie. Om te beginnen 
hebben we een ‘pilot study’ verricht ter verbetering van de aanvankelijke onderzoeksvragen en de 
aanvankelijke methodologie. 
 
Dit onderzoek is gebaseerd op case studies. De keuze voor case studies is gemaakt om diepgaand 
inzicht te krijgen in de effecten van privatisering. De cases zijn de Asmara Sweater and Garment 
Factory (IMA), Asmara Wine and Liquor Factory (AW&LF) en Red Sea Bottler’s Share 
Company (RSBSC). De kwalitative opzet van het onderzoek heeft geresulteerd in data die ons 
inzicht bieden in de veranderingen in brede zin in de periode na de privatisering. In de 
verzameling van de data is gebruik gemaakt van verschillende bronnen, zoals de onderzochte 
bedrijven, de overheid, non-gouvernementele organisaties, bedrijfsadviseurs en organisaties voor 




prestaties van de onderzochte bedrijven van voor en na de privatisering met elkaar vergeleken. 
Op basis van de case studies in Eritrea is getracht om bestaande tegenstrijdigheden in de 
literatuur te verminderen. Uit het onderzoek blijkt vooral dat de marktwerking in een 
ontwikkelingsland als Eritrea onvoldoende is ontwikkeld om te komen tot een goed 
functionerende markteconomie. 
 
Uitkomsten case studies 
Nieuwe ontwikkelingen bij IMA na de privatisering zijn de invoering van scholing voor 
medewerkers, de introductie van nieuwe producten en productlijnen en de ontwikkeling van een 
exportmarkt voor de producten. Er zijn investeringen gedaan in computers en in machines. 
Verder is er een stringent kwaliteitsbeleid ontwikkeld, resulterend in verbeterde producten, 
reductie van verspilling en daardoor verlaging van de productiekosten. Er is korte-termijn 
planning ingevoerd, terwijl de administratieve lasten en interne rapportages sterk zijn 
gereduceerd. De afdeling Financiën kampt met een groot tekort aan gekwalificeerde 
medewerkers, wat als gevolg heeft dat veel van de geambieerde MCS-veranderingen niet zijn 
doorgevoerd en er nog nauwelijks budgettering plaatsvindt. Deze ontwikkeling staat haaks op de 
aan de privatisering ten grondslag liggende verwachtingen. Wel is er meer aandacht voor 
klanttevredenheid, zijn de salarissen verhoogd en is de monitoring binnen het bedrijf middels 
interne rapportages en vooral door direct toezicht intensiever geworden. De benoeming van 
familieleden van de eigenaar op tal van posities heeft echter de positie van de bedrijfsleider 
verzwakt. Gedurende de eerste drie jaar na de privatisering zijn de prestaties van het bedrijf sterk 
verbeterd, maar externe factoren hebben die effecten weer grotendeels tenietgedaan. Naar 
aanleiding van een grensconflict tussen Eritrea en Ethiopië, heeft de Eritrese overheid jonge, 
ervaren medewerkers opgeroepen voor de militaire dienst met een gebrek aan gekwalificeerde 
mensen op de arbeidsmarkt als gevolg. Verder heeft de overheid de beschikbaarheid van 
buitenlandse valuta aan banden gelegd en de importmogelijkheden voor onder andere 
grondstoffen enorm beperkt. De belastingdienst erkent de omvangrijke verliezen op buitenlandse 
valuta niet als kosten, waardoor IMA meer belasting moet betalen. Al deze ontwikkelingen 
hebben een negatieve invloed op de activiteiten, prestaties en groei van het bedrijf. 
 
AW&LF heeft sinds de privatisering geïnvesteerd in machines, het bedrijfsterrein, gebouwen, 
computers en vrachtauto’s. De fabriek heeft zich verder toegelegd op verbetering van de 
productiekwaliteit, het terugdringen van verspilling, de introductie van nieuwe producten en 
productlijnen, marktonderzoek, het terugdringen van overbodige arbeid, verbetering van de 
winstgevendheid en verhoging van de salarissen van de werknemers. De werknemers zijn 
effectiever geworden en zijn zich bewuster geworden van de kwaliteit en de kosten van de 
producten. Privatisering heeft geleid tot verbetering van de prestaties van het bedrijf gedurende 
de eerste drie jaar na de privatisering; daarna zijn de prestaties weer verslechterd. Deze 
verslechterde prestaties zijn vooral te wijten aan externe factoren, zoals inflatie en het 
overheidsbeleid inzake buitenlandse valuta, de belastingen, importvergunningen voor 




invloed op de primaire processen, de productiekosten en de prestaties van de onderneming. 
Andere beperkende factoren zijn een felle prijsconcurrentie op de lokale markt en een voorkeur 
van consumenten voor buitenlandse producten. Door al die problemen is de productiecapaciteit in 
slechts geringe mate benut en zijn de overheadkosten per eenheid product erg hoog. Pogingen om 
deze kosten te verlagen zijn echter niet ondernomen. Ook dit bedrijf kampt met een gebrek aan 
gekwalificeerde medewerkers, doordat veel jongeren zijn opgeroepen voor de militaire dienst. 
Ook hier kampt de afdeling Financiën met een gebrek aan gekwalificeerde medewerkers om 
MCS-veranderingen door te voeren. Bovendien hebben de nieuwe eigenaren geen enkele 
scholing in management gehad. Het MCS is nauwelijks veranderd. Productieplanning is vooral ad 
hoc en op de korte termijn gericht. Er is geen relatie tussen de productieplanning en de 
verkoopdoelstellingen. Van budgettering is nauwelijks sprake. Wel worden het gebruik van 
grondstoffen, verspilling in het productieproces, productiekosten en productievolume 
bijgehouden en beheerst. Ook zijn de administratieve lasten verminderd. De lijnen van 
besluitvorming zijn kort. Al met al is het MCS iets efficiënter geworden, maar fundamentele 
aanpassingen hebben niet plaatsgevonden. 
 
RSBSC, een joint venture van de multinational Coca-Cola Company en de overheid, is ingrijpend 
vernieuwd na de privatisering: er is geïnvesteerd in gebouwen, moderne machines, 
ondersteuning, vrachtauto’s, computers en informatiesystemen. Het bedrijf heeft zijn 
verzorgingsgebied uitgebreid en nieuwe producten en productlijnen geïntroduceerd. Voorts heeft 
het zich veel meer toegelegd op kwaliteit en klanttevredenheid. De markt voor dit bedrijf is 
instabiel en daarom wordt er veel aandacht besteed aan verkoop, aan de ondersteuning van 
afnemers en aan marktkennis in de eigen organisatie. Werknemers worden gemotiveerd door 
hoge salarissen, jaarlijkse salarisverhogingen, bonussen en scholing. Sinds de privatisering is de 
werkgelegenheid binnen het bedrijf toegenomen, zijn gekwalificeerde managers op de 
kernposities benoemd, wordt kwaliteit actief bevorderd en is verspilling in het productieproces 
teruggedrongen. Er is nu een strikt systeem voor kwaliteitsbeheersing, dat zich uitstrekt over het 
gehele productieproces van input tot output. Ook het rendement van het bedrijf wordt regelmatig 
en gedetailleerd geanalyseerd. De doorgevoerde automatisering heeft een belangrijke impuls 
gegeven aan de veranderingen in het MCS. De afdeling Financiën is omvangrijk en heeft een 
soepele invoering van het MCS mogelijk gemaakt. De rapportages zijn geavanceerder geworden, 
control is geïntensiveerd en MCS-instrumenten worden intensief gebruikt, waarbij ook niet-
financiële informatie een belangrijke rol speelt. Het lagere management krijgt de mogelijkheid 
om te participeren in de opstelling van de planning en de budgetten. Het bedrijf heeft grotendeels 
het MCS en de wijze van rapporteren van Coca-Cola Company overgenomen. Daardoor is het 
MCS gestructureerder, explicieter en directer geworden. Door de joint venture met Coca-Cola 
Company kan RSBSC beschikken over de kennis, ervaring en technologie van een multinationale 
onderneming. Coca-Cola Company bemoeit zich intensief met de dagelijkse routines binnen het 
bedrijf. Net zoals de twee andere cases, is RSBSC ook geconfronteerd met een tekort aan 
geschoolde werknemers, grondstoffen en buitenlandse valuta. Ook de inflatie, vertraagde levering 




Veel van deze beperkingen hebben te maken met door de overheid veroorzaakte of opgelegde 
restricties. Privatisering van dit bedrijf heeft in veel opzichten positieve effecten gehad; de winst 
blijft echter achter bij de verwachtingen. 
 
Conclusies en implicaties 
De drie onderzochte bedrijven hebben door te streven naar uitbreiding van hun verzorgingsgebied 
en de introductie van nieuwe producten en productlijnen getracht een betere kwaliteit, een hogere 
klanttevredenheid en een hogere winst te realiseren. De nadruk op kwaliteitszorg is bij alle drie 
ondernemingen versterkt. Privatisering heeft ertoe geleid dat werknemers zich veel bewuster zijn 
geworden van de kwaliteit en de kosten van de producten. Verspilling is gereduceerd en de 
concurrentiekracht is vergroot. Bij IMA en bij AW&LF ligt de nadruk in het MCS vooral op 
korte-termijn planning en op beheersing van de dagelijkse processen. Beide bedrijven worden 
direct gemonitord door de eigenaren, die geen managementopleiding hebben genoten. Directe 
bemoeienis van de eigenaren heeft bij deze twee ondernemingen geleid tot minder interne 
rapportages. De kennis, ervaring en interesses van de eigenaren heeft veel invloed gehad op de 
keuze en het gebruik van het MCS. De betrokkenheid van familieleden van de nieuwe eigenaren 
heeft een negatief effect op het gezag van managers in loondienst, vooral in het middenkader van 
het bedrijf.  Privatisering heeft in het algemeen geleid tot de ontwikkeling van niet-financiële 
prestatie-informatie, verbetering van de informatieverzorging aan de leidinggevenden en betere 
analyse van deze informatie. De introductie van computers en moderne machines hebben grote 
invloed gehad. De introductie van computers heeft ertoe geleid dat tot dusver handmatig 
uitgevoerde berekeningen en registraties veel sneller kunnen worden verricht, waardoor de 
betrouwbaarheid en de tijdigheid van de informatievoorziening is verbeterd. In het bijzonder 
RSBSC past planning en budgettering toe voor zowel de korte als de lange termijn. De joint 
venture met Coca-Cola Company heeft een belangrijke rol gespeeld in de overdracht van 
technologie, kennis en ervaring. 
 
De cases zijn alle drie geconfronteerd met hevige concurrentie op de lokale markt en hebben 
daardoor nauwelijks enige vrijheid in het vaststellen van de verkoopprijzen van hun producten. 
Een aanvullende complicerende factor is de inflatie en het gebrek aan lokale productiemiddelen. 
De grote invloed van de overheid in het bijzonder ten aanzien van de aankoop van vreemde 
valuata en belastingen hebben een negatieve invloed op het functioneren van de bedrijven en op 
hun prestaties, vooral doordat deze bedrijven sterk afhankelijk zijn van te importeren 
grondstoffen. De geprivatiseerde ondernemingen zijn niet ondersteund door organisaties voor 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking in het doorvoeren van de benodigde veranderingen, terwijl dat 
aanvankelijk wel de verwachting was. Dergelijke ondersteuning is hard nodig, omdat de overheid 
nog steeds erg veel invloed op de private sector heeft. De omgeving vormt geen positieve 
voedingsbodem voor de door de nieuwe eigenaren nagestreefde veranderingen. Vooral de 
instabiele macro-economische situatie en de daarmee samenhangende inflatie hebben een 
negatief effect op het investeringsklimaat. De winstgevendheid in alle drie cases is daardoor sterk 




de restricties voor de private sector weg moeten nemen. Organisaties voor 
ontwikkelingssamenwerking zouden ondersteuning kunnen bieden in het oplossen van de 
belemmeringen voor het opbouwen van een sterke private sector. Ondanks alle beperkingen, 
hebben de drie cases een positieve bijdrage kunnen leveren aan de nationale economie en hebben 
zij hun productiviteit kunnen verhogen. 
 
Dit onderzoek geeft aanleiding tot aanpassing van het op basis van de bestaande literatuur 
opgesteldeconceptuele model. Zo moet het effect van het gedrag van de overheid op de 
verwezenlijking van de doelstellingen uit de ondernemings- en investeringsplannen aan het 
model worden toegevoegd. Informatie hierover is van belang om te bepalen of alle betrokken 
partijen aan hun verplichtingen hebben voldaan. De rol van de overheid na de privatisering dient 
nader te worden onderzocht. Vooral de vraag hoe de overheid een meer faciliterende rol kan 
ontwikkelen en ondersteunende diensten kan bieden aan de geprivatiseerde ondernemingen 
verdient aandacht. Ook is aandacht nodig voor het opstellen van eenvoudige regelingen en stabiel 
overheidsbeleid. Voorts speelt de beschikbaarheid van gekwalificeerde arbeidskrachten een 
belangrijke rol. De rol van informele controls en de invloed van familieleden zijn belangrijke 
thema’s in toekomstig onderzoek naar MCS-veranderingen na privatisering. Samenwerking met 
buitenlandse multinationale ondernemingen, waardoor toegang wordt verkregen tot kennis en 
ervaring van deze ondernemingen, is een belangrijke factor die nader onderzoek verdient. 
 
Aandacht voor kwaliteit, klanttevredenheid en niet-financiële prestatie-informatie blijkt erg 
waardevol bij de onderzochte cases. Verder heeft aandacht voor motivatie, scholing en betaling 
van medewerkers aanmerkelijke positieve effecten op het gedrag van de werknemers. 
Ondernemingen in ontwikkelingslanden zouden hieraan expliciete aandacht moeten besteden. 
Verder bevelen we aan dat IMA en AW&LF hun kosteninformatiesysteem aan een nadere 
analyse onderwerpen om op die manier tot verdere kostenreductie te komen. Deze 
ondernemingen moeten investeren in computers en in informatiesystemen. De verbetering van het 
MCS en de scholing van de managers is dringend gewenst bij IMA en AW&LF. 
